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ABSTRACT 
Towa~ds establishing an epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and 
info~mation science. 
A~chie Leona~d Dick 




This study examines the need fo~ and value of a theo~y of 
knowledge fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science that would account 
fo~ the 'Ways in which given phi losophica 1 assumptions lead ·to 
ce~tain modes of p~ofessional p~actice and styles of academic 
~esea~ch. Since given theo~etical standpoints influence the 
natu~e of lib~a~y p~actice and tend to st~uctu~e the way in which 
l~b~a~y and info~mation science ~esea~ch is conducted, this 
investigation focuses on an analysis of the fundamental 
conceptions of knowledge, info~mation, t~uth and ~eality in the 
context of the unique complex of functions of this p~ofession. 
The main method applied in this study is a ~ep~esentative 
consultation and ~eview of the lite~atu~es of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science, and of a few cognate o~ classical fields of 
study. A special focus is the examination and analysis of the 
w~itings of mo~e than 40 selected lib~a~y and info~mation science 
theo~ists, as well as those of non-lib~a~ians. The 
inductively-de~ived ~esults of this examination a~e ~eflected in 
analytical typologies. The holistic intellectual t~adition that 
unde~lies the_p~esumed continuities and commonalities in the 
typologies is developed as a f~amewo~k fo~ developing suitable 
c~ite~ia to establish and evaluate an app~op~iate epistemological 
position fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science. 
An epistemological position called holistic pe~spectivism is 
p~oposed as one which satisfies the postulated c~ite~ia. A 
g~aphic model of this position is explained as a means of 
demonst~ating the application of holistic pe~spectivism in given 
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It is unclear from the professional literature, and from 
general discussions concerning the theoretical development and 
professional practice of library and information science, whether 
there is sufficient consensus on the major philosophical issues 
to enhance and facilitate an understanding of the intermediary 
roles that librarians play in the rendering of 
information service. 
library and 
Such service, insofar as it encompasses every function and 
subfunction within the generally acknowledged complex of library 
and information science functions, emanates from and is a 
reflection of philosophical assumptions that typify the modes 
(levels and dimensions) of knowing of practising librarians and 
information workers. Moreover, underlying philosophical 
standpoints ·do influence the ways in which research is conducted 
and the ~ariety of modes of professional practice, and hence 
impinges upon the nature and quality of library and information 
service to users. An investigation into the relationship between 
the epistemological views and the practices of teachers, for 
example, has suggested that an understanding of their theories of 
knowledge provides significant insight into their professional 
roles as educators (Young, 1985). 
Although a similar investigation has not yet been undertaken 
in the field of library and information science to the knowledge 
of the researcher, there have been a number of speculative, 
1 
theoretical and on the whole fragmented explorations that have 
attempted an exposition of the predominant intellectual 
traditions underpinning library and information science theory. 
Such explorations have contributed to creating a critical 
awareness of the relation between thought and action in this 
profession. 
The value of this study to the theoretical foundations of 
library and information science and consequently of its ultimate 
practical utility are viewed as a major motivating factor in 
considering the investigation. It is envisaged that a clearly 
articulated epistemological position will contribute with 
firmer conviction and consensus support - to the resolution of 
numerous perennial debates on professional issues of both major 
and m£nor import. An epistemological framework would contribute 
\ 
to establishing more coherently the identity of this professional 
discipline (Christ, 1972: 22). It would provide a context for a 
more informed understanding. of such matters as the individual 
user's acquisition of knowledge from the content of material in 
both fiction and non-fiction categories held in librar~es; an 
exposition of the role of the librarian as an intermediary and 
as a researcher in this process; and the provision of incisive 
analyses of profession-specific key concepts such as information, 
knowledge, truth or ultimate reality in the context of library 
and information science. It would also propose a sensible 
theoretical basis for discussions concerning a. code .of 
professional ethics, mission statements and curriculum-
development proposals - matters which are often left unresolved 
2 
because of inner discords resulting from an inadequate 
understanding as to the true or most appropriate epistemological 
position for library and information science. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Such absence of agreement regarding fundamental aspects of 
library and information work manifests itself, for example, in 
the following difficulties, viz: 
(a) the lack of a logically tenable definition of the field: 
Having analyzed over 1 500 definitions of library and information 
science, Schrader concluded in a doctoral dissertation that the 
extant definitions in the professional literature reveal .. 
confusion, disagreement, contradiction, and inconsistency" (1984: 
59) • In an earlier doctoral study by Meijer that culminates in a 
well-substantiated proposed definition of librarianship, the 
logical inadequacies of existing definitions are exposed equally 
convincingly (1978). The work of these two scholars and that of 
others are analyzed in greater detail in this study. 
(b) the diversity of opinion prevailing in the professional 
literature concerning the relationship between "library science" 
and "information science": Library science and information 
science have been referred to inter alia as "intellectual 
competitors" and "rival traditions" (Schrader, 1984: · 59-60), and 
the literature reveals several propositions as to the-conjunction 
or disjunction of these two presumed interdependent or 
full-fledged disciplines and professions. The ambivalence 
surrounding the relationship between library science and 
3 
information science has sharpened the focus on the problem of the 
identity of this field of study. According to Wilson, the 
equivocal situation has contributed to the drastic closure of a 
number of library schools in the USA (1988: 82); and 
(c) the divergence of perception of the meanings of key 
terms such as information and knowledge which are of primary 
importance to the conceptual status of library and information 
science: It would appear, for example, · that the feature most 
common to attempts at defining information as a key concept and 
term iri the professional activity and disciplinary basis of 
library and information science is that of lack of agreement (cf 
for example Wellisch, 1972; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983; Meijer et 
1988; . Yuexiao, 1988). The prevalence of confusion in the 
many attempts at definitions of information has led to doubt as 
to whether consensual agreement is possible or likely to be 
reached at all until there is complete epistemological accord 
(Kesting, 1977: 164). Similar difficulties have complicated the 
definition and an adequate understanding of the nature of 
knowledge in library and information science. 
The problem that presents itself is not that no views have 
been expressed on the above-mentioned issues, but that these 
views represent, at a more fundamental level, an intellectual 
impasse emanating from conflicting philosophical assumptions. An 
explication of these philosophical assumptions may not only 
facilitate theoretical development but produce a more critical 
awareness of the ways that professional practices are influenced 
by these presuppositions. 
4 
1.3 Points of departure 
After due consideration of the problem, as outlined above, 
the following informal assumptions suggest themselves for further 
examination: 
(a) it is desirable for a profession with a well-developed 
institutional infrastructure of practice, education, 
training and research to explore its dominant 
epistemological positions, and to identify an appropriate 
one; 
(b) provisional reading suggests that there are, as yet, no 
commonly available statements in this field that clearly 
articulate an appropriate epistemological position for 
library and information science; 
(c) it is hoped that a set of criteria for establishing and 
evaluating such a position may be generated from an analysis 
of the epistemology-related views of selected library and 
inf.ormation science theorists; 
important that a search 
epistemological position 
science which satisfies the 




be made for an 
for library and 
proposed criteria; 
(e) a compelling epistemological position may contribute 
significantly to the resolution of the debates and 
difficulties referred to above, and hence benefit library 
and information science both theoretically and practically. 
1.4 Method 
In view of its essentially exploratory research goal 
(Mouton, 1990: 43)' this thesis is viewed as a preliminary 
investigation which may lend support to a more structured study, 
and in a more directly applicable sense as an attempt to gain new 
insights into epistemological positions in the professional 
discipline of library and information science which would 
beneficially inform the central concepts and constructs. 
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For these reasons, the main method applied in this study is 
a representative consultation and review of the literatures of 
libra~y and information science and those of other fields of 
study cognate to this field. In pursuit of the goal to maximize 
validity and to maintain the highest level of objectivity, there 
will be a concerted effort to allow the examined literature as 
far as possible to speak for itself. This will apply to the 
examination of conceptions of epistemology, the epistemological 
positions in selected fields of study cognate to library and 
information science, perceptions on information, knowledge and 
library and information science, as well as of the several 
contributions to the development of an epistemological 
for library and information science. 
position 
A special focus of this study will be to examine and to 
analyze the views of selected library and information science 
theorists (the perceptions of a few non-librarians will also be 
included in view of the manifest value of their original and 
relevant insights). Inferences will be drawn from these writings 
in an inductive manner and displayed in typologies to highlight 
major aspects of underlying theoretical notions. It is envisaged 
that the results of these inductively-derived inferences will be 
reflected in a proposed theoretical model. A number of perceived 
applications of this model will be identified and examined as 
associated areas for further more incisive research. 
6 
1.5 Demarcation of the focus of the study 
1.5.1 Universal principles 
This study concentrates on the search for global/universal 
theoretical principles that are applicable to this professional 
discipline as a whole rather than on the self-imposed limitations 
of: (a) individual library prototypes (such as public, national, 
academic, specialized and school libraries) and (b) specific 
regions/national boundaries, etc. The availability of such 
"linking" mechanisms as inter-library lending, computer-based 
networks and resource-sharing imply that no individual library is 
isolated, and that libraries/information centres collectively 
constitute a "global village" of recorded knowledge sources, and 
users in quest of their content . The consideration of a general 
framework of thought is hence expected to be profitable to the 
broadest area of application. 
1.5.2 Geographical delimitation 
In respect of the professional literature of library and 
information science, journals and monographs in the English 
language reflecting the Anglo-American tradition were scanned 
' thoroughly. Relevant material from the USA, Canada, South 
Africa, Great Britain and Western Europe received the most 
comprehensive and representative treatment. To a lesser extent, 
journals and monographs emanating from the old Eastern Bloc and 
South America were scanned and selected for potential 




sour-ces in the Afr-ikaans language wer-e also 
and wher-e cr-ucial quotations ar-e cited a fr-ee 
r-ender-ing in English is added. 
1.5.3 Chr-onological delimitation and ar-r-angement 
The liter-atur-e which has been consulted r-eflect ideas and 
opinions expr-essed in the twentieth centur-y, and as far- as 
possible in the case of contr-ibutions by libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science theor-ists (and those of non-libr-ar-ians) a chr-onological 
method of ar-r-angement is applied as a means of ensur-ing that the 
possibility of influence of the ideas of one pr-oponent upon 
another- will be detected, and of establishing whether-
clear-ly-discer-nible patter-ns of cumulative thought on the subject 
will emer-ge. 
1.6 Qualifications 
1.6.1 Usage of the phr-ase "libr-ar-y and infor-mation science" 
Although the focus of this investigation is on pr-ofessional 
pr-actice and r-esear-ch, ie the entir-e complex of activities 
encompassed within the domain of what may be tr-aditionally 
r-efer-r-ed to as "libr-ar-ianship", the pr-efer-r-ed ter-m applied 
consistently her-e is that of "libr-ar-y and infor-mation science". 
Cer-tain individual libr-ar-y theor-ists maintain clear- views of the 
identity of this pr-ofessional discipline, of its disciplinar-y 
domain, and of the natur-e of its r-elation with infor-mation 
science (cf inter- alia Meijer-, 1978: 52; Sher-a, 1983: 387; 
Wr-ight, 1983: 17). However-, the issue may r-ightly be claimed to 
r-emain inconclusive at this stage. Mor-eover-, this study has as 
8 
one of its aims the enhancement of an understanding of this 
dilemma (cf 1.1 & 1.2). The appellation "library and information 
science" is selected on the grounds that it appears to be: (a) 
the most representative in the current professional literature, 
and (b) neutral in respect of the avoidance of a one-sided 
emphasis on either "library science" or "information science". 
The term "librarian" is also used instead of the more rigid 
and cumbersome compound "librarian and information worker", 
except in contexts where the latter phrase is warranted. 
1.6.2 Repetition 
Certain concepts, phrases and arguments are repeated 
throughout the study in order to highlight its central ideas and 
to reinforce the key propositions that are postulated for 
critical consideration. However, an attempt is made to balance 
repetition as a strategic technique on the one hand with 
repetition as a "nuisance factor" on the other with the aid of a 
network of cross-references. In this manner it becomes more 
effective to integrate arguments, to identify key concepts and 
issues, and to link brief statements with those more fully 
elaborated elsewhere in the study. 
1.6.3 Applied nature of the study 
This study has an applied focus and is different from the 
classical philosophical search for an understanding of the nature 
of human knowledge in general, although knowledge of 
9 
epistemological positions in va~ious disciplines must be 
wa~~anted in the light of ~esea~ch methods whose validity ~ests 
on gene~ally acceptable epistemological assumptions. 
1.7 Associated a~eas fo~ ~esea~ch 
One way of studying the p~evailing epistemologies in the 
field of lib~a~y and irifo~mation science would be to focus on 
"epistemologies-in-action", ie the epistemic p~actices of 
lib~a~ians, in making thei~ own validity judgements in, fo~ 
example, collection development, management, etc. This would 
entail an empi~ical study involving the identification of 
dominant epistemologies th~ough a data-gathe~ing method such as, 
eg the Ross Epistemology Invento~y (Ross, 1970). Howeve~, this 
study focuses on explo~ato~y conceptual ~esea~ch as a necessa~y 
p~e~equisite fo~ the design of a sounde~ empi~ical investigation 
in a futu~e study. 
1.7.1 Special applications 
The model of an app~op~iate epistemological position fo~ 
lib~a~y and info~mation science may be tested mo~e ~igo~ously in 
specific contexts such as, fo~ example, in an individual type of 
lib~a~y o~ in a given p~ofessional function such as collection 
development. A numbe~ of possible a~eas of application will be 
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2 Explanations of epistemology and the major epistemological 
positions, rationalism and empiricism 
2.1 Conceptions of epistemology 
Definitions of epistemology reflect little significant 
variation in essence. For example, the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
defines epistemology succinctly as: 
"The theory or science of the method or grounds of 
knowledge" (1965: 624). 






branch of philosophy which is concerned with 
and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions 
and the general reliability of claims to 
( 1967: 9) . 
Coffey, a philosophy scholar of repute, in turn, affirmed several 
decades earlier that epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, 
constitutes: 
" the philosophical investigation of human knowledge 
itself, from the standpoint of the certitude, validity, 
or truth-value of this knowledge" (1917: 1). 
Hence, in definitions emanating from the subdivisions of 
"formal" philosophy, epistemology is viewed as a branch of 
philosophy which focuses on human knowledge, that assesses the 
validity thereof and investigates the methods by which it is 
acquired (cf 2.5). Epistemology is concerned with a general 
treatment of the nature of human knowledge as distinct from that 
of particular cognitive categories of knowledge, such as, for 
example, scientific knowledge or religious knowledge. (It should 
12 
be noted, however, that epistemology does connote the "philosophy 
of science" in continental-European philosophy (Aaron, 1979: 
601)). 
In addition to the wider focus of epistemology on the 
treatment of human knowledge in general, a narrower "applied" 
focus within professional and disciplinary contexts is emerging 
as researchers and practitioners in different fields of study are 
beginning to ,investigate the epistemological assumptions 
their research methodologies and professional underlying 
practices. This feature is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. Moreover, whereas traditional approaches to 
epistemology have tended to focus predominantly on the human 
knowledge of the individual, recent studies suggest a growing 
interest in epistemological issues surrounding "social systems of 
science, learning and culture". These studies have culminated in 
a division of epistemology into individual epistemology and 
social epistemology (Goldman, 1986: 1; cf Shera's notion of 
social epistemology-5.5). While the differences (as well as the 
'similarities and relations) between individual epistemology and 
social epistemology remain unclear, what is certainly manifest is 
the attempt to broaden the traditional scope of epistemological 
studies to include an awareness of its social aspects and its 
application in social contexts, such as, for example, those of 
academic research and professional practice (cf 3.3-3.5). 
13 
2.2 Epistemology and logic 
A comparison with logic evinces a clearer understanding of 
what is meant by the term epistemology. The association of 
epistemology with logic underlines the normative character of the 
former, as Voneche affirms: 
" the goal of epistemology has traditionally been 
conceived as a matter of logic ..• of abstract norms ... 
as a normative discipline ... " (1985: 1997). 
How does epistemology serve the interest of logic? Coffey 
proposed authoritatively some 74 years ago that: 
"Logic as a practical science brings to ligt'lt from an 
analysis of our thought processes certain normative 
principles which guide these processes towards the 
discovery of truth. In doing so it makes a number of 
assumptions, as, for instance, that by thinking 
correctly, ie, by judging and reasoning according to 
logical canons, the attainment of truth and certitude 
is possible. All such assumptions it devolves on 
epistemology to justify" (1917: 2). 
This claim by Coffey is still valid today, namely, that 
epistemology ought to validate those assumptions that make 
possible the attainment of truth through logical reasoning. 
Coffey infers from this that the aim of epistemology, unlike that 
of other departments of philosophy, is not to extend our 
knowledge but rather to perfect our acquired knowledge by 
teaching us what it is to know (1917: 2; cf 2.4). 
2.3 Epistemology and ontology 
The relation between epistemology and ontology appears to be 
one of mutual interdependence, that is, the one depends upon and 
is incomplete without, the other. This relation should be viewed 
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in the light of the erstwhile traditional inclusion of both 
within the broader framework of general metaphysics (Coffey, 
1914: 23). 
All metaphysics, as the study of the nature of being, aims 
at arriving at a rational and> systematic comprehension and 
exposition of reality (Aaron, 1986: 601). This is an ideal 
which the finite mind of man can only approximate as is evident 
from all recorded human knowledge. Hence a distinction between 
human knowledge and divin~ or infinite knowledge is subsumed. 
This capacity for legitimate but approximate understanding by 
mankind will remain unduly limited and unsubstantiated if it were 
unaccompanied by an investigation into the nature of "knowing" 
itself (Coffey, 1917: 4) • For this reason, the theory of being 
(ontology) has for its necessary counterpart and condition the 
theory of knowing (epistemology). 
The same position obtains with respect to epistemology. 
Since all knowing involves a knowing "subject", or, mind 
(subjectum cognoscens) and a known "object", or, reality 
(objectum cognitum), the two lines of investigation deal with two 
aspects of the same domain, "this domain being the sum-total of 
human experience, or reality as revealed in and through this 
experience of cognitive interchange" (Coffey, 1917: 4) • This 
interrelationship between ontology and epistemology emerges more 
clearly in the affirmation that epistemological positions such as 
; 
rationalism and empiricism are conjoined with given metaphysical 
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conceptions of .rea 1 i ty, ie, conceptions as to whether reality is 
' 
One (monistic) or Many (pluralistic) (cf William James' view in 
2.5, & 7.1). 
In the field of library and information science, Harris (cf 
5.26} and Bekker (cf 5.24) have made exploratory attempts to 
demonstrate the interrelationships between ontological and 
epistemological aspects of library and information work. The 
claims of a necessary interrelatedness of conceptions of 
knowledge and conceptions of reality are pursued in the context 
of library and information science in Chapter 7 (cf 7.6). 
2.4 Epistemology, psychology and cognition 
When epistemology is juxtaposed with psychology, distinctive 
standpoints are discernible. Coffey contends that the cognitive 
activities of the mind, when considered as mental processes or 
events, belong to the domain of psychology; but when viewed as 
approaches to the apprehension of truth (or reality} they belong 
to epistemology. He asserts that: 
" ... while as mental events they (cognitive activities) 
arise and develop according to laws of mental 
association and conjunction which it is the duty of 
psychology to elucidate, they have another and distinct 
aspect in that they claim to apprehend truth. It is 
precisely this claim which epistemology has to 
investigate" ( 1917: 3). 
For Coffey, then, it is the notion of truth or valid 
apprehension of reality that becomes the criterion for 
establishing a proper demarcation between epistemology and 
psychology. Other writers seek to avoid the application of this 
very distinguishing procedure. Kornblith, for instance, 
distinguishes epistemology from cognition by confining the former 
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to the question of how we ought to arrive at our beliefs, and the 
latter to the question of how we actually arrive at such beliefs 
(1985: 3) • Belief, for her, implies an assumption of having 
attained a state of apprehending truth and/or reality (cf 4.3.2 
for knowledge as justified true belief). 
At this point an exposition of the concept and term 
"cognition" is called for. The Encyclopaedia-Britannica defines 
cognition as: 
" the process involved in knowing, or the act of 
knowing, which in its completeness includes awareness 
and judgment" (1979: 1042). 
The Encyclopedia of psychology offers a more comprehensive 
definition, viz: 
"Cognition is a general term or a generic term used to 
designate all processes involved in knowing ... It 
comprises all mental activity or states involved in 
knowing and the mind's functioning, and includes 
perception, attention, memory, imagery, language 
functions, developmental processes, problem solving, 
and the are'a of artificial intelligence ... " (1984: 
228). 
The two definitions display a common focus on the act or process 
of knowing and its analysis into separate components and 
manifests no significant concern with the validation process 
surrounding the knowledge act or process. In contrast to 
epistemology, psychology (and cognitive science in particular) 
emphasizes a non-normative, truth-neutral description of the act 
or process of knowing. Hence, the traditional distinction 
between epistemology and psychology has collapsed in recent 
attempts to "naturalize" epistemology. 
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2.4.1 Attempts at naturalizing epistemology 
Quine has argued that epistemology should be naturalized and 
would in that event become a branch of psychology (1969: 68). 
In an attempt to explain the meaning of this proposition, Annis 
contends that the adoption of a naturalistic approach involves a 
description of "a group's inference habits, patterns of 
reasoning, the conditions under which beliefs of a certain sort 
are acquired, and their epistemic goals" (1982: 204). 
Kornblith, in turn, asserts that the traditional dichotomy 
between epistemology and psychology presupposed, fallaciously, a 
' 
division between the epistemological concern with the normative 
issue of how we ought to arrive at our beliefs on the one hand 
and the cognitive concern with the descriptive issue of how we 
actually arrive at our beliefs on the other (1985: 3). The aim 
of naturalistic epistemology is to merge these two artificially 
demarcated issues (ibid.). 
Scientific explanation and the scientific method (associated 
more narrowly with the natural sciences and technology) are among 
the central features of naturalism. (Naturalism, which 
incorporates materialism, maintains the philosophical view that 
the natural world is the whole of reality attainable by man and 
bases explanations for man's existence and behaviour on the 
physical world as distinct from cosmological, religious or 
supernatural views of the world (Danto, 1967: 448; Wilshire, 
1979: 16; cf 7.1-7.5)). This means that naturalistic 
epistemology seeks to apply the procedures of the scientific 
method to cognitive functions (cf last definition in 2.4). 
Moreover, one of the tenets of naturalism is that "the only mode 
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of experience which is cognitive is scientific, and no cognitive 
claims are to be accepted if they are based on other experiential 
modes" (Dante, 1967: 450). 
The suitability of the scientific method for the 
comprehensive exploration and resolution of 
epistemological issues remains an unresolved 
all or even some 
issue. Annis 
submits that one criticism of naturalism is that it "ignores the 
critical-normative aspect of epistemology", and that this leaves 
us with "simply describing epistemic practices instead of 
evaluating them" (1982: 205). Kornblith also notes that 
naturalistic epistemologists differ among themselves as to the 
level of directness of the bearing that psychology (and hence, 
the empirical sciences in general) should have on epistemology 
(1985: 4). 
Debates and differences regarding the naturalization of 
epistemology do not however provide a suitable background for 
distinguishing genuine knowledge claims from invalid ones, since 
cognition, as it is approached in psychology, appears to be 
inadequate in its -treatment of issues of an epistemological 
nature, such as, for example, conceptions of truth and reality 
(cf 6.3 & 7.1-7.5). The criteria for such a distinction are 
suggested, though not categorically, in the methods by which we 
come to know, and how this knowledge may be verified. The 
several modes of knowing that exist are all related, to a lesser 
or greater degree, to two major theories regarding respectively 
the source of and the test of the validity of knowledge, 
those of rationalism and empiricism. 
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viz, 
2.5 The ~ationalism/empi~icism debate 
Histo~ically, and especially since the Eu~opean 
Enlightenment, two dominant app~oaches to the acquisition of 
knowledge have been those inhe~ent in the methodologies and 
assumptions of ~ationalism and empi~icism (Williams, 1967: 71; 
cf also McGa~~y·s obse~vation-5.23). In its simplest essence, 
Ca~tesian ~ationalism (cf Rene Desca~tes, 1596-1650) holds that 
~eason is the sole sou~ce of all knowledge while Lockean 
empi~icism (cf John Locke, 1632-1704), in ~efuting this claim, 
asse~ts that all such autho~ity is contingent upon the condition 
of expe~ience giving ~ise to the empi~ical method of acqui~!ng 
knowledge th~ough obse~vation and expe~iment (Williams, 1967: 
73). 
In a fu~the~ attempt to emphasize the diffe~ences between 
~ationalism and empi~icism, and to p~ovide evidence of the 
inte~~elationship_ of epistemology and metaphysics (cf 2.3), 
William James (1842-1910) makes the telling point that 
~ationalism is monistic while empi~icism is plu~alistic (1911: 
9). By this, James implies that the ~ationalist begins with the 
"whole" and the unive~sal and unites things, whe~eas the 
empi~icist begins with the pa~t and conve~ts the "whole" into a 
collection of sepa~ate things (cf Monism, plu~alism and 
holism-7.1-7.7). James claims fu~the~ that human tempe~amen~ 
plays a st~onge~ ~ole than any objective p~emises in the choice 
by p~ofessional philosophe~s between ~atiorialism and empi~icism 
(1911: 6-7). James· own p~agmatist philosophical position has 
been cha~acte~ized as plu~alistic (and hence empi~ically 
o~iented) ~athe~ than monistic (Wahl, 1925: 134-5 ; c f 7 . 1 ) . 
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A classical debate between rationalism and empiricism 
revolves around the question of whether the mind possesses innate 
ideas, or whether it is a tabula rasa with no pre-existing 
cognitive material. There is agreement, from a logical point of 
view, that many general theoretical concepts of mathematics and 
the natural sciences cannot be totally reduced to empirical 
concepts. However, this does not mean that the rationalist view 
of these concepts is unconditionally acceptable. A concept such 
as "mass", for example, is more than its observable value and is 
part of a model of reality used to impose structure on it 
(Williams, 1967: 75) • Rationalism holds a realistic view of 
such concepts and their relation to reality which offer a 
representation of the world. Williams considers: 
" that there is a unique set of concepts and a 
unique set of propositions employing these concepts 
that adequately express the nature of the world, and 
that these propositions form a system and could ideally 
be recognized as a set .of necessary truths" (1967: 
73). 
This rationalist view leads to the general question as to 
how anyone can come to know this "uniquely correct representation 
of the world", and to two more specific questions, namely, "what, 
in general, is the guarantee that knowledge of the world is 
possible?" and, "how can any individual tell in a particular case 
whether he·has hit on some genuine piece of knowledge?" (ibid.). 
Different rationalist philosoph~rs approach these questions in 
different ways, influenced in one way or another by the Cartesian 
tradition of "clear and distinct perception" of the intellect as 
a test of genuine knowledge (Williams, 1967: 75) • 
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Empi~icist philosophe~s a~e simila~ly divided on the cent~al 
tenets of empi~icism. This has ~esulted in: 
" a gene~al empi~icist position that all knowledge 
is de~ived f~om expe~ience on the g~ounds eithe~ that: 
(a) all that we know is di~ectly conce~ned with sense 
expe~ience o~ de~ived f~om it by st~ictly expe~iential 
means, that is, lea~ning, association, o~ inductive 
infe~ence; o~ (b) all that we know is dependent on 
sense expe~ience in that all the mate~ials fo~ 
knowledge a~e di~ectly de~ived f~om sense expe~ience; 
o~ (c) all that we know is dependent on sense 
pe~ception in that even though we can know some things 
a p~io~i, this is only in a ~elative sense, since the 
having of expe~ience is a gene~al p~e-condition fo~ 
being said to have such knowledge" (Acton, 1967: 499). 
The majo~ empi~icist philosophe~s hold one o~ mo~e of these 
positions, o~ va~iations the~eof. 
Whethe~ ~ationalism alone, o~ empi~icism alone, can 
gua~antee knowledge is a matte~ of conjectu~e and dispute. In 
this ~ega~d, Acton contends that: 
"It is futile to a~gue whethe~ expe~ience o~ ~eason 
alone can p~ovide p~oof of what we o~dina~ily claim to 
know. No one could have knowledge of the wo~ld unless 
he had expe~iences and could ~eason, but this does not 
mean that eithe~ expe~ience o~ ~eason by themselves 
could p~ovide the kind of absolute ce~tainty which 
would constitute p~oof. No~ is it ~equi~ed that they 
should p~ovide p~oof in o~de~ that knowledge may be 
possible" ( 1967: 505). 
The gene~al view is, then, that human knowledge is dependent on 
both expe~ience and ~eason: expe~ience p~ovides the mate~ial of 
knowledge and ~eason p~ovides the p~inciples fo~ o~de~ing this 
mate~ial (Aa~on, 19.79: 622-3). One thing is ce~tain, howeve~, 
viz, that ~ationalism and empi~icism constitute the two pilla~s 
fo~ any discussion of the possibility, validity and limitations 
of knowledge. 
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in an attempt to ~econcile the 
epistemological dive~gencas, denies any p~io~ity to ~ationalism 
ove~ empi~icism, and vice ve~sa, in the attainment of knowledge. 
Both a~e of equal impo~tance. He a~gues that knowledge of an 
objective wo~ld is only possible if ou~ sense pe~ceptions a~e 
o~ganized within what he calls the pu~e a p~io~i intuitions of 
space and time in te~ms of ~ational p~inciples. The wo~ld of 
I 
senso~y expe~ience would be a confusing "manifold of fluctuating 
sensations without the a p~io~i intuitions of space and time" 
(Kant, 1781: 143). These intuitions and the catego~ies of the 
unde~standing enable us to synthesize ou~ sensations. This 
synthesis is ca~~ied out not by the empi~ical self but by a 
t~anscendental self, of which we know nothing but th~ough which a 
knowledge of the wo~ld is possible (1781: 144; cf Coetzee's 
cont~ibution-5.7). 
Fo~ all the appa~ent diffe~ences that distinguish 
~ationalism f~om empi~icism, both views endo~se a fundamental 
sepa~atibn of the knowe~ (subject) and the known (object), ie, an 
unde~lying dualism that maintains a ~adical disjunction of 
mankind and the envi~onment, and of the mind and the body 
(Ve~sfeld, 1991: 5) • The dualistic app~oach has se~ved as the 
significant pa~t of the philosophical basis of a mechanistic 
conception of the wo~ld. This mechanistic conception dominated 
Weste~n scientific thought f~om the second half of the 
seventeenth centu~y to the end of the nineteenth centu~y (Cap~a, 
1981: 21). Roszak co~~obo~ates this when he ave~s that: 
"Befo~e the seventeenth centu~y was finished, these two 
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the Rationalism of Descartes, the philosophical currents 
Empiricism of Bacon had formed a working alliance to produce 
the intellectual enterprise we call ·science" (1986: 212). 
The rationalist aspect of this mechanistic outlook derives 
from the separation by Rene Descartes (1596-1650) of mind (res 
cogitans) from matter (res extensa) and holds that the world is. 
constituted of entities which exist independently of each other 
(cf 7.3.1). Capra argues that, as a consequence of this 
division, " ... it was believed that the world could be described 
objectively, ie, without ever mentioning the human observer, and 
such an objective description of nature became an ideal of all 
science" (1981: 58). 
The empirical aspect of the mechanistic outlook, developed 
to a large degree by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Galilee 
Galilei (1564-1642), among others, bases the testing of theories 
firmly on experimentation and the evidence of experience. This 
involves the'' ... rigorous, well-targeted interrogation of nature 
by close observation and experimentation", which is undertaken in 
a spirit of" ... total objectivity, avoiding all assumptions and 
presuppositions. It should simply try to see things as they 
really are" (Roszak, 1986: 102). 
The dualistic approach (which separates the knower from the 
object of knowledge) and the mechanistic conception of the world 
that it espouses, has been confronted with a formidable 
challenge, originating remarkably enough, from recent research 
findings ~n several natural sciences, most notably, those in 
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contemporary physics (cf, for example Capra, 1981; Bohm, 1981) 
although the challenge to dualism emanated from several sources 
(Lovejoy, 1955; Capra, 1988; cf 7.1-7.4 for a discussion of this 
issue in several disciplines). A central concern of this 
challenge is the elimination of the dualism of mind and matter 
(or of knower from object of knowledge). Early in the twentieth 
century, findings emerging from investigations into aspects of 
electromagnetism and subatomic physics suggested that there 
appeared to be a significant interrelatedness of mind and matter, 
ie, that human consciousness seemed to play a crucial role in the 
interpretation and understanding of physical reality. These 
findings held significant implications for the long-held 
distinctions between the subject and the object, as maintained in 
dualist approaches to reality (and supported by rationalism and 
empiricism). The :traditional perception of a fundamental 
separation between subject and object was gradually being 
replaced with a view that the subject and the object, as 
components of the knowing process, are dynamically linked with 
each other within a greater whole, and that this holistic 
approach offered deeper insights into an understanding of a 
multidimensional reality (cf Contemporary physics-7.3.1). 
These newer, holistic approaches in physics and other 
natural sciences had already been anticipated, and are echoed, in 
the speculative ideas of several schools of thought in the West 
and in a number of ea~ly Eastern religious philosophies (cf 7.1 & 
7.2). 
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The challenge to epistemological dualism has not led to its 
demise, nor has the mechanistic conception of the world been 
totally discarded. What appears to characterize the intellectual 
scene in the late twentieth ~entury is the recognition of the 
validity of many modes of knowing, each with the potential of 
enriching a fuller understanding and appreciation for the 
fullness of human experience and total human culture (cf for 
example, Kesting's po~ition-5.28.10 & Jung's schema of cogni~ive 
functions-7.4). 
As theories of knowledge, rationalism and empiricism 
represent alternative epistemological positions that appear to 
offer greater insight into the variety of approaches to human 
knowledge when taken as essential components that are dynamically 
linked within a greater whole than if taken separately. The 
emphasis of one at the expense of the other would seem, as a 
necessary requirement, to include certain modes of knowing and to 
exclude others, whereas a recognition of both holds out the 
opportunity for a broader, encompassing view of the rich variety 
of all the forms of manifestation of human knowledge (cf 
Wholeness and fragmentation in conceptions of human 
knowledge-7.4). 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter we noted the key features of the meaning of 
the term epistemology by: 
(a) analyzing a few definitions; 
(b) comparing it with a few closely-allied fields of 
inquiry; and 
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(c) describing the principal themes surrounding the methods 
for acquiring and justifying knowledge (cf 4.3). 
This chapter has revealed a perception of epistemology as 
existing in a state of tension between its traditional 
philosophical context where it plays a normative, regulative 
role, and its modern psychological context where empirical issues 
have led to its assuming a descriptive role (cf 2.4.1). The 
importance of cognitive processes can no longer be ignored in a 
comprehensive discussion of knowledge acquisition. This does not 
however imply that the traditional view of epistemology is no 
longer valid. What needs to be emphasized is that there is no 
single method for acquiring and justifying knowledge that may 
serve as a fault-free basis for all kinds of knowledge claims in 
all fields of inquiry '(cf 2. 5)., 
In the context of library and information science, there 
would seem to be a need to establish the framework for a basis 
for an epistemological position that will recognize all manifest 
modes of knowing which encompass the whole of human knowledge as 
expressed in recorded form (ie, the generic record). 
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Epistemological positions within selected disciplines and 
professions 
3.1 The value of epistemological studies 
Attempts at naturalizing epistemology and dislodging it from 
its traditional place in philosophy (cf 2.4.1) have led to an 
increasing interest by specialized disciplines and professions in 
epistemological issues. Nutter, for example, considers that" ••• 
the first step in theory building is the resolution of basic 
epistemological issues" (1984: 167). This observation of the 
value of epistemology in the contribution towards a sound 
development of theoretical orientations is complemented by the 
perception of the equally significant role that epistemology 
plays in the practical application of theoretical concepts. 
Harding points out, for example, that epistemological choices 
(whether these choices are explicit or implicit) do result in 
differences in the manner in which we practise our professions or 
conduct scientific research. By this he means that the espousal 
of a particular conception of the world tends to incline one to a 
selected mode of practice to the exclusion of other possibilities 
of action (cf 7.3 & 7.4; 1988: 155). 
In the context of disciplinary research, epistemological 
assumptions often determine methodological principles and are 
philosophically more fundamental "(Levison, 1974: ix). This 
means that the mode and manner of investigating phenomena is 
preceded, either deliberately or unconsciously, by what we 
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consider worth looking for, ie, what we consider to be of value 
in a given subject field and will qualify as legitimate knowledge 
in that disciplinary context. 
The perceived significance of these issues is evident from a 
cursory examination of the literatures of a number of specialized 
disciplines and professions that have attempted to elucidate the 
dominant epistemological positions in their respective fields of 
study. For example, Dean 
epistemological positions that 
profession of social work (1989: 
and Fenby have e~plored th~ 
they believe are found in the 
46-54). They contend that 
social work action (clinical action) reflects the philosophical 
assumptions that underlie "methods of knowing" and that, if 
social workers examine the" •.• intellectual traditions of social 
science theory" and the" ... nature of knowledge in social work", 
they will develop an informed perspective and a critical 
awareness of the relation between thought and action in social 
work (1989: 46' 54) . 
In a similar development in the legal profession, Teubner 
has proposed a "constructivist epistemology of law" that attempts 
to delineate the content of the nature of thought processes that 
are dominant in the study and practice of law (1989: 13-27). 
3.2 Rationale for the selection of disciplines and professions 
cognate to library and information science 
Not all of the disciplines and professions that have made 
attempts to identify or develop epistemological positions in 
their fields of study, or that manifest an interest in 
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epistemology-related issues, share sufficient common ground for 
comparison with library and information science to warrant 
inclusion and discussion in this study. The most important 
criterion selected as a means for separating suitable from 
non-suitable examples for more detailed analysis, requires as a 
central concern the professional role of an intermediary in the 
transfer of knowledge. (The term "knowledge" is preferred to that 
of "information" in this study since formal epistemology is 
essentially concerned with the former. Furthermore, the term 
"information" has not yet been demarcated in the context of 
library and information science in a satisfactory manner - cf 4.2 
for an examination of several perceptions of the meaning of this 
te.rm, and 4.3.6 for the conception of knowledge adopted in th{s 
study). This results in a selection of disciplines and 
professions that are cognate to library_ and information science. 
This selection will itself be further limited to those cognate 
disciplines and professions whose literatures reveal a 
satisfactory degree of depth of discussion of epistemological 
aspects. 
The disciplines of (a) education, and (b) communication 
theory (encompassing the field of mass communication - cf 3.3 for 
a justification of its inclusion), appear to meet these 
requirements~ thereby making ·them eminently comparable to library 
and information science. While there are distinctive differences 
between these disciplines, the prospect of their commonalities 
offer an oppo~tunity for discovering insights into the common 
epistemological issues that occupy their theoretical concerns. 
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The most significant of these commonalities is the 
intermediary role of the professional in the transfer or 
distribution of knowledge. McQuail affirms this role as a 
central one in education and communication when he claims that 
"We usually speak of knowledge as the outcome of a communication 
or learning process" (emphasis added; 1983: 51). This role has 
been ack~owledged for a long time as one that also characterizes 
the disseminating function of libraries (cf Meijer's complex of 
functions-5.21). This acknowledgement has come both from: 
(a) librarians, (for example McGarry (cf 5.23)), who 
recognizes at the same time the benefit for librarians of 
examining the area of mass communication, in the claim that 
it will enrich their insights into the social context of 
their function of knowledge transmission (McGarry, 1972: 
11, 127) ; and ' 
(b) researchers into mass communication who describe the 
library as an "alternative mass communication institution" 
which deals with " organization and distribution of 
knowledge a function commonly linked with the ... mass 
media" (emphasis added; Budd, 1987: 133). 
One should add here the observation that this close 
relationship in regard of the knowledge transmission role of 
libraries and mass communication media may produce, in the short 
term, a competitive relationship between them (Orr, 1977: 212). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the three disciplines share an 
intermediary role in the transfer of knowledge, ie, they appear 
to have in common the task of performing a professional function 
of mediation between senders and receivers in the communication 
process, or between seekers of knowledge and records containing 
the desired knowledge. 
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It is possible to extrapolate further similarities and 
differences between these disciplines. For example, in respect 
of education and communication (more especially mass 
communication) there appears to be contact between one sender and 
many receivers simultaneously. This may allow extensive 
influence upon and immediate response from receivers, although 
uniformity of impact cannot be readily assumed. On the other 
hand, library and information work usually involves a one-to-one 
relationship that prompts a much wider variability of response. 
Moreover, the emphasis on the individual user in library and 
information service is a distinctively traditional professional 
feature (cf De Vleeschauwer's individualistic approach-5.3). 
Furthermore, the aim to serve the individual implies 
voluntary participation as distinct from compulsory participation 
in the services that are provided. Libraries and mass 
communication agencies, as institutions created to facilitate the 
distribution of knowledge, differ from education in the sense 
that the individual is more free in the former context to decide 
whether to use libraries or mass media than in the case of formal 
educational activities. Related to this voluntary character is 
the association of library (more specifically, the public 
library) and media use with leisure and free time, and its 
dissociation from work and duty. Moreover, the voluntary nature 
of participation implies that the transfer of knowledge in the 
case of libraries and communication (inclusive of mass 
communication) precludes a planned or systematic effort to select 
certain themes or doctrines for transmission, thereby excluding 
-others. On the other hand, educational activity compels the 
34 
teacher-, as a pedagogue, to II select and synthesise the 
selected" (Kesting, 1985: 170). In its aim to be inclusive in 
r-espect of all legitimate doctr-ines, libr-ar-ians str-ive to become 
"supr-adoctr-inal" or- "tr-ansdogmatic" - a pr-ofessional ethos that 
tr-anscends the legitimate constr-aints of an educational pr-ogr-amme 
(ibid.). 
Whatever- other- differ-ences and similar-ities may featur-e in 
these disciplines, the focus of this study is specifically an 
investigation into the existence of the pr-edominant 
epistemological positions within libr-ar-y and infor-mation science 
as a knowledge-tr-ansmitting pr-ofession. For- this pur-pose, ther-e 
appear-s to be sufficient common gr-ounds for- the compar-ison of the 
nor-mative and functional foundations of libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science with those of education and communication (the latter-
encompassing also mass communication), and hence for- fur-ther-
identification and analysis of the major- epistemological 
positions in these r-espective fields. 
In addition to education and communication, it seems evident 
that r-efer-ence to a classical model, though non-cognate, may well 
benefit this discussion. The classical model selected for- this 
pur-pose is that of the medical pr-ofession. The appr-opr-iateness 
of this selection is based on a number- of consider-ations, among 
which the following ar-e par-amount: 
(a) the pr-ofessional status of 
inter-nationally, and this has been so 
different cultur-es; 
medicine is secur-e 
since antiquity in 
(b) together- with other- classical pr-ofessions such as law 
and theology, it has ser-ved and continues to ser-ve as a 
gener-al r-ole model for- other- pr-ofessions in Wester-n cultur-e. 
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Faculties of medicine (along with those of theology and law) 
were found at the earliest established universities, eg at 
Salerno c 1084 (Wieruszowski, 1966: 76); and 
(c) like library and information science it has a marked 
interdisciplinary basis. 
It should be noted that it is neither possible to comment 
fully on all the epistemological issues raised in the literatures 
of these disciplines, nor is it within the scope of this study to 
attempt a definitive probe. It will be regarded as being 
sufficient for the task at hand to consider the major 
evolutionary trends of epistemological thought in these 
disciplines and professions. 
The classical model of medicine receives priority in the 
order of discussion that follows below. Of the cognate 
disciplines, education is given precedence over 
communication/mass communication for no specific reason since 
both are perceived to be concerned essentially with the 
transmission of knowledge. 
3.3 Epistemological positions in medicine 
A philosopher of medicine has noted that the" •.. biomedical 
revolution of the past two decades has raised fundamental 
questions concerning the conceptual foundations of medicine" 
(Lamb, 1986:. ix). He argues that, as medicine advances into new 
areas, greater conceptual uncertainty has become evident. What 
is required, he claims, is II more discussion of the 
metaphysical and epistemological aspects of medicine" (ibid.). 
The emphasis on epistemological aspects of medicine, in 
particular, derives from the perception that the theory of 
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knowledge lies at the heart of medical research and treatment, 
and that differences between underlying philosophical standpoints 
actually lead to different forms of treatment. Ledermann, for 
example, contends that although doctors are generally unaware 
that they carry on their practice employing a general theory or 
philosophy, " there is indeed a philosophy underlying every 
medical practice, [and] moreover that there are a variety of 
philosophies, concurrently held in the medical profession, and 
that differences between them lead to different forms of 
treatment" (1986: xix). 
The "variety of philosophies" referred to above has 
developed historically in medical theory and practice, and the 
historical development of Western medical science shares many of 
the characteristics of the history of natural science in the West 
(cf 7.3). Briskman underscores this parallel development when he 
explains that - from the point of view of truth - the demarcation 
of Western medical science from the claims of witchcraft, faith 
healing, Christian science and other informal modes of healing 
such as those practised, for example, by Paracelsus (1493-1541) 
was initially that the former was preferred to the latter because 
of the generally accepted philosophical tradition of inductivism 
( 1988: 3) • 
It was the application of the inductive method, based inter 
(1561-1626; cf 2.5), that alia on the ideas of Francis Bacon 
dist{nguished genuine empirical science from the traditions of 
pseudo-empirical superstition in Western culture. The inductive. 
method requires that the "neutral" scientist approaches the world 
37 
in an unprejudiced manner, making only empirical observations. 
Only after he/she has collected a sufficient body of unprejudiced 
observations does he/she begin to try, using these observations, 
to discover their underlying causes by inferring them from the 
observatibnal evidence itself (Briskman, 1988: .5). On the other 
hand, the method of superstition, which includes witchcraft, 
scientology and so on, begins with ideas (conjectures about the 
causes) and then proceeds to find empirical or observational 
evidence to support or "confirm" preconceived ideas (ibid.). The 
argument is that genuine empirical science is based on the 
application of the inductive method and is genuinely supported by 
observations and experiments, and thus the validity of its 
results is unequivocal and beyond dispute. 
The much later critique of the inductive method and the 
subsequent recognition of its shortcomings led eventually to the 
modified view advocated by Popper. Popper proposed a 
non-inductivist solution to the demarcation of genuine empirical 
science from pseudo-empirical superstition, viz that it is not 




but that, since these theories are open to 
and empirical criticism and hence to possible 
being falsifiable), they deserve to uphold a 
claim to truth in approximate terms (Briskman, 1988: 15; cf 
Brookes' position for the application of Popper's ideas to 
information science theory-5.10). 
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Briskman's leading argument is that, by and large, Western 
medical science has followed the development of the natural 
sciences in the Western world. For this reason, the approach 
described above is also characterized in medical science research 
theory as· a mechanistic or mechanisti~-materialist one (cf 2.5, 
\ 
3.3.1 & 7.3.1 for fuller elaborations of this approach) that 
maintains the fundamental separation or Cartesian dualism of 
knower from known (Ledermann, 1986: Xi X) • 
The Western-based epistemological dualities such as 
theory/practice, subjective/objective, basic/applied and so 
forth, are not encountered in traditional Chinese medical theory 
for example. As Farquhar points out, the reason for this is 
that Chinese scientific and philosophical discourses have been 
II characterized by forms of holistic participation in which no 
isolated observer standpoint has been fostered" (1987: 1013). 
The holistic aspect of traditional Chinese medical knowledge is 
' 
affirmed in the claim that: 
"Insofar as we can legitimately speak of knowledge in 
Chinese medicine ••. it must be seen as a complex 
achievement incorporating at least relationships to 
others (patients, teachers, students) and to the past" 
(1987: 1015). 
The interrelatedness of knowledge in this conception is also 
echoed in the approach in Western medical science that is 
described as holistic, following the use of Smuts' term 
(Ledermann, 1986: xxi; cf 7.1.1 for Smuts' original conception 
of holism). In medical science, the holistic approach starts 
from the whole person (cf 3.3.2) as distinct from the mechanistic 
approach which starts from the isolated individual part. The 
holistic approach in contemporary Western medical science also 
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received impetus from developments in the natural sciences, 
specifically in the areas of physics and biology. Research in 
these fields of study have sought 
\ 
to overcome the rigid 
separation of the knower and the known, as espoused in the 
mechanistic approach, and has acknowledged the crucial ~ole that 
human consciousness plays in scientific research and experiment 
(cf Contemporary physics and biology-7.3.1 & 7.3.2). 
As tools for gaining knowledge, these polar opposites in the 
philosophy of medicine (viz mechanism and holism) provide a 
conceptual framework which facilitates an exploration of the 
major epistemological positions that have affected and are still 
affecting medical theory and practice (Ledermann, 1986: xi). 
3.3.1 The mechanistic epistemological position 
The emergence of the mechanistic position should be viewed 
against the background of the early attempts to assimilate into 
medicine the spiritualist element of religious consciousness 
(Laura, 1985: 30). For example, the so-called vitalist school 
of thought held that there was a teleological principle present 
in living organisms, a "1 i fe-force" (an Aristotelian' "entelechy" 
- after the Greek en-telei-ekhe, meaning "to be in perfection") 
that played a role in the workings of the human body independent 
of the material components which constituted it (Driesch, 1914: 
19-26; cf also this theme in the context of holistic ideas in 
Biology-7.3.2). In contrast to the exponents of thi~ school of 
thought, the mechanists affirm the machine-like nature of the 
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human organism, thereby " fostering the working hypothesis 
that all illness was a result simply of ~ malfunction in the 
machine's parts" (Laura, 1985: 30). 
The original influence of the supernatural on the cause of 
illness diminished considerably with the articulation of the 
Hippocratic philosophy of medicine as set forth in the 
Hippocratic collection of writings, known as the Hippocratic 
Corpus (Lloyd, 1978) . This collection, which is broadly 
independent of Hippocrates the man, includes the contributions of 
a large number of medical writers, belonging to different schools 
and representing in many cases quite opposed viewpoints, and 
advocates a natural (ie, empirical) rather than a supernatural 
understanding of the human organism. It should be added that 
Hippocrates' (c 460-357 BC) own writings revealed the role played 
by the environment and the interdependence of the mind and the 
body in the preservation of health and the elimination of 
disease, and that it was the successors of Hippocrates who 
focused upon the mechanistic aspects of the Hippocratic tradition 
(Laura, 1985: 31). It was specifically Galen (cAD 129-99), as 
Hippocrates' "epistemological" successor, who in the second 
century advanced certain of Hippocrates' theories to support a 
characteristically mechanistic outlook (V~nzmer, 1972: 93). 
This mechanistic development of medical science was 
continued in the ninth century by such Arab physicians as 
al-Tabari and Rhazes, and in. the tenth century by Haly Abbas and 
Avicenna (Ali ibn-Sina, 980-1037). Venzmer contends that 
Avicenna's famous book, the Canon ot Medicine, was an explicit 
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attempt. to synthesize the wr-itings of Ar-istotle (384-322 BC) and 
Galen in the ser-vice of a coher-ent mechanist philosophy of 
medicine (1972: 109). 
Dur-ing the Renaissance the mechanistic appr-oach in medical 
science r-e-emer-ged in the wor-k of r-enowned ar-tists and 
scientists, such as Michelangelo (Michelagniolo Buonar-r-oti, 
1475-1564) and Leonar-do da Vinci ( 1452-1519)' who pur-sued 
dissection to achieve a knowledge adequate for- depicting the 
human body in its finest detail, ther-eby contr-ibuting 
inadver-tently to the development of new methods of medical 
r-esear-ch by their- new methods of ar-t (Laur-a, 1985: 32). 
The wor-k of Galilee (1564-1642) gave the mechanistic 
disposition an even str-onger- or-ientation. He held that 
I 
mathematical laws gover-ned the functions of all natur-e, including 
the human body (cf 2.5). Natur-e was to be" .•• under-stood and in 
tur-n controlled by effecting its r-eduction to the basic 
mathematical, or- mor-e pr-ecisely, the geometr-ical rBlations of 
which it was constituted. Medical master-y of the human body was 
simply one aspect of this reduction" (ibid.). This r-eductionist 
element, accor-ding to Laur-a, was eloquently ar-ticulated in the 
philosophy of Galilee's contempor-ar-y, Rene Descar-tes (1596-1650). 
Descar-tes' epistemic r-eductionism is coupled with his doctr-ine of 
dualism. Laur-a contends that the Car-tesian separ-ation of the ~ 
coqitans (mind) fr-om r-es extensa (matter-) made it possible for-
the fir-st time to descr-ibe the wor-ld of matter- as a machine whose 
wor-kings could be r-educed to mechanical laws. It was only by 
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eliminating the mind or spirit from matter that matter- could be 
characterized in purely mechanical terms without reference to 
spirit (1985: 33). 
Laura maintains further that Descartes' mechanistic and 
reductionist view of nature was given systematic mathematical 
formulation by Isaac Newton (1642-1727), and not only held 
far-reaching implications for natural science in general (cf 
7.3), but set the stage for the future development of medical 
science for the next three centuries. According to this view, 
the body is seen as a machine whose workings could be reduced to 
mechanical laws. Laura explains: 
"Incorporating the Galilean and Cartesian stress upon a 
reductionist mathematics, Newtonian mechanics 
transferred the Hippocratic reliance upon an empiricism 
of qualitative impression to an empiricism of 
quantitative analysis. Insofar as quantitative 
analysis favoured a science of mensuration, the 
reductionist programme claimed for itself an 
objectivity that could itself be measured" (1985: 33). 
This empirical approach sought the explanation for the cause 
of disease in an increasingly narrower focus upon the human body, 
that is, from the body as a whole to its parts, from its parts to 
its internal o~gans and glands, from its internal organs and 
glands to cells, and eventually to microscopic bacteria. 
Evidence of the further elaboration of the mechanistic 
approach in medicine include the gradual shift in analysis from 
organs to cells and their structure in the work of several 
prominent physicians in the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The main point to be observed, however, is 
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that mechanism and its reductionist epistemological principle had 
become firmly established in the theory and practice of medicine 
by the twentieth century. 
The mechanistic approach has led to advances in medical 
science such as, for example, the treatment of infectious 
diseases, the ability to remove diseased parts such as inflamed 
gall bladders and appendices and the prevention of illness 
through immunization (Ledermann, 1986: 26). However, the 
approach does·not appear to have been equally effective in the 
case of degenerative diseases and cancer. The view exists that 
' the principle of wholeness has much to offer to medicine and that 
the holistic approach should be considered as being complementary 
to the mechanistic one. Ledermann, for example, submits that the 
prevention of disease (a more significant aspect of medicine than 
the cure of illness) depends on the proper functioning of the 
whole body (and mind) and on the conditions under which health is 
possible (ibid.). Views such as these have led to the systematic 
development of an approach that focuses on the .whole rather than 
the part in medical treatment, and which involves a fresh 
construal of medical knowledge in the context of medical theory 
and practice. This position is discussed below. 
3.3.2 The holistic epistemological position 
Although the machine can serve as a model for living 
organisms, as the mechanist approach has demonstrated, there is a 
fundamental difference between living matter and non-living 
machine matter, viz, purposiveness, ie, a special form of unified 
action towards an end. It is this purposiveness (creativeness) 
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that distinguishes living organisms from non-living organisms, 
and such behavioural forms cannot be effectively explained in 
m~chanistic terms (this argument is also discussed in 7~3.2). 
According to certain medical theorists an approach that is 
consonant with this recognition is a holistic one. Holistic 
medicine denies that disease can be explained satisfactorily via 
its reduction to the particular biological causes traditionally 
associated with it. It stresses the multidimensional character 
of the human being and the essential interdependence between the 
state of a being and the biological, psychological, social and 
cultural factors which impinge upon it (Laura, 1985: 36). 
Like mechanism, holism also constitutes a view of the nature 
of the universe (cf Smuts-7.1.1); within the context of medicine 
it is likewise recognized as a way of gaining knowledge of the 
phenomena with which physicians are concerned (Ledermann, 1986: 
xi). Holistic medical practice does not treat parts in isolation 
but considers the different aspects of the whole person, ie body 
and mind in relation as parts to the greater whole of the 
surrounding environment. In the case of the body, for example, 
the food which is introduced into the body affects the whole body 
and a change of diet can profoundly affect vital functions. In 
the case of the mind, the individual mind is affected 
minds with which it comes into contact (Ledermann, 1986: 
by other 
36). 
Laura calls for the articulation of an epistemological 
framework that will support holism in medicine. He believes that 
the radical shift in medicine which seeks to treat illness and 
disease as a consequence of a complex interplay among social, 
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envir-onmental, psychological and physical factor-s cannot be 
suppor-ted by most of the tr-aditionally for-mal epistemologies 
under-lying medic~ne explicitly or- implicitly (1985: 35) . 
Laur-a's so-called "epistemic holism" der-ives its pr-edominant 
suppor-t fr-om the r-ecent developments in physics (cf 7.1.3). This 
epistemological position accor-ds a cr-ucial r-ole to the subjective 
knower-'s conceptual or-ganization in the gr-owth of knowledge. 
Although it is Laur-a who attempts to delineate the content 
of an epistemological position that will suppor-t a holistic 
appr-oach to medicine, ther-e wer-e sever-al pr-ominent ear-ly medical 
theor-ists who for-eshadowed this attempt. For- example, among 
sever-al other-s, the Fr-ench medical philosopher-, Car-r-el, noted the 
tr-end towar-d specialization without the accompanying need to 
synthesize. He claimed in the late 1940's that: 
"Nowadays the data accumulated by specialists ar-e 
lar-gely unusable because ther-e is no one to coor-dinate 
this knowledge and look at the human being as a 
whole •.• " (emphasis added; 1948: 54). 
Pr-oceeding along similar- lines, Spieker- ascr-ibes a "medical 
l?pistemology" to a noted philosopher- of medicine, Canguilhem. 
This position emphasizes the view that the patient should be seen 
a~ a totality and as a unique individual. Spieker- quotes 
Canguilhem in suppor-t of this position: 
"In the final analysis, would it not be appr-opr-iate to 
say that the pathological can be distinguished as such, 
that is, as an alter-ation of the nor-mal state, only at 
the l~vel of or-ganic totality, and when it concer-ns 
man, at the level of conscious individual totality ••. " 
(emphasis added; Canguilhem, 1978: 44 as cited in 
Spieker-~ 1987: 403-4). 
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Canguilhem continued the debate begun by the famous 
nineteenth-century French physiologist, Claude Bernard (1813-78), 
who posed the question as to whether the acknowledgement of the 
uniqueness of each organism is not tantamount to a denial of the 
possibility of a medical science in general (Bernard, 1865: 
129). Pointing out the limitations of statistical knowledge, 
namely, that the law of large numbers never teaches us anything 
about any particular case, whereas the individual patient is an 
organic whole (ie a particular case), Canguilhem suggested that 
the disease complex of each patient therefore cannot be a mere 
biological category. Disease should be viewed and treated within 
a broader context of imponderable influencing factors. It is 
clear that holistic notions were prominent in the theoretical 
views of noted physicians of the past, albeit in different 
guises. 
To return. to Laura's "epistemic hal ism", the discoveries of 
quantum physics and Einstein's theory of relativity (cf 7.3.1) 
constitute the basis of this epistemological view. Laura 
perceives the universe to be a "web of interconnections" and 
knowledge of such a universe as dependent upon both unity and 
diversity. 
follows: 
He explains the meaning of this proposition as 
"Epistemic holism ... seeks to preserve diversity at the 
expense of conformity. The unity of knowledge at which 
it aims comes not from the comparison of frames of 
semantic descriptions with some Archimedean world 
independent of description, for there is no world 
undescribed in virtue of which descriptions can be 
validated ... The growth of knowledge depends not so 
much upon some independent reality underpinning our 
descriptions, as upon the conceptual organization 
embracing them, and it is this which is the referent of 
epistemic holism" (1985: 38; cf 6.3). 
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Laura's notion of epistemic holism aims at countering 
fragmentation by synthesizing diversity or "frames of reference" 
and projecting them into " new constellations of meaning and 
understanding" (ibid.). He contends, furthermore, that since 
I 
knowledge and truth ar~ not completely co-extensive, truth is not 
the only, or even the prime, consideration in the growth of 
knowledge (ibid.; cf 6.3 & 8.5.4 for more detailed treatment of 
I 
the notion of truth). The implication of this claim for 
epistemic holism is that it not only seeks truth, but that it 
seeks also cognitive insight through intuition, imagination, and 
creativity. In this way, human knowledge is conceived as being 
multi-dimensional (ibid.; cf Kesting's view that human knowledge 
is organically indivisible-5.28.10). 
The debate between mechanistic approaches and holistic 
approaches is also evident in the search for epistemological 
foundations carried on in a field closely related to medicine, 
viz psychoanalysis. For example, Carveth offers a critique of 
Barratt's view that psychoanalytic knowing is based, not upon 
logical empiricism (which is associated with logical 
positivism-cf 3.4.1), but upon dialectical deconstruction. 
Barratt emphasizes strongly the social and historical 
determination of thought and contends that the scientific 
character of psychoanalysis is assured not by its use of the 
correspondence theory of truth, but rather by its readiness to 
systematically call itself and all of its assumptions in question 
(1987: 106). The correspondence theory, used largely in the 
natural sciences, holds that truth is guaranteed as a 
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correspondence between an observation and the external object of 
observation, that is, that things can be accurately known as they 
exist "out there". 
Carveth maintains that a blanket rejection of logical . 
empiricism and its correspondence theory is not consistent with a 
truly dialectical deconstructive method. Barratt, according to 
Carveth, has gone from the one extreme position where reality is 
entirely independent of the knowing subject to the other extreme 
position where all knowledge is constituted entirely socially and 
historically. Carveth cautions that: 
" to counter the claim that logical empiricism 
possesses literal validity by the opposite claim that 
it is literally invalid is to remain within the 
framework of a literalism which fails to grasp the 
metaphorical foundation of every approach to the 
ultimately incompletely knowable Real beyond its 
various representations in the registers of the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic" (1987: 107; cf 2.5). 
The necessity of using metaphors should be viewed in the 
light of the principle that some metaphors may be judged with 
validity as being more appropriate than others "in that they are 
in various ways more congruent (or less congruent) with the 
reality they attempt (inevitably incompletely) to symbolize" 
(Carveth, 1987: 107). 
Carveth proposes, as an attempt to resolve this dilemma, a 
rejection of both a pure objectivism and a one-sided 
subjectivism, that is, it is possible to "deconstruct" the 
privileging of either term of the binary opposition of subject 
versus object. What he really seeks is an accommodation of both 
49 
subject and object as opposed to the adoption of a one-sided 
perspective, a perspective which lends support to a parochially 
derived ~pistemological position for psychoanalysis. 
The attempt by Carveth to encompass different approaches 
within a greater whole sugge~ts an appreciation for broader, 
integrating frameworks that allow a more comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of the psychoanalytic process. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
The ·epi s temo 1 og ica 1 debates in medicine (physical 
health/illness) and psychoanalysis (mental health/illness ~nd its 
prevention or cure) surround the dichotomies of analysis versus 
synthesis, subject versus object, and other presumed polarities, 
thus reflecting essentially the tension between mechanism and 
holism in medicine and psychoanalysis. A too strict adherence to 
one extreme position results in the deleterious neglect of the 
other position. The resolution of these debates invariably lies 
in a position that would grant equal validity to the whole 
continuum in which each position would seek to establish its 
validity within well-defined contextual criteria. Both mechanism 
and holism, as ways of regarding phenomena" ... are complementary 
and are both necessary to a balanced understanding" of the 
nature of medical theory and practice (Ledermann, 1986: 43). 
The dominant epistemology-related issues that have been 
identified in these positions in medicine and psychoanalysis have 
included: 
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(a) the natu~e of the· subject-object ~elationship that 
influences conceptions of knowledge as they a~e applied in 
the context of medical theo~y and p~actice (cf 2.5); and 
(b) diffe~ent conceptions of the notions of knowledge, t~uth 
and ~eality as they appea~ in the lite~atu~e of medical 
science (cf 6.1-6.3). 
3.4 Epistemological positions in Education 
The lite~atu~e on epistemological issues in the field of 
education is pa~ticula~ly inst~uctive fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation 
science because of thei~ mission-di~ected commonalities. Both 
fields a~e ~ega~ded as knowledge-t~ansmitting p~ofessions. Each 
field is committed to the (educational/psychic/ethical, etc) 
development of individual and society and the acquisition of 
p~actical skills and techniques ~equi~ed fo~ his/he~ vocation in 
life in so fa~ as this mission can be accomplished th~ough the 
inst~umentality of knowledge-dissemination. H6weve~, each adopts 
diffe~ent sets of app~oaches to achieve these goals. This 
implies also, the~efo~e, the p~esence of given cha~acte~istics 
that set them apa~t. 
Education involves a delibe~ate attempt to ~egulate the 
lea~ning and teaching of individuals o~ g~oups of individuals, 
and to this end, tends to employ a cu~~iculum st~uctu~ed to 
endo~se o~ p~omote pa~ticula~ viewpoints. Lib~a~y and 
info~mation science ideally involves an actively neut~al 
diffusion of knowledge sou~ces to individual use~s upon demand. 
Whe~eas lib~a~y and info~mation science st~ives to maintain a 
t~ansdogmatic stance in ~espect of individual use~s, it is 
debatable whethe~ the p~ocess of education by its natu~e can be 
essentially value-f~ee o~ neut~al in ~espect of matte~s sensitive 
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to human bias and disposition such as political, religious, 
philosophical, scientific and artistic states of mind (cf the 
challenge to Wartofsky's claim below). 
It should be acknowledg~d at this juncture that education, 
in the context of this study, is viewed as: 
(a) predominantly formal, 
non-formal; 
as distinct from informal or 
(b) designed to serve primary, secondary and tertiary levels 
of teaching; 
(c) encompassing both teaching and research; and 
(d) unavoidably normative, 
discussion below) 
and hence ideological (see 
Because teachers are involved in the process of producing, 
transmitting and justifying public knowledge, as Matthews points 
out, it is important to recognize and to explicate the theories 
of knowledge encountered in the field of education (1980: 1 ) • 
While not entirely relevant to this study, it should be noted in 
passing that studies have been made of indiv~dual teachers' 
epistemologies, that is, attempts to understand teachers' 
theories of knowledge and the implications of these for practice 
(Young, 1985). A theory of knowledge makes explicit the 
underlying assumptions and tacit understandings that inform the 
educational process. Such a theory of knowledge may be codified 
into a model, or an epistemological position, that sets forth the 
distinctive descriptive features of that theory of knowledge. 
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Wartofsky also highlights the relevance of epistemology for 
education when . he notes that epistemological considerations are 
germane to education insofar as educational theory and practice 
are involved in the normative questions of the quest for truth, 
the elimination of error, and the development of critical and 
analytic modes of thinking, and in so far as education also deals 
with the concepts of knowledge, learning, understanding, and 
their relation to the acquisition of skills (1971: 424). 
Wartofsky's claim may be challenged today on two main 
counts, namely: 
(a) some researchers challenge the assumption if there can 
be any single epistemological basis for education since even 
the classical s~ientific epistemology with its rigid notion 
of objective truth is presently being called dn question on 
several disciplinary fronts (cf for example, 
) 
the case of 
contemporary physics-7.1.3). Hence O'Neill, for example, 
prefers to speak of educational ideologies instead of 
"educational philosophies" (1981) •. The implied difference 
between the two is that, whereas educational ideology seeks 
to promote a particular conception of reality (social, 
economic, political and so on), educational philosophy 
connotes a more open-ended and ongoing inquiry into the 
values and limitations of the nature of different 
conceptions of reality and the impartial identification, 
description and analysis of different educational theories 
(Carr, 1985: 19) . 
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As far as the former is concerned, Ashley contends that they 
constitute "systems of belief and values about the purpose 
of education held by particular groups of educators and 
publics and which result in educational action" (1989: 2). 
He argues that educational ideologies: 
" express and transmit beliefs about the nature 
of social, economic, political and religious 
reality by formal and non-formal processes. This 
is done particularly through the agency of formal 
schooling ... " (1989: 3). 
In spite of (and perhaps because of) the realization of the 
dominantly ideological nature of the educational process, 
the need to examine the underlying philosophical tenets, 
specifically the epistemological assumptions regarding the 
conceptions of knowledge, truth and reality, is maintained 
as a necessary requirement to keep intellectual debate in 
education in a healthy condition; and 
(b) the attempts to naturalize epistemology, that is, to 
make it a branch of psychology, will deprive educational 
theory of its traditionally normative features. However, 
there are well-documented critiques of the limitations of 
applying the principles of the scientific method (as 
advocated in attempts to naturalize epistemology) to 
epistemological issues (cf 2.4.1) 
Regardless of these challenges to the relevance of 
epistemology to education, a few well-defined epistemological 
positions are discernible in educational research and practice 
which offer valuable insights for library and information 
science. 
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By 1971, radical students were accusing many analytical 
philosophers of education of using philosophy "to attack value 
systems and at the same time to support present, socially 
dominant values, and they were asserting that this conservative 
function of analytical philosophy was starkly ideological" 
(ibid.). This led to the emergence of positions based on fresh 
approaches to education such as the new sociology of education 
and the reproduction of culture perspective (cf 3.4.3). 
Finally, an approach that seeks to integrate the former 
positions as parts of a greater, unified whole is currently 
emerging, although its intellectual origins are rooted in 
antiquity (cf 7.1). This approach is characterized as a holistic 
position (cf 3.4.4). It applies research from other fields of 
inquiry that are relevant to education and is based upon 
assumptions concerning the nature of the basic structure of the 
unive~se that are consonant with recent research findings in 
contemporary physics and other natural sciences (cf 7.3). 
It would appear, then, that the historical development of 
more or less well-defined positions provides a satisfactory basis 
for defining their order of presentation for discussion. 
3.4.1 The positivist epistemological position 
This stance is also referred to as a logically positivist 
position, and it is implicit in educational research where 
research is defined as the application of the scientific (method 
to the study of a problem either unexplored or insufficiently 
tested at the time when research is embarked upon (Logical 
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positivism, which emerged in the twentieth century, bears 
distinctive relationships with the positivism as developed by its 
chief exponent, August Comte (1798-1857)' in its 
anti-metaphysical stance and its emphasis on sense-experience as 
the basis for all knowledge. Furthermore, it shares a conviction 
that the principles of the natural sciences may be applied to 
epistemological problems ( cf attempts to naturalize 
epistemology-2.4.1; emp~ricism-2.5; Passmore, 1967: 52-6) ) . The 
principal issue is not so much the scientific method itself as it 
is the notion of "objectivity" which is widely claimed to be the 
funda~ental and essential component of the activity of the 
researcher (Freeman, 1980: 3) • Giroux points out that, in this 
position, the foundation for knowledge is drawn from the 
empirically-derived bases, such as in the natural sciences, and 
from the formal 
mathematics (1981: 
rationalist disciplines, such as logic and 
43). Knowledge is thus associated with 
"objective facts" gathered by the educational researcher and 
stands in opposition to his/her subjective experience. This 
position assumes a clear separation and distinction between the 
researcher and that which is being researched so that the 
explanations of a subject matter reveal the actual nature of that 
subject matter regardless of the researcher's own thoughts or 
desires regarding them. Eisner characterizes this feature of the 
positivist position as a bifurcation of the knower and the known 
in which only the "externalized" environment (as the known) 
attains the status of reality or truth "as it really is" (1988: 
18; cf 7.3 & 7.4). 
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It is clea~ that as a ~esult of its st~ong suppo~t of the 
methodological p~ocedu~es associated with the natu~al and 
physical sciences, this position upholds an epistemology in which 
knowledge sta~ts f~om the conc~ete and is ~aised to gene~al 
p~opositions th~ough a p~ocess of abst~action o~ gene~alization. 
This epistemology is cha~acte~ized as a ~ealist epistemology, 
which postulates that exte~nal objects exist independently of au~ 
awa~eness of them, and that t~ue knowledge is knowledge that 
co~~esponds to the wo~ld as it is (Knelle~, 1971: 24). 
The qualities of ~esea~ch that assu~e validity in this 
position a~e labelled as "objective" and "quantitative". T~uth 
is gua~anteed as a co~~espondence 'between an obse~vation and the 
exte~nal object of obse~vation. 
This position is also characte~ized as unde~sco~ing a 
so-called "technoc~atic rationality", which emphasizes a 
value-f~ee and ethically neut~al approach to educational 
research. 
historical, 
P~oblems are viewed as being isolated f~om their 
social, political and economic contexts, and, in 
fact, this position is best suited to and has been p~edominantly 
useful fa~ technical p~9g~ess and control (Gi~oux, 1981: 46; cf 
also Ha~~is' view-5.26). 
The positivist epistemological position thus p~ofesses to 
offe~ to educational ~esea~che~s an "apolitical" method fa~ 
investigating what are seen to be essentially issues of 
technique. It emphasizes quantitative measu~ement and nume~ation 
which a~e int~insic to the scientific method, and it subsc~ibes 
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to an "objectivist illusion" that the social wor-ld may be viewed 
as a r-ealm of facts independent of the knower-, that is, it 
suppor-ts an essential division between the subject and object in 
educational r-esearch. 
3.4.2 The inter-pretivist epistemological position 
This position is often char-acter-ized as "constructive" and 
"inter-pr-etative" because it emphasizes the r-ole of the subjective 
obser-ver- in the constr-uction of knowledge of exter-nal objects. 
Centr-al to this position is the concer-n with the communicative 
and symbolic patterns of inter-action that shape individual and 
inter--subjective meaning. Accor-ding to the view maintained by 
this position, knowledge tr-ansmitted in educational activities is 
not seen as objective and value-fr-ee (cf 3.4.1), but as a social 
constr-uction tied to the inter-ests, per-ceptions and exper-ience of 
those who "produced and negotiated its meaning" (Gir-oux, 1981: 
12) • This .epistemological position calls in question the 
"neutr-ality" of scientific resear-ch, and it is based on a more 
social or- sociological inter-pr-etation of scientific activity, 
following the r-esear-ch of Kuhn. The r-ole of the mind of the 
subjective r-esearcher- in shaping his r-eality, and the r-ejection 
of any unifor-m way of separ-ating facts fr-om values ar-e emphasized 
in this appr-oach (Miller, 1986: 24). The object of knowledge 
and the instr-ument of knowledge cannot be separ-ated but must be 
taken together- as a whole (Bridgman, 1958: 40). 
Whitty claims that the inter-pr-etivist epistemology is one in 
which"~ •• tr-uth and .objectivity ar-e seen as nothing but human 
pr-oducts and man r-ather- than natur-e is seen as the, ultimate 
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author of 'knowledge' and 'reality'" (1974: 120). This position 
thus rests on an idealist philosophical perspective, namely, that 
external objects depend for their existence on the subjective 
mind (Acton, 1967: 110). 
In education this position serves as a point of departure 
for many movements that stand in opposition to the positivist 
epistemological position (cf 3.4.1). Some of these schools of 
thought are the free-school movement of the 1960's in the USA, 
the_ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionist movements of the 
1970's and the recent new sociology of education movement 
(Giroux, 1981: 12) . 
Several eminent educational philosophers of the past 
subscribe to variant forms of this position. The view of 
Pestalozzi (1746-1827) that knowledge derives from sense 
perception underscores the central tenet of the interpretivist 
position, namely, that the subjective knower cannot be divorced 
from the object of knowing. He submits, however, that sense 
perceptions should be developed into "clear and distinct ideas", 
a phrase that suggests the influence of Cartesian rationalism 
(Connell, 1985: 5140; cf 2.5). 
Her-bart (1776-1841}, the German philosopher and educator, 
was strongly influenced by Pestalozzi's educational theories. He 
affirms the fundamental role of cognition in the learning process 
(cf 2.4). "Vorstellungs", or "presentations", which are closely 
associated with sense perceptions, are welcomed or repelled by 
other "presentations" already existing in the mind, whether 
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consciously o~ subconsciously. He~ba~t ~efe~s in this ~ega~d to 
dynamic consciousness and static consciousness (Bluhm, 1971: 
350). Following this line of ~easoning, he is led to the 
epistemological position that new expe~iences a~e always modified 
by what has been expe~ienced p~eviously. 
These ideas influenced B~une~·s (1915- ) wo~k on the natu~e 
of pe~ception, which lent impetus to the g~owth of the so-called 
"cognitive ~evolution" (cf 2.4). The cognitive ~evolution' 
prima~ily implies that the human mind plays a c~ucial ~ole in the 
knowing p~ocess, that is, .the mind is actively engaged in 
selecting and so~ting the stimuli of the exte~nal wo~ld acco~ding 
to inne~ dictates o~ models of that wo~ld. B~une~·s The p~ocess 
of education embodies his (and his colleagues') ideas on 
cognitive theo~y applied to education. He p~oclaims that the 
focus of this wo~k is on the knowe~ and the p~ocess of knowing 
and that its ideas sp~ing f~om epistemology and the sciences of 
knowing (1960: 186). 
John Dewey's (1859-1952) inst~umentalist position, .which is 
a fo~m of p~agmatism, may a~guably be viewed as a va~iant of 
inte~p~etivist epistemology. Inst~umentalism holds that 
scientific thought is inst~umental in p~oblem-solving. Fa~ 
Dewey, o~dina~y expe~ience is the fundamental and endu~ing 
~eality which is the basis fa~ all au~ lea~ning in which 
knowledge is gained th~ough p~oblem-solving and discove~y. He 
defines the educational p~ocess as "a continual ~eorganization, 
~econst~uction and t~ansfo~mation of expe~ience" (1916: 50). 




educational growth occurs as a result of the integration and 
combination of new experiences with existing experiences. This 
subjectivist element underscores the association of his ideas 
with the interpretivist position. 
The interpretivist position has been criticized for being 
subjective, and its research results described as being 
"relativistic". Freeman and Jones contend that to establish an 
interpretivist epistemology that is not relative or subjective, 
there is a need for a fresh interpretation of the notion of 
objectivity itself. Objectivity, in this new interpretation, 
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would involve self-reflection and self-criticism, and objective 
researchers would seek to understand and attempt to make known 
the way in which their ideas are influenced by their metaphysical 
or moral assumptions (1980: 13). Smith and Heshuis, in their 
turn, maintain that, instead of facing up to the relativist 
implications of the interpretivist position and attempting to 
seek a fresh perspective of the notion of objectivity as Freeman 
and Jones suggest, interpretative inquiry has tended rather, 
" to abandon its philosophical heritage and, as a 
result, it has come to look very much like a version of 
quantitative [positivist] inquiry within the same 
framework of assumptions" (1986: 25). 
Smith and Heshuis conclude, despairingly, that instead of 
subscribing either to the fundamentally flawed "positivist" 
and/or seriously problematic relativist "interpretivist" 
epistemological positions, it is now necessary to elaborate "new 
forms of rationality" (1986: 25) • They do not explain any 
further how these forms of rationality would manifest themselves, 
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but thei~ insights do hold se~ious implications fo~ the continued 
applicability o~ validity of only two dominant t~aditions of 
epistemology in contempo~a~y education in the West. 
The inte~p~etivist epistemological position shifts the 
emphasis f~om the known object to the knowing subject, and 
emphasizes the seve~al catego~ies of influencing facto~s that 
impinge upon the mind of the knowe~. The object of knowledge is 
not "seen" fo~ what it is, but "inte~p~eted" by the knowe~ in 
acco~dance with pe~sonal o~ subjective biases; and the cha~ge of 
~elativism has not yet been answe~ed satisfacto~ily. 
3.4.3 The ~ep~oductive epistemological position 
As distinct f~om an emphasis upon the knowing individual (cf 
3.4.2) o~ upon the known object (cf 3.4.1), this position focuses 
on "mac~o-st~uctu~al ~elationships and how these ~elations in the 
fo~m of st~uctu~al dete~minations shape, as well as limit, the 
actions of human beings" (Gi~oux, 1981: 13) . The cent~al 
inte~est of this position is to discove~ the ways in which 
schools function to ~ep~oduce a class-st~atified society, that 
is, the ways in which dominant classes a~e able "to ~ep~oduce 
existing powe~ ~elations in an unjust and unequal society" (1981: 
13). 
A p~otagonist of this view, F~ei~e (1921- ), insists that 
schooling is not neut~al. 
p~oclaimed "neut~ality" 
He maintains, mo~eove~, that the 
is a convenient ideology that masks the 
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political functioning of schooling. However, he avoids a 
mechanistic explanation of the school as a "wooden agent" in the 
transformation of students. He seeks, rather, to develop: 
" a dialectical understanding of the connections 
between school and the larger .universe of 
socio-political meanings and beliefs that legitimate 
the dominant society" (Giroux, 1981: 129). 
Illich (1926- ) holds a stronger, quite negatory view, of 
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the role of schools in society. He rejects the belief that 
education constitutes the "great equalizer" and he even calls 
for the very elimination of schools (as they exist today) (1971). 
Illich's view of schools and the educational process stems from a 
more fundamental critique of the associations between economic 
relations that affect the lives of individuals in society and the 
values that these relations institutionalize (Gintis, 1972: 95). 
These values, according to Illich, are those of progressive 
liberalism, and schools merely serve to legitimize them. Chief 
among these values is an undue emphasis on mechanistic approaches 
and its consequent underemphasis of subjective, non-mechanistic 
approaches. In an explanatory statement that holds significant 
implications, for both the professions of education and library 
and information science, Illich underscores the crucial role. of 
the subjective knower: 
"The world does not contain any information. It is as 
it is. Information about it is created in the organism 
through its interaction with the world. To speak about 
storage of information through its i.nteraction with the 
world is to fall into a semantic trap. Books or 
computers are part of the world. They can yield 
information when they are looked upon. We move the 
problem of learning and of cognition nicely into the 
blind spot of our.intellectual vision if we confuse 
vehicles for potential information with information 
itself" (1975: 101) 
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By this, Illich means that the institutionalization of knowledge 
makes people dependent on having their knowledge produced for 
them and leads to a paralysis of the moral and political 
imagination. It is the application of the subjective human mind 
to books and other "vehicles for potential information" that 
needs to be recognized as a significant aspect of the knowing 
process (cf 3.4.2). 
The perhaps excessive view of Illich is tempered in the 
proposal of a more sophisticated mode of reproduction, that is, 
that schools and students are not the passive recipients of the 
ideological 
institutions. 
imperatives of the logic of capital and its 
Giroux employs different notions of ideology, 
culture and hegemony to develop a critical perspective of the 
manner in which power, reproduction and resistance structure the 
complex relations among the state, 
educational structure. 
the economic system and the 
The concept of culture, in this perspective, is subsumed 
within the category of society where it is linked more closely to 
notions of class, power and ideology. In this way, the idea of a 
dominant culture with its accompanying minority cultures replaces 
the idea of one culture or a multiplicity of cultures. This 
dominant culture, according to Gramsci (1891-1937), is reproduced 
through the political and economic functions of the state (1971: 
57) • The state, says Gramsci, relies less upon the use of 
physical repression than it does upon the use of belief and value 




Giroux views ideology not in its orthodox Marxist conception 
as a set of illusions or lies, but as a set of beliefs, values 
and social practices that contain oppositional assumptions about 
varying elements of social reality, that is, society, economics, 
authority, human nature, 
of ideology 
when they are 
politics, and so 
in 3.4 above). 
institutionalized 
forth (cf Ashley's 
Ideologies become 
by the dominant 
conception 
hegemonic 
societies. Once this happens, they are stripped of their 
oppositional power and serve to legitimize existing institutional 
arrangements and social practices (1981: 148). In this way, the 
state apparatus in advanced industrial countries inequitably 
distribute not only economic goods and services, but certain 
forms of cultural capital as well, that is, that system of 
meanings, abilities, language forms, and tastes that are directly 
and indirectly defined by dominant groups as socially legitimate 
(Apple, 1979: 156). Schools then reproduce existing power 
relations "more subtly through the production of a dominant 
culture that tacitly confirms what it means to be educated" 
(Giroux, 1983: 267). 
Freire is conc.erned more with the epistemological 
assumptions upon which these macro-structural forces are 
predicated than upon the forces themselves. This is evident in 
his notions of "banking" education and "problem-posing" education 
which are antithetical concepts. He explains that the "banking" 
view of education holds that students are receptacles into which 
the teacher makes "deposits". Students receive patiently and 
passively these deposits of information and are adapted to the 
world (1972: 50). On the other hand, the "problem-posing" view 
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of education holds that teachers are themselves students and that 
students and teachers "become jointly responsible for a process 
in which all grow" (1972: 53) . Specific concepts of "knowledge" 
and "reality" underlie his "problem-posing" view. Reality is not 
static but dynamic, and hence viewed as a process by Freire. 
Knowledge, in his view, is not neutral, but is,ideological and 
political, and tied to human interests and norms. He states that 
it: 
" emerges only through invention and re-invention, 
through the restless, impatient, hopeful inquiry men 
pursue in the world, with the world and with each 
other" ( 1972: 46; cf 4.3). 
Freire's notion of knowledge recognizes the dialectical 
interconnections between the doer, the receiver and the objective 
world itself. These interconnections provide the main support 
for his dialogical theory of action, which is basically an 
epistemological stance. He contends, in this theory, that 
subjects meet in cooperation in order to transform the world 
which exi~ts in a dialectical relationship with them. Using the 
famous I-Thou relationship of ·Martin Buber (1878-1965), he 
converts the "Thou" into another "I", thus eliminating the object 
qua object. He explains that: 
The 
"The dialogical theory of action does not involve a 
Subject, who dominates by virtue of conquest, and a 
dominated object. Instead, there are Subjects who meet 
to name the world in order to transform it" (1972: 
135). 
reproductive epistemological position with its 
dialectical method takes the interpretivist epistemological 
position one step further. While the interpretivist position 
emphasizes the subjective role of the researcher or knower, it 
still maintains the passive status of the object of research. In 
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the reproductive epistemological position both subject and 
object, that is, both human consciousness and objective reality, 
are involved in a dialectical interplay to a higher synthesis, 
or, new knowledge that seeks to identify (unmask) and eliminate 
perceived power relations in society. 
3.2.4 The holistic epistemological position 
Another prominent position may be discerned in the 
literature of education. This position is found within the 
context of what is described as a holistic paradigm of thought 
(cf 7.1-7.7). In an article in the journal, Educational theory, 
Zigler proposes, as 
three mentioned above, 
an additional paradigm of thought to the 
a holistic one. He submits that this 
paradigm does not possess assumptions that are necessarily 
opposed to those of the other paradigms, but that it regards the. 
assumptions and research findings as parts of a more inclusive 
whole (1978: 318). Furthermore, from an epistemological point 
of view, it regards all areas of knowledge as interdependent and 
interconnected. 
According to Zigler, the central and distinctive assumption 
of the holistic paradigm of thought is that features of the whole 
are not entirely derived from the study of the parts (ibid.). In 
this way, the assumptions and research findings associated with 
other educational paradigms are considered to be parts of a 
larger, more unified system or whole. Zigler derives support for 
his view of the holistic paradigm from work undertaken by the 
Gestalt psychologists, and the views of the psychologist, Abraham 
Maslow (1908-70). He contends further that the holistic outlook 
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~eceived an impo~tant measu~e of c~edence f~om developments in 
theo~etical physics (cf Wholeness .and f~agmentation in the 
natu~al sciences and the social sciences-7.3 & 7.4). He also 
acknowledges that these notions a~e echoed in ea~ly Easte~n 
~eligious philosophies (cf Wholeness and f~agmentation in ea~ly 
Easte~n thought-7.2) 
In a st~onge~ attempt to link holistic ideas in education 
with a majo~ philosophe~ and educational theo~ist, ligle~ a~gues 
that such ideas appea~ to be evident in the w~itings of John 
Dewey (cf the pe~ception of Dewey's ~elevance to the 
inte~p~etivist position-3.4.2). Zigle~ maintains that Dewey had 
me~ely extended the thought of William James who had himself 
attempted to integ~ate the empi~icist's inclination to study 
pa~ts (plu~alism) and the ~ationalist's disposition fo~ 
const~ucting intellectual wholes and unifying p~inciples (monism) 
(cf 2.5; 1978: 320). In his a~ticulation of this holistic 
theme, Dewey, acco~ding to Zigle~, sought to ove~come the 
dualisms o~ dichotomies that pe~vaded philosophical and 
educational thought, such as science and mo~als, theo~y and 
p~actice, mind and body, and so fo~th. 
Zigle~ fu~the~ consolidates the a~gument fo~ the holistic 
pa~adigm of thought by ~efe~~ing to ~ecent ~esea~ch on the b~ain. 
He points out that ~ecent w~ite~s on this issue have suggested 
that the two hemisphe~es of the b~ain p~ovide distinctively 
diffe~ent functions which ~eflect the way we consciously 
expe~ience the wo~ld, ie, a ve~bal, analytic function and an 
intuitive, aesthetic-imaginative function (O~nstein, 1973). 
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Zigler admits that these findings are not new and that they were 
already observed by James who noted that there are two modes of 
consciousness or knowing, viz, knowing things immediately or 
intuitively and knowing things conceptually or representatively 
( James , 1 97 1 : 13) . 
Nevertheless, it was Dewey" .•• who understood the special 
bearing which a Holistic perspective holds for educational theory 
and practice" (Zigler, 1978: 323). For example, Dewey's work, 
entitled The sources of a science of education, recognizes the 
multi- and interdisciplinary nature of education which requires 
that it search for and synthesize the links with other fields of 
knowledge in order to construct a model of education that takes 
into account all findings relevant to educational practice. 
Hence, Dewey assumes a holistic approach that appears to be 
eminently suited to the purposes of education. 
While Zigler only infers indirectly the holistic mode of 
knowing from his interpretation of Dewey's theoretical writings, 
Hope attempts to articulate this epistemological position more 
explicitly in his application of holistic views to educational 
possibilities. The holistic mode of knowing, Hope contends, II 
integrates all forms of cognition from the innate impulse of 
instinct, to the rational faculty of the intellect, to the 
apprehensive powers of intuitive perception" (1988: 193; cf 
7.5). Hope maintains that while this holistic mode of knowing 
allows the expression of different ways of perceiving reality, it 
recognizes also that all are contained within a greater whole 
that develops to a higher synthesis of the individual parts. 
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Comenius (Jan Komensky 1592-1670)' a noted educational 
philosopher- who influenced Dider-ot and other- Fr-ench 
encyclopaedists of the eighteenth centur-y, did not specify any 
par-ticular- epistemological view. However-, it may be infer-r-ed 
fr-om his wr-itings with some author-ity that he was also inspir-ed 
by the notions of wholeness and totality with r-egar-d to 
knowledge. For- example, he holds that tr-uth is indivisible and 
should be seen as a whole, and his pansophic pr-ogr-am in education 
envisaged an encyclopaedia containing all scientific knowledge, a 
college with facilities for- the advancement and unification of 
knowledge, and a new method of access to knowledge in or-der- to 
achieve wisdom. That this method of access to knowledge r-equir-es 
an awar-eness of under-lying laws r-ather- than an accumulation of 
facts is confir-med in the following quotation: 
"Do not imagine that we demand an exact or- thor-ough 
knowledge of all the ar-ts and sciences fr-om all men ••• 
It is the pr-inciples, the causes, and the uses of all 
the most impor-tant things in existence that we wish all' 
men to 1 ear-n. . . " ( Comen ius, 1896: 70) • 
This emphasis of Comenius on the whole (for- example, gener-al 
pr-inciples and causes) r-ather- than the par-ts (accumulation of 
isolated facts), is one that appear-s to be entir-ely consonant 
with holistic appr-oaches as outlined by Zigler- and Hope above. 
The holistic epistemological position, while not widely and 
consistently applied in educational theor-y and pr-actice in the 
West, appear-s to be gather-ing suppor-t fr-om a gr-owing number- of 
theor-ists and also r-eveals str-ong associations with 
inter-pr-etations of views expr-essed in the wr-itings of major-
educational philosopher-s of the past. 
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3.4.5 Conclusion 
This section . has elicited from the writings of several 
writers in education at least four discernible epistemological 
positions that have developed historically. The dominant· 
epistemology-related issues that have been focused upon in these 
positions have included: 
(a) the subject-object relationship, ie, teacher and 
student/pupil, in which the focus of attention is shifted 
from the one to the other and to both with respect to their 
role in the knowing process (cf 2.5); and 
(b) varying conceptions of knowledge, learning, reality and 
truth as central epistemological notions in education (cf 
6.1-6. 3) . 
The implications of these positions have far-reaching 
effects on educational theory and practice, and their fundamental 
significance for the related field of library and information 
science cannot be sufficiently emphasized. 
3.5 Epistemological positions in communication theory (including 
mass communication) 
Another field of inquiry, o~ discipline, also closely allied 
to library and information science, and which has well-defined 
epistemological stances, is that of communication theory 
(encompassing mass communication). 
Communication is a word with multiple meanings. Some of 
these ·meanings are concerned with making oneself understood. 
Some use the term "communication" to indicate bilateral or 
two-way information flow (Boulding, 1956: 111) • The idea in 
this case implies a meaningful message from a sender to a 
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receiver, a relationship between sender and receiver, an effect, 
a context within which communication occurs and a range of things 
to 
meanings refer (McQuail, 1981: 3) • 
which 
There are also 
senses of the word "communication" that do not imply meanings 
intended by a speaker or a writer and understanding by a 
recipient, such as, for example, the communication of heat, of 
l~quids or gases between connected vessels or the communication 
of diseases (Machlup, 1983: 49). 
The term "communication", as it is used here, is limited to 
human symbolic communicative usage (including other modes of 
interpersonal exchange, for example, mathematics, music, Braille, 
etc) where meaning is of cardinal importance (cf its association 
with knowledge-transmission, below). Engineers, who also use the 
term, are interested in the correct transmission of signals, or 
(electronic) representations of messages and not in the purposes 
or meanings of messages. For example, mathematical communication 
theory such as that of Shannon and Weaver "concerns the signals 
alone •.. abstracted from all human uses" (Cherry, 1957: 168). 
Moreover, Machlup and Mansfield contend that the theory of signal 
transmission has nothing to teach that could be extended to human 
communication (1983: 56) • 
The area of mass communication is included within this 
conception of communication. Mass communications perform the 
basic tasks of the communication process, but involves different 
components in this process to achieve different (modified) 
purposes. Janowitz defines mass communication as follows: 
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"Mass communications compr-ise. the institutions and 
techniques by which specialized gr-oups employ 
technological devices (pr-ess, r-adio, films, etc.) to 
disseminate symbolic content to lar-ge, heter-ogeneous 
and widely disper-sed audiences (1968: 41). 
This definition highlights some of the var-iations and additions 
that should be r-ecognized. The 'sender-' in mass communication 
II is always par-t of an or-ganized gr-oup". The 'r-eceiver-' is 
always seen as" ••• a gr-oup or- collectivity with cer-tain gener-al 
attr-ibutes" (although it is the individual who actually r-eceives 
the message). The channel " no longer- consists of the social 
r-elationship, means of expr-ession and sensor-y or-gans, but 
includes lar-ge scale technologically-based distr-ibution devices 
and systems". The message in mass communication • II 15 ••• not a 
unique and tr-ansitor-y phenomenon, but a mass pr-oduced and 
infinitely r-epeatable symbolic str-uctur-e, often of gr-eat 
complexity" (McQuail, 1981: 4). 
The impor-tant point to be obser-ved is that libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science shar-es some of the same commitments and 
employs some of the same mechanisms as those of communication 
(viz, in a per-son-to-per-son r-ole) and mass communication (viz, 
using technological means or- devices such as newspaper-s, 
magazines, r-adio, video cassettes or- films to convey messages to 
a lar-ger- audience). Mor-e fundamentally, libr-ar-ies as 
distr-ibutor-s or- tr-ansmitter-s of knowledge stimulates" •.• the 
cr-eation of widely shar-ed symbolic r-ealities ••• " which is 
consider-ed to be a function of communication and mass 
communication (Budd, 1987: 133). 
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The usage of communication in this study is limited to the 
meanings o~ meaningful messages conveyed in/th~ough ~eco~ded 
knowledge by a sende~ to a ~eceive~. In this sense, 
communication (including mass communication) is cognate to 
lib~a~y and info~mation science in that lib~a~ies may also be 
const~ued as communication channels that facilitate the 
t~ansmission of ideas, as found in ~eco~ded human knowledge, f~om 
sende~s ("autho~s") to ~eceive~s ("use~s") mediated by lib~a~ians 
and/o~ info~mation wo~ke~s (cf 3.2 fo~ mo~e .simila~ities). 
Epistemological positions of this conception of 
communication a~e explicated as fully as possible with the 
intention of offe~ing insights fo~ the cognate field of lib~a~y 
and info~mation science. 
If the p~ocess of education includes, among othe~ things, 
the t~ansmission of knowledge (cf 3.4), then it is mo~e 
specifically the communication p~ocess that involves the t~ansfe~ 
of knowledge f~om teache~ (sende~) to student (~eceive~) within 
educational activities. This inte~~elatedness of communication 
and knowledge is affi~med by Che~witz and Hikins. They submit 
that: 
"The ve~y act of calling something 'knowledge' is the 
p~oduct of discussion and debate among scientists. 
This is to say that any scientific community is an 
audience to be pe~suaded and dissuaded; membe~s 
inte~act communicatively in the pu~suit of knowledge, 
and decisions as to what constitutes knowledge ~esult 
as much f~om p~ocesses of communication as f~om di~ect 
obse~vation of 'facts'" (1986: 10). 
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However, what may count and what may not count as valid 
knowledge in the areas of communication (and mass communication) 
depends upon the assumptions and views espoused in particular 
epistemological positions. 
According to Dissanyake, early models of communication 
reveal the influence of Aristotelian (384-322 BC) ideas on 
rhetoric as the art of persuasive speaking (or writing) (1983: 
36). Dissanyake claims, for example, that the Shannon and Weaver 
model of communication and all models that preceded it operate 
within the framework constructed by Aristotle. He argues that: 
"According to Shannon and Weaver, the communication act 
consisted of source, transmitter, signal, receiver and 
destination; this is virtually the same as Aristotle's 
communicator, message, and audience" (1983: 36). 
Thi~ Aristotelian framework, referred to by Dissanyake, is 
suggested in the following translation by Hobbes of Aristotle's 
treatise on rhetoric: 
"Of means of persuading by speaking there are three 
species: some consist in the character of the speaker; 
others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; 
others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of 
its proving, or appearing to prove the point" (1847: 
12) . 
Dissanyake views these models as being "mechanistic" and 
contrasts them with what he calls "process" models whose origins 
he traces to the ideas of Heraclitus, Hegel, Bergson, Whitehead 
and the modern physicists (cf 7.1 & 7.3.1 for an explication of 
the views of these philosophers). 
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The , mechanistic/objectivist and the process/inter-
subjectivist models of communication represent two distinctively 
different camps of epistemological thought, and are discussed 
below in that order. 
3.5.1 The mechanistic/objectivist epistemological position 
The. philosophical basis of this position in communication 
derives from the Cartesian-Newtonian Western world 
epistemological outlook. It is also characterized as a 
causalist-mechanist-energetic view in which there is a clear 
subject/object or mind/body dualism (Merrell, 1984: 140; cf 2.5 
& 7.1.3). This position bears a strong resemblance to the 
positivist epistemological position in education (cf 3.4.1). 
According to this view of the communication process, meaning is 
transferred in a linear, unidirectional manner from a sender to a 
passive receiver. No provision is made for feedback, or the 
opportunity for two-way, interactive communication. Successful 
communication is measured by the extent of overlap between the 
"mind" of the sender and that of the receiver, that is, the 
accuracy or "faithfulness" with which the original message is 
transmitted by the sender and acquired by the receiver. The 
receiver as a subject is neutral with respect to the meaning of 
message, that is, its meaning. This presupposes a realist 
epistemology, in which reality is wholly independent of the 
receiver (cf 3.4.1 & 6.3.1). However, in this view, reality is 
"active" and impinges upon the receiver's cognitive and affective 
lives (Cherwitz, 1986: 23). This means that while reality 
(external objects) is independent of one's mind, 
known. 
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it can yet be 
Cherwitz and Hikins develop this notion of reality into an 
epistemological position for communication. Synthesizing a 
conception of rhetoric from its early Greek and mediaeval 
formulations, they claim that language is capable of describing 
reality (in a rhetorical manner). They endeavour to articulate 
the central tenets of a "perspectivist rhetorical epistemology" 
for communication (1986: 166). While rhetoric encompasses both 
written and oral media in their view, their emphasis falls only 
on the written component. They conceive of rhetoric as the 
description of reality through language, and argue that it is 
central to the knowing process. However, the knowing process is 
construed in its objectivist stance, in which there is a clear 
and unambiguous distinction between knower (subject) and known 
(object). They clarify this stance by submitting that: 
" the objectivist position contends that 
observations conducted during the course of cancer 
research are observations of data whose existence is 
not dependent on the observer nor on his or her 
attitudes, beliefs and values. That is, the objects of 
scientific inquiry enjoy independent status. The task 
for rhetoric in the scientific method ... is to insure 
that the scientists' descriptions and measurements 
accurately reflect the independent objects of 
reality ... " (1986: 12; cf Medawar-6.3). 
In this view, then, reality which is independent of the 
subjective knower or receiver can be communicated, and hence 
known, in an objective sense, that is, by imposing itself ~n a 
one-way direction on the receiver. An epistemological dualism of 
sender and receiver is.central to this position, and it supports 
the view of communication in which meaning has little, if 
anything, to do with the "detached" receiver's role, situation or 
circumstances. 
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3.5.2 The process/intersubjectivist epistemological position 
The process/intersubjectivist position is open-ended and 
multi-dimensional as distinct from the mechanistic objectivist 
position. It derives strong support from developments in the 
so-called "new" physics (cf 7.1.3). 
In this view of .the communication process, the receiver is 
conc:li tioned by his subjective background and the equally 
subjective perception of the sender, and he/she acts as 
co-originator of the message. It is also characterized as a 
sociological view because it recognizes the influence of social 
factors that influence the communication process (cf the 
exposition of the interpretivist position in education-3.4.2). 
This position is evident in the work of Krippendorff who 
attempts to establish "an epistemological foundation for 
communication" (1984: 21-36). He argues against ontological 
assumptions of a one-way process of communication from an 
unvarying and disinterested object to an intelligent and 
interested observer (as advocated, for example, by Cherwitz and 
Hikins-3.5.1), and proposes in its place an epistemological model 
that allows a two-way communication process where properties of 
the observer enter his domain of observation (1984: 23). He 
replaces the duality of the observer and the observed with what 
he calls the "epistemological unity of observation". He 
maintains that: 
"While ontological commitments assign scientific 
observers the role of discoverers of facts that are 
unalterably outside themselves, the emerging 
epistemology for communication assigns such observers 
the role of co-creators of facts" (1984: 27). 
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This view subscribes to a "process" conception of reality as 
distinct from a commitment to a fixed, unalterable reality, and 
affirms the self-referential and perspectival character of 
knowledge (cf 7.5). 
A similar epistemological view underlies the attempt by 
Merrell to develop an epistemology of written texts. His ideas 
presume a communication framework, ie, the communication of ideas 
through the instrumentality of written texts, thus making them 
especially relevant and valuable for discussion here. He claims 
that the dualistic problem of perception, viz the separation of 
knower from known may be overcome by readers who put themselves 
"into" texts. He proposes a holistic framework for the reading 
process that seeks to transcend the subject/object and mind/body 
split in which human beings are potentially capable of 
reintegrating themselves with the external world and the world of 
texts (1984: 142). Interpretation is a central factor in 
Merrell's epistemological view, and knowledge is not directed 
toward the ideal of some static and absolute truth (such as 
Victor Cousin's philosophy of eclecticism- cf 6.3.2). On the 
contrary, Merrell maintains that knowledge is always incomplete 
since: 
"Nothing can be absolutely unknowable through time and 
nothing can be absolutely known at any given moment in 
time" (1984: 148). 
Merrell deals with the charge of relativism levelled against his 
position by proclaiming that any particular system or theory can 
only be an approximation of truth in its absolute sense, but that 
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the possibility exists for "discovering-inventing newer and more 
broadly-based portions of truth ad infinitum" (1984: 148; ~f 2.4 
& 3.4.2). 
In this process/intersubjectivist epistemological position 
the dualism of sender and receiver is replaced with an 
integration of sender and receiver, each contributing' in a 
mutually reciprocative manner to create the meaning of a message. 
This notion of mutual interrelationship is identified and appli~d 
by both Krippendorff and Merrell, and it avoids an undue emphasis 
on either pole of a metaphoric epistemological continuum for 
communication which places'the sender at one extreme end and the 
receiver at the other. By stressing the whole rather than the 
part, it becomes possible to explicate a bi-directional, 
non-linear, interactive communication process in which the 
receiver is not a passive receptacle of messages, but rather a 
dynamic re-creator of the meaning of the messages in accordance 
with a constellation of factors such as motives, needs, levels of 
interpretation, background, and so on. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
The epistemological positions in communication (and mass 
communication) that are identified above refl~ct: 
(a) the continuing epistemological debate on the dualism of 
subject versus object, or sender and receiver in the key 
communication activity of the transfer of knowledge (cf 2.5 
& 7.1-7.5); and 
(b) different conceptions in communication studies of the 
central epistemological notions of reality, truth and 
knowledge (cf 6.1-6.3) 
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Each position ~ep~esents a histo~ical moment in the 
development of epistemological thought in communication as it 
adapted~ respectively, the ea~ly G~eek and mediaeval conceptions 
of ~heto~ic (3.5.1), 'and the findings of expe~iments unde~taken 
in mode~n physics and the newe~ ideas in the philosophy of 
science (3.5.2; cf also 7.1.3). These positions a~e of g~eat 
pe~tinence to lib~a~y and info~mation science and offe~ ~ich 
insights into the epistemological dimensions of 
info~mation science as a communicato~y discipline. 
lib~a~y and 
3.6 Summa~y 
This chapte~ has sought to explo~e and elucidate the 
epistemological positions that a~e encounte~ed in a classical 
discipline and p~ofession, namely, medicine, and in two cognate 
disciplines, namely, education and communication (encompassing 
mass communication). The 
positions in these fields of 
examination of the epistemological 
study has ~evealed a numbe~ of 
valuable insights to the sea~ch fo~ such positions in lib~a~y and 
info~mation science, among which the following a~e wo~th noting: 
Fi~st, we obse~ve the conside~able amount of ~esea~ch inte~est in 
these issues as bea~ing fundamental implications fo~ 
unde~standing the ways in which given theo~etical assumptions, 
upon which methods of knowing a~e based, influence modes of 
p~ofessional p~actice as well as app~oaches to the design of 
~esea~ch techniques. Second, the~e is a manifest conce~n with 
the need to explo~e the natu~e of knowledge within the context of 
each discipline, and with the value of the consequences the~eof 
fo~ the ~ende~ing of p~ofessional se~vice. Fo~ example, in the 
disciplines of education and communication, a clea~ unde~standing 
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of what constitutes valid knowledge offers a sounder theoretical 
basis for the fulfillment of such professional tasks such as a 
consideration as to what knowledge is most reliable and important 
and hence worth teaching or communicating, how the search for 
knowledge ought to be conducted, what the most effective ways of 
transmitting knowledge are, and so forth. Third, it is evident 
that even if a single epistemological position may be dominant at 
any given time, there are others in the discipline that exist in 
a state of tension and conflict with that position. This 
accounts to some extent for the differences of opinion regarding 
the claimed "best" techniques or approaches in practice, as being 
reflections of fundamentally divergent theories of knowledge. 
While there may be other valuable insights from an analysis 
of these disciplines, the most significant has been the 
opportunity to observe the recognition of the relation between 
thought and action within the context of each. 
An implicit theme in the delineation of the substantive 
content of these positions has been a debate surrounding the 
emphasis of the importance of either a dualisti~ separation of 
the subject (knower) and object (known) or a holistic 
integration/synthesis of both as mutually reciprocative aspects 
in the knowing process. The former view received its f~ll~st 
expression in the mechanistic approaches to explanation that 
predominated in the natural sciences from the second half of the 
seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, and the 
latter view is represented in the form of non-mechani~tic 
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approaches which have more recently been applied with success in 
the natural sciences and the social sciences and the humanities 
(cf 7.3 & 7.4). 
A significant feature of the holistic approach has been the 
recognition of the validity of other approaches and the attempt 
to include and unify all other approaches within a greater whole 
that represents a qualitatively new level of synthesis that 
cannot be explained in terms of the constitutive parts, 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts (cf 7.1.1). 
ie, the 
The same 
claim cannot be made by any other position however, ie, no other 
position manifests, as a necessary theoretical feature, the 
inclusion of other conflicting (dissimilar) positions in an 
attempt to interrelate them into a larger whole. 
In this approach, human knowledge is perceived as being 
essentially holistic in the sense that all areas of knowledge are 
interrelated and interdependent as distinct· from its fragmented 
conceptions (cf 3.3.2 & 3.4.4). Furthermore, the notion of truth 
in the holistic outlook is not conceived in its absolute sense 
(cf 3.4.2, 3.4.4 & 3.5.2) and is not considered to be the most 
distinctive feature of human knowledge 
holism-3.3.2). 
(cf Laura's epistemic 
Although this chapter presents an insight into the growing 
recognition of the limitations of the application of mechanistic 
approaches in certain disciplines and professions (that include 
as a primary focus an intermediary role in the transfer of 
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knowledge), and indicates the direction that responses to these 
limitations have taken, a fuller articulation of the holistic 
approach (as one of these responses) is provided in Chapter 7. 
As pointed out above, all the positions identified and 
analyzed in Chapter 3 hold salutary insights for the possible 
development of an epistemological position for library and 
information science. However, none of these insights may be 
applied per se, for the following reasons: 
(a) First, none of the disciplines is completely 
co-extensive with the disciplinary domain of library and 
information science. Moreover, library and information 
science is too inter-, and multidisciplinary to consider as 
final, notions of validity or objectivity as they are 
treated 
" 
in the disciplines discussed here (cf 
Kesting-5.28.10); 
(b) Second, while education and library and information 
science overlap to a large extent, there are significant 
divergences (cf 3.4). A more thorough-going emphasis in 
commitment to the individual and personalized service is 
central to library and information science. Education 
concentrates on formal curriculum-assisted learning by 
groups of individuals. The degree of conscious and 
deliberate manipulation of what knowledge is considered to 
be of greater or lesser importance, is less covert than in 
the case of library and information science. Educational 
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cur-ricula, both through inclusionary and exclusionary 
practices selectively present a specific world view to the 
student; and 
(c) Third, a position acceptable to librarians and 
information scientists will have to come from within the 
profession itself,· ie, from those who possess both a 
knowledge of bibliographic issues and practices and who 
manifest an inclination to reflect upon their bearing upon 
the question of how we come to know through recorded 
knowledge, and how it may be possible to assess the validity 
of knowledge acquired in this manner. Several theorists and 
practitioners in the field of library and information 
science have, at some or other time, made implicit or 
explicit references to these issues. These contributions 
have to be recognized, and evaluated for their potential 
value in a proposal of a position suited to library and 
information science. These contributions are presented and 
evaluated in Chapters 5 & 6. 
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4 Definitions of information, knowledge, and library and 
information science 
4.1 Knowledge transfer as a theoretical focus for library and 
information science 
In con~rast to the well-established recognition by the 




of their intermediary roles in the transfer of 
and hence of the relevance of epistemology to their 
there are conflicting views in library and information 
science about a professional concern with the transfer of 
knowledge. The latter debate often assumes the "container" 
versus "content" form so that there is uncertainty as to whether 
librarians and information officers should focus on the physical 
carriers of knowledge, or the content thereof, or both, and to 
what extent. There is also uncertainty as to what similarities 
and differences, if any, there are between the terms "knowledge" 
and "information", as wel1 as their meanings in the context of 
library and information science. 
Regarding the issue relating to the concern of library and 
information science with either the physical record or knowledge 
itself, there are three views that are discernible in the 
literature: 
(a) There is the view that the concern of librarians with 
the content of documents is mostly for the purposes of 
classification and indexing (Cilliers, 1985: 154). There 
is, for example, the widely-expressed perception that the 
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study of the organization of recorded knowledge ought to be 
preceded by the analysis of knowledge itself as a valuable 
investigation by students of library and information science 
(cf for example Langridge, 1969: 3; McGarry, 1969: 127; 
Caldwell, 1970: 139). Caldwell suggests that such a study 
could include, for example, the theory of knowledge, 
perception, concept formation, the personal acquisition of 
knowledge and the growth of knowledge. However, he 
envisages this study of knowledge itself as a necessary 
prerequisite for the study of the organization of recorded 
knowledge as equal parts of a whole, conceived as a 
-
developmental unity (ibid.). 
There is the need to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, the conception of knowledge as that resource which 
manifests itself in physical records (as recorded knowledge) 
and which librarians and information officers organize for 
use, and on the other hand the conception of knowledge that 
manifests itself in distinctive modes of knowing and that 
guides the approach of the librarian and information officer 
to all his/her professional tasks (encompassing, inter alia, 
classification and indexing). McGarry characterizes this 
latter conception as the " special kind of knowing 
that distinguishes us from other related professions" 
(emphasis added; 1985: 97). This perception that there is 
a need for the clear understanding of basic concepts such as 
knowledge (and information) in the context of library and 
information science as a means to establish professional 
identity is shared by Pauline Wilson. She argues, moreover, 
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that the failure on the part of library and information 
science to distinguish itself from other information-related 
occupations by defining its instructional domain or 
explaining the content of education for information 
professionals has led to the closing of four library schools 
in the USA by 1988 (1988: 82). Hence, these definitional 
issues have more than mere academic value. 
In addition to the view that librarians are only 
concerned with human knowledge for the purposes of 
classification and indexing, an even-stronger view holds 
that it is fallacious to think that libraries are 
responsible for the transmission or transfer of knowledge at 
all. The reason for this claim is the view that the actual 
transfer of knowledge, which involves a process of 
"cognition", takes place after the user has been handed a 
generic document (Meijer, 1982: 24). Meijer maintains 
that: 
"The transfer of knowledge, an extralibrary 
matter, is therefore not characteristic of 
librarianship and is wrongly included with library 
activities" (1982: 24). 
In a later publication, however, Meijer et al do acknowledge 
that the library and information profession works with 
documents as well as their content (1988: 18-27, 95; cf 
5.21). This content (which Meijer et al submit is not 
adequately described by the terms "knowledge" and 
"information"-cf 4.2 & 4.3) should be made accessible in 
order to make cultural progress possible. The notion of. 
cultural progress appears to assume the transfer of 
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knowledge, or at least the interaction between knowledge and 
individuals, and knowledge and society, and suggests a 
partial acceptance of the view that libraries are, after 
all, intermediaries in the transfer of knowledge. 
(b) 
1
In contrast to these uncertain views, the perception 
that it is the very purpose of the library to be engaged in 
the knowledge transfer function is best summed up in Shera's 
claim that the library aims II to bring the human mind 
and the graphic record together in a fruitful relation" 
(1983: 387; cf Giuliano, 1969: 344). Shera speaks of the 
mastery of the substantive content of graphic records as the 
primary emphasis of librarians, and of librarianship being 
rooted in epistemology (1965: 176-7; 1970: 88). The 
categorical claim that library science should be seen as an 
integral part of the theory of knowledge is made by Staber 
and Schmidt (1983: 348-52; cf 5.28.1 for a brief exposition 
of their views). 
In this view, there is clearly the perceived need to 
move beyond the focus only upon the study of the physical 
records of knowledge towards the investigation of the 
processes surrounding the transfer of knowledge itself. In 
the context of a discussion of the foundations of academic 
librarianship, Buckland claims that academic library 
services have to do with: 
11 support for learning, both the study of what 
others hav.e discovered and research to discover 
what is apparently not yet known ... Yet the 
librarian's role is often very indirect. Rather 
than knowledge itself, the librarian's concern is 
usually with representations of knowledge: texts 
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and images... [and]... text-bea~ing objects: 
books, jou~nals, photog~aphs and databases 
millions of them. Somehow we need to maintain ou~ 
unde~lying conce~n with the gene~ation and 
acquisition of knowledge" (emphasis added; 1989: 
394). 
Buckland continues by explaining that the new info~mation 
technology is enabling the di~ect location, access, 
t~ansfe~, analysis, manipulation, compa~ison and ~evision of 
texts (ie, di~ect access to knowledge itself). He envisages 
that, in this way, lib~a~ianship may become di~ectly engaged 
in the sea~ch fo~ beauty, t~uth, justice and knowledge 
~athe~ than with texts and images that ~ep~esent them o~ 
physical objects that a~e text-bea~ing (1989: 391). 
(c) A thi~d view seeks a dialectical inte~action between: 
(i) the intellectual st~uctu~e of knowledge, and 
(ii) the lib~a~ian's technology of access to knowledge 
(W~ight, 1986: 768; cf 5.19). 
This view ~equi~es that the lib~a~ian concent~ate his 
intellectual effo~ts both on the physical "containe~" and 
knowledge itself, with a view to p~oviding optimal access to 
the holdings and to stimulating optimal use. Hannabus, in 
this ~ega~d, p~oposes that the cognitive dynamics 
su~~ounding what he desc~ibes as "the knowledge encounte~" 
(~efe~~ing t~aditionally to the ~efe~ence inte~view) which 
encompasses as essential components, the use~ seeking 
knowledge and the lib~a~ian as an inte~media~y in this 
p~ocess, is wo~thy of ca~eful investigation since it also 
sheds light on the issue of knowledge ~ep~~sentation (1988: 
14). These dynamics include wo~ld views, cognitive styles 
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and ways in which users, and librarians as intermediaries, 
categorize and classify knowledge as significant factors 
that influence the ways in which they II come to know" 
(ibid.). These and other aspects surrounding the process of 
knowledge transfer are considered by Hannabus as being 
important to the librarian as an intermediary in order to 
enhance an understanding of the process of seeking and 
handling information (cf 4.2 & 4.3 below for a more careful 
analytica~ distinction between the terms "knowledge" and 
"information"). He argues that "If we are to understand the 
way in which information gets converted into knowledge, such 
[knowledge] encounters ... are unique in their informative 
value to the ,professional information handler" (ibid.; cf 
4.3.5.1.4). 
/ 
While the first view, viz (a) above, essentially holds that 
libraries do not produce thoughts themselves, it is difficult to 
imagine how thoughts emerge and develop without recourse to 
organized knowledge in libraries. To preclude the transfer nf 
knowledge as a study for the librarian and information officer 
means that less emphasis is placed on user studies, knowledge 
utilization, the process of reading as a means of understandin_g 
the physical world, and the value of literacy programmes. 
Libraries corporatively develop their collections because they 
assume that individuals using them do "learn" or "acquire 
knowledge". 
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Meije~·s definition of lib~a~ianship o~ients this p~ofession 
to the ideal of cultu~al p~og~ess, and it is difficult to 
inte~p~et this notion in any context othe~ than in one of the 
g~owth of knowledge, o~ of what Danton calls "epistemological 
p~og~ess" (1934: 551) . This unde~sco~es the need by lib~a~ians 
and info~mation wo~ke~s, on the one hand, to come to g~ip~ with 
the seve~al ways by which thei~ use~s come to "know" th~ough the 
use of ~eco~ded human knowledge, and to unde~stand how thei~ own. 
methods of knowing influence thei~ inte~media~y ~ales on the 
othe~. An unde~standing of these p~ocesses will p~ovide the 
lib~a~ian with a keene~ insight into, and c~itical awa~eness of 
the epistemological dynamics su~~ounding, his p~ofessional ~ole. 
The close association of lib~a~y and info~mation science 
with education suggests an ove~lap of p~ofessional conce~ns (cf 
education as a cognate discipline-3.4). The diffe~ence between 
the two is in deg~ee ~athe~ than in p~inciple, and hence a 
I 
conce~n with how knowledge is t~ansmitted th~ough texts o~ 
documents is also an impo~tant study fa~ lib~a~ians. The issue 
involves epistemological conside~ations, and this study attempts 
to expound a f~amewo~k within which an unde~standing of the ways 
in which use~s of ~eco~ded knowledge may a~~ive at valid 
knowledge claims, and p~ima~ily, to establish an epistemological 
position fa~ lib~a~ians that will highlight the methods of 
knowing and philosophical assumptions that guide thei~ app~oaches 
to the pe~fo~mance of p~ofessional tasks, and that influence 
thei~ ~esea~ch st~ategies and techniques. 
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While the views noted above [(a) to (c)] exp~ess diffe~ences 
of opinion ~ega~ding the deg~ee to which knowledge t~ansfe~ ought 
to be investigated as a c~itical issue in the. education of 
lib~a~ians, the~e is little doubt that the te~ms "knowledge" and 
"info~mation" a~e widely used in the lite~atu~e of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science (cf 4.2, & 4.3.1 fo~ a discussion of the 
value of a definition of knowledge fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation 
science) . It may be infe~~ed hence that these te~ms a~e of 
cent~al significance in both academic and p~ofessional contexts 
and that the attempt to achieve cla~ity and consistency ~ega~ding 
thei~ meanings, and p~ecision in thei~ application, is a wo~thy 
unde~taking in the sea~ch fo~ an app~op~iate epistemological 
position fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science. 
On the othe~ hand, the absence (o~ unawa~eness) of a 
consciously-held and consensus-suppo~ted epistemological position 
may be the ve~y ~eason fo~ the failu~e to a~~ive at suitable 
definitions of the notions of knowledge and info~mation, 
as of lib~ary and info~mation science (cf 4.2-4.4). 
as well 
While ~t is beyond the scope and intended pu~pose of this 
study to explo~e the ~elationships between semantics and 
linguistic philosophy (specifically those between semantics and 
epistemology), the~e is conside~able evidence that the c~eation 
of the meanings of wo~ds, and hence thei~ definitions, a~e 
influenced by given philosophical stances. Fo~ example, in his 
wo~k Logic, t~uth and language, Aye~ p~oclaims that philosophe~s 
a~e conce~ned mo~e di~ectly with the definitions of wo~ds 
co~~esponding with the physical p~ope~ties of things (1946: 57) • 
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Of greater relevance here is the observation that, as a 
representative of the positivist view of language, Ayer contends 
that the meaning of a proposition is identical with its method of 
verification (referred to as the "principle of verifiability") 
(cf also the positivist epistemological position in 
education-3.4.1; Kretzmann, 1967: 404). The underlying 
empiricist epistemological position of positivism requires that 
validity of meaning, ie the truth or falsity, of concepts is 
established by the extent to which they are empirically 
observable, ie, tested against sense experience. For this 
reason, metaphysical concepts such as, for example "mass", "God" 
etc, are considered as being meaningless or "fictions" (Mouton, 
1987: 14; Blanshard, 1962: 323). 
This example highlights the ongoing concern of linguistic 
philosophers with the provision of definitions that they consider 
to be valid or true (in accordance with their epistemological 
positions), as distinct from conventional dictionary definitions. 
Furtherm6re, the specific view of reality maintained by a given 
philosopher supplies an epistemological dimension to the attempt 
to derive the meanings and definitions of concepts. The 
implication of this observation is that, without a clearly-held 
epistemological position, confusion and divergence of opinion 
appears to prevail in respect of the meanings or definitions of 
key concepts. 
This concern is expressed in the context of library and 
information science by Kesting: "In the absence of a coherently 
conceived epistemological foundation for our profession, we tend 
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to display the typical symptoms of Babel" (1990: vi; cf also his 
quotation regarding the lack of consensus of a definition for 
"information" at the end of .4. 2) • The absence of an 
epistemological position is clearly the result of the lack of 
funda~ental thinking and the paucity of writings on theoretical 
issues in this profession, as well as the positive disregard for 
its significance (cf also the Preamble to Chapter 5). Cronin, 
for example, states: "While others may seek to define and 
refine, we move beyond epistemology (what is information?) ... to 
value analysis (how can information be exploited?)" (1988: 1) • 
This assertion clearly links epistemology with the process of 
definition, in this instance the definition of information. 
This association is expanded in McGarry's observation that 
the several definitions of information reflect gradations and 
varieties of epistemological standpoints (1983: 99; cf 5. 23). 
This claim that epistemological views are fundamental in an 
attempt to define information is supported strongly in Benge's 
claim that " our descriptions of the meaning of information 
rest on our concept of reality", ie our epistemological 
commitments (1984: 188; cf 6.3). Hence there is a manifest 
acknowledgement of the relationship between epistemological views 
and definitional aspects. 
In the remainder of this chapter the divergence of opinion 
regarding the definition of the concepts perceived to be relevant 
to a discussion of epistemological aspects of library and 
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information science reflects th ese theoretical lacunae and the 
concomitant importance of establishing a clearly-defined 
epistemological position. 
The need to define "knowledge" and "information" in the 
context of library and information science cannot be divorced 
from the need to determine the identity of this professional 
discipline itself (cf Pauline Wilson's claim in 4.1 (a), above). 
It is especially the concern of several other academic 
disciplines with the notion of information that confirms the need 
for library and information science to distinguish itself in its 
approach to information as distinct in its essence from these 
disciplines (cf 4.2.1.4.1). For this reason, it is also 
necessary to provide an overview of the several definitions of 
library and information science and to examine the several 
categories of perceptions of the relationships between library 
science and information science (cf 4.4). 
4.2 Information 
There are so many different meanings of the word 
"information" that it has been referred to, inter alia, as a 
"God-word" and as "an 
\ 
all-purpose weasel-word" in extremity 
(Roszak, 1986: ix; Machlup, 1983: 653). The task of attaining a 
si~gle definition that would be acceptable in all contexts is 
complicated by several diffi~ulties. However, as "information" 
has been identified over a wide front as a potential central 
dynamic for the discipline of library and information science (cf 
,. 
Meijer et al, 1988: 64-84), there is a concomitant imperative to 
delimit this term to this disciplinary context. There have been 
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a few majo~ attempts in Weste~n count~ies ove~ the last two 
decades to desc~ibe the delimitation of info~mation within the 
context of lib~a~y and info~mation science (cf fo~ example 
Well isch, 1972; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983; Meije~ et al, 1988; 
Yuexiao, 1988). 
4.2.1 Difficulties of defining info~mation 
The difficulties of definition that have been identified a~e 
~andomly listed and b~iefly discussed below. 
4. 2. 1 .1" The his to~ ica 1 designation "In fo~mation Age" 
The cha~acte~ization of the cu~~ent histo~ical pe~iod as the 
"Info~mation Age", and the mode~n awa~eness of the value of 
info~mation fo~ seve~al occupations, indust~ies and p~ofessions 
exace~bates the difficulty of definition. In his su~vey of the 
histo~y of info~mation, Stevens makes the salient point that, 
amidst the cu~~ent emphasis on info~mation as a dominant 
contempo~a~y phenomenon, it has consistently been a significant 
element in the ove~all development of human society th~oughout 
the ages, having shaped the way in which we think and act 
cumulatively (1986: 2). He states in this ~egard that: 
"What is now p~oclaimed as an Info~mation Age is, in 
some sense, a te~m that can be applied to all stages of 
human development. The old concept, fo~ example, of an 
I~on Age can be seen to have had its ~oats in the 
discove~y and t~ansmission of info~mation about how 
i~on o~e could be t~ansfo~med into useful objects" 
( 1986: 2) . 
In gene~al then, Stevens' contention that all ages may be 
desc~ibed as "Info~mation Ages" seems justified to some extent. 
Howeve~, the application of this specific appellation to desc~ibe 
the essential quality of the p~esent histo~ical pe~iod stems f~om 
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the need to typify the significance of a period characterized by 
a dramatic interrelationship between civilization's information 
requirements and the emergence of tools and systems (ie, 
information technology) to meet those requirements. The further 
refinement of information technology contributed to the emergence 
of information industries that established themselves and grew to 
the point where they are now dominant economic segments of 
society (Stevens, 1986: 38). 
Hence, although the concept of information may have a long 
history, its perceived current social and economic significance 
has contributed to a concerted effort being made to define it 
systematically. 
4.2.1.2 The prevalence of vague definitions 
Many of the definitions in the literatures of library and 
information science as well as in those of other disciplines tend 
to be imprecise, ambiguo~s and contradictory - a difficulty which 
has been well-documented (cf for example Wellisch, 1972; Machlup 
& Mansfield, 1983; Meijer et al 1988: 69; Yuexiao, 1988). 
terminological and conceptual problem has led Belkin, 
The 
for 
example, to propose out of desperation that we ought to concern 
ourselves, not with definitions, but rather with concepts, of 
information (1978: 58) • Against this, Meijer has argued that 
conceptu,lization and definition are inseparably linked in so far 
as there can be no concept to interpret without definition as a 
process of delimitation (1978: 147-8). 
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The p~evalence of confusion in the many attempts at 
definitions of info~mation has led to doubt as to whethe~ 
consensual ag~eement is possible o~ likely to be ~eached at all 
(Kesting, 1977: 164; cf 4.2.3). 
4.2.1.3 Standa~d dictiona~y definitions 
Standa~d language dictiona~ies cannot supply an adequate 
definition because they tend to confine themselves to b~oad, 
gene~al, gene~ic desc~iptions. Fo~ example, the Webste~·s Thi~d 
Inte~national Dictiona~y defines info~mation as: 
"the communication o~ ~eception of knowledge o~ 
intelligence; something obtained o~ ~eceived th~ough 
info~ming; the p~ocess by which the fo~m of an object 
of knowledge is imp~essed upon the app~ehending mind so 
as to b~ing about the status of knowing" (1976: 1160). 
In its tu~n, the Sho~te~ Oxfo~d English dictiona~y states that 
info~mation is: 
"The action of info~ming; t~aining, inst~uction; 
communication of inst~uctive knowledge ... The action of 
telling o~ fact of being told of something ••. That of 
which one is app~ised o~ told; intelligence, news ... " 
. (1972: 1003). 
Stevens obse~ves in ~esponse to the above that while 
non-specialists still seem to use this kind of b~oad definition 
of the te~m, it is obvious that such gene~al definitions of 
info~mation cannot be applied p~ofitably to an unde~standing of 
the mo~e specialized ways in which the wo~d is now used in 
seve~al dispa~ate o~ cognate disciplines (1986: 6). 
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4.2.1.4 Te~minological difficulties 
These difficulties de~ive chiefly f~om two sou~ces: 
viz, the p~ominence of info~mation as a theo~etical phenomenon 
of inte~est in seve~al disciplines, 
info~mation with cognate te~ms. 
and the ~elationship of 
4.2.1.4.1 Conceptions of info~mation in diffe~ent disciplines 
The~e a~e seve~al disciplines that have an inte~est in 
info~mation, and that ~efine it f~om thei~ own points of view. 
This ~esults, not only in the eme~gence of a wide va~iety of 
definitions of info~mation, but also in the pe~ceived conceptual 
inte~~elationships of info~mation with many othe~ te~ms f~om 
these disciplines. These te~ms themselves often ~equi~e 
definition befo~e the meaning of info~mation can be cla~ified in 
its many contexts. 
In compiling thei~ definitive su~vey, The study of 
information; inte~disciplina~y messages, Machlup and Mansfield 
invited ~ep~esentatives f~om all academic disciplines claiming to 
have disciplina~y inte~ests in the study of info~mation to submit 
essays desc~ibing how info~mation ~elates to thei~ ~espective 
a~eas of study. Machlup and Mansfield's study contains 46 
essays, 20 of which inco~po~ate the designation of an ac~demic 
discipline o~ sub-discipline in the title of the essay conce~ned. 
In the final chapte~, Machlup ~efe~s to the "compendium of 
meanings" that eme~ge f~om these essays, noting that the ve~y 
dive~sity of disciplines involved impose ~est~ictions on the 
definition of info~mation "fo~ pu~poses of thei~ theo~etical 
tasks" (1983: 660). These disciplina~y-~elated ~est~ictions on 
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the definition of information suggest the need to guard against 
the unduly uncritical "borrowing" of definitions across 
disciplinary boundaries. For example, definitions of information 
in biology will unavoidably differ from definitions of 
\ 
information in library and information science because the two 
fields do not share a common or even remotely cognate 
( 
disciplinary focus. 
4.2.1.4.2 Relationship of information with cognate terms 
Many definitions of information refer to cognate terms such 
as data, percepts, knowledge and sometimes truth, understanding 
and wisdom (cf for example Ehlers, 1971: 178-85; Shera, 1972; 
Koc hen , 1 97 5 ; Bekker, 1977; Wilson, 1977, 1983; Pansegrouw, 1984 
etc). These cognate terms are themselves not easy to define, and 
their relationship with information has even been called in 
question by some researchers (Meijer et al, 1988: 83). 
The major difficulties of defining the term information 
underscore the absence of a single source for an adequate 
definition and suggest the probable futility of seeking to 
achieve a single, common definition of appropriate applications 
for the wide range of specialized disciplines involved. A more 
useful approach seems to lie in the direction of an attempt to 
delimit the parameters within which a suitable working definition 
may be sought for library and information science. 
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4.2.2 Classification of definitions of information 
4.2.2.1 Hierarchical structure of levels 
One attempt to delimit the notion of information in its most 
general sense is typified by Yuexiao's classification of the 
definitions of information. The writer was motivated by the 
discovery that the more than 400 diverse definitions of 
information encountered in his survey of the literature led to 
unavoidable misunderstandings in scientific and cultural 
communications. These definitions need to be classified 
according to ranges with appropriate descriptive headings. 
Yuexiao distinguishes, in a hierarchical structure headed by the 
philosophical range (the broadest), at least 14 other subordinate 
categories or ranges of definitions of information (1988: 481). 
The purpose of the classification is to clarify misunderstand-
ings by demonstrating the notion of multiple levels, ranges and 
categories of information definitions rather than singular ones 
with singular subsets (1988: 483). 
Yuexiao believes that it would be more profitable for each 
profession or discipline to attempt reaching agreement on the 
range of definitions or single definition most suited to its 
requirements rather than to expect that all professions and 
disciplines will attain consensus regarding a uniform definition 
of information. Accordingly, therefore, library and information 
science, which traces its roots, as librarianship, to the origins 
of writing as a means. of recording ideas and experience in 
int~rpersonally shareable symbols on relatively permanent media, 
and to the social and economic pressures that led to the 
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preparation, preservation and retrieval of permanent written 
records, shou~d restrict itself to that range of information 
which is of relevance to the collection, 
\ 
organization and use of 
recorded knowledge (1988: 485). In other words, library and 
information science is not the only or even the primary science 
involved in the study of information; hence its domain ought to 
be demarcated clearly (cf 4.4). 
In an investigation to "establish a scientific basis for 
curriculum development in library and information science and to 
determine the required learning content at the macrolevel", 
Meijer et al have identified and examined information as one of 
three proposed central dynamics of the discipline (1988: viii). 
The section of this investigation devoted to information as a 
~ 
probable central dynamic highlights the need to delimit its use 
to the context of library and information science. Meijer et al 
provide the following framework to facilitate critical analysis 
and delimitation of the concept of information: 
4.2.2.2 Information as content and/or process 
The range of definitions of information appropriate to 
library and information science may be further narrowed and 
analyzed in accordance with their primary emphases. M~ijer et al 
identify and analyze nine definitions of information as content 
(cf 4.2.2.2.1) and seven definitions of information as process 
(cf 4.2.2.2.2). A free rendering into English is followed by the 
original Afrikaans text~ This has been necessary because of the 
difficulty of achieving a meaningful literal translation. Each 
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---- -- ~-~- -----~---........... -
The essence of each of these pe~ceptions of info~mation is 
analyzed in conside~able detail and discussed c~itically by 
Meije~ et al (1988: 71). It is difficult to accept without 
fu~the~ ado Meije~ et al's view that "info~mation as commodity" 
[a(i)] and "info~mation as knowledge contained in documents" 
[a(vi)] can be included unde~ the wide~ ~ub~ic of info~mation as 
".content in documents" [a] (ie, documents as a gene~ic medium of 
whateve~ kind). 
of info~mation", 
While the fo~me~ suggests an exte~nal "ca~~ie~ 
the latte~ conveys the subjective meaning 
attached to g~aphic symbols, o~ "ma~ks-on-pape~". The tendency 
on the pa~t of Meije~ et al to conflate the exte~nal (physical) 
and the subjective (metaphysical) conceptions of info~mation 
within the same subcatego~y, appea~s to complicate the effo~t to 
p~ovide an unambiguous definition of the phenomenon of 
info~mation. 
Fu~the~mo~e, the ~efe~ence to info~mation as "the st~uctu~e 
of texts" [a(iii)] is not explained fu~the~ in Meije~ et al and 
is consequently obscu~e in isolation. The meaning becomes 
clea~e~ if one consults the o~iginal sou~ce, viz Belkin and 
Robe~tson, the cited o~iginato~s of this view, who claim howeve~ 
that it is impossible to isolate info~mation as "the st~uctu~e of 
texts" f~om its specific ~ole, ie, the capability of any text 
as st~uctu~ed by a sende~ - to change the "image-st~uctu~e" of a 
~ecipient. This use of the te~m "st~uctu~e" ~efe~s to its 
semiotic connotation, ie, it ~efe~s to concept formation and 
inte~-human communication (Belkin & Robe~tson, 
autho~s state specifically that: 
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1976: 200). The 
" we cannot study the 
associated info~mation, 
phenomena that ~elate 
~ecipient" ( 1976: 201). 
phenomenon of the text and its 
except in association with the 
the text to the sende~ and 
This statement would seem acco~dingly to suggest a "p~ocess" 
~athe~ than a "content" app~oach to defining info~mation. 
Nevertheless, the ove~~iding cha~acte~istic of this 
subcatego~y of definitions appea~s to be an attempt to ~est~ict 
the meaning of info~mation to that of a "physical ~eco~d" o~ 
"ge.ne~ic document", ie, info~mation is conceived as a physically 
independent and exte~nalized entity. 
(b) In cont~ast to the na~~owe~ conceptions of info~mation 
as content, above, this subcatego~y inte~p~ets info~mation 
as content mo~e widely as: 
( i ) 'content eithe~ ~eco~ded in/on documents, 0~ 
existing only in people's minds' ["inhoud wat [of] in/op 
dokumente vasgel~ is .•• [ofJ net in mensekoppe 
bestaan"]; 
(ii) 'Info~mation/s, ie, data, facts, thi~gs and events 
i~~espective of thei~ being ~eco~ded o~ not in o~ on 
documents; and' [" · Information (en) ' [ Inl igtinge] ~ dit 
wi 1 s~ data .• fei te .• dinge en gebeurtenisse wat in/op 
dokumente vasgel~ is, al dan nie; en"] 
(iii) 'eve~y sou~ce f~om which a human being may be 
info~med, viz, divine ~evelation, natu~e (ie, the 
enti~ety of c~eated ~eality), and cultu~e (inte~ alia 
what man obtains, manufactu~es o~ accomplishes via 
natu~al phenomena) ... and the content of human memo~y· 
["aile brongebiede waaruit 'n mens ingelig kan word~ te 
wete God se openbaring, die natuur (die hele geskape 
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werklikheid), [en] die kultuur (onder meer wat die mens 
met die materiaal wat hy uit die natuur verkry, 
vervaardig en tot .stand gebring het) ... en die inhoud 
van die menslike geheue"] (1988: 72). 
In this subcategory of definitions of information as 
content, the content that characterizes information is extended 
to include all possible sources, ie, it reaches beyond a narrower 
association with the generic document. In this way, the content 
of o_ne · s mind, cultural symbols and physical artifacts, etc, are 
all included in the meaning of information. More accurately, 
some of these sources have a latent "potential for meaning". 
Such a meaning becomes apparent through recognition by a 
"knowing" individual. For this reason, some cultural "products" 
may be more meaningful to some than to others. 
The value of unrecorded information (information "in one's 
mind") is enhanced when it is recorded in some permanent form in 
that it may be made more widely available, and it transcends the 
"time-bound" barrier, ie, it does not disappear.at the time of 
death of its creator/possessor. On the other hand, 
information does not exist in a "recorded" state, 
as long as 
its value is 
diminished by restricted and transient exposure, and indeed the 
possibility of its total disappearance (cf also conceptions of 
recorded and unrecorded knowledge-5.28.11 & 6.2.4). 
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4.2.2.2.2 Info~mation as p~ocess 
In addition to the nine inte~p~etations of info~mation as 
content, as noted above, Meije~ et al identify at least seven 
inte~p~etations of info~mation as p~ocess as encounte~ed in the 
lite~atu~e examined. The inte~p~etations that view info~mation 
as p~ocess a~e all de~ived f~om classical communication theo~y as 
applied to lib~a~y and info~mation science. These 
inte~p~etations may be divided into two subcatego~ies: 
(a) In the fi~st catego~y (comp~ising th~ee. 
cha~acte~izations), Meije~ et al state that: 
'Th~ee of the seven cha~acte~izations deal with 
p~ocesses that a~e di~ected at the ~eceive~. The 
p~ocesses conce~ned a~e the di~ect info~ming of the 
~eceive~ by the sende~, the indi~ect info~ming by means 
of a channel, and the execution of special 'info~mation 
t~ansfe~ functions in the channel fo~ the pu~poses of 
the ~eceive~· ["Drie van die sewe karakteriserings 
handel oor prosesse wat op die ontvanger gerig is. Die 
prosesse is die direkte inlig van die ontvanger deur 
die sender, die indirekte inlig deur middel van 'n 
kanaal en die uitvoering van spesiale 
'inligtingoordragfunksies' in die kanaal ten behoewe 
van die on tvanger"] ( 1988: 72) . 
In this th~eefold unde~standing of info~mation as p~ocess 
the idea of "action" o~ "activity" is of c~nt~al significance. 
The th~ee definitions concent~ate on p~ocesses di~ected at the 
~eceive~. Some of these views attempt to link the components of 
the communication p~ocess, viz, the sende~, the channel and the 
~eceive~ into a chain that suppo~ts an inte~action, o~ t~ansfe~-
·"action". 
(b) The ~emaining fou~ inte~p~etations of info~mation as a 
p~ocess have a bea~ing upon what occu~s within the mind of a 
~eceive~ (1988: 73). The focus, in this case, is on mental o~ 
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cerebral processes that convert external stimuli into personal 
meaning for the benefit of an individual receiver. In this way, 
an individual is able to "make sense of the world" by organizing 
the information assimilated, using internal mechanisms. The 
following quotation from Minder & Whitten in Meijer et al, which 
represents a summation of the views of several writers, explains 
more fully that information, in this sense, refers to: 
"the ways in which the human mind accepts external 
stimuli from the percept world and uses its internal 
functions of logic, memory and emotion to make meaning 
of them and to stimulate the mind to understanding and 
insights" (Minder & Whitten, 1975: 263 cited in Meijer 
etal, 1988: 73). 
This view corresponds closely with Licklider's perception of 
information as the processing of "organized data into knowledge" 
(1975: 167). 
The idea conveyed in this subcategory is that information is 
some active principle governing the human capacity to process 
fragments which are meaningless in isolation into a coherent and 
meaningful whole for the receiver. 
It is important to.note that Meijer et al claim that the 
nine interpretations of information as content and the seven 
interpretations of information as process do not exhaust the 
totality of the interpretations of information that apply to 
library and information scien~e, inferring, however, that they 
have highlighted the most significant ones at that. The reason 
for this is that there are a number of authors who view 
information as both content and process simultaneously. 
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4.2.2.2.3 Information- as content and process 
Instead of an either/or approach to the definition of 
information according to Meijer et al there is also a category of 
interpretation that construes information as both noun and verb, 
and hence as both commodity and process. It may well have been 
more accurate to characterize this category as a "multiple view 
of information", since many of the authors associated with this 
category characterize information in three and four different 
ways. 
Debons, for example, characterizes information not only as 
process and commodity, but also adds a third dimension to this 
multiple view: 
"I would like to think of information as an environment 
representing the assembly of peoples, equipment, and 
procedure - in the latter sense as a system obeying 
system laws. Consequently, I visualize a science of 
information as an attempt to bridge these three 
dimensions by laws which are metas~ientific in 
character" (1974: 14). 
In its turn, Furth's conception of information as a "process 
of knowing" and as a "coded fact" should be seen in the context 
of Piaget's theory of knowledge (1974: 21-27). This conception 
cannot be simplistically reduced to a·process plus content view 
of information. It should be mentioned that the Meijer et al 
survey does not give it this qualified description. The 
reference to Otten also requires further elaboration. Although 
Otten suggests that information may be seen as a commodity in a 
static sense and as a process in a dynamic sense, he continues to 
sketch a rather complex picture of the multi-level features of 
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info..-mation, the inte..-dependence of info..-mation with matte..- and 
ene..-gy and the significance of the communication p..-ocess to the 
existence of info..-mation (1974: 105). 
Meije..- et al (1988: 73) do contend, howeve..-, that these 
combined views of info..-mation a..-e not as concise as those 
exp..-essed in chapte..- subdivisions 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2.2. Thei..-
attempt to establish a scientific basis fo..- cu..-..-iculum 
development in lib..-a..-y and info..-mation science subsumes a content 
plus p..-ocess view of info..-mation. 
On pp. 74-5 they summa..-ize all the views conside..-ed in thei..-
study. Info..-mation as content is unde..-stood as: 
(a) 'Potential info..-mation in sende..-s' b..-ains; this may be 
subdivided into' ["Potensiele inligting in die brein van 
senders; dit kan onderskei word in]: 
(i) 'non-p..-ocessed data andlo..-· [nie-verwerkte gegewens 
en/of] 
(ii) 'p..-ocessed data and/o..-· [verwerkte gegewens en/of] 
(iii) 'constituted p..-e- and/dl"" post-exp..-essive knowledge 
in the human b..-ain' [gevormde pre- en/of 
post-ekspressiewe kennis in die menslike brein;"] 
(b) 'the content of documents (ie ..-eco..-ds, info..-mation 
sou..-ces) without na..-..-owe..- specification' ["die inhoud van 
dokumente (rekord, inligtingbronne) sonder nadere 
presisering;"] 
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(c) 'the content of processed data contained in and on 
documents, and' ["die inhoud van verwerk te gegewens wat 
in/op dokumente vasgel~ is, en"] 
(d) 'the content ot non-processed data which is contained in 
or on documents. To this should be added in a consistent 
manner': ["die inhoud van nie-verwerkte gegewens (data) wat 
in/op dokumente vasgel~· is. 
toegevoeg word":] 
Hieraan moet konsekwent 
(e) 'the potential information from the source areas which 
are not contained in or on documents' ["die potensi~le 
inligting uit die brongebiede, wat nie in/op dokumente 
vasgeltf} is nie"] (1988: 75). 
Information as process is understood variously as: 
(a) 'The direct informing of receivers from 
information-source areas' ["Die direkte inlig van ontvangers 
uit inligtingbrongebiede;"] 
(b) 'the direct informing of receivers by senders' 
direkte inlig van ontvangers deur senders;"] 
["die 
(c) 'all services, equipment and activities in libraries and 
information centres' ["alle dienste, toerusting en 
aktiwiteite in biblioteke en inligtingsentrums;"J 
(d) 'limiting these services, equipment and activities to -
the transfer of potential information of the channel to the 
receiver - including consultation services which facilitate 
communication between senders and receivers, and' ["die 
beperking van hierdie dienste, toerusting en aktiwiteite tot 
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die oordrag van potensi~le inligting van die kanaal na die 
ontvanger met insluiting van konsultasiedienste wat 
senders en ontvangers met mekaar in aanraking bring, en"] 
(e) 'one or more of the information activities operating in 
the receiver ["een of meer van die inligtingaktiwiteite in 
die ontvanger" J (1988: 75). 
Meijer et al conclude that the above delineation (viz (a) to 
(e)) reaffirms the finding that the prevalent application of the 
term 'information' in library and information science remains 
obscurely and hence inadequately demarcated (1988: 75) • 
4.2.2.2.4 General evaluation of the Meijer et al review of 
definitions of information 
The task of classifying definitions of information, as they 
are presented in the literature by various authors, under chosen 
descriptive headings, is not unrelated to the purpose of such a 
classification. Meijer et al's review should be seen in the 
context of the aim of their specific project, ie, to investigate 
the establishment of a scientific basis for curriculum 
development in library and information science. Hence their 
classification of the definitions of information of necessity 
imposes c~rtain restrictions on the definitions that they 
consider. 
Belkin's attempt to develop a suitable definition of 
information for information science demonstrates similar 
unavoidable difficulties. Having specified a number of 
I 
requirements with which a suitable definition should comply, it 
.i18 
is not su~p~ising that his own definition eme~ged as the most 
app~op~iate of all (1978: 
fact that seve~al autho~s, 
55-85). Of equal impo~tance is the 
whose definitions of info~mation we~e 
analysed by Belkin, ~esponded c~itically to the latte~'s 
inte~p~etation of thei~ views (1978: 242-6 & 350; 1979: 92-3). 
Thus, Belkin's analysis ~ests on assumptions which a~e que~ied by 
the ostensible c~eato~s of those ve~y assumptions and claims. 
While c~iticism may then be levelled at Meije~ et al fo~ the 
ways in which they have g~ouped togethe~ seemingly dispa~ate 
views of info~mation, thei~ ~eview eme~ges undoubtedly as a 
synthetic and helpful (if not at times a somewhat ~igid) analysis 
of a complex conceptual and semantic issue of p~ima~y impo~tance 
to the discussion of an epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and 
info~mation science. 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
The failu~e to delimit the te~m info~mation fo~ lib~a~y and 
info~mation science has led to the ~elative impossibility of 
accepting any single definition as completely adequate. Meije~ 
et al contlud~ acco~dingly that info~mation has not yet been 
delimited definitively as a potentially app~op~iate cent~al 
dynamic fo~ cu~~iculum planning and design in lib~a~y and 
info~mation science (1988: 83). 
F~om the point of view of this study, which, of cou~se, is 
not focused on the needs of cu~~iculum development, but conce~ns 
itself ~athe~ with an investigation into developing an 
epistemological posit~on fo~ the p~ofessional discipline of 
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library and information science, information is viewed within a 
broader epistemological framework, ie, the term information is 
delimited further in terms of the scope of this study by relating 
it more systematically to the term "knowledge" (cf 4.3). 
We have noted the need to recognize the divergence of 
opinion as to what constitutes information in the field of 
l~brary and information science. For example, in a manner akin 
to the content-plus-process conception of Meijer et al, (cf 
. 4.2.2.2.3)' Wright proposes a dualistic, physico-metaphysical 
scheme for thinking about informat~on (1986; cf 5.19). The 
the physical conception of information corresponds to 
interpretation of information in its objective existence both in 
a non-physical sense (ie, in one's mind) and a physical form (ie, 
on record) ( c f 4. 2. 2. 1) . The metaphysical view of information as 
idea implies "a humanistic study of information conceived as 
symbolic realities in the cultural environment" (1986: 739). 
Wright's schema is not delimited in terms of libraries and 
information centres, but it confirms the point nonetheless that 
there is very little basis for comparing definitions found in the 
literature without delimitation (cf Wright-5.19). 
The difficulties ·of finding a satisfactory definition for 
the term information has led Barnes to compare the situation to 
that in physics, in which photons are neither exclusively waves 
nor exclusively particles, but are entities with aspects of each 
(1975: 111; cf conceptions of reality in modern physics-7.3.1) 
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that: 
In the broadest sense of the conflict, Kesting concludes 
" •.. information may remain irreducible to a clearly 
unified concept and a neat definition, at least as long 
as ~nner epistemological discord continues to fragment 
the total body of knowledge into islands essentially 
foreign to one another, each imprisoned in its own mode 
of thinking, its own vernacular" (1977: 164). 
In the light of the foregoing review of the difficulties of 
defining information in the context of library and information 
science, the view of information as content plus process, as set 
forth by Meijer et al, appears to merit serious consideration. 
For the purposes of this study, however, the notion of 
information will be associated more closely with that of 
knowledge (cf 4.3). 
4.3 Knowledge 
The library's relationship with knowledge has not been as 
strongly emphasized in recent professional literature as has been 
its relationship with information. The issue as to whether 
library and information science focuses on the management of 
knowledge or the management of information as a central dynamic 
is still unresolved (cf for example Shera, 1972: 128; Meijer, et 
1988) . Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether there 
ought to be an emphasis on the one to the exclusion of the ~ther. 
Wilson, showing partiality, makes the claim that the library, 
especially the academic library, serves its purpose better by 
facilitating the acquisition and production of knowledge. She 
states that knowledge, not information, is "the best game on 
campus" (1988: 86). Boorstin, expressing similar views, contends 
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that libraries, along with colleges and universities, are 
knowledge- rather than information-based institutions 
1-2; cf 4.3.5.1.3). 
(1979: 
This dilemma is complicated by the difficulty of defining 
both terms in such a way that they are clearly delimited in their 
meanings for library and information science (cf 4.1). Many of 
the difficulties of defining information may be repeated here to 
show that to define knowledge is equally difficult. 
4.3.1 The value of a definition of knowledge in the context of 
library and information science 
The librarian is concerned with human beings and their 
desire to know. What they come to know, as a result of having 
assimilated the content of records held in libraries, is 
something that may be called knowledge. But many questions may 
be raised in this regard, eg, "is knowledge of this sort to be 
equated to the philosophical idea of knowledge or not?"; "is such 
knowledge necessarily true or valid?"; "does the nature of this 
knowledge differ from that of information?", etc. The last 
question noted here is itself rendered as problematic in the 
light of the discovery that information as a concept still 
remains poorly defined in several contexts, including that of 
library and information science. Nonetheless, there is a 
goal-specific need to define knowledge in the context of library 
and information science. 
need: 
The following reasons support this 
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(a) the~e a~e many diffe~ent conceptions of knowledge, 
including those unde~lying the social sciences gene~ally and 
those consistent with an epistemological view (cf 4.3.2; 
4.3.3); 
(b) the need to define info~mation should not be exe~cised 
in isolation f~om the need to define knowledge fo~ 
lib~a~ians; 
(c) the desc~iptions and metapho~s of lib~a~ies and books as 
"sto~ehouses of knowledge" o~ "~eposito~ies fo~ knowledge" 
' 
~equi~e a clea~e~ conception of what is meant p~ecisely by 
such application of the te~m knowledge; and 
(d) f~om the point of view of this study's focus on 
epistemological issues, it is necessa~y to reach consensus 
on usage fo~ the sake of cla~ity and consistency. 
Fo~ centu~ies, epistemologists have had as thei~ chief 
conce~n the study of knowledge, its g~ounds and limitations as 
well as its methods of acquisition (cf conceptions of 
epistemology-2.1). Fo~ this ~eason it is necessa~y to ~eview the 
majo~ conceptions of knowledge in that b~anch of philosophy. 
4.3.2 Definition of knowledge in epistemology 
Fo~ a numbe~ of decades, philosophe~s have debated the 
c~ite~ia fo~ knowledge. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
engage in this debate in any comp~ehensive sense. It is helpful, 
neve~theless, to note the salient featu~es of knowledge as 
consid~~ed by philosophers. 
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The traditional, formal epistemological view is that 
knowledge is justified, true belief (Ayer, 1956; Chisholm, 1977; 
Lehrer, 1978) . The three criteria for valid knowledge are, thus: 
(a) truth; (b) belief and (c) justification. 
The truth criterion of knowledge requires that it cannot be 
false, ie, to say "I know that X" is to say that "I know that X 
is true". To suggest that X could be both true and not true 
(false), at the same time and under the same conditions, would be 
to violate a fundamental "law of thought" (Quinton, 1967: 345). 
Although truth is construed differently in specific 
epistemological doctrines, it remains a cardinal criterion for 
the epistemologist. 
The belief criterion of knowledge requires that, to say that 
one has knowledge of X, not only must X be the case, but in 
addition one must believe that X is the case. Butcharov notes: 
"Whatever one really knows one also believes; for a 
statement of the form "X knows that P but does not 
·believe that P" seems to be, if not incoherent, 
puzzling without any redeeming informativeness •.. " 
( 1970: 15 ) .. 
Belief is then a necessary component of knowledge in formal 
philosophy. 
The justification criterion of knowledge turns on the phrase 
"sufficiency of evidence". Knowledge cannot rest on lucky 
guesses. To say that one has knowledge of X is to possess strong 
evidence that X is the case. 
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This view of knowledge as justified, t~ue belief is not 
without its det~acto~s, but it ~emains a plausible position to 
take in dealing with epistemological issues (Gettie~, 1963: 
121-3; Russell, 1959: 131-2). 
4.3.3 Definition of knowledge in the social ~ciences 
In the social sciences, especially the sociology of 
knowledge, knowledge ~elates to thoughts p~esent in a pe~son's 
mind (eg, opinions, assumptions, fantasies, etc). In this view, 
knowledge is ~elated to thoughts and may be pe~ceived as t~ue by 
an o~ganism, without meeting the c~ite~ia fa~ knowledge ( cf 
4.3.2). Knowledge in the social scientific sense is synonymous 
with Boulding's "image", ie, "the view of the unive~se held by an 
o~ganism" (1956). 
The majo~ diffe~ence between the social science view of 
knowledge and that of the t~aditional epistemologist is that the 
fo~me~ ve~sion of the te~m does not "~equi~e knowledge to be t~ue 
in te~ms of scientific o~ ontological c~ite~ia of objectively 
conceived authenticity" (Kesting, 1978: 4) • In this 
inte~p~etation, a pe~son's knowledge is based on his acceptance 
of what is t~ue ~athe~ than the fo~mal c~ite~ia of knowledge. 
This view of knowledge de~ives f~om the so-called "social 
const~uctivist" app~oaches to the theo~y of knowledge. (cf 
Mannheim, 1936; also, the inte~p~etivist epistemological position 
in education-3.4.2). 
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4.3.4 Broad conceptions and classifications of knowledge 
Apart from the narrower, definitional, approaches to 
knowledge, there are attempts at classifying into broad 
categories all the possible kinds of human knowledge. These 
broad classifications show the varieties of human knowledge in 
its totality and its unity. This sense of variety and totality 
is relevant for the field of library and information science 
which takes as its purview all human knowledge as reflected in 
the totality of recorded thought. 
Although there are several broad typologies or 
classifications of the many modes of knowing, with ensuing 
branches of knowledge, which date back to the earliest. Western 
philosophers, it is not within the scope of this study to analyze 
them. It is sufficient to delineate the major features of an 
exemplary model that seeks to encompass all the possible pathways 
to knowledge and which emphasizes alternative, but equally valid 
epistemic norms that support those claims to knowledge. 
I 
Such a 
model is offered by Royce (Figure 1). 
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Royce characterizes his approach to the classification of 
knowledge as insights into "different and complementary aspects 
of reality" (1964: 27). His approach reveals a correspondence 
with the Jungian scheme of major psychological functions (cf 
Jungian schema-7.4). The model illustrated above was presented 
to librarians and information scientis~s (albeit in a modified 
version) at the NATO conference of 1973 (cf Figure 3). 
Royce explains that ~ationalism is "that epistemological 
position which states that nothing is true if it is illogical" 
(.1964: 13). Empiricism is that approach to knowledge which 
states ·that we know · only via sensory experience, viz, 
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observation, and that the verifiability of a fact or idea is 
dependent on the criterion of valid perception versus 
misperception. The intuitionist claims to know by immediate or 
obvious apprehension. This knowledge is not mystical because an 
intuitive person is "highly acute or sensitive in perceiving 
complex stimulus configurations" (1964: 16} • By 
authoritarianism, Royce simply means that we know on the basis of 
authority. Using these "basic paths" of knowledge, Royce 
contends that no single individual path can claim to lead the 
seeker to the "Truth" (ie, ultimate reality}. Each path 
involves: 
" a different criterion for establishing truth and 
therefore a different reality continuum. Thus, each of 
these approaches, while epistemologically valid, is 
limited to a particular way of looking at things" 
(1964: 3}. 
Royce holds that ultimate reality is epistemologically 
untestable. He believes that all humans are "encapsulated" 
reality seekers, and there~ore lacking the adequate procedure for 
assessing whether ultimate reality is truly pluralistic or 
monistic (1964: 33; cf notions of plural~sm and monism, 
7.1-7.4}. He conceives knowledge in its broadest sense and 
recognizes the relevant criteria for validating different 
knowledge claims. 
4.3.5 Approaches to knowledge in library and information science 
Most of the writings by librarians and information 
scientists on the concept of knowledge also deal with the concept 
of information and the relation between the two, because both are 
central concepts for this discipline. An analysis of this 
lit~rature reveals at least four kinds of relationship between 
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knowledge and information. These relationships are discussed in 
a chronological order in terms of their treatment in the 
literature of library and information science. The four gr·oups 
do not suggest a division into mutually exclusive or water-tight 
compartments, as it is often possible to classify a single writer 
in more than one group. The essential purpose of this schema is 
to highlight the ways in which librarians and information 
scientists think about these concepts and their relations. 
4.3.5.1 The information-knowledge relationship 
The several views of librarians and information scientists 
on this relationship may be classified as follows: 
4.3.5.1.1 Equivalent 
Equivalent relationships imply the identity or near identity 
of the two terms. This is reflected in the statements that 
"information is knowledge of facts", 
processed with a point of view", and " 
information" (cf for example Nitecki, 
"knowledge is information 
knowledge is ordered 
1985: 390; Kochen, 1975: 
5; McHale, 1976: 4) • Machlup contends that in some instances 
information and knowledge are synonymous (1980: 9) • In this 
approach, information and knowledge are of the same kind, with no 
or little distinction between their precise meanings. 
4.3.5.1.2 Hierarchical 
A number of writers view information and knowledge as 
co-ordinate or as subordinate/superordinate to each other. 
Coordinate relationships suggest that, rather than being 
identical or nearly identical, the one is on th~ same level as 
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the other, but in a different form. Usually, information is seen 
as the externalized manifestation of knowledge, 
\ 
or as its 
materialized copy, ie, the physical sur~ogate of knowledge. 
Farradane states in this regard: 
" information is defined as a physical surrogate of 
knowledge •.. " (1980: 75). 
Bekker affirms that information is communicable knowledge 
which cannot exist without a medium (gestures, spoken, written or 
printed language) (1977: 7) • This observation stresses the view 
that information is a kind or variety of knowledge, ie, that 
information is an externalized representation of what exists in 
someone's mind. 
Superordinate or subordinate relationships see one term as 
encompassing the other. In this' way, knowledge may be a 
constituent of information, or, alternatively, information may be 
a smaller part contained within the greater whole of knowledge. 
For Shera, knowledge encompasses information. He claims that : 
" ••• information is a •.. part of the sum total of that 
which can be known ... knowledge is everything an 
organism has learned or assimilated - values as well as 
facts or information .•• " (1972: 115-6) 
McGarry also prefers knowledge as the more comprehensive of the 
two terms (1975: 34 ; c f 5 • 23 ) • 
For Ehlers, who adopts the formal philosophical position, 
information encompasses knowledge. He maintains that: 
"Knowledge is .•• a type of information which satisfies 
certain conditions .... Knowledge is totally contained 
within the general concept of information" (1971: 
181) . 
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Saracevic expresses similar views on this issue (1975: 347). He 
contends that: 
" it is evident •.. that information is a broader 
concept, involving in addition to knowledge, all kinds 
of signals and representations that affect our senses 
and biological processes" ( 1975: 348 cf 5.20). 
The idea of hierarchical relationships between information 
and knowledge does not emphasize the importance of one at the 
expense of the other; however, this notion does complicate the 
attempt at achieving a single, acceptable definition of either 
term. 
4.3.5.1.3 Dichotomous 
There are views by some who hold that information and 
knowledge are two basically different, even mutually exclusive 
terms. In Nitecki's opinion, for example, information is data 
about matter determined empirically, while knowledge is the 
philosophically inferred essence of that matter (1986: 391; cf 
5.14) . A similar distinction ~s drawn by Neill who contends that 
information may be described as "naked fact" and knowledge as "a 
systematic body of interrelating concepts" (1985: 57) • The 
following definition bf Boorstin also expresses a sharp 
divergence: 
"Information is something someone else provides 
us •.• We must all acquire knowledge for ourselves." 
( 1979: 6) . 
The bifurcation noted in Boorstin's quotation is that information 
is externally motivated (ie, we are informed from outside), 
whereas knowledge is inner-directed or self-motivated (ie, 
knowledge results from internal, subjective processes). 
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Pauline Wilson endorses the view that there are certain 
clear-cut differences between the two terms (1988: 84-5). She 
states: 
This 
"Information is acquired by being told. Knowledge can 
be acquired by thinking. Information is a process. 
Knowledge is a state. Information is a flow of 
messages. Knowledge is a stock. Information is bits 
and pieces of discrete information, fragmented and 
particular. Knowledge is coherent and structured, it 
often has enduring value. Knowledge may be 
restructured by the addition of new information, but 
new information is not necessary for new knowledge to 
be acquired." (1988: 84-5). 
interpretation of the information-knowledge 
relationship holds contrasting views of these terms, ·and the 
proponents assume, in some cases, an either/or stance in the 
sense that they hold clear convictions on which term should be 
preferred in library and information science. 
4.3.5.1.4 Continuum 
of: 
The information-knowledge continuum emphasizes the notion 
" information-knowledge as a continuous process of 
integrating newly received perceptions into the 
previously established systems of relations. It is a 
transition from a passive stat~ of knowledge (acquired 
in the past) to an active, newly formed state of 
relations , (newly perceived ideas)" (Nitecki, 1986: 
395). 
Similar approaches, though different in some ways, 
are suggested by Otten and by Kochen. Otten sees the two terms 
as separate entities rather than aspects of one process (Otten, 
1974: 103). Kochen views the information-knowledge process as 
part of his "epistemo-dynamics" which is a discipline that 
expresses regularities governing the transformation of 
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information into knowledge, an assimilation of knowledge into a 
more general understanding and a fusion of understanding into 
wisdom (Kochen, 1975: 42; cf 5.18). 
According to Vinken, the information-knowledge continuity is 
dynamic in the sense that after knowledge has been generated by 
information, knowledge in turn generates information on a higher 
1 eve 1 ( 1982: 334). This means that new information supersedes 
old knowledge and leads to the generation of new knowledge, and 
so on. Brookes contends that one's knowledge structure is 
modified by information input. This locates the 
information-knowledge process within an individual's "cognitive 
world", so that knowledge is structured, integrated information 
and information is fragmented knowledge (1981: 4; cf 5.10). 
It would appear that there may be either an epistemological 
demarcation principle or a practical demarcation principle to 
separate the two terms on the continuum. As an example of the 
former, Shera claims that it is at the point of validation that 
information passes the barrier to become knowledge (1968: 21; cf 
4.2). As an example of the latter, Stratton holds that 
"knowledge becomes information because .•• of accessibility", ie, 
information in recorded form is the objective, physical pole 
which is accessible to users, and is the concrete expression of 
the subjective, metaphysical pole which exists only as a mental 
event/process (knowledge) (1985: 35) . 
133 
The several approaches encompassed within the 
information-kn~wledge continuum share the view that the fluidity 
of the relationship between the two terms is a distinctive 
feature. Information is transmuted into knowledge, which may lead 
to the generation of new information (cf for example Hannabus, 
1984: 81; 1988: 12' 14; Farradane, 1976: 100) 0 Rather than 
being seen as separate entities, information and knowledge are 
seen as being dynamically linked with each other (cf Pratt, 1982: 
38) 0 The nature of this link, in Swan's view, is that of the 
provision of a vital human context so that knowledge differs from 
information II in the degree of connectedness, perspective, 
[and] human value .•. " (1988: 28) 0 Swan maintains that it is 
this human context that distinguishes librarianship from other 
information-based disciplines (ibid.). 
4.3.6 Conclusion 
When taken together, the different categories of 
relationship reveal the several ways in which librarians and 
information scientists view the interrelationships between these 
central concepts. While it is not within the scope of this study 
to arrive at a final solution to this dilemma, it is necessary to 
describe 
purposes. 
the conception of knowledge that will serve its 
While information is the "physical surrogate" and the 
process by which the content of records/documents as externalized 
ideas are transferred to the individual human mind through a 
medium (cf 4.2.3), knowledge is a personal mental state as well 
as the expression (in the form of information) of what is known. 
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Knowledge may be both private or public, and assumes a 
systematically organized structure that may be modified by 
information and that may be used by the human mind to generate 
new knowledge (Wilson, 1977; Ziman, 1968). When this knowledge 
is communicated, it requires a medium (such as gestures, 
written or printed language) and becomes information. 
spoken, 
Knowledge, as it is understood in this study, is not 
confined to truth in its narrow epistemological sense as it is 
held in formal philosophy (cf 4.3.2). Rather, the broader view 
of knowledge is adopted. The~e are several modes of knowing, and 
the knowledge that ensues from these modes subscribe to different 
sets of truth conditions. This means that while knowledge is 
true for the individual knower, it may not necessarily be held to 
be universally true. 
Libraries and recorded materials are consulted as part of a 
search by.individuals to know something, and the knowledge gained 
through th• use of libraries and recorded materials is personal 
and private to that individual. Patrick Wilson characterizes 
this view of knowledge as contrary to opinion, but concedes that 
what may be knowledge may become a matter of opinion (1983: 17; 
cf 5.17). This distinction between knowledge and opinion derives 
from the classical Platonic dichotomy (Ryle, 
Schrader-5.27). 
1967: 325-6; cf 
In a profession such as library and information science 
which seeks the systematic collection of all forms of recorded 
culture, an individual user is exposed to a multiplicity of 
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approaches to ultimate reality (cf the views of several theorists 
noted in Chapter 5). For librarians to emphasize one approach at 
the expense of the other would involve this profession in a 
debate regarding the superiority of one approach over the other, 
which may result in a consequent bias in one or all of its 
primary functions, viz systematic collection development, 
heuristics and promotion of use in the corporate or collective 
sense. 
From an epistemological point of view, this means that there 
is no room for a one-sided commitment to a single approach to 
human knowledge, but rather, there is the need to recognize the 
value of the several modes of knowing (with their respective sets 
of truth criteria) as equally valid manifestations within a broad 
and comprehensive conception of human knowledge (cf Royce's 
view-4.3.4; cf 5.13). Boorstin affirms this conception of 
" ~, ~ ;-( tL-~ "':J (.G\,.,.d ; -+, "'t.- fV W-veve.r 
knowledge when he states that: 1ou.. tv\ct'( -A'wit ;1::"-" 
"Knowledge comes from the free mind foraging in the 
rich pastures of the whole everywhere-past" (1979: 6). 
This holistic metaphor of knowledge appears to be suited to a 
perception of the "inclusive" nature of library and information 
science (cf 7.6). 
4.4 Library and information science 
There are several views of the relationship between library 
science and information science, ie, whether they are distinctive 
and separate disciplines, .whether they together constitute a 
single discipline, or, whether they are identical. (cf 4.4.2.1). 
Moreover, there is a view that it is difficult to deal with 
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relationships between the two until the status of each presumed 
area of activity has been established as a true discipline 
(Shera, 1983: 379; c f 5. 5) • 
It is questionable whether scholarly agreement beyond doubt 
on a definition of the field is possible before an understanding 
as to what constitutes its proper domain is achieved. On the 
other hand, a logically tenable definition of the field may 
assist in mapping out its domain. 
many problems, as may be seen below. 
Attempts at definition face 
4.4.1 Difficulties of achieving a "consensually" valid definition 
The difficulties of achieving a consen~ible definition of 
library and information science may be grouped into three 
categories. The term "consensible" is Ziman's neologism for 
signifying that body of rational opinion on which coll~ctive 
scholarly agreement exists (1968: 9). 
4.4.1.1 Historical 
Shera traces, through the establishment of institutions, 
associations and societies, a historically-based divergence, as 
well as convergence, between the two disciplines. He notes that 
the Brussels Institute which subsequently became the 
International Federation for Documentation (FID) was started by 
librarians (1983: 380). The goal of this group was to employ 
technology to provide access to the "total record of the human 
adventure" (ibid.). In other words, documentalists were mainly 
librarians who had used new technology. When, however:, the 
American Documentation Institute (ADI) was established in the 
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United States of America, the distinction was drawn more sharply 
between librarians and information scientists. The latter group 
began to concentrate on the "application of electronic and 
mechanical systems for improving the accessibility of graphic 
records" (ibid.). This became known as information retrieval. 
The division received impetus from the work by Shannon and Weaver 
on the communication of information. The ADI described 
information as their major concern, although this term was 
misleading (cf 4.2.1.4). By the late 1960's the ADI changed its 
name to the American Society for Information Science (ASIS), 
thereby accelerating 
circles. 
the process of an incipient split in some 
The insight offered by this brief historical perspective is 
the demonstration that ambivalence and divergent development has 
complicated the search for a "consensible" definition. 
4.4.1.2 Conceptual 
Conceptual difficulties in defining library and information 
science surround the absence of widely accepted definitions of 
information and information science (Serjean, 1976: 4). 
Meijer et al point out that the variety of opinions on the 
content of the concept information leads to the variation of 
points of view of the relationship between library science and 
information science (1988: 77; cf 4.2 & 5.21). 
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scientific and technical information and in the application 
of well-tested research methods to the study of information 
systems and services (1983: 18; cf 5.4). 
Even when information science is delimited to its relation 
with library science, there is little consensus in definition 
(Schrader, 1984) . Whether information science should be defined 
in isolation from library science or as part of library science 
depends on whether one accepts that the two are distinctive and 
separate disciplines or that they are fused in a single 
discipline (cf 4.4.2). 
4.4.1.3 Logical 
In a thorough analysis of more than 1 500 definitions of the 
terms "library science", "information science", of their 
conjunctions, their disjunctions and their respective conceptual 
antecedents, Schrader finds confusion, disagreement, 
contradiction and inconsistency. He contends that: 
" conceptualizations of library science are 
inadequate because of their institutional binding, 
while the conceptualizations of information science are 
inadequate because of their object binding. Neither a 
focusing on libraries nor a focusing on information is 
sufficient." (1983: 379). 
Schrader's analysis reveals the absence of conceptual 
evolution in the search for a definition of library and 
information science. Changes in labels or terms have outpaced 
advances in its conceptualization. In support of this claim, he 
notes that at least 340 synonymous, quasi-synonymous and 
pseudo-synonymous terms are proposed in the definitions analysgd 
which purport to describe the principal function (ibid.: 380). 
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Although these can be reduced to 29 generic terms representing 29 
divergent notions of how this field ought to be described, they 
are applied variously to objects, both physical and immaterial, 
to persons, and to objects and persons together. 
Schrader also notes that it is rare to find a paper which 
~resents definitions of both library science and information 
science. The more usual course is for the author to define the 
favoured term, to assert its separate and generally superior 
identity, 
381). 
and then to shift to some other subject matter (ibid.: 
The specific difficulties affecting logical adequacy of the 
analysed definitions, as formulated by Schrader are: 
(a) There is no clear indication as to the role of the user, 
when interacting with the librarian or information 
consultant; 
(b) The definitional literature does not focus on 
interacting relations between librarian/information 
consultant and user; 
(c) There is no focusing on all of this domain behaviour as 
a social system; and 
(d) There is no clear notion of what the user obtains when 
interacting with the librarian/information consultant 
information, knowledge, recorded information, recorded 
knowledge, etc, (1984: 65). 
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In an earlier doctoral dissertation on a definition of 
librarianship, 
definitions of 
Meijer identifies the following inadequacies in 
librarianship (a field which he incidentally 
equates with that of information science): 
(a) The pars pro toto group, which mistakes the part for the 
whole, is too narrow in its scope; 
(b) The genus group is too broad in its scope; and 
(c) The heterogeneously composed group lacks a central 
subject (1978; 1982). 
In their attempts at developing a logically tenable 
definition, both Schrader and Meijer seek ways of overcoming 
these logical inadequacies (cf 4.4.3). 
The variety of difficulties in defining library and 
information science emanates, to a considerable extent, from the 
ambivalence surrounding the relationship between the two 
disciplines. Conceptual progress is inhibited by conflicting 
views of this relationship. 
4.4.2 The library science-information science relationship 
An issue that further compounds the question of definition 
is the variety of opinions regarding the relationship between 
library science and information science. They have been referred 
to inter alia as "intellectual competitors" and as "rival 
traditions" (Schrader, 1984: 59-60). Schrader claims that every 
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conceivable p~oposition as to the dichotomy o~ conjunction of 
the two disciplines has been p~esented and p~omoted in the 
lite~atu~e (1983: 381). 
Fou~ majo~ catego~ies of ~elationship a~e identified by 
Meije~ et al. They a~e outlined b~iefly below (cf 6.1.5 fa~ a 
fifth catego~y, viz libra~y science and info~mation science as 
parts of a la~ge~ whole). 
4.4.2.1 Info~mation science as pa~t of lib~a~y science 
This view exp~esses the historical "senio~ity" of lib~a~y 
science. Info~mation science ~s seen as being g~afted on to 
lib~a~y science and able to benefit ce~tain a~eas of lib~a~y 
science, e.g., the o~ganization of lib~a~y mate~ials fa~ "maximum 
convenience and efficiency of use" (Shera, 
I 
1983: 385). Meije~ 
et al maintain that this view ~eceived impetus when the wo~d 
"documentation" was ~eplaced by "info~mation" (1988: 77; cf 
4.4.1.1). Acco~dingly, info~mation became restricted in its 
meaning to w~itten and/or p~inted documents b~ing limited to the 
"ontsluiting en beskikbaa~stelling van die ~eko~d" (ie, the 
inte~mediate heu~istic function) (Viljoen, 1973: 88' 109' 409) . 
Lib~a~y science assumes ~esponsibility for the info~mation 
function in society, and info~mation is ~ega~ded as being 
equivalent to lib~ary-mate~ials (cf also 6.1.1). 
4.4.2.2 Info~mation science and lib~a~y science a~e identical 
The central argument fa~ this view is that libra~y science 
and info~mation science sha~e the same goals and ca~~y out the 
same functions (Meije~ et al, 1988: 78). While O'Neill contends 
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that the professed differences between library science and 
information science are overshadowed by their commonalities 
(1982: 373)' Borko makes the categorical claim that "library 
science and information science is a single, unified discipline" 
(1984: 185). 
A cogent argument for the similarity between the two 
disciplines is offered in Meijer's doctoral thesis. He contends 
that both libraries and information centres aim to provide users 
with access to the content of recorded matter irrespective of 
whether the content is in printed, audio-visual, electronic or 
any other form (1978: 45). He concedes that the depth of 
analysis and retrieval in information science- is greater than in 
library science. Despite their identity, Meijer prefers the term 
librarianship ("bibliotheekwezen") to information science for 
historical reasons (1978: 52) . 
Although Schrader concurs with Meijer's view that library 
and information science share the same conceptual domain, he 
prefers to reflect explicitly this unity in the title "library 
and information science" rather than in a single title such as 
"librarianship" (1984: 59; cf also 6.1.3). 
4.4.2.3 Library science as part of information science 
This view derives from the more fundamental belief that 
libraries are not the only institutions that deal with 
infor~ation and that library science is not the only science 
relating to the study of information (Yuexiao, 1988: 485). 
Library science is seen as a branch of information science, and 
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information science is itself vi~wed more broadly as a meta-
science, 
Yuexiao, 
and as an interdiscipline (Otten & Debons, 1970: 94; 
1988: 488). As a metascience it is a science based on 
other sciences, and as an interdiscipline it is at an 
intermediate stage of an emerging new discipline in which 
researchers from other sciences share common interests. Once 
again, lack of agreement as to exactly what information science 
is or should be, complicates the issue of identity (cf 4.4.1.2 & 
6.1.2). 
4.4.2.4 Library science and information science as separate 
entities 
There are two interpretations of this view. The one is that 
separation is, in fact, substitution, ie, that information 
science is replacing library science. The second interpretation 
merely upholds a strict separation of the two. 
Saracevic supports .the first interpretation, citing 
adaptation to modern requirements as justification for his view 
(1982: 32; c f 5. 20) . This argument is extended to serve as a 
means of ensuring growth, or merely the survival of traditional 
library schools. This is reflected not only in the eagerness to 
incorporate the word "information" in the designation of library 
schools and the degrees they confer, but also in the intention to 
drop the word "library" altogether (Harter, 1982: 32). Bohnert 
points out that the disappearance of library science from the 
compound title "library and information science" would suggest 
that a single field (information science) could handle all the 
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diverse communication activities that exist (1982: 44). This, 
once again, alludes to the "identity" problem of information 
science (cf 4.4.1.2). 
The second interpretation of this view finds support in the 
writings of Holley (1985: 63)' Caldwell (1970: 138), and Van 
Brakel and Boon (1986: 17) who emphasize a sharp delineation 
between the two disciplines. Holley and Caldwell call for 
separate degrees in information science and library science and 
for the setting up of two distinct programmes within the same 
school. On the other hand, New observes that the overlap between 
the two would make it a waste of time to teach " ••• two kinds of 
information worker separately" (1978: 44; cf also 6.1.4). 
4.4.3 Towards a tenable definition 
The several difficulties surrounding a definition of 
library and information science do not lead to a situation of 
total despair. Two scholarly analyses, both in the form of 
doctoral theses, seek to address some of these problems and to 
derive a logically tenable definition. 
Meijer's definition is as follows: 
"Librarianship is a form of cultural enterprise whose 
main characteristic is the stimulation of the optimum 
use of mankind's cultural heritage insofar as it 
consists of coded thoughts recorded in documents that 
are and must be held in readiness for use with' the 
ultimate objective of making possible cultural progress 
(also in the fields of religion and science) in its 
particular spheres" (1982: 26). 
Schrader's definition, in its turn, proposes that: 
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Both 
"Libr-ar-y and infor-mation science is the study of the 
symbolic cultur-e accessing system, a system of social 
pr-actice in which access to r-epr-oduced symbolic cultur-e 
is pr-ovided for- user-s seeking that cultur-e" (1984: 
74) • 
definitions r-epfesent the culmination of intensive 
scholar-ly analysis. As such, they also r-eveal cer-tain 
difficulties. The ter-m "cultur-e" is used in both definitions, 
but connotes differ-ent meanings. In Meijer-'s definition it is 
adjoined with other- wor-ds to yield the phr-ases "cultur-al 
enter-pr-ise", "cultur-al her-itage", and "cultur-al pr-ogr-ess". As a 
"cultur-al enter-pr-ise", libr-ar-ianship (Meijer-'s pr-efer-r-ed ter-m) is 
subor-dinated to its genus pr-oximum, the cultur-al spher-e (ibid.: 
26). In the phr-ase "cultur-al her-itage" the extr-emely diver-gent 
content that libr-ar-ies deal with is descr-ibed, although it is 
confined to "coded thoughts in documents" to distinguish it fr-om 
ar-chaeological and museum ar-tefacts and, significantly, fr-om 
unr-ecor-ded knowledge/uncoded thoughts etc, (ibid.: 25) . The 
idea of the r-ole of libr-ar-ianship in the pr-ogr-ession of society 
(whether- in positive or- negative senses) is posited as "cultur-al 
pr-ogr-ess" (cf 4.1). 
In the Schr-ader- definition, the phr-ase "symbolic cultur-e" is 
akin to Meijer-'s "cultur-al her-itage" in that it r-efer-s to the 
content of r-ecor-ded cultur-e that libr-ar-ians and infor-mation 
officer-s deal with. "Symbolic cultur-e", a phr-ase that Schr-ader-
contends is mor-e useful than the ter-ms "infor-mation" and 
"knowledge", r-efer-s to ideas and values expr-essed and r-ecor-ded in 
symbols and encompassing both positive and negative thought 
(1984: 75; 1983: 3 57 ; c f 5. 27) • 
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This variety of uses of the term "culture" contributes to 
linguistic inexactness and ambiguity. In the social sciences 
there is no consensus on the use of this term. For example, 
Spradley identifies six kinds of definition, one of which is an 
"omnibus" definition. This omnibus concept of culture is the 
broadest, ie, culture is everything made by man, viz: 
"It is emotions and works of art; it is behavior, 
beliefs and institutions; it includes what people know, 
feel, think, make, and do" (1972: 6). 
It is not wholly clear whether or not this comprehensive concept 
of culture is subsumed by either or both Meijer and Schrader. 
Meijer's" ... is a form of ... enterprise ... " and Schrader's 
II is the study of ... " suggest that each definition has a 
different focus. Meijer focuses on professional activity and 
service while Schrader emphasizes the academic study of that 
activity. As a form of cultural enterprise, Meijer's definition 
successfully demarcates librarianship from similar activities in 
the cultural sphere, eg, museology. On the other hand, 
Schrader's objective of formulating an adequate notion of 
"definitional discourse" is to provide " a logical beginning 
for future researchers" (1984: 76). 
When taken together, ~he two definitions appear to enco~pass 
the most important features that a logically tenable definition 
requires. Library and information science may be seen as a human 
social practice in the cultural sphere. .It also involves the 
study of that practice. This study focuses upon the stimulation 
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for optimum use and the guidance of access to mankind's heritage 
of coded thoughts, as well as upon the user seeking access to 
that heritage. 
This conception views library and information science as a 
single discipline with service and academic components. The 
content of libraries and information centres is restricted to 
artifactual carriers of human thoughts encoded in symbolic form 
(although the theoretical interest of the librarian extends to 
include manifestations of oral or preliterate traditions cf 
5.28.11). This content is mediated by the librarian or 
information officer for optimum use through the execution of 
professional activities surrounding stimulation and the provision 
of access. 
The inclusion of the user in the ~efinition is significant 
for this study, since the recognition of the acquisition of 
knowledge by the individual user is a salient feature of a 
proposed epistemological position for library and information 
science (cf 8.5.1). 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
The definition of library and information science has 
received wide attention, but little consensus has emerged. A few 
researchers have attempted to overcome the more significant 
difficulties and to formulate a consensible definition. The 
components for a logically tenable definition may be derived from 
the writings of Meijer and Schrader (cf 4.4.3). 
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For the purposes of this study, additional emphases are 
placed on: (a) the task of the librarian (as intermediary) to 
discover the ways in which users may acquire knowledge through 
access and· use of the content of generic documents, and (b) the 
recognition of the ways in which librarians are themselves 
influenced in their practices by certain philosophical 
assumptions that underlie their methods of knowing. This study 
seeks to offer a framework that may accommodate all these ways of 
acquiring knowledge (and their related truth criteria), ie, a 
suitable epistemological position, as a necessary part of the 
librarians' fundamental academic training, 
also influences professional practice. 
4.5 Summary 
since such a position 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the several 
perceptions of the key concepts of information and knowledge and 
of library and information science, as well as the difficulties 
of attaining consensus-supported definitions. In the absence of 
exhaustively comprehensive definitions it has been useful, 
nonetheless, to observe the several approaches to dealing with 
complex theoretical concepts that are considered to be of primary 
significance to the investigation of epistemological aspects of 
library and information science. 
One of the major difficulties regarding the definition of 
the terms noted in this chapter has been the lack of demarcation 
and the absence of a coherent theoretical context to illuminate 
precise meanings. In an attempt to overcome this dilemma, the 
more fully developed theoretical writings of several librarians 
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and info~mation scientists (as well as a few non-lib~a~ians) a~e 
examined to p~ovide an oppo~tunity to analyse thei~ specific 
views of these key concepts and othe~ ~elevant epistemological 
issues. The ideas of these exponents a~e p~ovided in Chapte~ 5. 
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5 Cont~ibutions to the discussion of epistemological aspects 
of lib~a~y and info~mation science 
P~eamble 
As a ~equi~ement of the inductive app~oach adopted in this 
cent~al pa~t of the study, the w~itings of seve~al ~elevant 
autho~s a~e examined and explicated he~e. The inductive p~ocess 
p~ovides the desi~ed featu~e of infe~ential validity to 
st~engthen the quality of the a~gument p~esented and sustained in 
this study. The me~it of the inductive a~gument is that genuine 
suppo~ting evidence (as exp~essed in the statements of the 
exponents conside~ed in this chapte~) lends g~adual suppo~t to 
highly p~obable conclusions (Mouton & Ma~ais, 1990: 112). 
The majo~ity of these cont~ibutions ~eveal the fundamental 
ideas of selected, philosophically-inclined lib~a~ians and 
info~mation scientists. These fundamental ideas a~e of 
significant ~elevance to the subject of this study. Relatively 
few lib~a~ians and info~mation scientists have exp~essed in thei~ 
p~ofessional w~itings any majo~ inte~est in epistemological 
aspects of lib~a~y and info~mation science. Butle~ noted this 
cha~acte~istic almost six decades ago when he said that the II 
lib~a~ian is st~angely uninte~ested in the theo~etical aspects of 
his p~ofession ... the lib~a~ian appa~ently stands alone in the 
simplicity of his p~agmatism" (1933: xi-xii). This does not 
mean that the~e has not been any theo~etical ~esea~ch unde~taken 
since Butle~·s decla~ation in 1933, as Buckland points out (1983: 
35). What ~emains a conce~n, howeve~, is the paucity of 
monog~aphs and a~ticles add~essing fundamental theo~etical issues 
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in library and information science (Meijer, 1978: 8-13; 
Schrader, 1984: 59-77), and a general agreement on the " 
sorts of theory which could be expected with respect to library 
services" (Buckland, 1983: loc. cit.; cf Maguire, 1989: 4). 
There are, however, a small number of professional 
librarians and information scientists who have, in a major or a 
minor but always logically pertinent way, 
seminal contributions to this subject. 
made speculative or 
In addition to these 
librarians and information scientists, the contributions of three 
non-librarians have been included. Of the latter, Machlup is an 
economist who has contributed extensively to an understanding of 
the phenomenon of knowledge in . the post-industrial, 
knowledge-based society (cf 5.4). Royce is a psychologist who 
has elaborated an interesting model of the different modes of 
knowing (cf 5.13). De Mey is a philosopher who is concerned with 
the applications of research findings in cognitive psychology to 
information work (cf 5.25). 
In an attempt to offer a faithful reflection of the ideas of 
the selected authors it is impossible to maintain uniform 
treatment of the contributions of each individual author. In 
cases where references are plentiful, treatment is substantial. 
Conversely, in cases where references are sparse, the treatment 
aims to elaborate only to the extent that the author's main 
proposition is presented in essential outline. In this regard, 
it stands to reason that the treatment of individual 
contributions is bound to be of variable length. 
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Unevenness in t~eatment is inevitable in a study such as 
this whe~e the w~itings of each selected autho~ is examined f~om 
a specific standpoint, viz, his epistemological position in 
lib~a~y and info~mation science. Only those w~itings of a given 
autho~ which have p~ovided pe~tinent sou~ce mate~ial fo~ this 
study have been selected. These select bibliog~aphies appea~ at 
the end of each cont~ibution; while they a~e of cou~se not 
intended to be definitive bibliog~aphies of all the w~itings by 
o~ about each pa~ticula~ autho~, an attempt has been made to list 
all apposite ~efe~ences. 
Refe~ences to epistemological issues in lib~a~y and 
info~mation science va~y in scope f~om tentative ~ema~ks to mo~e 
comp~ehensive statements. Such statements have been made by both 
theo~ists and p~actitione~s in the field. The individual 
cont~ibutions to this subject, as they a~e listed he~e, have been 
selected on one o~ mo~e of the following g~ounds: 
(a) The cont~ibuto~s a~e eithe~ associated with the field of 
lib~a~y and info~mation science, o~ have exp~essed an 
inte~est in epistemological issues su~~ounding the t~ansfe~ 
of knowledge, o~ info~mation; 
(b) Thei~ w~itings, when conside~ed collectively, ~eveal a 
common inte~est in the explication of fundamental concepts 
cognate to epistemological issues such as t~uth, cultu~e, 
info~mation, knowledge, lib~a~y and info~mation science and 
knowledge t~ansfe~; and 
(c) Thei~ seminal ideas 
and info~mation science 
which the c~itical 
position fo~ lib~a~y 
developed. 
on epistemological issues in lib~a~y 
p~ovide a suitable context within 
development of an epistemological 
and info~mation science may be 
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The purpose of this chapter is to present the central ideas 
of the selected authors (as they bear upon the subject of this 
study) as faithfully as possible.· For this reason, a classified 
presentation has been avoided in order to prevent the posture of 
an "artificial" ("taxonomical") re-arrangement of the ideas of 
these authors in accordance with the purpose(s) of such a 
classification. However, a critique as opposed to an exposition, 
it is felt, does require some classified framework (cf Chapter 6 
-Critique of the contributions). 
The arrangement that seems to present itself as the most 
suitable for the purp~se of this study is one that offers a basis 
for observing some measure of. evolution of thought on the 
subject. 
practical 
That goal has not always proved attainable, from a 
point of view, since the 30-odd selected authors only 
span the last hundred years or so. For this reason, it has not 
always been possible to infer from the writings of a particular 
author the degree of influence of an earlier writer, except in 
cases where direct references are made. Nevertheless, whatever 
development of ideas there may have been, a chronological 
arrangement (by date of birth) of these authors is suited to 
this more modest purpose~ It has been assumed that chronological 
arrangement by date of birth would be more suitable than 
chronological arrangement by date of publication. A primary 
reason for this is that some major authors have published 
articles and monographs consistently - and in other instances 
sporadically - over a period of many years, thereby confounding 
the attempt to determine the significance of a single location in 
the list of a given author in a constant manner throughout. 
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The ch~onological a~~angement by date of bi~th applies only 
to the majo~ exponents, ie f~om 5.1-5.27. The mino~ 
cont~ibutions in 5.28 a~e a~~anged p~ima~ily acco~ding to thei~ 
p~edominant conceptual outlook in an attempt to link ~elated 
pe~ceptions that would cla~ify key issues in a self-evident 
manne~ with a minimal need fo~ inte~p~etation by the ~esea~che~. 
Mo~eove~, it is the pu~pose of this chapte~ to p~esent each 
autho~·s cont~ibution, as fa~ as possible, as a self-contained 
cohe~ent unit of a theo~etical thought system in o~de~ to p~ovide 
a complete and faithful ~eco~d of that system of thought. These 
individual cont~ibutions a~e summa~ized below, 
followed by the mino~ cont~ibutions in 5.28. 
f~om 5.1 to 5.27, 
5.1 BUTLER, PIERCE (1886-1953) 
It may seem odd that Butle~, who had academic qualifications 
in medieval histo~y and theology, advocated the application of 
the scientific method in the investigation of lib~a~y p~oblems 
(Ka~etzky, 1982: 62; Ha~~is, 1986: 516). Howeve~, a c~itical 
~eading of the w~itings of Butle~ ~esolves this appa~ent 
difficulty. Butle~·s call fo~ the application of the scientific 
method should be viewed within the b~oade~ context of his 
emphasis on the need fo~ the lib~a~ian to b~oaden his vision in 




Butler's view of the library provides a clearer 
understanding of his more philosophical ideas. He maintains that 
libraries reflect the social and intellectual state of their 
times, and that the history of libraries is thus a part of the 
history of scholarship (1961: 84). In his view, it is 
impossible to divorce the study of libraries from that of 
civilization. He believes that, for example, "The library has 
been created by actual necessities in modern civilization. It is 
now a necessary unit in the social fabric" (1933: Xi) • 
As an important part of modern civilization, libraries 
fulfill a specific role. In this regard, he argues that: 
is 
"The library may therefore be regarded as an 
integrating machine in which all the diverse 
intellectual factors of civilization are reduced to a 
single index value and library history as a running 
record of its fluctuations" ( 1945: 10). 
Because the library is contained within a larger whole, it 
necessary for the librarian, especially the library 
researcher, to adopt a broad outlook of its function in society. 
This requires that the library researcher should search for 
explanatory principles outside of the library itself. He states 
in this regard: 
"But the library has no integrity in itself; it is only 
an incidental mechanism in the larger machine of 
civilization. The forces that impel its activities, 
the conditions that prescribe them, and the work they 
accomplish are all externally determined. Hence every 
cause and effect in librarianship must be looked for 
outside, in the culture of which it is a subordinate 
element" (1953: v). 
Butler's insistence upon the "externally determined" nature of 
libraries and hence of library resear2h thus provides a 
background to understanding his conception of the role of 
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scientific method in investigating library problems (Coetzee, 
1962: 41). In his preface to the Phoenix edition reprint of 
Butler's classic monograph, Introduction to library science, 
Asheim makes the observation that Butler expresses the need "to 
shape a professional philosophy responsive to the needs and 
interests of the coeval society" (1961: vii) . Butler saw in the 
so-called scientific method a partial but necessary component of 
a professional philosophy of librarianship. Karetzky contends 
that: 
"The library philosophy Butler wanted would co-exist 
with, and to some extent be based on, a library science 
and the library philosophy would be more effective if a 
library science existed because with an 'accurate sense 
of social reality', librarians could formulate their 
ideals and standards according to it instead of making 
them a priori" (1982: 63). 
Butler was acutely aware of both the possibilities and the 
limitations of a library science. He recognized that science 
cannot deal with "the problems concerning the ultimate nature of 
things and final reality" (Karetzky, 1982: 64)' and that, to 
this end, the scientific and humanistic aspects of librarianship 
should co-exist (Butler, 1961: xii; 26-9). He believed 
nonetheless that the consequent sacrifice of some spirituality 
was far outweighed by the benefit promised by science (1961: 
xi-xiii). 
The need to balance the different approaches in library 
philosophy is emphasized in subsequent writings by Butler. Here, 
for example, he observes that, despite their quest for a 
philosophy of librarianship, librarians have tended to remain 
pragmatically empirical (1951: 236). He notes the emergence 
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amongst libr-ar-ians of a "scientistic delusion" descr-ibed as the 
"mistaken assumption that libr-ar-ianship is a pr-ofession only 
insofar- as it is a science" (1951: 239). 
Emphasizing the many-sidedness of libr-ar-ianship, he 
consider-s that: 
"The intellectual content of libr-ar-ianship undoubtedly 
consists of thr-ee distinct br-anches. It deals with 
things and pr-inciples that must be scientifically 
handled, with pr-ocesses and appar-atus that r-equir-e 
special under-standing and skills for- their- oper-ations, 
and with cultur-al motivations that can be appr-ehended 
only humanistically" (1951: 246). 
Against this background, the libr-ar-ian can never simply be a 
subject specialist, but should r-ather be equally concer-ned with 
"ever-y ramification of ever-y science and of ever-y humanistic 
discipline, not for- their- own sake, but for- the sake of 
scholarship as a whole" (1945: 10). Scholar-ship in this sense 
is defined by Butler- as "the total intellectual content of a 
culture" (Wilson, 1945: 150). According to Coetzee, Butler-'s 
notion of the "histor-y of scholar-ship" has str-ong associations 
with Sher-a's idea of social epistemology (1966: 156; cf 5.7). 
The notion of scholarship is centr-al to Butler-'s view of the 
chief function of librar-ianship. He claims that this • II l. s ... to 
communicate, so far- as possible, the whole scholar-ship to the 
whole community .•. " (1951: 246). 
Her-e Butler- stressed the instr-umentality of libr-ar-ians in 
realizing the function of the libr-ar-y in society. His 
pr-ofessional view was idealistic, optimistic and even ambitious 
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in the sense that he held lib~a~ianship to be a p~ime p~omote~ of 
wisdom in the individual and the community and the subsequent 
advancement of civilization (1951: 
Butle~ clea~ly ~ecognized the sho~tcomings of empi~icism in 
its fo~mal epistemological sense (cf 2.5). He maintained the 
need to see the validity of othe~ app~oaches to lib~a~y and 
info~mation science. He also confi~med the necessity fo~ 
lib~a~ians to conce~n themselves with such app~oaches in 
decla~ing that: "it will make a g~eat diffe~ence ... whethe~ ... 
[the lib~a~ian] thinks of t~uth as an objective standa~d, .o~ as a 
limit to which the app~oximations of science a~e g~adually 
app~oaching" (1961: 90). 
Butle~'s cont~ibution should be viewed in the light of his 
attempt to convince the lib~a~y p~ofession of the theo~etical 
necessity and ·p~actical benefits of applying a scientific 
app~oach to aspects of lib~a~ianship. Science becomes a useful 
adjunct fo~ lib~a~ianship in his view. Howeve~, his own 
academic t~aining in the humanities and his conviction that 
lib~a~ianship is also humanistic suggest that lib~a~ianship 
should accommodate mo~e than one epistemological app~oach. 
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5.2 RANGANATHAN, S.R. (1892-1972) 
scholarship and 
1944. Library 
Ranganathan held advanced academic qualifications in 
mathematics, English literature and library science (Kumar, 1977: 
53). He has been considered, moreover, as "the father of Indian 
librarianship" and one of the "immortals" of the profession of 
library and information science (Sharma, 1979: 58; Palmer, 1969: 
285). Striking parallels have even been drawn between 
Ranganathan and Gandhi in the context of Indian culture. Kumar 
claims, for example, that "Like Gandhiji, Ranganathan would have 
preferred to have opted for truth rather than logical 
consistency", and that "Like Gandhian thought, Ranganathan's 
philosophy was a open-ended system welcoming new ideas ... His 
ideas were cyclical in the dialectical sense of the term ... " 
(Kumar, 1986: v) .. 
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Ranganathan has made significant contributions to many areas 
of library and information science, most notably those of library 
classification and reference work. He sought the basic 
principles that unify library practices and services as a whole 
while studying librarianship at the University College of London 
in the 1920's. 
Great Britain, 
After extensive travel and library practice in 
he formulated five laws of library science, which 
constitute, for him, a unified theory for library service as a 
whole (Atherton, 
follows: 
1973: 141) • These laws have been codified as 
( i) "Books are for use"; 
(ii) "Every reader his book"; 
(iii) "Every book its reader"; 
( iv) "Save the time of the reader"; and 
( v) "The 1 ibrary is a growing mechanism". 
In Mangla's view the five laws as articulated above provide 
Ranganathan with a definitive conceptual framework for developing 
various normative principles, canons, techniques, practices, etc, 
essential for organizing libraries and their services along 
scientific lines (1984: 277). Satija argues that Ranganathan's 
laws conform to the logical requirements for scientific laws: 
"From a philosophical and epistemological standpoint, they fully 
hold the status of a law" (1986: 89). He proposes that the rest 
of Ranganathan's writings flow seminally out of the five laws and 
that the "Development of Ranganathan's work is only a history of 
·interpreting and tapping the laws" (1986: 91) . 
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There are, however, ambivalent claims among critics and 
admirers concerning the alleged scientific nature of 
Ranganathan's work in librarianship. Chappell, for example, 
challenges the generally held assumption that scientific 
methodology characterizes Ranganathan's approach to 
librarianship, suggesting that the impact of his own value system 
and of the Hindu tradition is in fact dominant in many of his 
writings: 
"While the conventional characteristics of a scientific 
methodology often appear to be imposed on his 
conceptions after the fact, the influence of the cosmic 
and moral world view of Hinduism seems integral to his 
thought, shaping it from within and forming the 
perspective from which he observes library practice and 
formulates his five laws. Ranganathan's approach to 
librarianship is fundamentally not scientific but 
religious in the broadest sense of the term" (1985: 
381). 
The two conceptions basic to all forms of Hinduism are a 
belief in cosmic unity in the essential interrelationship of all 
things, and a conviction that knowledge is a powerful agent of 
this unity (Edgerton, 1964: 21) • Chappell argues that this twin 
philosophy pervades Ranganathan's writings. She contends that 
"Ranganathan · s belief in the importance of _1 ibrarianship and his 
understanding of its primary function are rooted in a faith in 
the pragmatic and ultimately cosmic value of knowledge" (1985: 
382). Librarianship is instrumental in facilitating a progress 
of librarians and library patrons from a "vital plane" to a 
"mental plane", and finally to a "spiritual plane" (1985: 383). 
Chappell submits that, according to Ranganathan, the purpose of 
librarianship is to participate in the unfolding of this 
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universal destiny by educating individuals towards the adoption 
of a sense of intellectual and social cooperation and unity, into 
a realization of interrelatedness (1985: 384). 
Chappell's view is not without support from Indian 
librarians. Kumar characterizes Ranganathan primarily as a 
religious person, while Satija contends that he taught attitude 
and spirit more than "facts, methods, theory or philosophy" 
(1977: 57; 1987: 307). Despite this characterization, 
Ranganathan's religious views are not interpreted as being 
antithetical to his so-called "spiral of scientific method". 
Ranganathan believed that mystical intuition was a fundamental 
basis of the "scientific method", but Kumar points out that it is 
not unusual for scientists to discover laws through intuition and 
that this does not make such laws any less objective than laws 
derived inductively. He considers, in fact, that "Ranganathan at 
heart was a positivist, despite the halo of a mystic attributed 
to him" (Kumar, 1977: 57) . 
Ranganathan affirms of his own account the influence of both 
religious and scientific influences in his thinking in the 
statement: 
"I have had split moments of experience of intuition. 
My five laws of library science were seen in this 
way. My own other postulates, forming the foundation 
of my theory of library classification were seen like 
that. I had to slave a great deal to understand the 
Why and Why For of certain facts of experience. But 
when the intellect had done its best, and it appears 
for a split second and gives the postulates etc. (sic] 
Once they are handed over by intuition, my intellect 
had to work out their implications for days and days 
with hardly any sleep for example, continuously for a 
few days. My theory of library classification, 
published as Prolegomena to library classification, has 
been worked in this way" (Quoted by Kumar, 1977: 59). 
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Ranganathan made a plea for the scientific study of the 
fundamental characteristics of human thought that could be 
applied to the study of library classification. However, 
Chappell points out that there is little evidence that he ever 
undertook the kind of systematic and rigorous investigation that 
he advocated or that he attempted to make use of available 
research (1985: 393). in spite of this, his classification 
scheme has drawn praise 'from many librarians. Shera, for 
example, proclaims that: 
"Of all librarians, only S.R. Ranganathan has attempted 
to build a bibliographic classification upon 
epistemological principles. By demonstrating the ways 
in which knowledge grows -- by 'denudation, dissection, 
lamination, and loose assemblage', he has clearly shown 
the relation between bibliographic classification and 
the patterns of man's cognitive growth" (1973: 333). 
Shera and Perry contended earlier that: 
" for the first time, 
of the management of 
epistemology" (1965: 45). 
librarianship as the science 
knowledge merges with 
It is perhaps to be regretted that Ranganathan does not make 
any pronounced references to epistemology, but it is clear that 
he did not conceive of it only in its narrow scientific sense. 
He was inspired instead by broader notions of the unity of human 
knowledge and by the need to make this knowledge readily 
accessible to the library user. Chappell has dSserted, for 
example, that his classification scheme is valuable for its 
immediate helpfulness rather than for any direct correspondence 
it might have with some fundamental reality (1985: 393). It is 
however significant to note that Ranganathan's work on the 
theoretical foundations of library science was inspired by the 
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notion of unity, or as it is expressed in Sanskrit 
Ekavakyata. This profound Vedic principle of unity implies that 
all knowledge is one, was a guiding principle in his life: 
"I often realize that even apparently trivial 
occurrences are organically fused into a single life 
experience .•. The five laws of library science is a 
verbal record of the Ekavakyata of library practice and 
science, as it revealed itself to me" (1963: 817). 
Chappell rates Ranganathan's contribution to librarianship 
as an equivocal one, however: 
"The value of his work is by no means negligible, but 
neither is it fundamental. He does not, as he tries to 
do, find a way of firmly anchoring the jerry-built 
structure of librarianship to the bedrock of 
metaphysical reality, of keeping it constantly attuned 
to the cosmic plan ..• Ranganathan's justification of 
his vision is finally no more than a statement of faith 
in intuition. Since intuition is uncontrollable and 
incommunicable, we have no way of systematically 
exploiting it or of judging its claims" (1985: 394). 
However, Chappell's assessment does not negate the consensus 
that Ranganathan remains a fundamental thinker in library 
philosophy who, through his writings, reflects the tension in 
library and information science of the presence and equal 
validity of more than one epistemological approach, tending to 
favour a personal preference for the mystical mode of 
consciousness as a dominant gateway to an appreciation of 
librarianship's key role in preserving and unfolding the 
spiritual heritage of mankind. 
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5.3 DE VLEESCHAUWER, H.J. (1899-1986) 
During the many years that he explored the historical 
dimensions of philosophy, the Belgium-born De Vleeschauwer became 
intimately acquainted with the learned libraries of Western 
Europe. In this process he was induced to study the library as a 
phenomenon. He explains in this respect: 
"What took me along this path was not professional 
necessity but sympathy based upon the splendid feeling 
of solidarity I experienced in the great study 
libraries·of Western Europe" (1961: 245). 
De Vleeschauwer was primarily a philosopher and a cultural 
historian, who at one time headed both the Department of 
Philosophy and the Department of Library science at the 
University of South Africa (Van Jaarsveld, n.d.: 9·) • Among his 
numerous writings, about three hundred books and articles have 
been published, while about seventy-five books and articles 
remain unpublished (Van Jaarsveld, n.d.: 9) • In one of the 
issues of Mousaion, a periodical started by De Vleeschauwer, his 
student, Rauche, provides a succinct account of his career and a 
systematic listing of his extensive writings in philosophy and 
library science (1957: 1-61). 
His writings in library science cover a wide spectrum to 
encompass its history (which he felt gives a proper perspective 
and depth to theoretical library science), its philosophy, its 
scientific status, its professional deontology (including 
censorship and intellectual freedom), user studies, comparative 
literature for librarians and the academic preparation for a 
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p~ofessional ca~ee~. This patent ve~satility has led one w~ite~ 
to compa~e him favou~ably to Ranganathan in an in~e~national 
pe~spective (Montgome~y, 1963: 366). 
De Vleeschauwe~ holds well-defi~ed views of the lib~a~y. 
His pe~ception of the lib~a~y as a cultu~al and humanistic social 
institution as distinct f~om a utilita~ian and mechanical agency 
pe~meates all his w~itings. This view is illust~ated in the 
contention that "A lib~a~y is not an abst~action but a unit 
within the intellectual f~amewo~k of a pa~ticula~ nation" (1966: 
7; cf Butle~-5.1). 
the intellectual 
The lib~a~y·s inc~easingly impo~tant ~ole in 
wo~ld att~acted him as a philosophe~ and 
educationist to study lib~a~y science- (!ben, 1962: 308). 
De Vleeschauwe~·s philosophical views p~ovide a context fa~ 
unde~standing mo~e fully his w~itings on lib~a~y science. The 
epistemological position he develops in his philosophical wo~k 
pe~meates his pe~ception of the pu~pose of the lib~a~y. 
His fo~mally epistemic 







pe~ception. His th~ee longest wo~ks on Kant comp~ise 1 700 pages 
and constitute one of the most valuable cont~ibutions eve~ made 
to Kantian lite~atu~e (Van Jaa~sveld, 9). In his The 
development of Kantian thought, he offe~s a pee~-acknowledged 
histo~ical account of Kant'_s intellectual life (1962a: viii). 
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One of De Vleeschauwer's other major works is a multi 
volumed history of philosophy in the West. He claims that 
Western philosophy had its basis in the concern for the physical 
world rather than in the concern for God or for man (n.d.: 6)~ 
He also claims, that epistemology originated in Spanish 
scholasticism when reality and thought were divided into two 
separate worlds and their necessary correspondence subjected to 
formal proof (n.d.: 55) . 
He poses the fundamental problem of epistemology as follows: 
How can we show, by analytical/demonstrable or rational/ 
scientific means, that our objective representations correspond 
to such an extent with transcendental reality that these 
representations may be regarded as adequate? (1952: 243). 
In .De Vleeschauwer's o~n attempt to resolve this problem it 
is suggested that knowledge results from a relationship between 
subject (the person's mind) and object, and that it becomes 
manifest as judgements that are objective, , universal and 
necessary (cf 4.3.2 for other conceptions of "knowledge"). 
Importantly, he believes that epistemology, which recognizes the 
limitations of human knowledge, is always aware that the logical 
o~der is contained within, and by, an anthropological order 
(1952: 247). In this respect he states: 
" die hele problematiek van die waar- en valsheid 
1@ in daardie intieme kontak van die logiese met die 
antropologiese opgesluit" (1952: 247). 
De Vleeschauwer's own epistemological position is a 
perspectivistic one which serves as a foundation and explanatory 
principle for the multiplicity of truth perspectives (cf 4.3.4). 
176 
' 
None of these pe~spectives is supe~io~ to the othe~, 
stand in ha~monious ~elation to each othe~ (1952: 
and they 
267). 
Pe~spectivism affi~ms a plu~alistic wo~ld-view as distinct f~om 
a monistic one. It is cha~acte~ized as a p~inciple of tole~ance 
fo~, diffe~entiation in viewpoints. It is also a p~inciple of 
mutual unde~standing and mutual ~espect which ~ecognizes that ou~ 
mental lives ~eflect a pe~sistent state of tension between 
~ationality and i~~ationality and excludes a pe~fectly complete 
knowledge of all that is (1952: 
discussion of pe~spectivism). 
269; cf also 8.1 fo~ a fulle~ 
Rauche, who studied unde~ De Vleeschauwe~, cla~ifies fu~the~ 
the notion of pe~spectivism. He maintains that ou~ knowledge of 
the t~uth is pe~spectival and that in ou~ sea~ch fo~ knowledge we 
a~e conf~onted with mo~e than one kind of knowledge, fo~ example, 
mo~al knowledge, 
(1983: 26). 
aesthetic knowledge and ~eligious knowledge 
These types of knowledge a~e methodologically 
constituted and ~econstituted in the fo~m of va~ying theo~ies and 
in te~ms of man s changing expe~ience of ~eality. No single 
method may be absolutized, although it is in point of fact the 
method which is the t~uth-function of knowledge (1983: 29). In 
this view, the scientific method is simply anothe~ man-made 
method that ~ecognizes the human mind as the c~itical denominate~ 
in all human t~uth. T~uth-pe~spectives change in acco~dance with 
man's histo~ically changing wo~ld consciousness (1983: 31). 
This insight is antithetical to that unde~lying dogmatism and 
encou~ages modesty, tole~ance, open-mindedness, ~espect and 
goodwill among people in thei~ ·exchange of ideas. Rauche 
maintains that it is upon this g~ound of contingent expe~ience of 
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reality that the dialogue about truth continues in the natural 
sciences, in history, in philosophy, in theology and other types 
of knowledge (1983: 32). 
In his studies of library science as a science, De 
Vleeschauwer sets forth a general philosophical investigation of 
the library as part of a larger phenomenon, namely, the means by 
which all human thought can be communicated in writing (1960: 
3). He asserts that, with a true library theory, library science 
cannot be denied a fixed and assured place in the globus 
intellectualis of contemporary thought. This, it is contended, 
can only be achieved if researchers concentrate on library 
science as a whole rather than on library practices and 
techniques (1960: 132). 
De Vleeschauwer contends that library science is 
'scientific' (that is, in the broad Germanic sense of 
Wissenschaft) in essence. It cannot be categorized as an exact 
natural science in accordance with a positivistic conceptual 
framework, as Butler sought to do (1960: 97; cf 5. 1) • De 
Vleeschauwer presents a clear description of his conception of 
the criteria for a science. When he applies these criteria to 
library theory, he proposes that we should be able to: 
(i) describe the elements of which librarianship as a 
multifarious phenomenon is composed; 
(ii) determine the universal 
phenomenon as a whole; 
and formal nature of 
(iii) explain its complex causal nexus; 
the 
(iv) show that the present-day library is the dynamic 







the professional aspect of the library 
ethical and professional deontology (1960: 
He proc:eeds·to demonstrate that library sc:ienc:e fulfills 
these criteria, thereby qualifying as a "mental" sc:ienc:e rather 
than a " natura 1 " sc: i en c: e in the :=9c.::l:....:o:::..b=u:..::s=<--_ ___,~=.;-n:..:...::t:..::e=-1::....:.1->=e:..::c:=-t=u->=a:..:l:..:~:::.-=s • He 
states: 
"In its particular objective content the library 
remains a mental phenomenon. The library is 
materialized mind both in essence and in prac:tic:e; both 
in its aim and in its utility" (1960: 239). 
He c:onc:eives of "mental" sc:ienc:e as a genus, and assigns library 
sc:ienc:e to some species thereof, namely, the cultural sc:ienc:es 
(1960: 240). 
Criterion ( ii) above is formulated in terms of the 
possibility of generalization of library theory in respe~t of 
time, plac:e and observer. In this regard, De Vleesc:hauwer seeks 
to discover the central object or dynamic: of the library as a 
whole around whic:h all the others may be grouped. This central 
object, he submits, will of necessity be both general and 
indefinite: general, sinc:e it is the unique, central theme with 
whic:h every aspect of the library is c:onnec:ted; indefinite, sinc:e 
an additional characteristic: should be assigned to it in order to 
transform the general object into a library object (1960: 41) • 
Having thus characterized the central object, De 
Vleesc:hauwer identifies it as the transmission of ideas through 
the instrumentality of books. This is: 
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" the unive~sal idea unde~lying each conc~ete aspect 
of the lib~a~y ... it may be an object of scientific 
~eflection since its unive~sal natu~e is based on a 
function which is gene~al, and independent of time, 
place and human obse~ve~s" (1960: 44). 
This cent~al object satisfies the c~ite~ion of unive~sality 
~equi~ed by science. His conviction that this cent~al object 
supplies lib~a~y science with unity and inte~nal cohe~ence leads 
him to ~eject a lib~a~y science based on p~ecepts which gove~n 
individual p~ocesses, such as the injunction of giving the ~eade~ 
the book that he ~equi~es as quickly as possible. Such 
p~ofessional p~agmatism, he contends, .fails to account fo~ 
lib~a~y thought as a whole (1960: 99). 
In his discussion of the ethico-deontological aspect of 
lib~a~y science, De Vleeschauwe~ identifies and discusses fou~ 
pu~poses of the lib~a~y, namely: 
(i) the individualistic; 
(ii) the sociological; 
(iii) the pedagogical; and 
(iv) the objectivistic. 
The individualistic ?PP~oach views the lib~a~y as a place 
that allows the thinking individual an oppo~tunity fo~ f~eedom of 
thought (1960: 65). This app~oach is simila~ to that of 
B~oadfield, as exp~essed in the latte~·s Philosophy of 
lib~a~ianship (1949). It sees the lib~a~y as se~ving individuals 
~athe~ than communities. 
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The sociological, or- socialistic appr-oach, r-estr-icts the 
libr-ar-y to a r-eflection of the views of the author-ities in 
contr-ol of the community. This appr-oach aims at establishing 
cer-tain nor-ms and ideals as the homogeneous basis of a unified 
body of communal thought thr-ough car-eful selection, and even 
censor-ship of liter-atur-e (1960: 
libr-ar-y pr-omotes and pr-otects a 
66). 
"way of 
example, "the Amer-ican way of life". 
In this conception, 
life", such as, 
the 
for-
The pedagogical concept of the libr-ar-y is closely connected 
with the pr-evious one and aims at the pr-ovision to adults of 
oppor-tunities for- acquir-ing cultur-e and pr-ofessional tr-aining. 
In this appr-oach the libr-ar-y consider-s itself as par-t of the 
educational str-uctur-e of a par-ticular- community and believes that 
it has the social duty of educating the masses, and moulding 
people into "useful and innocuous member-s of their- r-espective 
communities" (1960: 67) • 
None of these thr-ee appr-oaches r-esolves the individual 
ver-su~ community pr-oblem an~ they ar-e inadequate in accounting 
for- the plur-alistic char-acter- of pr-esent-day society which the 
libr-ar-y ser-ves. De Vleeschauwer- sets for-th his own appr-oach, 
which he calls "objectivistic". This appr-oach claims that the 
libr-ar-y should take no stand on the pr-oblem of the individual 
ver-sus community, nor- should it hold any r-epr-esentative opinion. 
The libr-ar-y should aim at being a complete r-ecor-d of intellectual 
life. 
wor-ld 
It can only r-ise above the contr-over-sies r-aging in the 
and embody the r-egar-d for- the fr-eedom of human per-sonality 
if it r-emains neutr-al and, instead of assuming a doctr-inal 
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attitude in the world, "gives proof of a noble eclecticism and of 
a high degree of intellectual many-sided and wide interests" 
(1960: 216). 
As a~ individual, the librarian should hold his own opinion, 
but in a professional capacity, he should build up his library as 
an actively neutral institution supplying all the contending 
parties with intellectual weapons. The library should be allied 
to neither the East nor the West in any single-minded sense. As 
an instrument of civilization it should recognize only the 
authority and purpose of serving the intellect and the free 
personality. This is an objective authority and not the 
subjective conviction of an individual, a community or some other 
social force. This forms the basis for his objectivistic concept 
of the library, in which it reflects the pluralistic intellectual 
life of its community and pursues a policy of 
neutrality. 
ideological 
By pluralism, on which democracy is based, De Vleeschauwer 
means the recognition of diversity and individuality which are 
entitled to certain inalienable rights and liberties (1959: 63). 
He maintains that the whole of creation up to and including the 
human mind is built on the heterogeneity of genera and species, 
that is, on pluralism (1959: 66; cf 5.26 for Harris' view of a 
pluralist ontology in library and information science). 
In this objectivistic view, the library is the handmaiden of 
the objective mind and the human personality, of responsible 
citizenship and intellectual 




and of the fundamental 
The objectivistic app~oach ~eflects De Vleeschauwe~·s 
epistemological position as it is developed in his philosophical 
w~itings, that is, pe~spectivism. It is quite possible that if 
he had concent~ated his mental ene~gies on the epistemological 
foundations of lib~a~y and info~mation science, 
developed his pe~spectivistic epistemological 
he would have 
position within 
this objectivistic f~amewo~k. He affi~ms that the lib~a~y·s 
p~ima~y duty is to be an institution of ve~acity, which in its 
w~itten content objectively ~eflects intellectual life by 
displaying a many-sided inte~est in it, and by admitting all 
ideological 
ideological 
t~ends without taking an active pa~t in 
feuds of the count~y (1960: 69; 1961: 206). 
the 
He 
speaks of an adeguatio bibliothecae et idea~um, decla~ing that 
.the g~eate~ this adeguatio is and the mo~e fully the lib~a~y can 
achieve it, the mo~e t~ue it will be to its own natu~e and aims, 
and the bette~ it will fulfill its mode~n function (1960: 70). 
De Vleeschauwe~·s conception of cultu~e eme~ges in a 
histo~ical analysis of a fundamental duality in lib~a~ianship. 
He t~aces this duality to a schism in intellectual life, namely, 
the libe~al p~inciple of individual f~eedom and the socialistic 
p~inciple of equality which led to a duality in cultu~e, that is, 
between active c~eation and gene~al cultu~e (fo~ othe~ views of 
cultu~e, cf 4.4.3). Active c~eation implies scientific cultu~e 
o~ pa~ticipation in ~esea~ch. Gene~al cultu~e has a mo~e passive 
meaning, namely, the contemplation, evaluation and enjoyment of 
someone else's c~eative wo~k, whethe~ lite~a~y o~ scientific 
(1964: 33). 
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This duality led to the eme~gence of the lea~ned lib~a~y on 
the one hand and the public o~ "~eading" lib~a~y on the othe~. 
Cultu~e lies at the hea~t of the policy which should be adopted 
by the public lib~a~y since the lib~a~y emanates f~om, and ~eacts 
upon cultu~e (1960: 240; 1961: 238). All the othe~ lib~a~y 
objectives se~ve me~ely to stimulate in the public an inte~est in 
cultu~e, on the assumption that all books a~e inst~uments fo~ the 
bette~ment of the mind (cf 4.4.3). De Vleeschauwe~ claims that 
cultu~e cannot be o~ganized and he objects st~ongly to a 
"cultu~al policy" which can be used by the state to its own 
political ends (1959: 73). 
As an integ~al pa~t of the social ~eality, the lib~a~y 
embodies the p~inciples of tole~ance and f~eedom. It does not 
stand in isolation f~om the wo~ld, and yet it stands aloof f~om 
any sectional outlook o~ specific dogma. Fo~ De Vleeschauwe~ the 
lib~a~y is a place of II tole~ance and of pu~e, unalloyed 
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5.4 MACHLUP, F. (1902-1983) 
As an economist, Machlup was interested in the p~oduction 
and distribution of knowledge in modern society. His work has 
been and still is of considerable importance and of provoking 
interest to librarians and information scientists. His 
comprehensive study of information (co-authored with Mansfield) 
offers valuable insights to librarians and information scientists 
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of the nature of information and the relationship between library 
science and information science (1983). Harmon considers him an 
iconoclast who sought to "rid the study of knowledge of its 
mystic baggage, folklore, and semantic confusion ••• " (1982: 
235). 
Machlup's analysis of the notions of knowledge, information 
and information science should be seen in the context of his 
encyclopaedic effort at developing an economics of knowledge. 
Following upon his earlier work, The production and distribution 
of knowledge in the U.S.A., published in 1962, Machlup initiated 
a research project on several aspects of the economics of 
knowledge. The initial project envisaged eight volumes, but was 
later expanded to ten. He died while working on volume four, 
which is an interdisciplinary study of information (Machlup & 
Mansfield: 1983). 
Machlup rejects ce~tain distinctions in meaning between 
information and knowledge (cf 4.3.5.1). He proposes that we 
should avoid the "redundant phrase 'knowledge and information' 
when both are meant to signify contents" (1980: 9) ' posing the 
question: 
"Is there any tradition or any philosophically sound 
reason for such discrimination between knowledge and 
information where their contents are the same or both 
refer to the same contents? All information, in the 
sense of the contents conveyed, is knowledge •.• " 
( 1980: 58). 
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Machlup's conce~n with the concept of knowledge and the need 
to ~e-fashion it in the mode~n knowledge-based economy ~eflects 
his unde~lying conviction that ce~tain "kinds of knowledge a~e 
inst~umental in inc~easing the efficiency of the economy" (1980: 
6) • 
He identifies five types of knowledge, viz, p~ac tic a 1, 
intellectual, epheme~al, spi~itual and unwanted (1980). Miksa 
suggests that these catego~ies of knowledge p~esent a "useful 
f~amewo~k fo~ thinking about and t~acing the development of the 
mode~n lib~a~y" (1985: 170). Miksa does not, howeve~, ca~~y any 
fu~the~ the implicit suggestion that the diffe~ent catego~ies of 
knowledge ~esult f~om diffe~ent ways of knowing which, acco~ding 
to Machlup, is p~ecisely what epistemology studies (1980: 27). 
Fo~ Machlup, 
science (cf 4.4.2). 
lib~a~y science is a sub-field of info~mation 
Fu~the~mo~e, lib~a~y science is viewed as 
being empi~ical in all its aspects (1983: 16) • 1'1achlup does 
not, howeve~, ~est~ict info~mation science in this way. Ha~mon 
contends that Machlup was "intensely dedicated to the task of 
b~oadly defining info~mation science and its ~elation not just to 
economics but to the sum of human knowledge" (1987: 227). Fo~ 
this ~eason, he p~oposes, togethe~ with Mansfield, fou~ views of 
info~mation science (1983: 18; cf 4.4.1.2). Fi~st, it may be 
conside~ed as the systematic study of info~mation which involves 
all o~ any combination of a numbe~ of academic disciplines. 
Second, in its association with compute~ science, it may denote 
the study of the phenomena of inte~est to those who a~e conce~ned 
with compute~s as p~ocesso~s of info~mation. Thi~d, in lib~a~y 
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and information science, it indicates the application of new 
technologies to traditional practices of librarianship. Fourth, 
it may be perceived as the intersection 6f newer technologies 
with a special interest in improved communication of scientific 
and technological information (ibid.). In its association with 
library science, it is seen as concentrating on improving its 
technical aspects only. Rayward points out that the fourth view 
which holds that information science is the intersection of newer 
technologies, and which is also a combination of the other three 
views, is one that is currently emerging strongly (1985: 120). 
Machlup views library and information science in a narrow 
sense in which the incorporation of information science into 
library science consists " ... merely of teaching the students to 
use a new tool, the computer (1983: 21). 
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5.5 SHERAI J.H. (1903-1982) 
Sher-a has been descr-ibed as a fundamental thinker- - one who 
tr-ied to tr-ace the foundations of his foundations (Bekker-, 1984: 
15) . The wor-d "foundations·~ was a favour-ite one in his 
vocabular-y (Rawski, 1973: 353). 
He was inspir-ed by the notion of r-econciling libr-ar-y science 
with infor-mation science under- "a unifying theor-etical cover-" 
(Br-ookes, 1973: 234). Accor-ding to Sher-a, libr-ar-y science and 
infor-mation science have been concer-ned, mistakenly, with 
individual systems and both lacked any gener-al theor-y. His ideas 
on the ar-ticulation of such a gener-al theor-y do not always appear-
to develop in a logically consistent manner-. Br-ookes has 
suggested an explanation for- this: that Sher-a's sever-al essays 
wer-e wr-itten "at var-ious times for- a var-iety of pur-poses and 
occasions" (1973: 234)' which seems a fair- and per-ceptive 
comment. 
Sher-a locates the centr-al pr-oblem for- libr-ar-ies and 
infor-mation wor-ker-s, namely, the "maximization of the social 
uti 1 i ty of gr-aphic r-ecor-ds", in a lar-ger- social context. (The 
ostensibly confined ter-m "gr-aphic", incidentally, seems 
unfor-tun~te since it excludes in the liter-al sense other- possible 
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sou~ces such as, fo~ example, audio-visual mate~ial, while this 
was clea~ly not She~a·s intention). In this la~ge~ social 
context the assistance of schola~s f~om othe~ academic 
disciplines is valuable, but it is left to lib~a~ians and 
info~mation scientists themselves to synthesize the ~esults of 
inte~disciplina~y schola~ship (She~a, 1966: 75) • 
The notions of unity and synthesis featu~e st~ongly in 
She~a·s w~itings. Fo~ example, he obse~ves that "f~agmentation" 
and "cent~ifugation" a~e tendencies ~esulting f~om the inc~ease 
in volume and complexity of man's knowledge (1965: 15), and that 
what is needed to counte~act these tendencies is "a powe~ful 
cohesive fo~ce" (ibid.). He contends that this fo~ce can be 
exe~ted 
society. 
by the communication system ope~ating in civilized 
To this end, She~a, togethe~ with Ma~ga~et Egan, developed 
what they called a "theo~y of g~aphic communication" in which 
communication is conceived as an inst~umentality as distinct f~om 
an end (1952: 129). In this conception, the dynamics of 
bibliog~aphical cont~ol is conside~ed one such inst~umentality of 
communication. Bibliog~aphy is seen in its mac~ocosmic view as 
distinct f~om its mic~ocosmic view which emphasizes "each 
bibliog~aphy as a sepa~ate tool fashioned to meet the specific 
needs of a limited numbe~ of pe~sons with mo~e o~ less common 
inte~ests" (1952: 125). 
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In this way, bibliography (conceived in its widest sense) 
and communication merge to provide the essential elements for a 
possible line of study that investigates human intellectual 
as recorded in documents (ie, "the generic development 
document"). Shera and Egan named this discipline social 
epistemology which, they envisaged, would become an academic 
discipline in its own right and a core subject in the education 
of librarians (1956: 8) • This discipline would have its own 
"corpus of theoretical knowledge" as well as one of "practical 
aspects" (1970: 87-8). Brookes views his own bibliometric 
studies as the development of the quantitative aspects of what he 
refers to as Shera's "theory of bibliography" (1973: 240). He 
states that the initial work in developing the practical aspects 
of social epistemology was undertaken by information scientists 
because they "were more familiar with general theories, with the 
construction of theoretical models and with the required 
techniques than are most librarians" (1973: 241). However, he 
does add that the development of social epistemology offers 
common ground for librarians and information scientists to 
cultivate, together, a unifying concern which holds out the 
promise of an ultimate reconciliation between the two disciplines 
(1973: 245). 
What exactly is meant by social epistemology is uncertain. 
The several descriptions of this phrase in Shera's writings 
reflect ambivalences and a lack of clarity. 
variously and disparately described as: 
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For example, it is 
1. " the study of those 
as a whole seeks to 
unde~standing ~elation to 
physical, psychological and 
p~ocesses by which society 
achieve a pe~ceptive o~ 
the total envi~onment 
intellectual" (1952: 134). 
2. " the analysis of the p~oduction, dist~ibution 
and utilization of intellectual p~oducts in much the 
same fashion as that in which the p~oduction, 
dist~ibution and utilization of mate~ial p~oducts have 
long been investigated. G~aphic communication p~ovides 
objective evidence of the p~ocess" (1952: 135). 
3. " social epistemology .•• shoul-d lift the 
intellectual life f~om that of a sc~utiny of the 
individual to an enqui~y into the means by which a 
society, nation, o~ cultu~e achieves an unde~standing 
of the totality of stimuli which act upon it. The 
focus of this discipline should be upon the 
p~oduction, flow, integ~ation, and consumption of all 
fo~ms of communicated thought th~oughout the enti~e 
social fab~ic. F~om such a discipline should eme~ge 
then, a new study of knowledge about knowledge, giving 
~ise to a new synthesis of the inte~action between 
knowledge and social activity, o~, if you p~efe~, 
soc ia 1 dynamics" ( 1970: 86) . 
4. "The emphasis of social epistemology falls on the 
whole man and the whole society, and all thei~ ways of 
thinking, knowing, feeling, acting and communicating" 
(1968: 24). 
These seve~al desc~iptions fail to delineate in an 
unambiguous way the p~ecise scope and meaning of social 
epistemology. She~a did cont~ast it with the sociology of 
knowledge by stating that the sociology of knowledge conce~ns the 
conditioning of knowledge by social ideas, while social 
epistemology is conve~sely conce~ned with the impact of knowledge 
upon society (1970: 107). (It is inte~esting to note in passing 
Fulle~·s obse~vation that in fo~mal philosophy, social 
epistemology is cu~~ently viewed as the ~esult of a 
~econciliation of no~mative philosophy of science and empi~ical 
sociology of knowledge (1988; cf 2.1 fo~ the t~aditional 
conception of epistemology)). 
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Despite the lack of clarity in his definition of social 
epistemology, there ls little doubt regarding Shera's conviction 
that librarianship is truly based on epistemological foundations, 
"because it deals with the nature of knowledge and the 
utilization of that knowledge by men both individually and in 
groups, that is, collectively" (1970: 88). Here, as. elsewhere, 
it is to be noted that he generally prefers the term "knowledge" 
to that of "information" since knowledge encompasses information 
(1983: 382; cf 4.3.5.1.2). This allows him to stress that 
librarians deal primarily with ideas, con~epts and thoughts, and 
only incidentally with "things", that is, "things that can be 
measured, weighed, poured fastened, or mixed together" (1983: 
384). The juxtaposition of a primary emphasis on ideas and a 
secondary emphasis on "things" should be viewed in the light of 
Shera's sustained argument for a holistic view of librarianship 
so that it encompasses, according to Wright, the " immaterial 
realities (ideas) and physical instruments (data) .•. " which 
interact as two great halves" .•. to create the unity of one 
great whole" (1988: 38). For Shera, knowledge is conceived in 
its broadest possible sense. In a statement on the unified, 
cohesive, holistic nature of knowledge, he declares 
unequivocally: 
"I submit that knowledge is unitary; that the world of 
knowledge is a unity ... " (1970: 100). 
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Shera also views culture in this broad sense. For him, 
culture is a duality of action and thought, and should be 
understood in its several manifestations throughout history and 
throughout the world 
cu 1 ture). 
(1970: 89; cf 4.4.3 for other notions of 
It is perhaps curious that in one of his last essays, which 
reflects the mature culmination of his life-long ideas about 
librarianship and information science, no mention is made of 
social epistemology at all. He suggests in this essay, instead, 
that librarians should look to "symbolic interactionism" for the 
proper foundation of a theory of librarianship instead of 
expecting it to come from information science (as he had once 
mistakenly thought it would) (1983: 386). Whether Shera 
abandoned social epistemology in favour of symbolic 
interactionism, and whether there are any fundamental connections 
between the two fields, is not sufficiently clear. Wright 
suggests that Shera's injunction that librarians should look to 
symbolic interactionism for a proper foundation of a theory of 
librarianship affirms his consistent reminder that 
librarianship's primary area of concern is that of social 
phenomena rather than natural phenomena (1988: 48). 
What clearly does pervade Shera's writings in the ultimate 
sense, however, is the thought that the librarian's bibliographic 
and information systems should conform as closely as possible to 
man's use of recorded knowledge (in the generic document). For 
him, the unique purpose of the library is to bring the human mind 
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and the "graphic" record together "so that people may understand 
the totality of the environment in which they find themselves and 
their own place in it" (1983: 387). 
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5.6 FAIRTHORNE, R.A. (1904-
Fairthorne, a trained mathematician, began applying his 
technical knowledge to the study of the theoretical foundations 
of the classification and communication of information while he 
worked for the Royal Aircraft Establishment (Coblans, 1974: 
129). Perhaps predictably, one of his early articles dealt with 
the mathematics of classification (1947). In this article he 
outlines, amongst other things, the limitations of Aristotelian 
classification for libraries, ie, the restri~ted utility of 
genus-species relationships for effective arrangement of library 
materials (1947: 35). Some of his essays relating to library 
and information science culminated in a monograph entitled 
Towards information retrieval (Fairthorne: 1961). 
In his theory of communication, Fairthorne reserves for 
information a strict, technical meaning, that is, its narrower 
sense as interpreted in Shannon's mathematical theory of 
information (1954: 255; cf 4.2.2.2.1). Much later, in a more 
skeptical vein, he submits that the word "information" is no more 
than "a linguistic convenience that saves you the trouble of 
thinking what you are talking about. Fortunately one does not 
have to use the word. Always, if we put our minds to it, we t:an 
say what we mean" (Quoted in Cawkell, 1987: 1). 
While it appears that he is vague 
ambivalent about the meaning of information, 
and perhaps even 
there is no such 
ambivalence in his view of the purpose of information retrieval. 
Bohnert contends that, from the beginning, Fairthorne maintained 
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the proposition that retrieval is a social process and that, 
consequently, he targets the user as the emphasis of all 
retrieval systems design (1961: xiii). Whether the user should 
receive the actual knowledge or information contained in the 
document or merely the document itself is another issue that is 
unclear from Fairthorne's writings. For example, he challenges 
Nitecki's view that knowledge is the subject of study of library 
science, taking "discourse" to be that subject (1968b: 363; cf 
5. 14) . He proposes that the difference between the two can be 
' explained as "being informed about a document" (Fairthorne's 
conception) and "being informed Qy_ a document" (Nitecki's 
conception). However, in the same essay on the limits of 
information retrieval he demonstrates the need for the 
information retrieval syste~ to select those documents with true 
statements rather than those with false statements (according to 
the precepts of formal logic). He submits that the factors that 
govern this situation are ignorance and chance (1968b: 366). 
Regarding the intellectual foundations of information 
science, he cont~nds that physical analogues, th~t is, references 
to mass, time, space and electrical charge are necessary but not 
sufficient to explain the informational situation. Despite his 
wide knowledge of technical applications to library operations, 
and perhaps because of it, he advocates careful and limited 
application of "automata" to library problems, warning against 
the expectation of "sensational advances, suggested by diluted 
analogies between control mechanisms and multi-purposed 
institutions" (1961: 21) • Fairthorne's cautious approach to the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to library 
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p~oblems and his emphasis of the use~ in ~et~ieval system design 
~eveal a necessa~y p~ofessional tole~ance of mo~e than one 
epistemological app~oach to lib~a~y and info~mation science. He 
states that basic theo~y should dete~mine the natu~e of p~actice, 
othe~wise lib~a~ians: 
" ... will be unable to supply a fo~mal key to the lock, 
but will continue as befo~e to tampe~ with the lock to 
fit thei~ favou~ite keys" (1975: 13). 
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5.7 COETZEE, P.C. (1905-1987) 
Coetzee, who also se~ved as hono~a~y edito~ of South Af~ican 
lib~a~ies between 1960 and 1968, distinguished himself as a 
stimulating polemicist in debates on the mo~e fundamental issues 
of lib~a~y and info~mation science theo~y (Kesting, 1969: 77) . 
He ~eveloped the conceptual f~amewo~ks for subdisciplines which 
have since been inco~po~ated in the basic p~ofessional p~og~ammes 
fo~ education fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science at some 
unive~sities in the Republic of South Af~ica, most notably those 
of ~eade~ship ("Lese~kunde", o~ Use~ Studies), and the study of 
science as an aspect of the cultu~al inf~ast~uctu~e of mode~n 
civilization (1977a; 1978a). 
Coetzee's ea~ly conce~n with fundamental issues is evident 
f~om an essay p~oduced mo~e than fifty yea~s ago in which he 
exp~esses the view that most w~itings about lib~a~ies at the time 
wer-e "p~etentious and unsatisfacto~y" (1935: 40). In that ea~ly 
essay he calls fo~ a p~ofessional philosophy that would account 
fo~ the pu~pose of the lib~a~y and its function within an 
o~ganization. 
Taken as a whole, Coetzee's w~itings emb~ace both p~actical 
and theo~etical issues of lib~a~y and info~mation science. Fo~ 
example, he w~ote a guide to the p~epa~ation of scientific 
documents, and made seve~al significant cont~ibutions to the 
subject analysis and bibliog~aphic desc~iption of documents 
( 1956; 1962a) . 
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Although Coetzee developed a distinctive epistemological 
position in his docto~al thesis, w~itten in 1952, the~e is no 
evidence to show that he was contemplating the application of 
these views to th~ study and p~actice of lib~a~y and info~mation 
science. His docto~al thesis w~estles with a basic 
epistemological p~oblem, namely, the possibility of the human 
mind to g~asp an object exte~nal to itself (1952: 4) • He 
contends that attempts to ~esolve this p~oblem have concent~ated 
essentially on th~ee aspects: 
(i) the natu~e of t~anscendental ~eality; 
(ii) the st~uctu~e of the mind ("gees"); and 
(iii) the status of the object which the mind comp~ehends 
(1952: 4). 
The emphasis on one o~ the othe~ of these th~ee aspects has 
given ~ise to th~ee methods of app~oaching the knowledge p~oblem 
as well as to seve~al othe~ philosophical p~oblems 
These methods a~e thosg of: 
(i) abst~action; 
(ii) t~anscendental deduction; and 
(iii) ~eduction;;-
(1952: 5) • 
Coetzee postulates that these th~ee methods complement each 
othe~. He then p~oceeds to examine the 
me:taphysico-epistemological concepts of "meaning" and "~eduction" 
in the wo~k of Edmund Husse~l and Nicolai Ha~tmann. This 
examination culminates in the endo~sement of the claim of 
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Ha~tmann, a Ge~man ~ealist philosophe~, that no mode~n 
epistemology is possible without a metaphysical foundation (1952: 
192). He p~oposes that any valid epistemological position should 
explain the notion of t~anscendental ~eality in a satisfacto~y 
manne~. T~anscendental ~eality, fo~ Coetzee, de~ives f~om Kant's 
idea of t~anscendentalism. This te~m is used of any philosophy 
which ~esembles Kant's in being based upon the ~ecognition of an 
a p~io~i element in expe~ience (Sho~te~ Oxfo~d English 
dictiona~y, 1965: 2229). Kant had demonst~ated that the~e was a 
ve~y impo~tant class of ideas which did not come by expe~ience, 
but th~ough which expe~ience was acqui~ed instead (Acton, 1967: 
114). 
It is Ha~tmann who holds that the'epistemic ~elation between 
knowe~ and known is ~eally an ontological ~elation between one 
being and anothe~; acco~dingly, the p~oblems in.epistemology·a~e, 
o~ issue in, p~oblems of ontology (Ce~f, 1967: 423). Following 
Ha~tmann, Coetzee posits the following metaphysical 
p~esuppositions fo~ his epistemological position: 
(i) the~e is a t~anscendental ~eality which is made 
subjective th~ough meaningful ~ep~esentation; 
(ii) the~e is pa~tial ove~lapping of 
knowledge and ~eality which makes 
ce~tain pa~t of ~eality, and 
the catego~ies of 
it possible to know a 
(iii) the~e is an immanent o~ inte~subjective identity of 
knowledge catego~ies which makes it possible fo~ one 
pe~son's knowledge to co~~espond with (as distinct f~om 
being identical with) that of anothe~ (1952: 201). 
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Coetzee characterizes the resultant epistemological position 
I 
as one of perspectivism, having argued that the consistent 
accumulation of knowledge broadens one's perspective, thus 
facilitating the formation of new convictions to substitute those 
presently held (cf also 8.1 for a more detailed discussion of 
perspectivism). There is a remarkable correspondence between the 
ideas of Coetzee and those of De Vleeschauwer (cf 5.3). Both 
produced doctoral dissertations in philosophy. De Vleeschauwer's 
dissertation (1951) preceded that of Coetzee (1952) by just one 
year. Furthermore, both De Vleeschauwer and Coetzee subscribe to 
a perspectivist epistemological position, but as far as can be 
determined, they arrived at their positions independently, 
although De Vleeschauwer emigrated to Pretoria, South Africa, the 
city of Coetzee's entire professional career, in the early post 
World War II years. 
It is essential to note that Coetzee was a pluralist who 
recognized the distinctness of several realities. He did not 
endorse the classical view of reality as an organized whole, with 
patterns subsisting independently of the subjective observer, but 
believed instead that the subjective individual knows only his 
own world of experience which is woven from several states of 
contexts into that of a total context (1978b: 8) • He claims 
that there are spheres of reality to which different sciences 
subscribe, namely, the inorganic, the organic, the psychic, the 
mental and the idealist ( ie, in the Platonic sense, viz, that of 
formal Idealism) (1978: 24). It is only within these 
autonomous realities that individual sciences (both natural and 
social) attempt to form a coherent whole (1977a: 27). Coetzee· 
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distinguishes his pluralist outlook from Western thinking, which 
he characterizes as being prejudiced towards holistic or monistic 
solutions (1978: 8). 
In an address to the Philosophical Society of South Africa, 
Coetzee proposes that the mind ("gees") constitutes a reality 
with its own structure which is neither material nor psychical, 
and which inheres in a community of minds, sometimes referred to 
as the social reality (1959b: 17) • 
sineidetic reality (Greek sunoida: 
He describes this mind as a 
"to see collectively"). 
Sineidetic reality (an ontological system) exerts an educative 
influence on the community. The potential of such influence is 
qualified by the nature of the interchange between individuals as 
sharers and receivers of ideas. Politicians, statesmen, teachers 
and other vocational groups who convey the ideas of the community 
act as instruments of this system. Although it is not stated 
explicitly, and while there are no references to Popper, 
Coetzee's sineidetic reality or "mind" bears. clear resemblances 
to Popper's "third world" of objective knowledge (cf 5.10). 
Coetzee regards the discovery of this reality as the most 
profound achievement of twentieth-century philosophy 
25) • 
(1959b: 
To appreciate Coetzee's insights more fully it is necessary 
to understand his use of the terms "enculturation" and the 
"record". Coetzee holds that the library is a cultural 
instrument and that its functions are derived from its cultural 
character (cf 4.4.3 for other views of culture). Libraries 
strive to perpetuate culture and the cultural progress of a 
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community (1962b: 6) • He tr-aces the r-oots of the ter-m "cultur-e" 
etymologically, showing that it or-iginally r-efer-r-ed to a pr-ocess 
that connotes impr-ovement, even ennoblement. He maintains that 
the ter-m was or-iginally associated with an intimate knowledge of 
the wor-ks of Latin and Gr-eek wr-iter-s (1959a: 12) . Cultur-e is 
viewed as that for-ce that supplies unifor-mity of thought and 
actions in a community. It is closely associated with education 
since individuals have to be inducted into the ways of the gr-oup 
to which he/she belongs. Coetzee infer-s thr-ee functions fr-om 
this conception of the libr-ar-y as a cultur-al instr-ument, namely: 
(i) the pr-eser-vation function; 
(ii) the documentation function; and 
(iii) the sineidetic function. 
The sineidetic function, which is absent fr-om subsequent 
discussions of the libr-ar-y's functions, bear-s 
r-esemblances with and differ-ences to education. 
cer-tain 
Wher-eas 
education r-equir-es a teacher- and a student, 
pr-esumes the individual's exposur-e to ideas. 
this function simply 
The individual is 
in the position to extr-act fr-om liter-atur-e those ideas and 
opinions that lead to his per-sonal development (1959a: 
3. 4) • 
In a later- essay on the functions of the libr-ar-y, 




pr-oposed in 1959), and adds to this a social function (1962d: 
122). These two functions, accor-ding to him, ser-ve the needs of 
r-esear-cher-s and lay r-eader-s r-espectively in their- attempts to 
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' 
const~uct o~ discove~ aspects of ~eality (1962b: 8) • It is 
especially the lay ~eade~, o~ Homo legens vulga~is, whom the 
lib~a~ian should assist in disc~iminating between good and bad 
lite~atu~e (1953: 66). 
Since the lib~a~y is an indispensable inst~ument fo~ 
cultu~al p~og~ess and the self-development of the individual, 
encul tu~ation is viewed as that p~ocess whe~eby an in,dividual 
acqui~es the conceptions, the customs and the behaviou~ patte~ns 
of the g~oup (1950: 2· 
' 
1975: 6) • Encultu~ation takes place 
when a pe~son "picks up" the ethos (a ~elatively constant system 
of beliefs and attitudes) and mo~es (a ~elatively constant system 
of behaviou~ patte~ns o~ folkways) of a g~oup. Encultu~ation is 
a life-long p~ocess and diffe~s f~om fo~mal education in that it 
is mo~e spontaneous and is initiated and maintained by the 
individual's desi~e to be pa~t of the g~oup (1966b: 30). He 
says: 
"Enkultu~asie is ... n opvoeding deu~ voo~beeldstelling 
en voo~beeldnavolging ee~de~ as n opvoeding deu~ 
onde~~ig" (1968c: 40). 
The lib~a~ian should become a "cultu~ologist", who studies 
the cultu~e, o~ cultu~es, of the community he/she se~ves, with 
two ends in view: "fi~stly to discove~ what books will be most 
acceptable to those cultu~al g~oups; and, secondly to find. a 
means of ~aising the gene~al cultu~al level of the g~oup o~ 
g~oups conce~ned" ( 1975: 10). Fo~ Coetzee, this encultu~ative 
function of the social, o~ public, lib~a~y, is fa~ mo~e impo~tant 
than its educational function (1975: 8). 
205 
Coetzee uses the ter-m "r-ecor-d" to descr-ibe the essential 
featur-es of libr-ar-y science. It is not clear- whether- he dr-aws a 
distinction between libr-ar-y science and infor-mation science, but 
he does say that the pr-ofession of infor-mation scientist began 
because libr-ar-ians wer-e unpr-epar-ed for- the task of specialized 
r-etr-ieval of infor-mation (1967b: 41) • The fundamental cor-e of 
libr-ar-y science, Coetzee claims, is the pr-oblem of stor-age and 
r-etr-ieval of the r-ecor-d of human exper-ience, lear-ning and 
imagination, which unites it into an integr-ated whole. Stated 
mor-e succinctly, it is the science of the r-ecor-d (1972: 170). 
He defines science (as Wissenschaft) as follows: 
"'n Wetenskap is 'n menslike onder-neming wat, uitgaande 
van 'n bepaalde pr-obleem of gr-oep pr-obleme, daar-na 
str-ewe om feite te ontdek en te beskryf, met die cog op 
'n ver-k 1 ar-ende insig" ( 1965a: 105) • 
This view of science as an enter-pr-ise of living men initiated by 
an inter-est in a fundamental pr-oblem was pr-oposed by the 
pr-agmatist philosopher- Char-les Sander-s Peir-ce (1931-8). 
The r-ecor-d is an or-ganic extension an objective, 
collective memor-y of the cultur-al community, and its conser-vation 
and or-ganization for- use is the fundamental pr-oblem of libr-ar-y 
science (1975: 78, 117) • This r-ecor-d exists mainly in wr-itten 
for-m and may be divided into the r-ecor-d of act and the r-ecor-d of 
lear-ning (1962a: 55) • The r-ecor-d of lear-ning is of gr-eater-
impor-tance for- subject cataloguing and documentation, and should 
not be confused with "facts" or- "knowledge", which ar-e ter-ms 
that Coetzee associates with tr-uth and ultimate r-eality. He 
declar-es: "Although [we] may claim to know ... a ver-y lar-ge 
number- of facts, only bold metaphysicians will pr-etend to 
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knowledge concerning the ult{mate nature of the universe of facts 
(that is to know what it really is)" (original emphasis) (1962a: 
56). 
To explain what is meant by the record of learning, Coetzee 
draws a sharp distinction between facts, scientific research and 
the record of learning. He states: 
"We are concerned with three sets of realities: a 
universe of facts, a considerable part of which forms 
the external world; a universe of research consisting 
mainly of men engaged in trying to discover more and 
more of the facts; and, a universe of learning 
consisting of the notions of men" (1962a: 56). 
The record of learning exists both in the subjective mode 
(in the minds of men and women) as well as the objective mode (on 
the shelves of libraries) (cf 4.2.2.2). Methods are required to 
supply from the record of learning in the objective mode those 
parts that are relevant to the scientist's or individual's needs. 
The discovery of these methods rests on an understanding of the 
workings of the human mind and memory. Coetzee says that it is 
largely a matter of relations. The process of scientific 
thinking starts with an image which may be regarded as a relatum 
(or point of support of a relation). Other relata are brought 
into the consciousness in order to form a whole. When certain 
important relata are absent from the memory, research is 
initiated in search of the "missing parts". Coetzee contends 
that this process has to be duplicated if we are to succeed in 
making the contents of the record of learning available to 
students, scholars and scientists (1962a: 58). 
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Although Coetzee favours a scientific approach to library 
and information science, his conception of science is not a 
narrow, method-related one. He demonstrates the value and the 
validity in certain aspects of both the inductive and deductive 
approaches (1959a: 11) . He also recognizes the shift from 
internal approaches to external approaches in library and 
information science research, which stresses the goals of 
libraries and information centres rather than their internal 
operations (1962c: 41) • While libraries cannot afford to remain 
out of touch with the times, the blind acceptance of a modern 
materialist-oriented scientific approach over humanistic 
scholarship cannot benefit research in library and information 
science (1965b: 121; 1965c: 34). Human studies form the 
intellectual basis of library and information science. Coetzee 
demonstrates that the historical separation of natural science 
and humanistic scholarship in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries gave rise to a "cultural disinheritance" 
(1975: 12) . Human life lost its meaning, and communication 
barriers developed between scientists and non-scientists, and 
even between groups of specializing scientists. In these 
circumstances the important task of the public library is to 
restore a general frame of thought and assist the layman and the 
scientist to find meaning in life. The need to counteract 
"cultural disinheritance" and preserve the "whole" should be 
in collaboration realized 
(schools, universities) and 
teachers) (1975: 12) . 





Library science, according to Coetzee, like other sciences 
(both natural and social), has its unique worlds of facts and 
means (1975: 117) . All the sciences together exist as a 
commonwealth, or, plurality of institutions (1977a: 13) • 
Coetzee's study of the sciences, or, "wetenskapkunde", is 
different from Shera's social epistemology (cf 5.5). The goal of, 
Coetzee's study of the sciences is not the apprehension of 
knowledge about knowledge, but rather of the trutn, or many 
truths, regarding the sciences (1977a: 15) . Coetzee finds 
Shera's use of the term epistemology misleading, and asserts that 
what is meant by Shera is really an empirical study of the 
sciences as social phenomena, that is, a "Wissenschaftskunde" 
(1966c: 155) . This is probably due to Shera's imprecise and 
half-contradictory definitions of "social epistemology" (cf 5.5). 
Coetzee points out that Shera's notion of social epistemology was 
' 
preceded by Butler's "history of scholarship" (acknowledged by 
Shera in 1960), by the "literary history" of Bacon (whom Coetzee 
claims as the father of social epistemology) and by the ideas of 
Peirce (1966c: 156). 
In an essay on the "two faces of librarianship", Coetzee 
contends that Shera's social epistemology may serve as a 
foundation for documentation (which Coetzee confines to the 
research library), while the social function of libraries 
requires for its foundation a "culturology of readership" (user 
studies) (.1975: 9) • He envisaged two separate branches of 
library science based on each of these concepts which would have 
a common foundation in a more basic science of communication, and 
would study two aspects of the same fundamental phenomenon (1975: 
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10) • Coetzee's ideas on communication, which are developed 
systematically in his writings on user studies ("leserkunde"), 
take into consideration the reality of communication as it is 
experienced by everyone rather than the literature of 
communications research (1975: 253). Communication, for him, is 
essentially a dialectical process in which the sender (act of 
expression) and receiver (condition of understanding) constantly 
switch roles (1975: 256). 
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5.8 MIKHAILOV, A.I. (1905-1988) 
Mikhailov, a Soviet writer, played a significant role in the 
development of informatics in the Soviet Union. He and his 
co-author, Giljarevskii, associate the notion of informatics with 
documentation, and state that" ... informatics studies the laws 
governing all forms of information activities, as well as their 
theory, history, methodology and organization ... " (1969: 21). 
Houser, however, contends that by information Mikhailov means 
scientific information, and proceeds to reformulate the 
definition of informatics as" ... that scientific discipline that 
studies the structure and general properties of scientific 
information and the laws of all processes of scientific 
communication" (1988: 17) . For Mikhailov, scientific 
information must be qualitatively scientific and meet all 
conditions of scientific conceptions, ie, it excludes nominally 
scientific information, for example, a newspaper report that may 
be of interest to natural scientists (1988: 480). It is 
important to note that Mikhailov's notion of informatics also 
differs from that of Gorn. Gorn views informatics as computer 
and information science (1983: 121; cf Machlup's conceptions of 
information science: 5. 4) . 
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While for Mikhailov informatics is dedicated to a study of 
scientific commu~ication, he maintains this understanding that it 
is "not concerned with the determination of truth or falsehood of 
information •.. " (1969: 14). Whether he rather associates truth 
or falsehood as qualities of knowledge is unclear, 
should be noted that he draws a distinction between 
although it 
information 
and knowledge by declaring that information does constitute a 
certain form of knowledge that exists when this knowledge is 
alienated from its carrier (in particular, from its producer) and 
is materialized in the form of a document (1983: 14; cf 
4.3.5.1.2). 
materialized, 
He asserts that not every piece of knowledge can be 
and not every social structure needs to transform 
knowledge into information (1983: 15). 
Mikhailov reasons that the quality of knowledge/information 
attained through direct experience (for example, that of a 
scientist in a laboratory) is superior to that gained via the 
agency of a document. In this way he accounts for the difference 
between information (as manifest, 
and information (as knowledge). 
externally observable signals) 
The former is studied by 
disciplines belonging to the cybernetical group, and the latter 
by information science and semiotics (1983: 16) • 
In the absence of an explicit statement in his available 
writings it is conjectural whether Mikhailov expanded his view of 
informatics as the study of scientific information to the study 
of information as knowledge, but in a later article he uses the 
term information science rather than informatics. He views the 
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task of the information scientist as the creation of an 
information environment, and its expansion according to 
preference to the community of adequately informed users 
according to their importance to social production (1983: 17) . 
Information science should engage itself in the removal of 
obstacles surrounding the · creation and expansion of the 
information environment, such as growing paper prices, vo~ume of 
information, complex relationships between sciences, industry and 
the economy at large. He contends that because of this complex 
context, information science is multi-faceted. 
It is not easy to draw any firm conclusions from 
Mikhailov's writings, but it is evident that his conception of 
informatics favours a narrow emphasis on scientific epistemology, 
albeit within the general framework of dialectical materialism 
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The Polish-born Farradane, an eminent classificationist, 
wrote under the name of Lewkowi tsch unti 1 about 1940,. His 
several writings may be subdivided into two broad categories. 
The first category contains his ideas on the organization of 
materials which extends to essays on library classification as 
well as to original insights into "relational indexing" (1980c: 
267). The second category encompasses his attempts to explain 
the nature and scope of information science as a discipline as 
well as to develop its theoretical basis. While articles in the 
second category provide relevant material for this study, they 
also contain ideas that are seen as a natural progression from 
the seminal ideas expressed in earlier writings from the first 
category. 
Farradane's concern for the provision of complete 
classified record of scientific literature is traced back to an 
early essay (Lewkowitsch, 1938: 255). He claims that the 
information problem is most acute in the field of the natural 
sciences, and proposes that chemistry be given priority regarding 
the organization of its literature (1959: 20). Farradane 
propounds the idea that the information problem be made an area 
of scientific study by which he presupposes the application of 
the principles of the "scientific method" to the issue of the 
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o~ganization of knowledge in the natu~al sciences and technology 
(1970a: 612). The scientific method, acco~ding to him, may be 
used to ~esolve the epistemological p~oblem that a t~ue o~ 
,-
logically sound classification faces (1950: 83). His 
unde~standing of the definition of scientific method is 
elabo~ated mo~e fully in a much late~ publication: 
"I define 'scientific method' as a method of enqui~y 
involving p~ocesses of obse~vation and expe~iment, as 
fa~ as possible unde~ cont~olled conditions, and as fa~ 
as possible with the attainment of ~ep~oducibility of 
the phenomena unde~ investigation •.. , followed by the 
c~eation of hypotheses to explain the situations, 
p~ediction f~om such hypotheses and, most impo~tantly, 
the testing of such p~edictions by fu~the~ expe~iment 
in o~de~ to p~ove o~ disp~ove the hypotheses which, 
when sufficiently validated, a~e often called laws" 
( 197 6: 94) . 
Fa~~adane p~oceeds to say that science is the body of knowledge 
which ~esults f~om the application of the scientific method as 
defined above (ibid.). He const~ues science in its na~~owe~ 
association with the natu~al sciences. In his association of 
scientific knowledge with t~uth he acknowledges that it 
p~esupposes ~elative t~uth, but that in this ~espect sea~ches fo~ 
the best fo~ms of logical p~ocesses that p~ovide t~uth within a 
~elative f~amewo~k (1950: 84). 
Fa~~adane asse~ts that a classification scheme should be 
cons t~uc ted "indue ti ve 1 y ,; (in acco~dance with the p~ecepts of the 
scientific method), piecing togethe~ known f~agments of ~elations 
(as distinct f~om "deductively" whe~e la~ge catego~ies a~e 
subdivided by "p~inciples of division"). This p~ocess should 
sta~t with uniquely definable items of knowledge, called 
"isolates" (1952: 74). 
216 
Implicit in his w~itings on classification, fu~the~mo~e, a~e 
conceptions of the fundamental notions of knowledge and ~eality. 
Fa~~adane holds a subjectivist view of knowledge, that is, as 
something available only in the individual mind. In his essay on 
the psychological basis of classification it becomes clea~ that 
Fa~~adane develops his ideas on knowledge along empi~icist lines 
(cf 2.5 fo~ an exposition of the tenets of empi~icism). He 
postulates a steady p~og~ession f~om the awa~eness of expe~ience 
via stimuli to sense-data and pe~ceptions to become knowledge 
only when assimilated (1955: 191) . This idea of p~og~ession is 
evident f~om the following quotation: 
"A pe~cept is a ~esponse to· a single stimulus. A 
concept is a st~uctu~ed set of pe~cepts; it may be an 
individual 'thing' o~ an abst~act o~ class 'idea'. Let 
me define mind as the complex of thoughts and ce~tain 
b~ain p~ocesses, and define knowledge as the st~uctu~ed 
sto~e of thoughts in the mind (and only in the mind)" 
( 1976: 97) . 
Reality, in Fa~~adane's view, exists outside ou~selves and 
cannot be app~ehended di~ectly (1978: 320). Ou~ knowledge of 
~eality is p~oduced only th~ough the mediation of ou~ b~ains 
which t~anslate the p~ima~y sense-data into thoughts, concepts 
and thei~ ~elations (1952: 78). He ~ejects claims of di~ect, 
holistic app~ehensions of ~eality p~esumed to have been obtained 
by ext~a-senso~y pe~ception. In essence, the impe~ative of 
scientific epistemology leads him to discount the validity of 
philosophical, non-expe~imental o~ intuitive app~oaches to 
knowledge (1952: 78). 
In the second catego~y of w~itings, Fa~~adane exp~esses 
doubt that the essential tasks of an info~mation scientist have 
any affinities with lib~a~ianship (1960: 191). F~om a late~ 
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essay it is evident that he views info~mation science as a 
distinct discipline in its own ~ight (1969: 32). He ~ega~ds 
info~mation science as a development of the specialization of the 
~esea~ch and development wo~ke~'s app~oach to satisfy his/he~ own 
info~mation needs and 
~elevant sou~ces of 
to p~ovide intellectual access to the 
info~mation. The field encompasses a 
combination of communication techniques and sto~age and ~et~ieval 
techniques, each affecting the othe~ (1970b: 264). 
A ve~y clea~ definition of info~mation is found in 
Fa~~adane's thoughts on info~mation science. He conside~s 
definitions of info~mation based on some assumed mental state of 
the ~ecipient as "exp~essions of igno~ance of the natu~e of 
thought" (1979: 13) . Mo~eove~, holistic, "system", concepts of 
info~mation p~eclude a study of isolated pa~ts of the system and 
lead to philosophical speculations which cannot advance ou~ 
t~eatment of info~mation science (1979: 17) . A t~ue info~mation 
science, he a~gues, is one that is expe~imental and based on 
obse~vable elements. Fo~ 
definition of info~mation, 
o~ su~~ogate of knowledge, 
this ~eason, he p~oposes, as a 
any physical fo~m of ~ep~esentation, 
o~ of a pa~ticula~ thought, used fo~ 
communication (1979: 13; cf 4.3.5.1.2). 
Fa~~adane has been accused of empi~ical foundationalism (an 
epistemological position holding that data constitute a 
~ock-bottom foundation upon which info~mation and knowledge is 
based) (Hamma~be~g, 1981: 261). Hamma~be~g a~gues that data 
cannot be app~ehended as ~aw, b~ute facts since any pe~son is a 
p~isone~ of his own ~ep~esentational p~ocess, that is, we can 
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never escape a point of view. Data, like information and 
knowledge, are human-related and cannot be foundational (1981: 
261). According to Hammarberg, Farradane's "physical" definition 
of information appeals to physics. However, modern physics, 
especially quantum physics, is no longer epistemically neutral in 
that it deals with the raw, brute facts of the world. It is, in 
point of fact, "just as theory-bound as any other human 
endeavour, and its statements are cast in representational form 
I 
which always reflects a point of view" (Hammarberg, 1981: 266; 
cf 7.3.1 for the acknowledgement of this in modern physics). 
In his response to Hammarberg, Farradane states that his 
definition of information is not concerned with "facts", "truth", 
"belief", or "reality", but merely aims at standardizing the 
definition by giving it one technical meaning within the field of 
information science, which is that of the "language" vehicle of 
communication (1981: 270). In the same response Farradane 
distinguishes knowledge from truth on the basis of the degree of 
reproducibility of beliefs. Knowledge is not necessarily truth, 
while truth is something which is generally accepted and which 
has not yet been disproved (1981: 270). 
Hammarberg's epistemological reading of Farradane's, later 
writings is flawed by failure on the part of the former to 
recognize other references by Farradane. For example, in an 
earlier essay, .Farradane rejected the correspondence theory of 
truth, a cardinal feature of empirical foundationalism (1955: 
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191; cf 3.2.1). He views t~uth as a consensus of consistent, 
communicable knowledge, that is, a consensus of expe~ience among 
a totality of minds (1981: 269). 
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5.10 BROOKES, B.C. (1910-
B~ookes, who obtained advanced academic qualifications in 
mathematics and physics, b~ings to the field of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science the gene~al theo~ies of the philosophy of 
science as well as the p~ecision of mathematical and statistical 
techniques. His p~ofessional inte~ests a~e the application of 
statistical p~ocedu~es to p~actical lib~a~y and info~mation 
p~oblems, and the development of the theo~etical basis of lib~a~y 
and info~mation science (Shaw, 1990: 3) • His w~itings, as a 
whole, ~eflect a consistent effo~t to dema~cate the field of 
info~mation science and supply it with the app~op~iate 
mathematical tools, in a manne~ that sets it apa~t f~om othe~ 
sciences o~ disciplines. It is especially his wo~k on the 
t.heo~etica 1 aspects of lib~a~y and info~mation science that is 
~elevant to this study, although his insistence should be noted 
that the establishment of a p~ecise statistical appa~atus and 
p~ocedu~e is ~equi~ed to facilitate the testing of hypotheses in 
the p~ocess of developing a gene~al theo~y of lib~a~y systems. 
One of the fi~st cont~ibutions by B~ookes to the lite~atu~e 
of lib~a~y and info~mation science is a manual entitled Edito~ial 
p~actice in lib~a~ies, fo~ which he se~ved as edito~. This 
handbook was compiled with the aim of assisting lib~a~ians ancl 
info~mation office~s "to design and edit the publications which 
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they a~e often expected to guide th~ough the p~ess" (1961: v). 
B~ookes' own cont~ibution to this wo~k sets out the p~ocedu~e fa~ 
editing a manusc~ipt. These skills equipped him fa~ his 
subsequent ~ole as ~eviewe~ of publications fa~ the Jou~nal of 
documentation and the Jou~nal of info~mation science. 
It is pe~haps helpful, in attempting to assess B~ookes' 
cont~ibution in an app~op~iate context, to note that he is a 
dualist, that is, he holds the philosophical position that the~e 
is an insupe~able gulf between two ~ealms of being (Hall, 1967: 
364). On mo~e than one occasion he not only acknowledged this, 
but p~oceeded to explain the implications of this position fa~ 
lib~a~y and info~mation science. Thus, he points out, fa~ 
example, that lib~a~y and info~mation scientists in thei~ 
p~ofessional wo~k a~e eithe~ monists o~ dualists, that is, they 
eithe~ ~ecognize one ultimate ~eality o~ two (1981b: 3; cf 7.1 
fa~ a gene~al t~eatment of this issue & 7.6 fa~ its impact on 
lib~a~y and info~mation science). Monists ·~ecognize ei the~ the 
physical wo~ld o~ the mental wo~ld as ultimate ~eality. Monists 
who ~ecognize the physical wo~ld as ultimate ~eality a~e physical 
~ealists. P~esent-day physical ~ealists, a~med with compute~s, 
attempt to ~educe thought to a pu~ely physical 
info~mation-p~ocessing activity. B~ookes is skeptical of the 
~eductionist ~isk attached to a compute~-dependent stance. Fa~ 
example, in a ~eply to a lette~ by Spa~ck-Jones, B~ookes asse~ts 
that compute~ p~og~ammes that simulate human thought p~ocesses 
~un the ~isk of ~eductionism in so fa~ as they tend to ope~ate on 
too na~~ow a basis (that is, elementa~y logic, sets o~ simple 
a~ithmetic) (1984c: 43). 
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As a dualist, however, Brookes recognizes the necessary co-
existence of two worlds, namely, the physical and the cognitive. 
It is essentially the cognitive world that occupies his attention 
and he proceeds to use several analogies from the physical world 
in his discussions of the cognitive world. While these two 
worlds are linked by information processes, the potential 
contributions of information theory to any theory of knowledge is 
"stultified unless the dualism of mind and body is recognized" 
(1981d: 198). This position is the classical Cartesian 
mind-body dualism as set forth in the philosophical writings of 
Rene Descartes. Brookes' concern with the cognitive world leads 
him to claim that: 
" it is illogical to discard the human mind and yet 
rely on the concept of information in the metaphysics 
of the information sciences" (1982: 49). 
It is probably Brookes' dualist position that led him to 
accept Popper's pluralist ontology, since, in a certain sense, 
dualism is seen as a special case of pluralism (Hall, 1967: 
364). Moreover, his dualist position may also explain the 
difficulty he has with holism. He views the holistic perspective 
as antithetical to analytical science. The problem with holism, 
according to Brookes, is that it evades difficulties by raising 
the level of argument to a higher level of generality, whereas 
science resolves the difficulty by analysis on a more specific 
level ( 1981a: 201). 
In one of his early essays, Brookes calls.for a general 
theory of human communication (1964: 7) • He submits that the 
then prevalent theory - namely the Shannon model where someone 
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wishing to convey ideas to another person simply expresses 
(encodes) the ideas clearly in natural language which is 
interpreted (decoded) by the recipient - is closely associated 
with Wittgenstein's "atomic theory of knowledge". This 
epistemological position, which was repudiated by the later 
Wittgenstein, holds that the whole of knowledge is expressible 
only in the form of atomic propositions, that is, as single, 
simple facts about objects (1964: 10) • This position was 
adopted and expounded by logical positivists both in Britain and 
North America and implied the disintegration of coherent 
knowledge into "a great heap of atomic facts" (1964: 10) • The 
"atomic theory of knowledge" which permeated many fields of 
thought received further impetus from the mathematical theory of 
communication, and the successful use of digital computers (1964: 
8) • 
Brookes contends that, while atomic (logical atomism) and 
positivist (logical positivism) theories of knowledge are not 
wholly false, they are not adequate for a true information 
science, which has to establish its own autonomous theoretical 
basis (1964: 12) . He states: 
It is 
"Waiting for Godot may seem a far cry from Chemical 
abstracts, but the development of information science 
depends on establishing a scientific (i.e., 
hypothetical) general theory of human communication 
which could embrace the professional activities of 
Beckett and Ionesco as well as those of research 
chemists" ( 1964: 12). 
clear that Brookes envisages a general theory of 
communication that would encompass both the speculative and the 
exact poles of the knowledge continuum (cf 4.3.4). 
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A principal characteristic of Brookes' writings is his 
sustained argument for a wider interpretation of the term 
information as a basis for a general theory of human 
communication, in opposition to the tendency to apply the term in 
the narrow, technical sense as has been customary in, for 
example, telecommunication engineering, and for seeking to define 
th~ interrelationship between the concepts of information and 
knowledge. 
information, 
While a narrow, technical interpretation of 
in his view, is tenable for documentation, he has 
maintained the position that information science (which is seen 
as a major evolutionary development of documentation) requires a 
wider interpretation. 
It is significant to note in passing that Brookes initially 
seemed to seek in his general theory of human communication the 
common ground upon which library science and information science 
could be recon~iled (1973: 245). In a later essay, however, 
information science is distinguished quite unequivocally from 
library science as a discipline with "its own unique territory, 
its own unique problems and its own unique view of human affairs 
which now has to develop its own principles and techniques" 
(1980a: 128). 
While Brookes concedes that his ideas and theories have 
always remained open to correction and have indeed often been 
refuted by others as well as by himself, his later essays 
evidence beyond doubt a consolidation of many opinions and ideas 
expressed in his earlier essays (1981c: 89). 
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An example of his "open approach" is the development of his 
definition of information science. In 1972 he suggested that 
information science is the scientific study of information 
phenomena and is concerned with information both in its widest 
human, semantic sense, I(w), and in its narrow Shannonian sense, 
I(n) (1972b: 167). While I(w) is not definable in quantitative 
terms, I(n) is precisely and measurably defined. Information 
tra~sfer of I(w) from human to human is mediated by the reduction 
of I(w) to I(n) in which compact form it is processed by print as 
well as the computer, and is then transmitted and distributed 
around the world to those who wish to regenerate the I(w) from 
the I(n) made accessible to them. Information science is then 
the study of these reductions and regenerations, and of the 
intermediate processes and transmissions (1972b: 172). 
A few years later Brookes adopts a problem-related approach 
to information science based on his reading of the writings of 
Popper, Kuhn and Ravetz. He then sets out to propose that 
informatidn scientists should identify the fundamental problem of 
information science, form a social group (in the Kuhnian sense), 
and work towards establishing an intellectual consensus or 
paradigm. Accordingly, he finally breaks completely with the 
Shannon model of communication and presents his own. This may be 
graphically presented as follows: (see Figure 2) 
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SouRct DESTtNA-rlON 
SHANNCNS Mot>E.L cf CoMMUN\GAl'\ON 
CI-\ANNE.L DESTINATION 
Ft~URE 2: ~RooKE.S' MOD\FlEb MODE..l OF COMMUN\CAI\ON 
/ 
In Shannon's model the source has three components, viz: 
(a) a store of messages to be communicated; 
(b) a device which encodes the messages into some suitable 
form; and 
The Shannon destination also has three component~: 
(a) a detector of the transmitted messages; 
(b) a decoder; and 
(c) a receptor of the decoded messages. 
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"Noise" is regarded as a random disturbance which may transform 
the signals transmitted from one form to another (1975a: 44). 
Brookes says that the Shannon model is non-cognitive and 
non-semantic, .and therefore not applicable to human communication 
of the cognitive kind. (Belkin notes that Brookes was one of the 
earliest proponents of the cognitive viewpoint in information 
science (1990: 11) ) . In his model, which reflects the several 
components of information, Brookes also has a source and 
destination. The components are labelled "Physical", 
"Biological", and "Cognitive". He assumes that all communication 
rests on some physical basis of patterns of sound or light or 
some other form of electromagnetic transmission. It also has a 
biological basis since these patterns are detected by sensory 
organs our eyes or ears - and are transduced into electrical 
signals which pass from the sensory organs along neural pathways 
to the central nervous system. Finally, the cognitive basis may 
be recognized in the assumption that these signals are once again 
transduced into the signals that we recognize and interpret 
cognitively (1975a: 46). 
Brookes also places information in an evolutionary context, 
in the Darwinian sense, by pointing out that the increased 
widening of sensory horizons has led to increasing adaptability 
to different conditions. The discovery of speech, writing, 
telescopes and microscopes are cited as significant developments 
in man's successful adaptation to most parts. of the earth. It is 
especially the rapid expansion of the stores of information 
external to man's body, ,or what Brookes calls the "social brain", 
228 
knowledge (cf 4.3.5.1.4). Unless information modifies knowledge 
it is regarded as "noise" an "unwarranted unhelpful 
distraction" (1981a: 4). 
This fundamental equation of Brookes requires that 
information science should analyse examples of knowledge 
received. structures and observe their response to information 
Knowledge structures may either be "subjective", that is, human 
knowledge structures which are complex, dynamic and recalcitrant 
to fixed analytical techniques, or "objective", that is, the 
knowledge structures of any "compact, ongoing science" which are 
directly accessible to observation and analysis. It is this 
latter area of exploration which is unclaimed by any other 
science and which is suitable for scientific study (1981a: 4). 
As a dualist calling for a firmer metaphysic for information 
science, Brookes sees the need to formalize a set of mathematical 
and statistical techniques that would be appropriate for the 
cognitive world or "cognitive space" (1981a: 6) • While he 
recognizes that there are individual subjective cognitive spaces 
with their peculiar oddities and distortions, there is one 
objective cognitive space which is that of "scientific consensus" 
(1981a: 7). It is this space that engages Brookes' thoughts and 
it is scientific literature that records changes of scientific 
thought as new scientific theories emerge to displace others 
(1980b: 164). He contends that information science should 
develop its own calculus to measure information in a wider sense 
than its technical meaning and he calls for a new statistics of 
levels of individuality (1980c: 118). He believes that the 
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special needs of people with their interest in individuality and 
social interactions have, from the point of view of quantitative 
analysis, been neglected for too long. The quantitative studies 




Bradford's law of scatter, and studies of 
(He incidentally also views these studies as the 
on the practical aspects of Shera's social 
epistemology (cf 5.5)). 
Popper, whose ideas feature strongly in Brookes' writings, 
first came to the notice of the English-speaking philosophical 
world in the mid-1930's with the publication of his Loqik der 
Forschung (Quinton, 1973: 33). Popper provides an account of 
the growth of scientific knowledge which is distinguished from 
non-science or metaphysics by his principle of falsifiability 
(1959: 73). He claims that science grows not by mechanical 
induction of general propositions from accumulated reports of 
particular observations but by the imaginative formulation of 
hypotheses which are then tested and, unless they elude all 
efforts to falsify them, 
34). 
revised and replaced (Quinton, 1973: 
It is especially Popper's 
epistemology that Brookes finds attractive. 
with subjectivist 
It is exactly the 
recognition of the limitations of this "subjectivist blunder" by 
Popper that Brookes regards as the epistemological progress which 
may benefit the theoretical development of information science 
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(1984b: 40). Popper's third world is the basis for an 
"objective epistemology" for information science instead of the 
"commonsense theory of knowledge" (1980a: 127). 
It is clear that for Brookes an acceptable theory of 
knowledge would have to make provision for the satisfactory 
incorporation of the notion of information. His "objective 
epistemology" for information science is not fully explained 
anywhere in his writings and is further obscured by the failure 
to construe the term "objective" in its relation to the 
true-false distinction. His emphasis is on scientific knowledge 
and he focuses strongly on the published literatures of the 
natural sciences. 
Brookes' overriding aim is to provide theoretical coherence 
for information science. He seeks to bring the whole field of 
information science closer to its avowed aim, namely, that of 
information retrieval. He claims that the "Cranfield paradigm" 
still dominates the information retrieval scene and provides 
physical measures (such as numbers of documents retrieved) which 
are suitable for document retrieval rather than information 
retrieval (1981b: 1) • His work overall may be seen as an effort 
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5.11 DEBONS, A. (1916-
In a joint essay in 1970, Otten and Debons argued from the 
premise that, like matter and energy, information is a 
fundamental phenomenon, and they proceeded to formulate the basis 
for a metascience of information, which they called 
"informatology" (1970: 91) • They defined informatology as the 
study of the fundamental principles underlying the structure and 
use of information (1970: 92). This metascience was intended to 
serve as "a common basis upon which all information-oriented 
specialized scientes and technologies can be understood and 
studied" (1970: 92). Information science (as allied to library 
science) was considered as being a smaller part Qf this 
metascience. 
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Debons' mo~e ~ecent w~itings concent~ate on theo~etical 
aspects of info~mation science and ~eveal ve~y concise 




"Data: 1 et te~s, numbe~s, 1 ines, g ~a phs and symbo 1 s, 
etc., used to ~ep~esent events and thei~ states, 
o~ganized acco~ding to fo~mal ~ules and conventions. 
Information: the cognitive state of awa~eness (as 
being info~med) given ~ep~esentation in physical fo~m 
(data). This physical ~ep~esentation facilitates the 
p~ocess of knowing. 
Knowledge: the cognitive state beyond awa~eness. 
Knowledge implies an active involvement and 
unde~standing and the ability to extend the level of 
unde~standing to meet life's contingencies. Knowledge 
can also ~efe~ to the o~ganized ~eco~d of human 
expe~ience given physical ~ep~esentation (books, 
~epo~ts) • 
Wisdom: implies the application of 
contained in human judgment cente~ed 
c~ite~ia o~ values that a~e gene~ally 
cultu~e o~ society" (1988: 8). 
knowledge as 
a~ound ce~tain 
accepted by the 
al contend that the concepts data, info~mation, 
and wisdom can "be viewed as pa~t of a continuum, one 
leading into the othe~, each the ~esult of actions on the 
p~eceding, with no clea~ bounda~ies between them" (1988: 5· ' 
cf 
4.3.5.1.4). These t~ansfo~mations f~om one to the othe~, fo~ 
example, f~om data to info~mation, can be seen as pa~t of a 
spect~um "of cognition that cha~acte~izes human competence in 
dealing with life's events" (1988: 6) • This spect~um is 
hie~a~chical, and each t~ansfo~mation ~ep~esents a step upwa~d in 
human cognitive functioning (ibid.). This spect~um is also 
cha~acte~ized as a knowledge spect~um, and fo~ms the envi~onment 
in which lib~a~ianship and info~mation science ope~ates. 
235 
Lib~a~ianship and lib~a~y science a~e defined by Debons et 
tl as follows: 
"Libr-ar-ianship is di~ectly focused on the institution 
of the libr-ar-y and the ser-vices p~ovided to the 
community. Libr-ar-y science concer-ns the pr-inciples 
that gover-n the acquisition, stor-age, and r-etr-ieval of 
knowledge" (1988: 34). 
They contend that, histor-ically, one of the pr-ima~y r-oots of 
infor-mation science is epistemology (1988: 9) • This claim is, 
r-eg~ettably, not developed fur-ther- or- bthe~wise substantiated. 
Info~mation science is char-acter-ized as the study of 
info~mation systems. Infor-mation systems ar-e envi~onments of 
"per-sons, machines and pr-ocedu~es that augment human biological 
potential to acquir-e, pr-ocess, and act upon data. It thus 
impr-oves our- chances of su~vival" (1988: 9) • Debons views the 
info~mation system as the technological component and the libr-a~y 
as the institutional component (each as par-t of the whole) of a 
complete system for- human ser-vice (1985: 67). 
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5.12 FOSKETT, D.J. (1918-
Towa~ds a metascience of 
Society fo~ Info~mation 
Foskett believes fi~mly in the unity of knowledge, and that 
"on the highest levels of thought, the~e ·is no- fundamental 
antagonism between science and humanism" (1964: 235). His 
seve~al essays and confe~ence add~esses se~ve to affi~m his 
conce~n fo~ the division in the intellectual ~ealm and the ~ole 
of lib~a~ies in combating this. He also views the lib~a~y as an 
agency that is able to p~omote inte~-cultural unde~standing. In 
this ~ega~d, he advises the ca~eful use of advanced technology. 
He states, fo~ example: 
"The biggest p~oblem of the Info~mation Age is to use 
the advances in science and technology to ~ecognize and 
communicate that info~mation which p~omotes 
unde~standing of and sympathy with, the cultu~al 
he~itage of othe~ people, thei~ point of view. The 
me~e t~ansmission of info~mation as an end in itself 
may well ~esult in the opposite" (1984: 11). 
In Foskett's view, the~e ought to be a g~eate~ emphasis on 
the social ~ole of lib~a~y and info~mation se~vices than on the 
techniques employed in its p~actice because "Lib~a~ianship is 
above· all a social activity"(1973: 169; 1965: X ) • Only "A 
t~ue unde~standing of ou~ ~ole in society will enable us to judge 
co~~ectly the ~ole of the machine ... " (1966: XX). It is then in 
the inte~ests of education fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science to 
focus on the sociology of knowledge and gene~al systems theo~y as 
necessa~y studies that will p~omote a g~eate~ integ~ation of 
lib~a~y and info~mation se~vices into the wide~ society. A 
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knowledge of these disciplines will nourish an education that 
will provide "the light of truth which guides techn'ology along 
those paths that are of most benefit to humanity" (1973: 173). 
Rather than facilitate access to bits of information, 
Foskett maintains that the library should "act positively in 
preserving human· values" ( 1984: 128). He laments that: 
"At no time in history has there been a keener 
awareness of the seamless web that is the structure of 
knowledge, nor perhaps, a greater danger of its 
fragmentation into a jumble of separate bits of data" 
( 1986: 316) . 
Foskett views personal knowledge as unique, in that" •.. only I 
know what I know ... " and thus different from information which is 
shared with others (1986: 314; cf 4.3.5.1 for similar views of 
knowledge). In a collective sense, however, Foskett holds that 
." ••. the ways of knowledge and experience continually change" 
(1986: 313) and that therefore library classifications ought to 
change from time to time. This is clearly a reference to 
epistemological shifts, or differences in the modes of knowing 
that affect or are affected by prevailing classification schemes. 
This implication is also evident in his claim that "All the basic 
and traditional processes in libraries are directed towards 
creating ..• an intellectual structure that provides meaning to 
the research of the past and motive for the research in the 
future" (1986: 312). This intellectual structure reveals itself 
in the library classification which reflect the epistemological 
views of a given historical or social period. 
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He points out that what is lacking most in the library 
profession is thought, and that the need to establish a 
professional purpose is still unfulfilled. 
He considers that what passes for theory is no more than a 
facile manipulation of mathematical and other symbols without any 
truly general significance. Librarianship, in his view, should 
not be reduced to a technology, and social epistemology forms the 
characteristic feature of our professional philosophy (1973: 
186; cf 5.5 for the original conception of social epistemology by 
Shera) • 
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5.13 ROYCE, J.R. (1921-
The writings of Royce are considered in this chapter because 
his ideas on the different paths to knowledge are held to be· 
relevant to a discussion of epistemological aspects of library 
and information science and because he ~resented his ideas to 
librarians and information scientists at the NATO conference of 
1973. In the 20-odd years that Royce, a trained psychologist, 
has investigated c~gnition and the theory of personal~ty, he 
developed a psycho-philosophical theory of knowledge that posits 
three basic ways of knowing. An understanding of these basic 
ways of knowing requires some insight into the development of his 
thought. 
Royce's work in cognitive psychology makes an appeal towards 
a fundamental break with the traditional approach to research in 
psychology. He expresses the need for psychology to "embark on a 
self-conscious search for a philosophy which emerges from its own 
problems" and the need for it to " 
indigenous methodology" (1973: 7) • 
pay more attention to its 
He argues that the early 
history of psychology as a discipline shows that it was dominated 
by the borrowing of methodology from the natural sciences. He 
claims that "It was natural for the new discipline of psychology 
to latch on to whatever scientific method it could find in order 
to gain acceptability in the scientific fraternity and in order 
to make headway in solving problems" (1973: 6) • He proceeds to 
explain that it soon became apparent that many problems in 
psychology would not succumb to traditional scientific 
methodology. Psychology began to move away from an "outmoded 
philosophy of science". He states: 
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"While it seems reasonable to say that a more flexible 
cognitive psychology has already begun to replace the 
previously restrictive behavioristic psychology, our 
discipline seems to be floundering in a philosophic 
vacuum at present, torn between the irrationality of 
existentialism at one extreme, and attempting to break 
loose from the shackles of operationalism and positivism 
at the other extreme ... " (1973: 7). 
The many variables of individual behaviour require an equally 
multivariate research approach in psychology, according to Royce, 
and psychology itself is a multi-paradigmatic science with a 
pluralist ontology (1973: 7• 
' ' cf 5.26 for Harris' view of a 
pluralist ontology for library and information science). 
Royce's views on the three basic ways of knowing or 
"epistemic styles" should be seen in the context of his elaborate 
hierarchical conceptual framework for a multi-factor theory of 
individuality. His several writings constitute a notable 
contribution to naturalistic epistemology, or as he calls it, 
psychological epistemology, and even epistemological psychology 
(1980: 150). 
There are three overarching concepts in his multi-factor 
theory, viz: 
(a) "psychological structure (a multi-dimensional, organized 
system of processes [subsumes mental structure] by means of 
which an organism manifests behavior and mental phenomena)"; 
(b) "mental structure (a multi-dimensional organized 
sub-system of processes [subsumes cognitive and affective 
structure] by means of which an organism manifests mental 
phenomena)"; and 
(c) "cognitive structure is a multi-dimensional, organized 
sub-system of processes [subsumes perceiving, thinking, 
symbolizing] by means of which an organism produces 
cognitions, where cognitions refer to those mental phenomena 
which are products of cognitive processes (i.e. perceiving, 
thinking, symbolizing)". (1973: 313). 
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simultaneously invokes a valid truth criterion (i.e. 
leads to a justifiable knowledge claim in addition to 
being a characteristic mode or way of interacting with 
the environment) we will refer to it as epistemic style" 
( 1973: 330-1 ) . 
Although he originally identified four epistemic styles in his 
work The encapsulated man, Royce later reduced these to three 
basic ways of knowing (1964; 1983: 193). It is important to 
note that Royce's basic ~pistemic styles reflect the influence of 
the Jungian scheme of psychological functions (cf 7.4). He 
characterizes the epistemic styles or "ways of knowing" as 
follows: 
"Empiricism involves knowing via sensory inputs. It is 
an inductive process whose epistemological validity is 
primarily dependent on perceiving accurately. 
Rationalism involves knowing via the formation and 
elaboration of concepts. It is a deductive process 
whose epistemological validity is primarily dependent on 
logical consistency. And metaphorism involves knowing 
via the construction and elaboration of symbol systems. 
It is an analogical (or abductive) process whose 
epistemic validity is dependent on the extent to which 
the metaphorical patterns (eg. art forms such as plays 
and paintings) achieve universal significance" (1973: 
331). 
These ways of knowing are illustrated in Figure 3: 
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According to Royce, each knowledge process involves uncertainty 
and the possibility of error, and ~ltimate reality is unknowable 
because it is epistemologically untestable (1983: 192}. He 
characterizes these ways of knowing as basic in the sense that 
are specifiable and primary, and that unc~rtainty is clearly 
recognized. In this manner, Royce demonstrates ~hat his earlier 
epistemic styles of "authoritarianism" and "intuitionism'' (1964) 
do not qualify. Intuitionism fails to qualify because it does 
' not have a valid truth criterion or epistemology. Royce replaces 
this with metaphorism (1980: 154). He does, however, state that 
intuition is actively involved in all three epistemologies 
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(ibid.). Author-itar-ianism fails because "both its psychological 
pr-ocesses and its tr-uth cr-iter-ion ar-e based on some other- (ie, an 
author-ity) epistemic appr-oach - ie, author-itar-ianism is a der-ived 
way of knowing, not a basic way of knowing" (1983: 192). 
In a "final comment" on encapsulation Royce pr-oclaims that: 
"While differ-ent paths to knowledge such as r-ationalism 
or- empir-icism, may pr-ovide penetr-ating insights into 
r-eality or- enr-iching images of the wor-ld, none 
(individually or- in combination) can hur-dle, or-
other-wise over-come, the bar-r-ier- that stands between 
humank~nd and ultimate r-eality. Fur-ther-mor-e, to the 
extent that a par-ticular- way of knowing is not made use 
of, images of r-eality will be impover-ished" (1983: 
239). 
Royce suggested these ways of knowing to infor-mation science, 
and his fr-amewor-k pr-ovides significant insights into the task of 
developing an epistemological position 
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5.14 NITECKI, J.Z. (1922-
References by Nitecki to epistemological issues emanate from 
a more fundamental and enduring concern for a unified theory for 
1 i brary and information science. Nitecki's approach is 
essentially an eclectic one, and he postulates the following 
prerequisites for a theory of library science: 
(a) "it should be necessarily flexible so that it can 
respond to the variation in the nature of demands of library 
service"; 
(b) "it should be sufficiently broad, so that 
accommodate the findings of specific sciences"; 
it can 
(c) "it should be logically consistent to assure a degree of 
uniformity in the formulation of general principles of 
library science"; 
(d) "it should be satisfactorily 
distinguishes library science as 
(1968a: 105). 
defined, so that it 
an autonomous science" 
In the same e~say Nitecki lays a foundation for his conception of 
library science which he develops further in subsequent essays. 
He locates the basis for library science in a triadic 
relationship that exists between the book (B), the user (U) and 
knowledge (K), and he defines library science as the knowledge of 
I 
relations between B-U-K (1968: 109; cf 4.3.5.1.4 for his ideas 
on the information-knowledge continuum). 
In a later essay, Nitecki consolidates library science and 
information science as subspecies of the same basic intellectual 
approach which he calls "metalibrarianship" and which he defines 
tentatively as a theoretical discipline that studies 
relationships between the already-mentioned three basic 
components of knowledge transfer: the generic book (B); its 
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subject matter-, or- knowledge (K); and its r-eader-s or- user-s (U), 
consider-ed simultaneously as an actual pr-ocess of infor-mation 
tr-ansfer-, the impact of that pr-ocess on its par-ticipants, and an 
expr-ession of the meaning of knowledge or- infor-mation tr-ansfer-r-ed 
(1981: 106). He views the mission of this gener-ic concept of 
libr-ar-ianship as the acquisition, or-ganization and pr-eser-vation 
of knowledge r-esour-ces; the pr-ovision of r-easonably unr-estr-icted 
access to these r-esour-ces, and the assistance to patr-ons in the 
pr-oper- use of bibliogr-aphic tools (1983: 406). 
Fair-thor-ne cr-iticizes Nitecki's claim that knowledge 
(defined by Nitecki as r-elations known) is a legitimate subject 
of study of libr-ar-y science. Fair-thor-ne takes "discour-se" to be 
that subject, and he explains the differ-ence between the two as 
being infor-med about a document (Fair-thor-ne's conception) and 
being infor-med ~a document (Nitecki's conception) (1968: 363; 
cf 5.6)~ In his r-ejoinder- Nitecki r-efutes this char-ge, ar-guing 
that an author- communicates to a r-eader- the insights of his 
message, yet the char-acter- of that message itself infor-ms the 
libr-ar-ian about the r-elevance of a par-ticular- book to the total 
libr-ar-y collection and its user-s. In other- wor-ds, knowledge 
enter-s the subject matter- of libr-ar-y studies only to the extent 
that it affects the 8-U-K r-elationship. Nitecki fur-ther-
distinguishes his appr-oach fr-om Fair-thor-ne's by claiming that the 
latter-'s mathematically or-iented appr-oach pr-oduces a model fr-ee 
fr-om semantic and epistemological implications in the flow of 
infor-mation (1968b: 373). 
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In the subsequent development of a model that would supply a 
metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of librarianship, 
Nitecki elaborates his B-U-K relationship into the concept (CO), 
its meaning (ME), and the response to it by its interpreter (R) 
as primary components of library and information science (1979: 
35). In this model, concepts (knowledge} are communicated in 
vehicles carrying the conceptual messages to the receivers of 
these messages. Together, these components are stated as COMER, 
and imply an open-ended epistemology (1979: 38). He proceeds to 
qualify his conception of knowledge within such an epistemology 
as a non-physical, or metaphysical, entity, whose essence is the 
relationship between various aspects of reality and whose 
substance is a linguistic structure (1979: 32). Individual 
interpretations of a message, or of its meaning, is a fundamental 
characteristic of his model, and he proposes that with any new 
insight into a conceptual relationship "knowledge is upwinding in 
the helical fashion of a spiral, giving us at each analytical 
turn different glimpses of a shifty and kaleidoscopic reality" 
(1979: 39). 
In a subsequent essay on the nature of creative reading, 
Nitecki applies the open-ended epistemology of his COMER model of 
·library and information science. In this essay he concentrates 
on the interpretation by a reader of the content of a message: 
"Interpretation of the text's meaning by an individual 
reader is a domain of philosophical speculation about 
subjective relations between the meaning of the text 
formulated by the author and its effectiveness in 
communicating meaning to the reader" (1986: 230). 
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Thr-ough r-eading, an individual is able to inter-r-elate pr-evious 
under-standings of the meanings of a par-ticular- concept with new 
inter-pr-etations of that meaning as it emer-ges in a cr-eative 
r-eading (ibid.). In this way, Nitecki ar-gues, "Reading as a 
par-t of the thinking pr-ocess contr-ibutes to a definition of 
r-eality as a subjective image of the /wor-ld" (ibid.). He 
r-e-affir-ms his conception of knowledge by claiming that it is 
not "neatly packaged ideas in books classified within a static 
system. Knowledge is a pr-ocess, not a commodity, a dynamic 
pr-ocess of r-elating pr-eviously known exper-iences with new ones. 
It is a constantly changing networ-k of r-elations" (1986: 232; 
cf 4.3.5.1). 
Nitecki's r-elational appr-oach to the theor-y of libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science offer-s a model that pr-ovides a philosophical 
exposition of libr-ar-y science as a domain of epistemological 
study of differ-ences between the var-ious r-elationships within 
the model, but which he assigns to other- disciplines, such as 
sociology and psychology, r-egr-ettably, without fur-ther-
discussion (1979: 37). 
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5.15 ZAAIMAN, R.B. (1922-
Zaaiman views the development of information science as a 
form of scientific revolution (in the Kuhnian sense) and states 
that it emerged as a result of a cross-fertilization of ideas 
between scientists and librarians. Following the Kuhnian 
interpretation of "normal science" in which research is based 
upon one or more past scientific ·achievements and which provides 
the foundation for further practice, Zaaiman contends that 
anomalies arose in the "information paradigms" of both the 
community of natural scientists and that of librarians (Kuhn, 
1970: 10; Zaaiman, 1978). 
He traces the origins of the information paradigm of the 
natural sciences to seventeenth-century science, specifically to 
the inducti~ism of Bacon and Galileo (1978: 7; cf 3.1). 
Observation and experiment were the essential means for the 
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creation of new knowledge in the inductive method as advocated 
by Bacon and Galilee. Whatever information problems confronted 
natural scientists in their work were investigated by the 
natural scientists themselves. 
paradigm provided a 
fulfillment of real 
He maintains that: "This 
satisfactory basis for the 
needs of the scientific 
Bacon ian 
variegated 
community, and the paradigm remained valid until the 19th 
century" (1978: 7) • The anomaly that would ultimately lead to 
a "paradigm shift" and the origin of information science was the 
rapid growth in the number of publications and the subsequent 
need for more advanced bibliographical control. 
Zaaiman establishes the information paradigm of the library 
in the seventeenth century also, specifically with the ideas of 
Gabriel Naude, and describes it as a "preparation-and 
management" paradigm (1978: 1 1 ) • This paradigm failed to 
develop for libraries a scholarly t~adition in relation to their 
users (1978: 13) • This scholarly tradition developed with the 
appearance of the professional librarian and the emphasis on 
personal service to users, and constituted " .•• one of the great 
contributions of library science to the development of 
information science" (1978: 13-14). By this, Zaaiman means 
that the shift in reference work philosophy from the provision 
of literature to the provision of information emphasized the 
librarian's role as direct participant in the process of 
investigation. However, he contends that Naude's paradigm did 
not "provide the librarian with the theoretical basis by means 
of which he could comfortably handle the required role'' (1978: 
16) • 
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The difficulties in the handling of info~mation expe~ienced 
in both the natu~al science and lib~a~y communities led 
eventually to the histo~ic Scientific Info~mation Confe~ence of 
1948. The conve~gence of these two communities ~ealized the 
establishment of info~mation science as "two kinds of 
info~mation activity which fo~me~ly had existed la~gely 
independently of one anothe~ ••. [ and had now come] togethe~" 
(1978: 20). Whet he~ info~mation science possesses its own 
paradigm and its own ~esea~ch community consisting of lib~a~ians 
and natu~al scientists o~ whethe~ it simply ~efe~s to separate I • 
pa~adigm shifts within each community is unclea~. Zaaiman 
desc~ibes a pa~adigm fo~ natu~al scientists and a pa~adigm fo~ 
lib~a~ians and speaks of "The new pa~adigms fo~ both the 
scientists and the lib~a~ians ..• " (1978: 18-19). In othe~ 
wo~ds, while he explains the histo~ical eme~gence of info~mation 
science as a development of the info~mation activities of the 
two communities, the~e is no cla~ity on its identity, ie, as an 
independent new discipline o~ as associated with eithe~ natu~al 
science o~ lib~a~y science. 
This ambiguity ~eappea~s in his analysis of the diffe~ences 
in educational p~og~ammes fo~ lib~a~ians and info~mation 
office~s. Zaaiman submits that the absence of a st~ong ~esea~ch 
t~adition in lib~a~y education has cont~ibuted to the ~eluctance 
of natu~al scientists to study info~mation science. He appea~s 
to suggest that natu~al scientists should take educational 
matte~s into thei~ own hands in this ~ega~d, as: 
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" in view of histor-ical involvement of scientists in 
the per-for-mance of infor-mation wor-k, in the development 
of infor-mation science, and in infor-mation science 
education, it cannot be said that libr-ar-ians hold a 
senior- par-tner-ship in deter-m1ning the natur-e and 
contents of the education of scientists for- infor-mation 
wor-k" (1984: 101). 
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5.16 SWANSON, D.R. (1924-
Swanson has academic qualifications both in physics and 
libr-ar-y science. His ear-ly wr-itings in libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science investigate the feasibility of natur-al language sear-ching 
by computer-. His later- essays cover- such aspects as libr-ar-y 
automation, cataloguing, infor-mation r-etr-ieval, education for-
libr-ar-y and infor-mation science, and its intellectual 
foundations. 
In his wr-itings he is significantly influenced by Popper-ian 
epistemology (cf 5.10 for- Br-ookes' application of Popper-'s ideas 
to infor-mation science). Swanson's r-eflections on the natur-e and 
aims of cataloguing and infor-mation r-etr-ieval in par-ticular- have 
pr-ompted him to adopt a Popper-ian epistemological fr-amewor-k for-
libr-ar-y and infor-mation science. In a study concer-ning the 
r-equir-ements for- futur-e catalogues he conducts a memor-y 
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experiment to discover the things about books that are remembered 
in order to improve catalogue use (1972: 302). In this study he 
explores the assumption that users tend to remember attributes 
about books that are too fragmentary and incoherent to encourage 
use of existing catalogues (hence libraries). This leads him to 
suggest that more effective search strategies would take 
guesswork, or, conjecture, into account (1972: 315). Conjecture 
is a central tenet of Popper's theory of knowledge. Swanson 
argues that knowledge is forever conjectural (involving guesses 
and trial-and-error), and that the designers of catalogues should 
take this feature into account. 
Applying Popper's notion of an "objectivist epistemology", 
Swanson likens knowledge to "a structure or an edifice" and 
submits that the ''objectivity of knowl~dge derives not from the 
objectivity of its creators, but from its public character and 
its accessibility to criticism and to logical argument (1980: 
114) • This edifice has a life of its own and "can undergo 
continual reshaping" (ibid.). Swanson urges librarians to become 
familiar with Popper's conception of the growth of scientific 
knowledge and to "create suitable aids for organizing and 
facilitating it" (1980: 115) . 
Swanson maintains the proposition that the essential role of 
libraries in the growth of knowledge is to facilitate 
"problem-oriented" access to knowledge, that is, to recognize the 
method (Popper's) by which knowledge grows, and to adapt 
bibliographic tools in accordance with this philosophical 
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doctr-ine (cf also Ber-gen's view on Popper-'s "falsificationist" 
conception of the gr-owth of knowledge as applied to 
libr-ar-ies-6.3.2). 
REFERENCES 
Swanson, D. (1960) Sear-ching natur-al language text by computer-. 
Science, October- 2, pp. 43-51. 
Swanson, D. (1972) Requir-ements study for- futur-e catalogs. 
Libr-ar-y quar-ter-ly, val. 42, no. 3, pp. 302-315. 
Swanson, D. (1980) Libr-ar-ies and the gr-owth of knowledge. 
Libr-ar-y quar-ter-ly, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 112-135. 
Swanson, D. (1986) Undiscover-ed public knowledge. 
Quar-ter-ly, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 103-118. 
Libr-ar-y 
Swanson, D. (1987) Two medical liter-atur-es that ar-e logically 
but not bibliogr-aphically connected. Jour-nal of the Amer-ican 
Society for- Infor-mation Science, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 228-233. 
5.17 WILSON, Patr-ick (1927-
Wilson, who holds degr-ees in both philosophy and libr-ar-y 
science, pr-ovides thought-pr-ovoking comments on epistemological 
matter-s sur-r-ounding libr-ar-y and infor-mation science. He 
descr-ibes his book, Second-hand knowledge; an enquir-y into 
cognitive author-ity, as a wor-k of social epistemology (as 
distinct fr-om for-mal philosophical epistemology) (cf 2.1 & 5.5 
for- mor-e discussion of this distinction). 
Wilson claims that epistemological questions ar-e social 
questions, and that social epistemology is the only epistemology 
(1983: 202). His book, in its ultimate essence, is about 
cognitive author-ity, or-, in Royce's ter-minology (cf 5.13) ' 
epistemic author-ity. He descr-ibes a cognitive author-ity as one 
to whom we tur-n for- infor-mation but also one to whom we tur-n for-
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advice, even in cases whe~e it is clea~ that the~e is no 
knowledge to be held at all. Knowledge is viewed as a closed 
question as opposed to an opinion, but what is knowledge may 
become a matte~ of opinion (1983: 17; cf 4.3.6). Wilson also 
inte~p~ets knowledge in its social o~ public sense and defines it 
as: 
" the view of the wo~ld that 
const~uct at a given time, judged 
p~ocedu~es fo~ c~iticism and 
published ~eco~d" ( 1977: 5). 
is the best we can 
by .ou~ ow~ best 
evaluation of the 
Wilson's book culminates in a chapte~ that investigates the 
cognitive autho~ity of lib~a~ies and the p~inted wo~d. He 
demonst~ates the need to evaluate the quality of texts (which 
would consequently imp~ove the quality of ~esea~ch). Howeve~, he 
concedes that while this is desi~able, it is impossible. Even 
1 i b~a~ i.ans, who by vi~tue of thei~ p~ofessional capacities seem 
to be the best g~oup of pe~sons to p~onounce judgements on the 
cognitive autho~ities of autho~s and texts, do not have a 
~eliable basis fo~ such a task. · 
In the light of these conside~ations, Wilson suggests that 
lib~a~ians should supply wo~ks on all subject a~eas without 
p~edisposing ~eade~s against o~ fo~ ce~tain mate~ials. The 
lib~a~ian should maintain a "studied neut~ality" and should be 
"p~ofessionally non-committal" (1983: 190). Wilson 
cha~acte~izes this app~oach as p~ofessional skepticism about 
claims to knowledge o~ claims of the supe~io~ity of one opinion 
ave~ anothe~ (1983: 194). Mo~e specifically, this position is 
cha~acte~ized by Wilson as one of Py~~honian skepticism, that is, 
the attitude of one who neither asse~ts no~ denies the 
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possibility of knowledge but continues to inqui~e, though always 
unsatisfied that ce~tain knowledge has been found (Hallie: 1967: 
36). Fo~ Wilson, Py~~honism is a state of mind (as distinct f~om 
a doct~ine) - a state of mind in which its adhe~ents would not 
conclude that nothing could be gained by inqui~y of some so~t, 
but would ~athe~ find themselves unconvinced that anything had 
been established so fa~ (1983: 194). In this ~ega~d, he pleads 
that the lib~a~ian should: 
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5.18 KOCHEN, M. (1928-1989) 
into 
Kochen's w~itings, which a~e cha~acte~ized by the fusion of 
ideas unde~pinning the natu~al sciences and the humanities, 
invest lib~a~y and info~mation science with a distinctive 
intellectual quality. Although he contends that it is 
"unp~oductively ~est~ictive" to suggest that the p~ima~y focus of 
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info~mation science should be lib~a~y and info~mation wo~k, his 
view on the ~elationship between lib~a~y science and info~mation 
science may be best summa~ized in h~s own wo~ds, viz, "What 
matte~s is that investigato~s who identify with the info~mation 
disciplines fo~mulate ~esea~chable p~oblems and make discove~ies, 
and cont~ibute insights that cla~ify the natu~e and dynamics of 
info~mation and knowledge" (1983: 373). He views the lib~a~y as 
a potentially "g~owing encyclopaedia system" that summa~izes and 
o~ganizes knowled~e. Its function might be "p~ima~ily to teach, 
seconda~ily to info~m, and to elicit and se~ve the needs of 
o~dina~y citizens and thei~ key social p~oblem-solve~s" (1974: 
Xi V) • The "wo~ld encyclopaedia" idea of H.G. Wells influenced 
Kochen's thinking about lib~a~ies, leading Swanson to a~gue that 
this concept "p~obably inspi~ed Kochen's ea~liest inte~est in the 
p~oblems of f~agmentation and synthesis of knowledge" (Wells, 
1938; Swanson, 1990: 
a wo~ld encyclopedia 
10). Kochen p~esented his own ve~sion of 
which became the basis fo~ a late~ wo~k 
which he edited (1972; 1975a). 
Fo~ Kochen, the fundamental conce~n of info~mation science 
is to coo~dinate the inc~easing g~owth of knowledge and the 
complex political, social, and economic issues of mode~n life in 
such a way that the quality of life is imp~oved (1975b: 576). 
His w~itings p~esent a consistent, systematic view of p~oblems 
~elated to the g~owth of knowledge. The g~owth of knowledge 
in tu~n, evokes integ~ative gene~ates specialization and, 
~esponses such as syntheses, ~eviews and the c~eation of links 
between f~agments of knowledge (1974: 6) • His conce~n with the 
g~owth of knowledge extended to both the development and g~owth 
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of bodies of knowledge, ie disciplines, and the gr-owth of 
knowledge in the individual's mind. With r-egar-d to the latter-, 
he was attr-acted to the per-spectives of cognitive science, and 
pr-oposed the view that new knowledge str-uctur-es ar-e der-ived fr-om 
existing ones (1988: 251). 
He expects that infor-mation systems should not only 
communicate knowledge, but that it should r-epackage and 
r-e-or-ganize knowledge as well. Conventional infor-mation systems 
mer-ely impar-t under-standing and awar-eness; Kochen contends that 
they should also modify behaviour- (1975b: 576). 
He pr-ovides a br-ief intellectual histor-y of infor-mation 
science in which he discusses Wundt's depar-tur-e fr-om Kant's 
belief that the mind cannot know itself, the r-evolution in 
theor-etical physics (for- example, Einstein's r-elativity theor-y 
and Heisenber-g's uncer-tainty pr-inciple), G~del's mathematical 
theor-em, Wiener-'s cyber-netics, Shannon's mathematical theor-y of 
communication, and Neumann's conception of the moder-n computer-
(1974: 5). 
When Kochen claims that infor-mation science should explicate 
the dynamics under-lying the gr-owth of the liter-atur-e of 
scientific r-esear-ch, it finally becomes clear- that his r-efer-ence 
is confined to the natur-al sciences. 
Kochen r-ecognizes the sear-ch for- conceptual unity in the 
infor-mation sciences and char-acter-izes the centr-al issue as a 
coher-ent conceptualization of how knowledge, under-standing and 
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wisdom is generated and used by people to enable them to cope 
with whatever problem situations they encounter. He maintains 
that library scientists concern themselves with only one special 
aspect of this problem, namely, how to organize the graphic 
records of civilization for maximal and 
utilization (1974: 7). 
effective social 
There is some ambivalence in his conception of information. 
He explains the term information as the removal of uncertainty 
(in the Shannon/Weaver.sense) and suggests that the mathematical 
theory of communication has much to offer to information science~ 
yet, in another article, he calls for a "broadened concept of 
information" in which its cognitive component is placed in 
perspective as "a relatively small factor compared with affective 
and other components" (1965: 145; 1984: 343; cf 4.2.2). 
Knowledge, according to him, is information interpreted according 
to a point of view (cf 4.3.5.1). Understanding goes beyond 
information in that it reflects the comprehender's awareness not 
only of what he knows but also of what he does not know, and 
needs to know, and how these interrelate. Wisdom goes beyond 
understanding in that it not only prepares a person to act but 
guides and evokes an appropriate action at the right time and 
place on the basis of knowledge and understanding (1975a: 5; cf 
5.11 for a similar hierarchy of these related concepts as 
perceived by Debons). 
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Kochen envisages the eme~gence of a new discipline which he 
calls "episterna-dynamics". This discipline is to investigate the 
p~ocesses by which the g~owth of knowledge occu~s. Mo~e 
specifically, he states that it is conce~ned with: 
" the lawful ~egula~ities gove~ning the acquisition 
of info~mation and its t~ansfo~mation into knowledge, 
the assimilation ,of knowledge into unde~standing, and 
. the fusion of unde~standing into wisdom" (1974: 38). 
This new discipline has st~ong epistemological commitments, so 
that its p~actitione~s have as thei~ sup~eme loyalty the devotion 
to t~uth, and, mo~e specifically, these t~uths a~e capable of 
helping use~s to cope with p~oblems (1975b: 583). Kochen 
exp~esses the hope that this discipline will become the co~e of 
info~mation science and supply its scientific foundation. Like. 
She~a (cf 5.5), who also p~oposed a new discipline (social 
epistemology) to lib~a~ians and info~mation scientists, Kochen 
does not explain in sufficient outline and detail the essential 
content of "episterna-dynamics". He has, howeve~, left in his 
w~itings a "~ich intellectual legacy" f~om which lib~a~y schola~s 
may de~ive ~ewa~ding insights into lib~a~y and info~mation 
p~oblems (Swanson, 1990: 15) . 
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5.19 WRIGHT, H.C. (1928- ' 
As a student of Sher-a, Wr-ight also investigates foundational 
aspects of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science and also pr-efer-s the 
ter-m libr-ar-ianship as an over-ar-ching label for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation wor-k. 
The most pr-ominent featur-e of his wr-itings is the 
fundamental distinction between what he r-efer-s to as the physical 
and metaphysical aspects of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science. As 
a r-esult he has been char-acter-ized by one commentator- as an 
epistemological dualist .(Donohue, 1977: 371; cf also the dualism 
of Br-ookes-5.10). Wr-ight consistently advocates the pr-ecedence, 
in this dualism, of the metaphysical over- the physical. By this 
he means that "The human mind is the sour-ce and subject 
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matter- of ••. libr-ar-ianship •.• " (1978b: 396). The physical 
aspects of libr-ar-y pr-actice ar-e necessar-y, but of secondar-y 
impor-tance to the "immater-ial", metaphysical aspects. 
He declar-es: 
"Libr-ar-ianship is not a function of liter-acy der-ived 
fr-om the physical configur-ations of visual char-acter-s; 
it is the dependent var-iable of ideas, which constitute 
the ir-r-educible constituents of all knowledge and 
infor-mation, r-egar-dless of their- expr-essive modes. 
Liter-acy, libr-ar-ies and computer-s ar-e, after- all, only 
the instr-uments of libr-ar-ianship, things by means of 
which human thoughts ar-e communicated and explor-ed. 
These distinctions ar-e impor-tant, for- a pr-ofession must 
be based upon its substance, not upon its instr-uments •.• 
We must go completely beyond our- instr-uments, clear- back 
to the immater-ial r-ealities of thought, in or-der- to 
place libr-ar-ianship on its only sur-e foundation" (1978b: 
396). 
It is pr-ecisely in r-egar-d to the "immater-ial r-ealities of 
thought" that Wr-ight dr-aws the shar-p epistemological distinction 
which has ear-ned him the label of a dualist. He pr-oclaims that 
"The capacity of the intelligence to manage only the dual 
r-ealizations of mater-ial and ideal for-m imposes the sever-est 
constr-aint of all on the possibilities of human knowledge" (1977: 
17) • As a r-esult of this, he states, ther-e ar-e "only two kinds 
of tr-uth, two kinds of thinking, two kinds of knowing, two kinds 
of lear-ning ... " (ibid.). The two kinds of knowing ar-e: 
(a) a qnostoloqy, or- "the exper-iential knowledge which 
r-esults dir-ectly fr-om actual sensor-y contact with or-
exposur-e to something in the ambience of intelligence"; and 
(b) an epistemonics, or- "the intellectual knowledge der-iving 
dir-ectly fr-om abstr-act thought and only indir-ectly fr-om'the 
[sensor-y] ambience" (1977: 17). 
He also descr-ibes two kinds of tr-uth which cor-r-espond with 
the two kinds of knowing. Exper-iential (ar-tistic) tr-uth r-efer-s 
to (a) above and r-equir-es something to be tr-ue to a per-ceiver-'s 
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experience. Intellectual (scientific) truth refers to (b) above 
and relates to the objective realities of perceived entities 
(ibid.). There is a bond that ties the two kinds of truth, 
thought, knowledge and learning together, and which is labelled 
the "sensory-noetic disjunction" (1977: 21) • Wright traces the 
historical origins of his philosophical views to the Greek 
philosophers. He supports the perspective of the scholar, 
Guthrie, who claims that the division of philosophy into 
matter-p~ilosophers and form-philosophers ''is perhaps the most 
fundamental that can be made in any age, our own included" (1960: 
21) • 
Two basic problems in the history of philosophy are, 
according to Wright: 
(a) " ..• the study of man,. in which the phenomena of human 
expression are instrumental to the communication of ideas"; 
and 
(b) " ... the study of physical realities in which ideas are 
instrumental to the rational manipulation of phenomena" 
(1981: 37). 
Wright's work may then be seen to be an effort to align 
librarianship with (a) above, ie, with "the formal realities of 
the ideational order, not with the physical realities of the 
statistical order" (1981: 38). 
Wright contends that a critical philosophy of librarianship 
would have to ask questions about: 
(a) "metaphysics (our beliefs about the realities librarians 
must deal with)"; 
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(b) "epistemology (our- theor-ies explaining how the r-ealities 
ar-e known)"; and 
(c) "ethics (our- theor-ies 
r-elation to those r-ealities)" 
explaining how best to act 
( 1983 : 11-12 ) • 
in 
Libr-ar-ianship can choose either- "ideas" (the "noetic" wor-ld of 
for-mal thought) or- "data" (the physical wor-ld of matter- and 
ener-gy) as its ultimate r-ealities, but cannot have it both ways 
(1983: 12) . Those libr-ar-ians who evade this choice by claiming 
that "infor-mation" is the ultimate r-eality for- libr-ar-ianship 
still have to choose between the conception of 
"infor-mation-as-ideas" and "infor-mation-as-data", which is, once 
again, an instance of the for-m ver-sus matter- dichotomy (cf 
4.2.3). Wr-ight expr-esses his own bias by submitting that 
libr-ar-ians should r-egar-d it as their- sacr-ed duty "to r-eject the 
physical concept of infor-mation-as-data, which r-educes 
libr-ar-ianship to notation science, and r-e-asser-t the metaphysical 
concept of infor-mation-as-ideas, which r-egar-ds it as the 
car-togr-aphy of knowledge" (1983: 14). By intellectual 
.car-togr-aphy he means the "human ar-t of or-ienting people to ideas" 
(1983: 15) • 
The epistemological positions for- libr-ar-ianship ar-e 
connected with the choice of what the ultimate r-ealities ar-e. He 
states that if our- ultimate r-ealities "r-educe to data" then the 
best ways of thinking about them ar-e empir-ical. This is what 
has, unfor-tunately, happened. Hence: 
"The libr-ar-ians and infor-mation scientists by accepting 
mater-ialistic ways of thinking about their- for-mal 
r-ealities, have r-eified infor-mation (by r-educing ideas 
to .data) in or-der- to study it scientifically" (author-'s 
emphasis; 1983: 14). 
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However-, if our- ultimate r-ealities "r-educe to ideas", then 
the best ways of thinking about them ar-e r-ational, not empir-ical 
(1983: 15) . He explains that "This implies commitment to the 
r-ecognitive methods of cr-itical humanism, which ar-e essentially 
intr-ospective- and per-ceptive as in the ar-ts, not obser-vational 
and r-eflective as in st:ience ••. " (ibid.). This "exclusivity" 
featur-e in his thinking leads him to view libr-ar-ianship and the 
natur-al sciences as antithetical. He contends that each focuses 
on a "differ-ent or-der- of r-eality" (1978a: 261). As a 
metascience, libr-ar-ianship is concer-ned with knowing about 
knowledge (1985b: 18) . Infor-mation science also needs to 
abandon its use of the physical methods of natur-al science if it 
is to be of greater- assistance to libr-ar-ianship. He believes 
that infor-mation science is par-t of libr-ar-ianship and that it can 
only help libr-ar-ianship in its "communicative tooling" (1983: 
17; cf 4.4.2.1 for- other- pr-oponents of this view). 
Wr-ight eventually r-ealizes the inevitable dilemma of a 
dualist epistemology, which Sellar-s puts as follows: "How can 
ideas in a pur-ely mental r-ealm know things in a physical domain?" 
(1941: 409). Wr-ight pr-oposes a "psychophysical inter-actionist" 
solution to this dilemma. He suggests that "the separ-ate wor-lds 
of for-m and matter- do come together- in man" and that 
libr-ar-ianship is deeply involved with the mind-body pr-oblem of 
philosophy, since: 
(a) "knowledge is composed of for-mal 
wor-ld of mind, wher-eas" 
subsistents in the 
(b) "all expr-essions of knowledge consist of 





W~ight states that what is needed is a t~uly comp~ehensive theo~y 
of communication "that integ~ates the ~ealities at both ends of a 
wi~e connecting human beings to thei~ physical and cultu~al 
envi~onments - a psychophysical theo~y that explains all of thei~ 
complex inte~actions with both of those envi~onments" (1986: 
740). 
w~ight p~oceeds to develop this psychophysical, inte~active 
theo~y by employing the ideas of symbolic inte~actionism, a 
theo~y that She~a (cf 5.5) claimed in one of his final a~ticles 
would supply the p~ope~ foundation fa~ lib~a~ianship (1983: 
386). In this theo~y the physical symbols become inst~uments of 
communication that a~ouse ideas in the mind. W~ight associates 
symbolic inte~actionism with ~ationali~t epistemology because it 
(symbolic inte~actionism) "studies fo~mal objects which a~e 
communicated by natu~al language but cannot be desc~ibed 
mathematically, and ~ationality is its only c~ite~ion of t~uth" 
(1986: 751; cf 2.5 fa~ the ~ationalist epistemological 
position). 
w~ight's p~efe~ence fa~ a ~ationalist epistemology fa~ 
lib~a~ianship leads him to also ~eject a p~agmatist epistemology 
(which he associates with anti-intellectualism). He maintains 
the p~oposition that p~agmatism is an indefensible philosophical 
stance fa~ the lib~a~ian since: 
(a) " •.. it constitutes an expe~ientially biased philosophy 
of action de~ived f~om scientific mate~ialism''; and 
(b) " ... lib~a~ians a~e in the knowledge business, not in the 
action business ... " ( 1986:. 765) • 
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He_claims that Ame~ican lib~a~ians, in applying the p~ecepts of a 
p~agmatist outlook, mistakenly ~educe thei~ knowledge p~oblems to 
action theo~y in o~de~ to solve them scientifically. Howeve~, 
II action theory cannot ~esolve the knowledge p~oblems of 
lib~a~ianship because theo~ies of knowledge (epistemology) a~e 
not ~educible to theo~ies of action (ethics/societology/ science) 
o~ vice-ve~sa" (1988: 51) . 
Fo~ W~ight, then, a ~ationalist epistemology is p~efe~~ed to 
an empi~icist epistemology and a p~agmati~t epistemology fo~ 
lib~a~y and info~mation science. A ~ationalist epistemology 
suppo~ts his basic view that lib~a~ianship deals with the 
"intellectual ~ealities of thought" and not with the "sensibles 
of expe~ience", ie, it is "idea science, not data science" 
(1978b: 388; 1983: 15) . 
REFERENCES 
Donohue, J.C. (1977) Reviews. 
fo~ Info~mation Science, vel. 28, 
Jou~nal of the Ame~ican Society 
pp. 371-372. 
Guth~ie, W.K.C. 
A~istotle. New Yo~k: 
(1960) The G~eek philosophe~s f~om Thales to 
Ha~pe~ & Row. 
Sella~s, W. (1941) "Philosophy of o~ganism and physical ~ealism" 
In: The philosophy of A.N. Whitehead, edited by P.A. Schilpp. 
Chicago: No~thweste~n Unive~sity, pp. 407-433. 
She~a, J.H. (1983) "Lib~a~ianship and info~mation science" In: 
The study of info~mation: inte~disciplina~y messages, edited by 





The o~al antecedents of G~eek 
B~igham Young Unive~sity. 237p. 
W~ight, H.C. (1978a) Inqui~y in science 
Jou~nal of lib~a~y histo~y. philosophy 
lib~a~ianship, val. 13, no. 4, pp. 250-264. 
and lib~a~ianship. 
and compa~ative 
W~ight, H.C. (1978b) Of mi~~o~s, monkeys and apostles. Jou~nal 
of lib~a~y histo~y. philosophy and compa~ative lib~a~ianship, 
vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 388~407. 
268 
Wright, H.C. (1981) An anthropological model for librarianship. 
Scholar and educator, vol. 5, pp. 31-39. 
Wright, H.C. 
librarianship. 
(1983) An interdisciplinary philosophy of 
Scholar and educator, vol. 7, pp. 11-24. 
Wright, H.C. (1985a) Shera as a bridge between librarianship 
and information science. Journal of library history, philosophy 
and comparative librarianship, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 137-156. 
Wright, H.C. (1985b) The occupational alignment of 
librarianship with the metasciences. Scholar and educator, vol. 
9, pp. 15-19. 
Wright, H.C. (1986) The symbol and its referent: an issue for 
library education. Library trends, Sp~ing, pp. 729-776. 
Wright, H.C. (1988) Jesse Shera, Librarianship and Information 
Science. Occasional ·Research Paper, no. 5. Brigham Young 
University School of Library and Information Sciences. 
5.20 SARACEVIC, T. (1930-
Saracevic relates the term information to that of knowledge 
by asserting that knowledge is to be viewed in a static sense and 
information in a dynamic sense. For him, information is a 
broader concept embracing knowledge (cf 4.3.5.1.2 for this 
conception of "information"). ~e also characterizes ~nowledge as, 
potential energy, and information as kinetic energy to 
demonstrate the latter's association with communication-related 
manifestations of knowledge (1975: 347). 
In an early essay, co-authored with Rees, Saracevic 
distinguishes between librarianship and information science on 
the basis of the distinction between a science and a profession, 
or theory and practice. They state that the most fruitful 
relationship between a science and a profession applies the 
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results of scientific investigation in development and practice 
(1968: 4098). In this essay the hope that information science 
might supply a theoretical basis to librarianship, is proclaimed: 
"Paralyzed by decades of philosophical and literary 
argumentation, librarianship has much to gain from 
information science. The insights, tools, and 
methodologies of mathematics, logic, statistics, 
linguistics, systems analysis, behavioural sciences, 
etc., have much to offer librarianship. Flippantly, it 
is possible to suggest that we have tried formal 
philosophy, sociology, and technology, so why not try 
science?" (1968: 4100). 
In a more recent essay, Saracevic calls for an independent 
information science. Arguing against the integration of 
education for library science and information science, he claims 
as bases for his independent approach: 
(a) "the growth of unique information science knowledge and 
know-how"; 
(b) "the growth and 
market places", and; 





high demands of un1que information 
caused primarily by unpredictable 
of information technologies" (1982: 
This argument is used by Saracevic to ensure the growth and even 
survival of traditional library schools, and his efforts at 
separating information science from library science culminated in 
a total curriculum revision for education in information and 
library science at Case Western Reserve University - Shera's 
academic base until his retirement and death in 1982. Expressing 
her dismay at this approach of Saracevic, Bohnert contends that 
the disappearance of library science from the joint designation 
"library and information science" suggests that information 
science could handle all the diverse communication activities in 
the world (1982: 44) . 
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Saracevic's support of the methods of the natural sciences 
to library problems appear, at the same time, to excl'ude the 
failed methods of other disciplines such as "formal philosophy 
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5.21 MEIJER, J.G. (1931-
Meijer holds the view that library science and information 
science share the same goals and carry out the same functions 
(1988: 78; cf 4.4.2.1 for a d~scussion of this view). While 
both libraries and information centres aim to provide users with 
access to the content of recorded knowledge regardless of 
physical format, the depth of analysis in information science is 
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greater than in library science. Meijer concedes that it is for 
historical reasons that he prefers the term librarianship 
("bibliotheekwezen") to information science (1978: 52) • 
The notions of both universality and divergence feature 
strongly in Meijer's writings on the content of library 
collections and librarianship. Of library collections he 
asserts: 
"Documents in a library collectively represent all 
human thought in written form, and therefore have a 
universal dimension. Contrasts between people, ethnic 
groups, outlooks on life, scientific views, etc., are 
reflected in the documents. Temporary as well as 
permanent controversies are incorporated in them. 
Apart from its universal character, the content of 
library documents therefore also has a divergent 
character" (1982: 13). 
Meijer uses the phrase "the cultural heritage of mankind" to 
reflect the universal and divergent qualities of the content of 
library collections ("containing both positive and negative 
elements") (1982: 15) • These same qualities of universality and 
divergence characterize librarianship (ibid.), and Meijer 
concludes, in the light of these central features, that the main 
function of the library is: 
" to stimulate people to make optimal use of that 
part of mankind's cultural heritage preserved in 
libraries. The aim of this stimulation is inter alia 
to support decision-making and scientific and technical 
progress (which cannot occur without adequate 
information) through optimum provision of sources of 
information or, to put it differently, to enable 
society to progress in a positive or a negative sense" 
(1982: 16). 
Against this background Meijer investigates the logical 
requirements for a logically tenable definition for 
librarianship. He proposes the following definition (which is 
analysed in 4.4.3): 
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"Librarianship is a form of cultural enterprise whose 
main characteristic is the stimulation of the optimum 
use of mankind's cultural heritage insofar as it 
consists of coded thoughts recorded in documents that 
are and must be held in readiness for use with the 
ultimate objective of making possible cultural progress 
(also in the fields of religion and science) in its 
particular spheres" ( 1982: 26). 
While Meijer characterizes the main feature of librarianship 
as the "stimulation of the optimum use of mankind's cultural 
heritage insofar as it consists of coded thoughts ..• " he contends 
that the actual transfer of these thoughts is an "extra library" 
affair. He argues that: 
"The transfer o'f knowledge after all does not occur at 
the moment when the user is handed a document by a 
librarian, but only afterward, during cognition. The 
interaction between book and user is a typically 
extralibrary matter. Libraria~s and archivists, who 
functionally and fundamentally share the same task, 
enable this interaction by stimulating people to make 
the optimum use of their collection but they do not 
establish any active communication between authors (or 
their works) and the users. The transfer of knowledge, 
an extralibrary matter, is therefore not characteristic 
of librarianship and is wrongly included with library 
activities.;. Libraries ..• do not produce thoughts but 
place them in readiness for use" (1982: 21). 
Here Meijer is clearly concerned with the professional 
activities of librarianship rather than the academic study of its 
essential substance (cf also 4.4.3). In this regard, Meijer 
expresses the view that the "action radius" of libraries does not 
include the generation of coded thoughts, and that, therefore, 
librarianship should not" ... enter the field of philosophy to 
lay claim to a large part of epistemology" (1982: 20). From a 
scheme of six activities regarding coded thoughts, namely: 
(a) generation; 
(b) recording; 
( c ) d up 1 i cation ; 
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(d) dist~ibution; 
(e) holding in ~eadiness (facilitating access (1988: 75) ) ; 
and 
(f) use, 
Meije~ dema~cates lib~a~ianship's ~adius of action as "the 
documenta~y ~eco~ding, the holding in ~eadiness fo~ use, and the 
use of coded thoughts" (1982: 21) . In a late~ investigation 
into the establishment of a scientific basis fo~ cu~~iculum 
planning fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science in South Af~ica, 
Meije~ et al identify the following complex of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science functions: 
(a) "collection building/development", which include: 
( i) "se lee tion of ~efe~ences fo~ acquisition ing"; 
"p~eselection, selection o~ evaluation of 
documenta~y info~mation sou~ces", and "selection"; 
(ii) "acquisitioning"; and 
(iii) "p~ese~vation"; 
(b) "In 1 igtingonts lui tingsfunksies" ( ' Info~mation sto~age 
functions' - the~e is no adequate English equivalent fo~ 
this Af~ikaans te~m), which include: 





(v) "t~anslation"; and 
(vi) "publishing of catalogues, etc"; 
(c) "Info~mation ~et~ieval functions", which include: 
(i) "use~ p~ofiles"; 
(ii)"finding info~mation ~efe~ences" o~ 
"documentation"; 
(iii) "~efe~ence/info~mation se~vices"; 
( iv) "use~ guidance"; and 
(v) "packaging and ~epackaging of info~mation"; 
(d) "document delive~y"; 
(e) "management"; 
(f) "education" and "t~aining",; and 
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(g) "r-esear-ch" ( 1988: 18-27). 
Meijer- et al also pr-ovide a cr-itical analysis of the notion 
of infor-mation as a pr-oposed centr-al dynamic for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science in the study mentioned above (1988: viii; cf 
4.1.2). "Infor-mation management" and "bibliocultur-e" ar-e the 
other- two pr-oposed centr-al dynamics. After- an intensive r-eview 
of the sever-al differ-ent conceptions of the definitions of 
infor-mation, they conclude that the notion of infor-mation, fr-om 
the point of view of the pur-poses of cur-r-iculum development for-
libr-ar-y and infor-mation science, r-emains obscur-ely demar-cated 
thus failing the test of unequivocal identity for- those pur-poses 
(1988: 75; cf 4.2.2.2.4). However-, in their- analysis, they 
acknowledge the validity of a content (infor-mation as content) 
plus pr-ocess (infor-mation as pr-ocess) view of infor-mation (1988: 
74-5; cf 4.2.2.2.3). These conceptions of infor-mation ar-e 
consider-ed by Meijer- as still being pr-ovisional. 
Meijer-'s conception of knowledge is associated per-tinently 
wittl "coded thoughts", or-, thoughts that have been expr-essed and 
r-ecor-ded in per-manent for-m and that may be pr-eser-ved in 
libr-ar-ies. He ther-efor-e discar-ds Sher-a's "total 
knowledge-situation" as unspecific because: 
" to mention one thing - wor-dless thoughts and 
views that ar-e never- pr-opagated ar-e inaccessible ... a 
lar-ge par-t of the total knowledge situation must 
ther-efor-e still be excluded. The par-t of human thought 
impor-tant to libr-ar-ianship consists of those thoughts 
expr-essed thr-ough codes ... [The] field of activity of 
libr-ar-ians falls within the limits of coded thoughts 
r-ecor-ded in documents" (1982: 20). 
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It should also be noted that the notion of the 11 pr-ogr-ess of 
knowledge .. is the cr-iter-ion in his investigation into the 
per-iodization of libr-ar-y histor-y. In each of the thr-ee 
successive per-iods of the per-iodization model he associates the 
libr-ar-y with its concer-n with knowledge r-espectively in its 
nar-r-ow, its br-oadened and its specialized aspects (1977: iv}. 
Meijer- expr-esses concer-n for- the lack of adequate scientific 
foundations for- libr-ar-ianship in a r-ecent unpublished essay 
(1990: 37) . He points out that libr-ar-ianship cannot hope to 
pr-ogr-ess scientifically unless it develops its theor-y and 
metatheor-y. He declar-es in this r-egar-d that, ..Without 
metatheor-etical study the essence, aim and mission of a 
pr-ofession do not enter- into the scientific pictur-e and the 
hor-izons of pr-ofessionally or-iented disciplines .. (1990: 15) . He 
consider-s that the ~ind of metatheor-etical r-eflection in 
libr-ar-ianship that will .. answer- the ultimate 'why' question 
-
of the discipline, is indispensable ..... (1990: 38). 
Meijer- clear-ly r-ecognizes the need for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science to investigate fundamental theor-etical issues 
and he has made significant contr-ibutions to this end. 
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5.22 HARMON, G. (1932-
Ha~mon's notion of info~mation science eme~ges f~om a mo~e 
fundamental gene~al systems app~oach. He p~oposes the view that 
info~mation science appea~s to be a membe~ of a set of 
communication-o~iented disciplines which eme~ged almost 
simultaneously du~ing the time of Wo~ld Wa~ I (1973a: 116)' 
exp~essing the hope that, with active p~og~amming, info~mation 
science and othe~ communication-o~iented disciplines II could 
se~ve to fo~m a sup~asystem of knowledge potentially capable of 
unifying the a~ts, sciences and p~ofessions" (1973a: 116) . 
Acco~ding to him, this sup~asystem could p~ovide a basis fo~ the 
mo~e complete inte~p~etation of ~eality (ibid.). 
The notion of a sup~asystem finds its o~igins in the wo~ld 
encyclopaedia concept of H.G. Wells that Ha~mon discusses in 
~elation to imp~oved lib~a~y classification systems (1938; 1973: 
221). He demonst~ates that memo~y limitations influence human 
o~ganization of knowledge and that attempts at an encyclopaedic 
o~ganization of knowledge .could lead to the development of a 
"wo~ld b~ain" (1973a; 1973b: 229). Ha~mon cites as p~actical 
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examples of cont~ibutions to such a wo~ld b~ain as la~ge 
info~mation and ~efe~enc~ netwo~ks and advances in communications 
and compute~ technology (ibid.). 
The movement towa~ds this wo~ld b~ain that Ha~mon envisages 
is one that is ~eflected in an eme~ging, new social o~de~ in 
which info~mation p~ofessionals play a majo~ ~ole (1979: 98). 
He defines info~mation p~ofessionalism in a b~oad sense, viz, 
that it "d~aws upon, cont~ibutes to, and p~ovides integ~ation fo~ 
nea~ly all o~ganized disciplines and p~ofessions" (1979: 99). 
He p~oceeds to claim that info~mation p~ofessionals might bea~ 
the titles of "statistician, analyst, p~oject manage~, app~aise~, 
consultant, te~minal ope~ato~, legal aid planne~, ~esea~che~, 
p~og~amme~ o~ chemist" (1975b: 59) . Ha~mon makes the st~ong 
claim that in this new social o~de~ " .•• institutions like post 
offices and lib~a~ies, appea~ to be a~tifacts of a social o~de~ 
d~awing to a close" (1979: 102). 
Ha~mon contends that in this new age of high technology and 
f~antic change we need mo~e abst~act and ~igo~ous definitions of 
info~mation (1987: 223). Consequently, he conceives of 
info~mation as metaene~gy, and he defines metaene~gy as that 
which occu~s between, with, o~ afte~ ene~gy, and is inst~umental 
in its change, t~ansfo~mation and cont~ol (1975a: 93). 
view info~mation is seen as "a ~esidual o~ catalytic 
In this 
fo~m of 
ene~gy which ~egulates 
a~tificial systems" (1984: 
othe~ fo~ms of ene~gy in natu~al and 
193). Acco~ding to Ha~mon, concepts 
of ene~gy togethe~ with ~ecent cont~ibutions in systems theo~y 
and the~modynamics have se~ved to demonst~ate the ene~gy-like 
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properties of information (1984: 193). He argues that 
information, conceived in this way, can be measured directly or 
indirectly through the use of conventional energy equations 
(ibid.), posing the question: "If we cannot measure information, 
do we know what we are talking about?" (1984: 198). While he 
does not provide the grounds for a more natural or sufficient 
link between the notions of energy and information, he associates 
his concept with that of Otten and Debons (cf 5.11) (who have 
demonstrated that information and energy share certain 
fundamental attributes) (1975a: 98). 
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5.23 McGARRY, K.J. (1934-
McGarry's concern with the "philosophy of librarianship", 
which for him is the quintessence that sets library and 
information science apart from other disciplines and professions, 
cannot afford to ignore the unifying theoretical base of 
librarianship and information work (1981: 8; 1983a: 5) • The 
concern with basic theoretical issues is reflected inter alia in 
his claim that "We still search for the theoretical underpinnings 
of a curriculum for the 1990's" (1985: 97). 
Regarding the relationship between librarianship and 
information science, he asserts that: 
"Information science grew out of the use of and 
research in automated retrieval systems and took on the 
mantle of the older activity of documentation. But 
automation is also at the base of modern library 
systems, so the computer alone does not divide 
librarianship and information science ... Perhaps the 
safest statement to make is that they are overlapping 
but not co-extensive studies" ( 1981: 150). 
McGarry notes that the several definitions of information 
reflect gradations and varieties of epistemological standpoints, 
that is, one defines information in accordance with one's world 
view or ideology (cf 4.1 for the philosophical presuppositions of 
definitions) : 
"At the one end of the spectrum is the view that 
information exists in the structure of the material 
world and would still be there whether we existed or 
not; at the other end is the view that the non-human 
world the movement of rivers, the direction of 
prevailing winds, etc, can only become information 
when acted upon by the concept system of the knower" 
( 1983b: 99) • 
The two fundamental views stated in the quotation above 
reveal McGarry's conviction that "the history of epistemological 
theory has always been battleground between the rationalist and 
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the empir-icist" (1969: 127). He believes, however-, that, fr-om 
the point of view of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science, 
epistemological studies need to be given a social context, 
fear-ing that "epistemological studies [would] become ar-id and 
ir-r-elevant if they ar-e not r-ooted in social r-ealities" (1969: 
126). 
In a r-ecent essay McGar-r-y r-easser-ts the per-sonal per-suasion 
that fundamental issues r-equir-e ur-gent attention, declar-ing that 
we still need to find out" ... wher-e libr-ar-ianship begins and 
ends, what libr-ar-ians and infor-mation officer-s need to know, and 
what special kind of knowing is it that distinguishes us fr-om 
other- r-elated pr-ofessions" (1985: 97). While McGar-r-y does not 
ar-ticulate a full-fledged epistemological position for- libr-ar-y 
and infor-mation science, he does r-ecognize the validity ·and 
appr-opr-iateness of the adoption of mor-e than one epistemology in 
pr-ofessional theor-y, advocating however- that a study of these 
epistemologies be placed at all times in a social context. 
Fur-ther-mor-e, it is clear- that he holds the view that the 
establishment of an epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science would help to set it apar-t fr-om other- r-elated 
pr-ofessions by delineating its unique "kind of knowing". 
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5.24 BEKKER, J. (1939-
Bekker- r-egar-ds libr-ar-y science as an applied, 
vocationally-dir-ected social science which also contains elements 
that ar-e r-elated to the natur-al sciences and the humanities 
(1987: 17) • As one of "four- bibliothecal disciplines", libr-ar-y 
science is per-ceived as a holistic discipline in the sense that 
it synthesizes the r-esults of bibliology (a discipline that has 
infor-mation r-ecor-ds as its object), infor-mation science (which is 
concer-ned with means of infor-mation r-etr-ieval which br-ings 
libr-ar-y r-ecor-ds and libr-ar-y user-s together-) and r-eader-ship (which 
has the libr-ar-y user- as its object) (1978: 29). Bekker- explains 
that the bibliothecal disciplines, as mentioned above, study 
"ar-tificially cr-eated fields of study" r-ather- than "natur-e (ie 
the r-eality which has not been cr-eated by human beings) II (1978: 
31) • 
In his doctor-al thesis (which investigates the application 
of pr-ofessional ethics to libr-ar-ianship) Bekker- combines a 
functionalist appr-oach to the philosophy of libr-ar-ianship with a 
systems appr-oach in or-der- "to show that libr-ar-ies and 
libr-ar-y-like agencies for-m a unity" (1976b: 174). In this 
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regard, he seeks a unifying principle in the "basic library 
function distinguished by Shera" (1976b: 148). He analyses 
Shera's statement that ~he library's function is to maximize the 
social utility of graphic records for the benefit of humanity 
(Shera, 1968: 9; 1972: 197). Bekker's critical analysis of 
this statement results in a slightly different formulation, viz. 
II the basic function of the library is to optimize the social 
value of recorded information for mankind; or to optimize the 
value of recorded information for~mankind" (1976b: 147) . He 
claims that this basic function has "remained the same throughout 
history" in spite of changes in emphasis, in services offered, 
tasks performed and techniques used (197_6b: 110). 
It is worth noting that many of Bekker's central ideas 
appear to derive from Aristotelian philosophy. 





application of functionalism (1976b: 132), and his search for "a 
practical ethics with one basic guiding principle" (1976b: 63, 
67&395). 
Bekker's concern with.unities or single guiding principles 
is evident in his argument that the two-cultures debate of Snow 
sets forth an artificial division of culture. Culture, according 
to Bekker, consists of spiritual and material aspects, and both 
should be given equal recognition. He proposes a broad view of 
culture, declaring that "'Kultuur' is 'n omvattende begrip wat 
diachronies en sinchronies variasies kan akkommodeer. In hierdie 
sin is daar net een kultuur ... " (ie, 'Culture' is a comprehensive 
concept which may accommodate diachronic and synchronic 
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variations. In this sense there is only one culture ... ) (1987: 
15) . Bekke~ maintains that the basis of the two-cultu~es debate 
displays a mate~ialism-idealism dualism. 
ought to be ~ejected in favou~ of continua. 
Dualisms o~ dualities 
He contends that it 
is impo~tant " ... om dualistiese 'kultu~e· uit te ~oei en ontslae 
te ~aak van dest~uktiewe dualiteite" (ie, to ~emove dualistic 
'cultu~es' and to get ~id of dest~uctive dualities) (1987~ 16) • 
Fo~ this ~eason, he ~ejects the sha~p cont~ast of ha~d sciences 
on the one hand and lite~atu~e on the othe~ (as in the 
two-cultu~es debate), and p~oposes a continuum of natu~al 
sciences, social sciences and the humanities so that knowledge is 
to be seen as a whole (1987: 15) . 
Acco~ding to Bekke~, the two-cultu~es debate ~eveals itself 
in lib~a~y and info~mation science as the distinction between 
lib~a~y science on the one hand and info~mation science on the 
othe~ ("the te~m lib~a~ianship is often p~efe~~ed to lib~a~y 
science in o~de~ to deny a scientific natu~e") (1987: 18) • In 
cont~ast to this pe~spective, Bekke~ maintains that lib~a~y and 
info~mation science fo~ms a unity p~ima~ily committed to the 
communication of info~mation and the lib~a~ian should be able to 
~econcile the human and the non-human, ie the two cultu~es (1987: 
20). 
Bekke~ ~ecognizes the need to investigate the 
epistemological foundations of the lib~a~y phenomenon as pa~t of 
a b~oade~ investigation into the ontological and epistemological 
status of ~eco~ded knowledge and submits that such a study could 
develop into a sub-discipline of lib~a~y science. This 
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sub-discipline should be called bibliothecal epistemology 
("bibliotekale epistemologie") because of its connections with 
the library phenomenon (1984: 30). 
For Bekker, the key question whose answer will determine the 
epistemological status of the record, that is, its meaningful 
content, is: "to which extent are the statements contained in the 
record true?" (1984: 3) • He clarifies his use of the term 
"record" by saying that it is "die vergestalting wat n 
ge?eksternaliseerde gedagte aanneem" (ie, the concrete form or 
substance that an externalized idea assumes) (1984: 3) • He 
and argues that non-fiction (as "literature of knowledge") 
fiction (as "literature of imagination") form a continuum and 
that each of these categories of literature have an independent 
epistemological character. 
The epistemological status, or, truth-quality, of factual 
records is determined by comparing their claims with the reality 
of sense experience. He considers it imperative that such 
records be truthful because of their increasing use for practical 
applications and 
information (1984: 
the growing reliance of modern man on recorded 
17) • 
In the case of fiction, the epistemological status of 
statements is based not upon their correspondence with 
sense-experience outside the record, that is, external reality, 
but with the overall message within a given record, that is, its 
own reality of the author, or imaginary world. He contends that: 
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"Die aanvaarbaarheid van n storie vir die leser kan 
egter afhang van die auteur se werklikheidsiening. In 
so 'n geval moet daar in die laaste instansie na die 
empiriese werklikheid as sodanig verwys word" (ie, The 
reader's acceptance of a story can, however, depend 
upon the author's perception of reality. In such a 
case empirical reality would have to serve as a final 
point of reference) (1984: 19). 
The two categories of reality, as outlined above, should be 
recognized along with the limitation that he places on all 
records, or documented information to reveal aspects of reality. 
He argues that documented information can only supply a partial 
view of reality: 
It 
"Selfs wanneer die grootste moontlike mate van vryheid 
bestaan, kan die bibliotekaris nie verseker dat die 
biblioteekgebruiker 'n volledige beeld van die 
werklikheid (dws 'n w@reldbeeld en n beeld van die 
lewe) kry nie. Dit is die geval omdat alles wat ervaar 
word nie in die vorm van gedokumenteerde inligting 
beskikbaar gestel word nie ... " (ie, Even when the 
greatest measure of freedom prevails,, the librarian 
cannot assure the user of receiving a complete picture 
of reality, ie a world view and an image of life. This 
is so because all possible experience cannot be made 
available in the form of documented information) 
( 1976a: 4) . 
is evident from Bekker's thoughts on the epistemological 
status of th·e record that his approach presupposes a broad 
conception of knowledge which also accommodates its narrower 
conception. He asserts that knowledge in the narrower sense., is, 
in fact, a part of knowledge in the broad sense (cf 4.3.5.1.2 for 
this view). He explains his reason for adopting this position by 
arguing that in ~hilosophy (especially in epistemology and logic) 
knowledge has connotations of truth and validity; in the social 
sciences (especially in the sociology of knowledge) knowledge is 
what passes for knowledge (1977: 5; cf 4.3.2 & 4.3.3 for 
related discussions). Since the disciplines which study 
communication phenomena are classified as social sciences, he 
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p~efe~s the b~oad conception of knowledge (1977: 6) • In this 
way, lib~a~y and info~mation science focuses on knowledge in the 
b~oad sense and the lib~a~ian should endeavou~ to disseminate 
wo~ks espousing all possible viewpoints (eg o~thodox as well as 
uno~thodox opinions) so that the lib~a~y use~ may be allowed to 
develop a c~itical attitude in the sea~ch fo~ t~uth and thus 
II in 'n g~ote~ mate in die waa~heid te deel" (ie, participate 
to a greater degree in the truth) (1976a: 6-7). 
Bekke~·s views a~e pa~ticula~ly inst~uctive fo~ the 
development of an epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and 
info~mation science. He p~ovides significant pe~spectives on the 
epistemological aspects su~~ounding the content of lib~a~ies and 
info~mation cent~es, ie, ~eco~ded knowledge. 
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5. 25 De !"'EY, M. (1940-
De Mey, who is attached to the Belgian univer-sity of Ghent's 
depar-tment of logic and epistemology, discusses the r-elevance of 
the cognitive view for- infor-mation science. The cognitive view 
is essentially the view that: 
"any for-m of infor-mation pr-ocessing, whether- natur-al or-
ar-tificial, r-equir-es a device that has in some way or-
another-, an inter-nal model or- r-epr-esentation of the 
envir-onment in which it oper-ates" (1982: xv; cf 2.4). 
De Mey consider-s the ~ognitive or-ientation as the most r-ecent 
stage in a ser-ies of stages that char-acter-ize the evolution of 
theor-ies on per-ception, communication and infor-mation pr-ocessing. 
He outlines the development of these stages as follows: 
"(a) a monadic view dur-ing which infor-mation units ar-e 
handled separ-ately and independently of each other- as if 
they wer-e simple, self-contained entities"; 
"(b) a str-uctur-al stage wher-e the infor-mation is seen as a 
mor-e complex entity consisting of sever-al infor-mation units 
ar-r-anged in some specific way"; 
"(c) a contextual stage wher-e, in addition to an analysis of 
the str-uctur-al or-ganization of the infor-mation-bear-ing 
units, ther-e is r-equir-ed infor-mation on context to 
disambiguate the meaning of the message"; and 
"(d) a cognitive or- epistemic stage in which infor-mation is 
seen as supplementar-y or- complementar-y to a conceptual 
system that r-epr-esents the infor-mation-pr-ocessing system's 
knowledge of its wor-ld" (1980: 49). 
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Scientific knowledge (as the kind of knowledge generated in the 
natural sciences), according to the cognitive view, is merely a 
special instance of the general conditions governing the 
acquisition of knowledge. He claims that "The dynamics of 
scientific thinking exemplifies the dynamics of cognitive 
processes in general" (1984: 107). 
From an epistemological point of view, the cognitive view 
recognizes that the constraints on knowledge are no longer in 
terms of some neutral truth, but in terms of the knowing system's 
"action equipment". The "actions" referred to here are those of 
the knower. They are also known as "procedures", so that any 
knowing system is equipped to know its own "micro-world" in terms 
of the feasibility and the effects of the basic set of actions it 
can perform. De Mey points out that the "micro-world" approach, 
in which knowledge is fragmented, eschews and fails to account 
for the opposite approach which searches for unity. In this 
connection, he claims: "Some see life as more attractive if 
there are many different worlds to know, others feel safer to 
think of it as one solid unit" (1980: 57) • 
De Mey associates pluralism with the cognitive view and 
speaks of a multiplicity of world views, or, world models, 
according to which "the world can be known in a multitude of ways 
and retains the potentiality for surprises and challenges all the 
time" ( 1982: 256). At the same time he cautions against the 
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epistemological risks of pluralism, ie relativism, or, the notion 
that a plurality of world views implies the acceptance of the 
validity of every possible view (1982: 256). 
The key component elements in the cognitive view are: 
(a) a shift in the focus from the object and signal 
subject or the receiver; and 
to the 
(b) a shift in focus from clearly delineated units handled 
in isolation towards handling information processing in 
terms of world models. 
With regard to the former element, cognition connects a 
knowing subject to a known object. In contrast to crude 
empiricism, where reality is "out there" unfolding itself to a 
passive subject, the cognitive view emphasizes the active 
organizing activity of the subject. 
With regard to the other element in the cognitive view, 
larger and larger wholes are involved in understanding even 
simple messages. 
Since the cognitive view recognizes the importance of 
knowledge contributed by the knower in a knower's processing of 
information, a library user has a "world-model" which generates 
expectations to make sense of the data he receives. In this 
view, knowledge assumes a dynamic character in which the 
knowledge user is an active manipulator of knowledge sources. De 
Mey claims that this approach may promote a fuller understanding 
of the interactions between librarians and users (1984: 109). 
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De Mey recognizes the value of epistemological 
considerations for library and information work and his cognitive 
view provides many rich insights into the nature of a suitable 
epistemological position for library and information science. 
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5.26 HARRIS, M.H. (1941-
The intellectual tradition that nourishes the 
epistemological views of Harris is that of critical social reform 
in the U.S.A. This is evident in his essay on a revisionist 
interpretation of the history of the public library in the U.S.A. 
He argues that "library historians have generally been in 
agreement with the standard interpretation of American reform as 
a struggle for human betterment and a challenge to injustice and 
a repressive status guo. The movement was seen as liberal, 
humanitarian, and idealistic" (1975: 40). 
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The revisionist view challenges this claim and regards it as 
"little more than a regressive fantasy" (1975: 41) • In his 
application of this revisionist interpretation to the American 
public library, Harris contends that in spite of its idealized 
history, the American public library has always been an elitist 
and authoritarian social institution which has never been certain 
of its purpose (1975: 21). 
In a later essay Harris calls for a" ... rethinking of the 
epistemological foundations of research in library and 
information science" (1986a: 516). He argues that positivism, 
and its logical derivative, logical positivism, which has been 
widely discredited by social scientists when viewed as the only 
legitimate epistemic path to knowledge, is still espoused by many 
library researchers. He maintains that the current positivist 
epistemology in library and information science arose from a 
"scientific delusion" fostered by the work carried on at the 
University of Chicago's Graduate Library School in its early 
years (1986a: 517) . 
Harris contends .that research in library and information 
science and even the practice of librarianship is guided by a 
paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense). However, this paradigm has 
"been s~ widely and uncritically adopted that it has become very 
nearly invisible to practicing librarians and researchers alike" 
(1986b: 213). He characterizes this paradigm as being 
"pluralistic", which views librarians as "apolitical servants of 
the 'people'" and libraries as "simple mirrors, neutral 
reflections of society's 'racial memory'" (1986b: 215). 
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Consequently, research in library and information science tends 
to concentrate on "administrative problems" that are amenable to 
"technical solutions" (1986b: 216). 
Coupled to this pluralist "ontology" is a positivist 
epistemology that has " led us to make a fetish of certain 
methodological approaches to our research and has blinded us to 
the right questions" (1986b: 217•) . He poses the question: "What 
are the characteristics of the positivist epistemology that has 
become so dominant ~mong researchers in library and information 
science?", and proposes the following set of answers: 
(a) "Library science is a genuine, albeit immature, natural 
science. It follows then that the methodological procedures 
of science are applicable to library science; that 
quantitative measurement and nume~ation are intrinsic to the 
scientific method; that complex phenomena can best be 
understood by reducing them to their essential elements and 
examining the ways in which they interact"; 
(b) "The library (broadly defined) must be viewed as a 
complex of facts governed by general laws. The discovery of 
these laws and theories is the principal project of 
research"; 
(c) "The relation of these laws and theories to practice is 
essentially instrumental. That is, once the laws are in 
place we will be able to explain, predict, and control -
produce a desired state of affairs by simply applying 
theoretical knowledge"; and 
(d) "The library scientist can, and should, maintain a 
strict 'value neutrality' in his work" (1986b: 219-20). 
While Harris demonstrates the limitations of positivist 
epistemology, he cautions against a return to the "old 
subjectivism" that prevailed in library science before the advent 
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of the GLS of the Unive~sity of Chicago. He decla~es that what 
is needed is" •.• an attempt to t~anscend the dialectic of defeat 
and move beyond positivism and subjectivism" (1986a: 522). 
In a ~eview of Ha~~is' pe~ceptions of the p~evailing 
epistemological f~amewo~k fo~ lib~a~y se~vice in the U.S. A. , 
Bergen accuses him of the fallacy of "Gnosticism" o~ solipsism in 
the sense that "he is privy to a T~uth about lib~a~y se~vice in 
the U.S. denied to those colleagues untuto~ed in his b~and of 
Hegelian, essentially idealist, Ma~xism" (1987: 71) . Acco~ding 
to Bergen, Ha~~is holds that positivist epistemology is uniquely 
adapted to add~ess "those questions of logistics and 
implementation, manage~ial and technical" and has the added 
advantage that it has "decla~ed itself apolitical and 
value-neut~al" (1987: 72) • Be~gen contends that Har~is does not 
prove that positivist epistemology cannot successfully be applied 
to ~the~ lib~a~y p~oblems such as political economy and culture 
(1987: 73). He also c~iticizes Ha~~is fo~ not indicating 
whethe~ his epistemology p~ecedes o~ issues f~om his ontology (cf 
Royce's t~eatment of this dilemma in psychology-5.19). Such a 
decision, fo~ Be~gen, is significant since he maintains that, 
"p~esuppositions about social ~eality, its plu~alistic and 
democ~atic cha~acte~ ... flow from choice of epistemology. 
Because the epistemology selected tends to sensitize an obse~ve~ 
to ce~tain aspects of the phenomenal world, it is mo~e 
fundamental than the wo~ld views, pe~spectives, and outlooks 
which ar-e at • II 1. ssue ... (1987: 73; cf 5.28.8 fo~ a fuller 
t~eatment of Be~gen). 
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I~~espective of such dismissive assaults Ha~~is' pe~spective 
nonetheless ~emains significant insofa~ as it p~ovides f~esh 
te~ms fo~ debate by displaying an uno~thodox viewpoint of one of 
the epistemological issues pe~taining to lib~a~y and info~mation 
science. 
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5.27 SCHRADER, A.M. (1944- ) 
Sch~ade~·s epistemological views a~e placed within the 
context of his mo~e cent~al conce~ns with the definitional 
adequacy of lib~a~y and info~mation science. He summa~izes the 
majo~ ~esea~ch focus of his docto~al disse~tation as follows: 
"It is ~udimenta~y theo~etical ~esea~ch into concept 
fo~mation fo~ the domain of lib~a~y and info~mation 
science with th~ee objectives: to b~ing togethe~ f~om 
the published lite~atu~e all the majo~ gene~ic 
definitions of the domain, to evaluate thei~ logical 
and conceptual adequacy, and to assist in p~omoting and 
in achieving enhanced consensus about what ought to be 
taken as the essence of the domain" (1984: 61). 
Sch~ade~·s docto~al disse~tation investigates the p~oblem of 
definition of lib~a~y and info~mation science and p~ovides'also, 
in ba~e outline, an epistemological position fo~ the discipline 
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(cf also 4.4.3). He claims that the definitions analysed in the 
thesis (more than 1 500), reveal no clear notion of what the user 
obtains "when interacting with the librarian/information 
consultant [is it] information, knowledge, recorded 
information, recorded knowledge, documents, information 
communication, records of intellectual activity, facts, ideas, 
messages, graphic records, signs and symbols or data?" (1984: 
65) • The "something" that the user obtains, according to 
Schrader, is "a selection from available reproduced symbolic 
culture" (1983: 356). "Symbolic culture" is central to 
Schrader's definition of library and information science, so that 
it is viewed as the study of the symbolic culture accessing 
system in which librarians guide users seeking access to symbolic 
culture. Schrader explains that " 'culture' encompasses ideas 
and values internalized by persons operating in their human 
groups, and the products of behaviour and action which take the 
forms of symbols and artifacts" (ibid.; cf 4.4.3 for an analysis 
of Schrader's notion of culture). It is the "representational 
dimension of human culture expressed as ideas and values in 
object form" that the user acquires (ibid.). This is called 
symbolic culture and it is preferred to such notions as 
"information", "knowledge", or "cognition". Schrader supports 
his preference for symbolic culture by noting that: 
"In the literatures of library and information 
the concepts of information, knowledge, 
data •.. and similar expressions are conflated 




However, not all human experience, not all culture, is 
manifested as symbolic culture; all human experience, 
all culture; encompasses more than 'symbolic culture'. 
Such notions as information, knowledge; or like 
expressions, when taken as synonymous with all human 
experience, suppress standards of rationality and 
judgment, whether in science, philosophy, art, or 
social practice. 'Facts' or 'data' taken as synonymous 
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with 'knowledge' rules out not only all non-scientific 
knowledge, but also all conceptual structures 
theories, methods, logic, and mathematics - in which 
scientific knowledge is grounded" (1983: 357). 
Schrader submits that symbolic culture contains both positive and 
negative components, and that it is an axiological problem for 
the library whether to preserve and make accessible negative 
manifestations of culture such as " ... opinion, perverse culture, 
misinformation, rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, slander, lies, 
superstition, scientific fraud, prejudice, hate literature, 
irrationality, insanity ... " (1983: 358). He adds, importantly, 
that the conceptualization of symbolic culture must be "1 arge 
enough to admit them as a theoretical possibility" (ibid.). 
Schrader reveals his own view as to what should be made 
available to the user. In this regard, ethical and 
epistemological views are merged in a well-defined stance. He 
.claims that, "from a philosophical point of view, total 
comprehensiveness is undesirable" because some cultural 
manifestations are intrinsically less valuable than others. 
"Ideas and values which meet truth criteria are the symbolic 
culture that ought to be made available. Transmission of 
knowledge is what is wanted .. " (1983: 361). Knowledge, 
according to Schrader, is a component of symbolic culture. The 
other component is opinion. He proclaims that: "Following 
Plato, symbolic culture can be sorted along the 'divided line' 
into knowledge taken as the ideal and opinion taken as imagery" 
(1983: 376). This may be illustrated as follows (Figure 4): 
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This view of knowledge is consistent with the rationalist 
epistemology of Plato (cf also 2.5). Ryle points out that, in 
Platonic epistemology, knbwing is an intellectual rather than a 
sensory process, but that, nevertheless, "thought and sense 
perception can and sometimes must cooperate if our mundane 
inquiries are to result in new knowledge" (1967: 327). It is 
---precisely --the orientation- ""towards new knowledge that Schrader 
considers as the chief characteristic of his ~se of the term 
"knowledge". In this way, he argues that: 
"Knowledge taken as emergent, as truth-seeking, is 
permanently conjectural, and self-enhancing; there is 
always more to understand, more to clarify •.• These 
considerations make the determination of what is to be 
counted as knowledge unpredictable and uncertain, to 
varying degrees" (1983: 377). 
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Schraqer declares that the application 
\ 
of the criterion of 
knowledge or truth-seeking as the way of ,selecting "system 
content" (materials) will, to a degree, determine the intrinsic 
worth of accessing systems. 
It is not clear whether Schrader's symbolic culture subsumes 
a number of disparate modes of knowing with related truth 
criteria. He merely divides symbolic culture into two large 
components, viz, knowledge and opinion (following Plato), and 
proceeds to recommend knowledge (truth-seeking) as a selection 
criterion that will ensure "library goodness". 
However, on the broader level of library and information 
science research, he does provide a more detailed ,epistemological 
description. According to Schrader, research in library and 
information science investigates problems of fairly diffe~ent 
kinds that require, concomitantly, different methods of inquiry. 
Different ways of knowing (epistemologies) underlie these methods 
of inquiry. He describes these "ways of knowing" as: 
(a) quantitative which 
and praxiological; 
(b) qualitative; and 
(c) performative. 
He characterizes these 
knowledge" as follows: 
includes scientific, philosophical 
"ways of inquiring or producing 
" ••• empirical analysis is used to produce scientific 
knowledge about the empirical properties of the 
symbolic culture accessing entities; conceptual 
analysis is used to produce philosophical knowledge 
about the inherently valuable properties of these 
entities; empirical and conceptual analysis is used to 
produce praxiological knowledge about the instrumental 
properties, or the means-end relations, of these 
299 
entities; pe~ceptual analysis is used to p~oduce 
qualitative knowledge about the unique qualities of 
these entities, and, t~ansactional analysis is used to 
p~oduce pe~fo~mative knowledge about symbolic cultu~e 
accessing system p~ocesses" (1983: 370). 
In Sch~ade~'s view ~esea~ch in lib~a~y and info~mation 
science ~equi~es diffe~ent epistemologies to investigate 
diffe~ent types of p~oblems. Rathe~ than advocating a single o~ 
absolute epistemological foundation, he acknowledges the equal 
validity of diffe~ent ways of knowing, o~, discove~ing, that 
should cha~acte~ize lib~a~y and info~mation science ~esea~ch. 
Sch~ade~ thus offe~s epistemological conside~ations on two 
levels, namely, a na~~ow focus (mic~o-level) on a single "unit" 
of lib~a~y and info~mation science p~actice, that is, ~ep~oduced 
symbolic cultu~e, and a b~oad focus (mac~o-level) on lib~a~y and 
info~mation science p~actice as a whole, that is, ~esea~ch. 
REFERENCES 
Ryle, G. (1967) "Plato" 






In: Encyclopedia of philosophy; edited 
Macmillan, vol. 6, pp. 314-333. 
Towa~d a theo~y of lib~a~y and 
(Unpublished disse~tation). Indiana 
Sch~ade~, A.M. (1984) 
info~mation science. 
vol. 9, pp. 59-77. 
In sea~ch of a definition of lib~a~y and 
Canadian jou~nal of info~mation science, 
5.28 MISCELLANEOUS SEMINAL POSITIONS 
Besides the exponents of diffe~ent theo~ies listed above, 
the~e a~e a numbe~ of w~ite~s (not all of whom a~e lib~a~ians o~ 
info~mation wo~ke~s) who have made p~ovisional, explo~ato~y 
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contributions to the proposition that library and information 
science is concerned with the transfer of 
\ 
knowledge. These 
include the following positions: 
5.28.1 St~ber and Schmidt argue that library practice 
proves that library science and epistemology should be linked 
because library ~cience should be seen as an integral part of the 
theory of knowledge (1983: 348-52). They contend that more 
research into the connections between the two will provide a 
deeper understanding of library history. 
5.28.2 In his book, The nature of knowledge: an 
introduction for librarians, Kemp offers a survey of the most 
significant features of knowledge (following _the Popperian 
model-cf 5.10) he believes that librarians ought to be acquainted 
with. Although .he does not provide a cogent argument for his. 
preference for the term knowledge to information, he avers 
unequivocally that, .in the choice between the two, "libraries are 
sources of knowledge rather· than information'' (1976: 12) . 
Moreover, librarians should concern themselves with the study of 
knowledge because libraries and information centres not only 
collect knowledge contained in documents, but they "strive to 
facilitate its communication. For this reason, the librarian or 
information scientist must know something of communication ... of 
the creation and use of knowledge" (1976: 12) • 
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as a possible foundation for a philosophy of librarianship. They 
document the surrender of the claim by the natural sciences to 
yield absolute, or objective truth (1978: 50; cf 7.3). They 
locate their epistemological position in what they refer to as 
"story systems". They postulate that story systems are: 
"organizations of information constructs that describe, 
explain, and partly constitute the world of lived 
experience. The story system of a culture is 
co-extensive with all that is known, with all that a 
culture recognizes as knowledge or opinion... A 
culture's story system contains its inventory of 
reality" (1978: 16). 
Accordingly, they claim that story systems are central in the 
creation by human beings of real worlds adapted tQ themselves 
alterable and communicable worlds that are transmitted in a 
1 traditional linguistic code (ibid.). 
5.28.6 This idea of the social construction of reality also 
features prominently in Mukhopadhyay's essay on the foundations 
of informatics and the theory of reference (1984: 20). In 
Taranto's proposal on the epistemological foundations of 
information theory the related idea that reality cannot be 
apprehended directly is expressed as follows: 
"cognitive reference to an object has to be mediated by 
some means, which will say that a particular object •.. 
is never free of interpretation ... This is where 
traditional epistemology cannot serve as analytical 
. too 1" ( 1985: 292) . 
5.28.7 The notion of "mediation", mentioned in the 
quotation above, is acknowledged in the context of libraries by 
Engle who contends that through the II medium of physical 
symbols, the metaphysical entities, such as ideas and 
information, are evoked and communicated ... II (1986: 31.). In 
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p~elite~ate/o~al societies whe~e the~e is an immediate p~esence 
of both speake~ and listene~, the mediation of physical symbols 
is unnecessa~y. Howeve~, lite~ate society sepa~ates the text 
f~om its inte~p~etation, and the mediation of ideas th~ough the 
physical symbols lead to alte~ed conceptions of mind and ~eality 
(cf conceptions of un~eco~ded knowledge-5.28.11.2 & 6.24). 
5.28.8 The ~ecognition of the inte~dependence of the 
physical and the metaphysical in the knowledge-t~ansmitting 
p~ocess, constitutes, fo~. Be~qen, the essential foundation fo~ a 
successfu 1 theo~y of l'ib~a~ ianshi p, which, he asse~ts, p~omotes 
the dialectical inte~play of ideas and matte~ (1986: 399). He 
states that "the metaphysicians of 1 ib~a~ianship a~e· w~ong in 
believing that one can be devoted to fo~m in ou~ discipline 
without ~efe~ence to content" (emphasis added; 1986: 399). Mo~e 
than twenty yea~s ea~lie~, Be~gen suggested that an unde~standing 
of the physical aspects of lib~a~y ope~ation should be 
accompanied by equal insight into socio-psychological foundations 
of lib~a~ianship (1963b: 479). 
In his ~eview of Ha~~is (cf 5.26), Be~gen advocates the 
application of many epistemologies fo~ lib~a~ianship because each 
one enables us to note diffe~ent things about the social wo~ld. 
He claims, in his discussion of the p~os and cons of the Hegelian 
Ma~xist and positivist epistemologies, that, "Bette~ an ana~chic 
hospitality to all wo~ld views than to assign canonical status to 
eithe~" (1987: 74) . In suppo~t of the p~oposition that no 




" we should use ever-ything at hand, poetic 
intuition, Thomistic metaphysics, symbolic 
inter-actionism, as well as plur-alism-positivism and 
Hegelian Mar-xism. It would not hur-t us to r-elax and be 
mor-e neutr-al, even anar-chic, with r-espect to differ-ent 
ways of obtaining knowledge" (1987: 75). 
By r-ecognizing the validity and equal impor-tance of several 
appr-oaches, libr-ar-ians, in Bergen's view, str-ive to become 
scholar-s in the classical sense (1963a). 
5.28.9 Ar-guing that ther-e is a need for- libr-ar-ians to br-eak 
fr-ee fr-om functionalist (ie, "logical empir-icist") 
or-ientation in libr-ar-y and infor-mation science r-esear-ch, Olaisen 
expr-esses views consonant with the tr-ansdogmatic thr-ust of 
Ber-gen's position. He contends that we should r-ecognize that 
par-adigms and metaphor-s can pr-ovide only par-tial and incomplete 
tr-uths .and that, ther-efor-e, we should espouse a "paradigmatic 
toler-ance" which enables a mor-e effective means of investigating 
the II totality of types of infor-mation needs, information 
r-esources, and infor-mation tr-ansfer- mechanisms" (author-'s 
emphasis; 1985: 147). In this way, the recognition of the 
validity of sever-al ways for- obtaining knowledge is assur-ed. 
5.28.10 Similar- themes char-acter-ize Kesting's theor-etical 
wr-itings. Ber-gen's "anar-chic hospitality to all wor-ld views" and 
Olaisen's refer-ences to "par-adigmatic toler-ance" and "totality" 
ar-e consonant with Kesting's centr-al ideas of "or-ganic wholeness" 
and "supr-adoctr-inalism" as necessar-y featur-es of human knowledge. 
A cur-sor-y analysis of thematic concepts and ter-ms that 
distinguish his theor-etical views r-eveals a consistent attempt to 




the role of libraries in the transfer of 
For example,- the terms "universality", 
"interdisciplinary", "cross-disciplinary", "total context" (1969: 
60-1) ' "organic who 1 eness", "total human culture", 
"indivisibility" (1973b: 
"undivided universe" (1977: 
101, 
163, 
103, 106), "holistic view", 
165), and "geheelmens" (ie, 
total person) (1973a) all sugge~t the theme of wholeness, and 
holism as a systematic philosophical outlook (cf 7.1.1; 7.6 & 7.7 
for fuller discussions of this approach). 
This dominant theme that defines Kesting's theoretical 
position emanates from his fundamental conviction that" ... 
reality 
(1973b: 
in its ultimate essence is synonymous with wholeness" 
103; cf a 1 so 6. 3) . Consequently, he views library 
science as an inclusive discipline, ie, it encompasses "the 
universal coverage of 





implicitly as the disciplinary domain of information science) 
(1969: 59) . For this reason, library science, by virtue of its 
undisputed historically-defined quality of universality, is able 
to incorporate information science. Conversely, the narrower 
focus of information science at the same time precludes an 
accommodation of the broader scope of library science (1969: 
79) . This narrower focus manifesting itself in an emphasis on 
II specificity, speed and exhaustiveness in providing 
specialist information ... ", is viewed as an" ... offspring of the 
traditional function of information as performed by the 
~06 
conventional lib~a~y down the yea~s ... ", but which has been 
inhibited in its g~owth by p~actical limitations such as the lack 
of basic equipment and skilled manpowe~ (ibid.). 
Anothe~ application of the notion of wholeness is found in 
his p~oposition that human knowledge is o~ganically indivisible. 
His views on knowledge a~e insepa~able f~om those conce~ning 
lib~a~y and info~mation science because he makes a plea fo~ a 
science committed to dealing with all the phenomena of an 
undivided unive~se and which p~esupposes the o~ganic wholeness of 
human knowledge as ~eflected in the co~po~ate holdings of 
lib~a~ies (1977: 165). This pe~ception of the o~ganic wholeness 
of human knowledge p~oposes a fusion of the "speculative" and 
"exact" poles of knowledge (as set fo~th in Snow's two-cultu~es 
metapho~", which cha~acte~izes one conception of the opposite 
poles of human cultu~e) and an attempt to encompass the seve~al 
modes of knowing that has p~olife~ated since the II onset of 
~ationalism in the 16th centu~y" (which manifest themselves as 
"specialized b~anches fo~me~ly contained in a compa~atively 
limited ~ange of disciplines") (1973b: 103; 1985b: 381). This 
fusion and encompassment ~eally imply the ~ecognition of the 
connections (inte~disciplina~y and c~oss-disciplina~y) among (and 
between) the "ha~d" sciences and the "soft" o~ "speculative" 
sciences (1973b: 106). He suggests the mould of a ~eceptacle, 
an inve~ted cone, as a metapho~ to delineate the essence of this 
pe~ception of human knowledge. The lowe~ end of the cone is the 
"p~ope~ domain" of the "exact" end of the knowledge spect~um. 
Ve~tical lines of connection between diffe~ent disciplines extend 
f~om the "exact" base of the cone to its oute~ ~eaches whe~e it 
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intersects with the 
vertical interactions, 
"speculative" sciences. 
there are also horizontal 
In addition to 
interactions 
that manifest themselves as hybrid disciplines such as 
biochemistry and physical chemistry (ibid.). 
Kesting has more recently adapted the classical Jungian 
model of the cardinal functions of consciousness or 
"psychological orientations to reality" (cf 7.4 for an 
explanation of Jung's schema) to represent his conception of the 
structure of human knowledge in the context of library and 
information science. This structure is illustrated in Figure 5 
(cf also Figure 13 for a further adaptation of Kesting's model 
and Figure 15 for ·its inclusion in a proposed·epistemological 
position for library and information science). According to 
Jaffe the four functions of consciousness described by Jung -
thought, feeling, intuition and sensation - equip man to deal 
with the impressions of the world he receives from within and 
without (1964: 267). The necessary integration of these four 
functions that man (both individually and collectively) has to 
achieve reflects the wholeness of the human psyche, of which the 
consciousness is as much a part as the unconscious (ibid.: 268). 
Although Kesting considers his adaptation of Jung's classical 
schema as provisional and still embryonic, it reflects a useful 
attempt at postulating the major modes of knowing that need to be 
acknowledged in the context of the dynamic complex of functions 
of librarianship as a professional discipline. Kesting's model 
also reflects the influence of the ideas of another pioneer in 
identifying epistemological positions in professional groups, viz 
that of Royce (cf Figures 1 & 3). 
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The Objective World 
The Subjective World 
Human modes of knowing: an adaptation of Jung"s ~~hema of the 
·functions of human consciousness (Psychological types (1921], 1971) 
- J G Kesting, unpublished notes, 1991 
This ho~istic view of human knowledge, which emphasizes its 
essential unity and interrelatedness, also proposes the "innate 
complementarity" and interconnectedness of all approaches to the 
ways of knowing and the absence of the dominance of one approach 
over another. This perception forms the basis for a professional 
view that is characterized by Kesting as "supradoctrinalism" and 
which illuminates the epistemological and ethical dimensions of 
library and information science (cf in this respect the 
perspectivism of De Vleeschauwer-5.3, and Coetzee-5.7). As a 
professional ethos for library and information science, 
supradoctrinalism espouses an active neutrality insofar as it 
"encompasses all legitimate doctrines" in the attempt to 
accumulate "all the genera and species of recorded human thought" 
(1985a: 170-171). In an attempt to reconcile supradoctrinalism 
with his holistic outlook of reality, Kesting argues that: 
"Only supradoctrinalism enables man to encompass the 
multidimensional faces of ultimate reality: the 
[juxtaposed] opposites, the eternal flux of change. In 
this sense, Neo-Marxism is as real and valid as Liberal 
humanism or Traditionalism" (1985a: 170; cf also the 
view of Heraclitus-7.1 and that of Bergen-5.28.8). 
The multiplicity of epistemological approaches (which often exist 
as polarized or contrasting approaches to reality) that 
supradoctrinalism accommodates is patently evident, for example, 
in the many schools of thought identified in any major 
encyclopaedia of philosophy. This rich variety of paths to 
knowledge highlights the wide range of choices available to the 
individual on the one hand and the necessity of selecting and 
applying a given epistemological position through which reality 
may be organized on the other. 
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Through supradoctrinalism, Kesting not only establishes a 
basis for the delineation of the essential foundation for an 
ethical position for librarians and information scientists, but 
he also offers a serviceable insight regarding the fundamental 
characteristics that an epistemological position for library and 
information science should have. 
5.28.11 While many of the exponents discussed thus far in 
Chapter 5 emphasize in their writings the perception of knowledge 
in recorded form as the major source for a consideration of 
epistemological issues of library and information science, there 
are a few who acknowledge the coexistence of knowledge in 
recorded and unrecorded form. Examples of such positions 
include, inter alia, Coetzee's reference to the "subjective mode 
of the record of learning" (in the minds of men and women) ( c f 
5. 7) ' Brookes' "subjective knowledge structures" (cf 5.10) and 
Kochen's mention of "knowledge in the individual's mind" (cf 
5.18). However, it should be noted that no systematic discussion 
of the significance of the personal, private or subjective aspect 
of unrecorded human knowledge emerges from their writings. 
/ 
From the point of view of the focus of this study, recorded 
human knowledge and unrecorded human knowledge are considere~ to 
' be of equal importance for an investigation into the 
epistemological aspects of library and information science, 
insofar as the library user (human knower) ipso facto 
appropriates the content of library material (recorded human 
knowledge) to attain and/or augment personal knowledge which does 
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not necessarily become recorded. This mental process presumes an 
organic link/fusion of the two states of human knowledge. This 
link is evident at the level (1) of the resear~h scholar, and (2) 
of the ordinary person ·in preliterate and literate cultures. 
5.28.11.1 The invisible college 
At the level of the research scholar the informal 
communication of personal knowledge in research communities (ie, 
between individual researchers) is referred to as "invisible 
colleges". This phrase was coined by De Bolla Price in the early 
1960's. (Incidentally, Kochen, for one, considers De Bolla Price 
to be one of the greatest pioneers of information science and its 
greatest intellectual leader (1984: 147-8)). The phenomenon of 
"invisible colleges" should be viewed against the background of 
De Bolla Price's analysis of the natural sciences. In contrast 
to Kuhn's "paradigm" analysis of the natural sciences (cf 7) De 
Bolla Price's analysis is based upon his attempt to describe the 
structure of science "in terms of aggregates of people, monies, 
and results" in which such notions as " ... elites of persons, 
institutions, and nations" clearly emerge (Griffi.th, 1980: 56) . 
The notions of "elite" and "invisible colleges" are inseparable. 
Members of an "invisible college" are an "elite" of highly 
productive researchers in a given field of specialised knowledge. 
De Bolla Price contends that "invisible colleges" are" ... thrown 
up automatically by the scientific community", and consists of 
II the hierarchical elite resulting from an expectable 
inequality, and numbering about the square root of the total 
population of people in that area of research front" (1971: 75) • 
This small group of highly productive researchers are closely 
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connected by an "infor-mation flow" that is mor-e dir-ect and quick 
than the for-mal means of communication. He states that the " ••. 
whole r-aison d ·~tr-e of these gr-oups was to substitute per-sonal 
contact for- for-mal communications" (1966: 843). 
The featur-es of infor-mal communication and per-sonal contact 
in "invisible colleges" pr-esuppose the existence of a liter-ate 
tr-adition, or-, human knowledge in r-ecor-ded for-m. This is evident 
fr-om sever-al obser-vations. Fir-st, the cumulative natur-e of the 
gr-owth of scientific knowledge oper-ates on the pr-inciple that new 
ideas, theor-ies, etc, which ar-e communicated per-sonally in 
"invisible colleges" der-ive fr-om those alr-eady documented in the 
liter-atur-e of a given scientific discipline. Second, one of the 
pur-poses of the "invisible college" is to supply a means of quick 
access (bypassing the conventional, for-mal and time-consuming 
pr-ocedur-es of scientific publication) to r-elevant 
colleagues with the ultimate goal of publication, 
ideas of 
.since the 
in par-t, measur-ed by the quality, statur-e of a scientist is, 
amount and cur-r-ency of his actual peer--r-eviewed publications. 
Thir-d, many of the actual media of infor-mal communication ar-e 
pr-int-based, eg, pr-e-pr-ints, confer-ence r-epor-ts, dr-aft copies, 
etc. De Solla Pr-ice himself could only explor-e this phenomenon 
thr-ough the medium of r-ecor-ded knowledge as distinct fr-om an 
"invisible college of invisible colleges". At the level of the 
r-esear-ch scholar-, then, the link between r-ecor-ded human knowledge 
and unr-ecor-ded human knowledge is fir-mly in place. 
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5.2~.11.2 The dynamics of oral communication in preliterate 
or semi-literate cultures 
At the level of the ordinary person the argument turns on 
the questionable value of literacy as a measure of cultural 
progress, ie, should the ability to access recorded knowledge be 
viewed as a necessary advancement from a reliance on 
knowledge that is not recorded, ie, human memory. 
personal 
5.28.11.2.1 Coomaraswamy calls in question the belief that 
literacy should be held up as an absolute standard " •.. by which 
to measure the cultures of unlettered peoples" (1979: 45-6). 
In oral cultures it is personal knowledge that is considered 
to be ·of greater significance. From the Indian point of view, 
for example, II a man can only be said to know what he knows by 
heart; what he must go to a book to be reminded of, he merely 
knows of'' (Coomaraswamy, .1979: 41). Literacy, which is assumed 
in the matter of access to recorded knowledge, is not to be seen 
as the line that demarcates "culture" from backwardness and 
ignorance, according to Coomaraswamy. He provides a cogent 
argument for the proposition that while literacy may be a 
necessity of modern industrial societies, there is no necessary 
connection of literacy with culture, and " that to impose our 
1 i teracy .•. upon a cultured but illiterate people is to destroy 
their culture in the name of our own" (1979: 35) . 
From the point of view of the focus of this study it is not 
so much the issue of superiority or inferiority of either the 
literate or the preliterate (oral) tradition that is considered 
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to be a significant one. What is crucial is the need to view the 
two as complementing each other to form a whole so that 
unrecorded knowledge and recorded knowledge, ie, oral and 
literate traditions const~tute, in essence, a dynamic unity. In 
support of this, Coomaraswamy points out that" ... the whole 
class of prophetic literature that includes the Bible, the Vedas, 
the Edda, the great epics, and, in general the world's 'best 
books' ... existed long before they were written down" (1979: 
35) • Furthermore, since their transmission was oral, there was 
no notion that a written copy of any df the great religious works 
was a sacred object by itself. Satgoor, for example, points out 
that it was the sound of Veda in itself that was considered to be 
sacred and potent and that great emphasis was placed on the 
correct pronunciations and recitations of the texts (1990). 
5.28.11.2.2 The idea of mutual complementarity as distinct 
from a superiority differential is relevant also to the issue of 
epistemological differences that are present in the oral and 
literate traditions. In his investigation of communication 
patterns in traditional West African societies, the librarian, 
Benge, notes the epistemological character of the personal 
knowledge of so-called non-literate persons. He claims that 
types of linear thinking are foreign to them and that they do not 
think in terms of cause and effect (1972: 78). Benge documents 
the observation by de Sola Pool (a distant relation of de Solla 
Price) that Western logic which has been dominated by the law of 




been accepted in classical Indian logic where statements can 
simultaneously be true and false (ibid.). Benge notes in this 
regard: 
It 
"In the Western tradition 'truth' is valid in itself 
and independent of who says it, but in Brahminical 
philosophy this is not so and facts must be validated 
by an in-group authority. Therefore the spoken word is 
more trustworthy than a written source, and a statement 
is valid in a traditional society if it comes from the 
right oracle. In such societies the social function of 
a communication is more important than its truth value" 
( 1972: 79) . 
is the social dimension that predominates in 
epistemological aspects of the oral tradition, and the emphasis 
is on personal relations, ie, personal knowledge. Benge makes 
the poignant observation that literate and oral traditions may 
co-exist as a fertile combination that influences communication 
in tracli tiona l societies in a mutually regenerative way (1972: 
77) . 
The interpenetration of these traditions manifest themselves 
also in modern societies in a discussion surrounding the 
epistemological status of fiction as a broad category of recorded 
human knowledge (cf also 8.5.3.1.1 for a related discussion). 
The connections are evident in an analysis of the historical 
development surrounding the transference of elements of myth and 
allegory in the oral tradition to the earliest forms of 
literature such as epics, legends and fairy tales. Myth occurs 
in the history of all human traditions and communities and is a 
basic constituent of human culture (Smith, 1986: 710). No 
matter how completely different they may be from the ordinary 
world, myths present themselves as authoritative accounts 
(ibid.). Myths in ancient civilization are known by virtue of 
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the fact that they became part of a written tradition. In the 
case of Greece, according to Smith, II virtually all myths are 
'literature: in the form in which they survived, the oldest 
source being the epics of Homer" (ibid.: 715). These myths are 
reinterpreted and passed down from one generation to the next 
through allegorical understanding. Allegory contributes to 
bringing order to mythological interpretation. As every culture 
embodies its basic assumptions in stories whose mythic structures 
reflect the society's prevailing attitudes toward life, allegory 
arouses in the reader or listener a response to different levels 
of meaning (Fadiman, 1986: 110-111). This raises the issue of 
interpretation which is a critical aspect.in the consideration of 
fiction as a valid representation of reality (This is discussed 
in greater detail in 8.5.3.1.1). 
Thus, at the levels of both the research scholar and the 
ordinary "unlettered" person there are claims relating to the 
necessary interdependence and equal value of unrecorded knowledge 
and recorded knowledge, and to the dynamic relationships that 
fuse them into states of cognitive unity which have a fundamental 
bearing on the knowledge-transmitting modes of 
librarianship and information science. 
5.29 Summary 
This chapter has 








concerned with, to a lesser or greater degree, the transfer of 
knowledge role of libraries. It has been necessary to be 
selective in the treatment of the ideas of the several writers in 
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o~de~ to concent~ate ou~ thoughts on the pu~pose of this study 
which is to explicate the cent~al elements fo~ establishing a 
p~oposed epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation 
science. A c~itique in the fo~m of typologies of these 
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6 Critique of the contributions 
Preamble 
The critique presented in this chapter is not directed at 
the individual contributions nor at the individual contributors 
listed in Chapter 5. 
collective body of 
Rather, it sets forth an evaluation of the 
thought on epistemological orientations and 
issues relevant to establishing an epistemological position for 
library and information science, as it is provided in that 
chapter. Hence the analysis offered here refers to a corpus of 
thought as a whole as distinct from a position or concern 
articulated by any·individual contributor. However, with a view 
to attaining certain general insights, it has nonetheless been 
necessary to make critical 







cross-references are supplied in order to 
and perceptions. 
identify given views 
The critique here assumes the form of analytical typologies 
insofar as the predominant views of the contributors from Chapter 
5 are arranged according to selected categories that represent 
the issues considered to be important for this study. 
Nonetheless, no specific contribution has been evaluated from a 
given vantage position on the part of the researcher~ since the 
fundamental purpose of the typology is rather to identify the 
main strands of diversity that typify Chapter 5. The critique 
the different aims essentially at describing and highlighting 
viewpoints relating to those aspects considered to be fundamental 
to establishing an epistemological position for library and 
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information science. A lack of uniformity of viewpoint 
qualitatively and quantitatively characterizes the 
contributions throughout Chapter 5. The critique in this chapter 
is intended to systematize this absence of uniformity, and make 
The mode of the diversity more readily apparent to the reader. 
approach inherent in analytical typology has been 
useful for this purpose. 
found to be 
To an important extent the categories of viewpoint 
underlying the typologies suggest themselves in the writings of 
the contributors selected. This has eliminated the need to 
impose a preconceived structure on the several viewpoints since 
they are collocated and separated in accordance with their 
dominant characteristics. The unavoidable difficulty of this 
approach, however, is that the resultant categories are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive as may be required by the rules of 
any unequivocally dichotomous classification. 
The presentation of the subjective views of individual 
theorists is not well served by a classification based on the 
rigours of traditional logic. There is support for this notion 
in the literature regarding the application of typological 
methods in the natural and the social sciences. 
Hempe 1, for example, whose views on this matter are 
significantly authoritative since they are consensus-supported, 
contends that "systematic fruitfulness" should be the overriding 
consideration in arriving at workable models of type. He argues 
that "The characteristics which serve to ... define the different 
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types should not me~ely p~ovide neat pigeonholes to accommodate 
all the individual cases in the domain of inqui~y, but should 
lend themselves to sound gene~alization ... " (1970: 156-7). 
Following Hempel, the catego~ies of the typology p~esented 
he~e a~e patently not wate~-tight pigeonholes. In an application 
of the p~inciple of "systematic f~uitfulness", the categories 
a~e, as fa~ as possible, d~~ived f~om the actual viewpoints of 
the cont~ibuto~s as distinct f~om being imposed in a delibe~ate 
o~ p~econceived manne~. Fo~ this ~eason, the positions of 
individual cont~ibuto~s may justifiably be placed in mo~e than 
one catego~y in given cases. Howeve~, the attempt by the 
~esea~che~ to categorize an individual's position acco~ding to a 
p~edominant viewpoint only once has p~ecluded the possibility 
that the exponent featu~es in a given juxtaposition of va~iant 
catego~ies. 
It should also be noted that two facto~s eme~ging f~om an 
analysis of chapte~ five have complicated the task of attempting 
to p~esent a definitive c~itique: 




natu~e of the 
lib~a~y and information 
science and the ~esultant un~esolved debate of the 
~elationship between lib~a~y science and info~mation science 
has led to a dive~sity of ambivalent, speculative and even 
obscu~e claims (cf 6.1). With ~ega~d to the fo~me~, an 
exponent's pe~ception, fo~ example, of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science as essentially an a~t, a natu~al science 
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o~ a social science, would appea~ to influence di~ectly his 
.p~edisposition towa~ds an app~op~iate epistemology. With 
~ega~d to the latte~, the ~elationship between lib~a~y 
science and info~mation science is discussed in 4.4.2 as an 
issue ~elated to the definition of lib~a~y and info~mation' 
science. (The c~itique classifies the seve~al exponents 
acco~ding to thei~ views of this ~elationship). 
(b) Second, 
issues in 
it ls unclea~ as to whethe~ epistemological 
lib~a~y· and info~mation science a~e of a p~ima~y 
o~ seconda~y (ie, de~ivative) natu~e which poses the 
question: should epistemology p~ecede ontology o~ should 
ontology p~ecede epistemology? Cont~asting views in this 
~espect have been expounded by W~ight and Be~gen. Fo~ 
W~ight, ontological assumptions a~e of p~ima~y impo~tance 
(cf 5.19). Be~gen, on the othe~ hand, maintains that 
epistemology is mo~e fundamental (cf 5.26. fo~ his view ·in 
the, context of Ha~~is' cont~ibution). The position adopted 
in-this study is that since no single app~oach to ~eality 
no~ any single mode of knowing can ·claim to be the onl~ 
valid one, it ·follows that it is not necessa~y to be fo~ced 
into a choice of the p~ecedence of epistemology o~ ontology. 
On the cont~a~y, ce~tain epistemological app~oaches 
sensitize one to ce~tain ~ealities in a mo~e helpful way 
than othe~s and the~efo~e all app~oaches should be 
~ecognized fo~ thei~ advantages as well as limitations (cf 




development in library and information science in the Republic of 
South Africa, confirms the absence of sufficient interest in the 
theoretical definition of library science and information science 
and in the demarcation of these fields of study. Consequently, 
they argue, this impasse has led to several theoretical 
difficulties for library and information science such as, for 
example, an identity crisis, a diversity of opinions regarding 
the central goal and dynamics of professional education, an 
inadequate balance between theory and practice, uncertainty 
regarding its relationship with the social environment, and so on 
(1988: 1-5) . 
The ambivalent 
conjunction/disjunction of 








status of library science or information science, 
the scientific 
complicate the 
formulation of an appropriate epistemological position for 
library and information science. It is especially the unresolved 
identity of information science and the nature of its specific 
relationship with library science that confuses the issue. The 
contributions reveal widely divergent perceptions of the issue 
(See Figure 6). 
6.1.1 Information science as part of library science 
In this view the information-disseminating function, of 
which information science is perceived as a logical institutional 
development, is considered to be one of the traditional functions 
of libraries (cf for example 5.28.10; Kesting, 1969: 60; Malan, 
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SCHRADER, A. M. - 5.27 
. .. 
NO ·WELL-DEFINED VIEW (cf 6.1.6) 
BUTLER, P - 5.1 
RANGANATHAN, S.R. · - 5.2 
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McGARRY, K.J. - 5.23 
HARRIS, M.H; - 5.26 
MISCELLANEOUS GROUP - 5.28 
1969: 159) . Info~mation science is pe~ceived as being g~afted 
on to lib~a~y science and capable of imp~oving ce~tain a~eas of 
lib~a~y science. This is the view of She~a: 
"Info~mation science can p~ovide the lib~a~ian with 
some impo~tant and useful tools to expedite lib~a~y 
se~vices, but the ability to communicate a message with 
inc~edible speed ove~ long distances th~ough the use of 
glass fibe~ bundles o~ lase~ beams o~ to sto~e vast 
quantities of ~eco~ded knowledge in compute~like 
mechanisms does not in any way alte~ the pu~pose of the 
lib~a~y" (1983: 387). 
Simila~ly, W~ight views lib~a~ianship as the mo~e 
encompassing field. He decla~es of lib~a~ianship, "I •.. see it, 
not as a subcultu~e of info~mation science, but as a la~ge~ 
discipline which includes info~mation science ... Info~mation 
science can help lib~a~ianship with its communicative tooling; 
but that's all it can do ... " (1983: 17; cf 5.19). 
The opposing view, that lib~a~y science is pa~t of 
info~mation science, is p~esented below. 
6.1.2 Lib~a~y science as pa~t of info~mation science 
Cent~al to this view is the conviction that lib~a~ies a~e 
not the only institutions that deal with info~mation and that 
lib~a~y ·science is not the only science studying info~mation (cf 
4.4.2.3). Lib~a~y science is pe~ceived as constituting a pa~t of 
info~mation science which is itself a metascience consisting of a 
numbe~ of integ~ated disciplines. 
Although Wilson states that the distinctions between lib~a~y 
science and info~mation science have become blu~~ed, he does 
point.out that: 
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11 library scientists, if there are any, might also 
claim to be information scientists; library science 
would be the name of the species, information science 
the name of the genus 11 ( 1983: 394) . 
The only other major exponent who may be listed in this 
category is Machlup who considers library science as a sub-field 
of information science the l'atter conceived in its broadest 
sense (cf 4.4.1.2 & 5.4). In this regard, information science is 
regarded as connoting the systematic study of information as 
content and as process and may embrace all or any combination of 
several academic disciplines (1983: 18) . However, it should be 
pointed out that Machlup and Mansfield have detected at least 
three other uses of the term information science, one of which is 
adjoined to library science. It would appear that the claim of 
this viewpoint should be seen in the light of (for them) the 
still unresolved identity of information science. 
6.1.3 Library science and information science are identical 
In this view library science and information science are 
regarded as sharing the same goals and functions (Meijer et al, 
1988: 78) . Moreover, they are considered to form a single, 
unified discipline (Barko, 1984: 185). Meijer provides a strong 
argument for the adoption of the notion of the common identity of 
the two fields by demonstrating that in practice both libraries 
and information centres provide access to the content of recorded 
knowledge irrespective of physical format (cf Meijer's complex of 
major functions of library and information science-5.21, and the 
view that advocates the identity of library· science and 
information science, 4.4.2.2). 
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Sch~ade~·s in-depth analysis of the definitions of lib~a~y 
science and info~mation science culminates in the view that the 
two fields of study sha~e the same conceptual domain, and a~e 
hence identical. 
6.1.4 Lib~a~y science and info~mation science as sepa~ate 
entities 
This pe~ception holds that the~e a~e no ~eal connections 
between lib~a~y science and info~mation science and that they a~e 
independent and self-sufficient fields of study with dispa~ate 
p~actical applications (cf 4.4.2.4). 
I 
Kochen obse~ves an ove~t distinction between lib~a~y science 
I 
and info~mation science: 
"To suggest that the p~ima~y focus of info~mation 
science should be lib~a~y and info~mation wo~k is 
stifling and unp~oductively ~est~ictive" (1983: 372); 
and he ~efe~s to: 
" the confusion gene~ated by supe~ficial 
inte~p~etations of 'info~mation science and 
documentation' in its popula~ sense with ~efe~ence to 
such institutions as lib~a~ies o~ media cente~s" (ibid: 
375). 
Having o~iginally distinguished info~mation science f~om 
lib~a~y science on the g~ounds that the fo~me~ is a science 
(theo~y) and the latte~ a p~ofession (p~actice), Sa~acevic late~ 
p~oposes a complete sepa~ation of info~mation science and 
lib~a~y science (cf 5.20). sa~acevic cites in suppo~t of this 
sepa~ation the inc~ease of "info~mation science knowledge and 
know-how", the g~owth of unique info~mation ma~ket places and 
socia.l p~essu~es caused by unp~edictable changes and effects of 
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information technologies (1982: 32) • He argues that this 
separation could ensure 
schools. 
the survival of traditional library 
Farradane's writings on the nature of information science 
lead to the conclusion that it has no affinities with 
librarianship and that it. is a discipline in its own right (1960: 
191; cf 5.9). He regards the development of information science 
as the resultant specialization of the research and development 
worker's approach to satisfy his/her own information needs and to 
provide access to relevant sources of information. In similar 
fashion, Zaaiman views information science as a development that 
emerged from the needs of natural scientists to satisfy their 
information needs and to systematize their literature in order to 
maximize access·to its intellectual content in a way that library 
science has 
mechanisms). 
failed to do (eg, through heuristic retrieval 
Furthermore, the scientist is unable to receive 
much help from a librarian who is not a specialist in a given 
field of inquiry in the natural sciences and technology. Zaaiman 
characterizes the research that was undertaken to explore the 
problems of investigating alternative information systems of 
effective communication of information to natural scientists as 
information science (1969: 128; cf 5.15). This research offers 
library science the opportunity of developing its scientific 
basis, according to Zaaiman (1969: 130). 
Also viewing information science (as informatics) as 
primarily serving the information needs of natural scientists, 
Mikhailov locates its origin with the division of labour in the 
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scientific community (cf 5.8). This division of labour came 
about when the number of scientists and scientific organizations 
became very large and the problem of communication among 
scientists and organizations became basic to the survival and 
development of science. Informatics is seen by Mikhailov as a 
natural development from bibliography and library science, with a 
narrower focus on the communication of scientific information 
(1969: 21) • He regards library science as a "pedagogical 
discipline" to distinguish it from informatics but, regrettably,· 
fails to explain the meaning of his usage of this appellation 
(ibid.). 
Brookes was already working in the methodological areas of 
information science before the term was invented (Shaw, 1990: 3· 
' 
cf 5.10). His knowledge of statistics, his interest in the 
philosophy of science and his work on the presentation and 
communication of scientific and technical literature determined 
the nature and direction of his contributions to the development 
of information science (ibid.). Although he originally sought to 
reconcile library science and information science, he eventually 
distinguished information science from library science, the 
former constituting a discipline with ... its own territory, its own 
unique problems and its own unique view of human affairs which 
now has to develop its own principles and techniques " (1973: 
245; 1980: 128). 
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6.1. 5 Info~mation science and library science as parts of a 
larger whole 
This view differs from the proposition that information 
science and library science are identical (cf 6.1.3). According 
to this view, library science and information science are smaller 
parts of an encompassing whole that serves larger purposes. 
However, it is not unequivocally clear what the specific 
relationships between library science and information science 
within this whole are. 
For Debons this whole is described as the "knowledge 
environment": 
" an environment that deals essentially with the 
total domain of recorded experiences and the means for 
using these experiences towards human development and 
survival. The information system is the technological 
component, the library the institutional component 
(each being part of the whole) of a complete system for 
human service" (1985: 67; cf 5.11). 
From a more theoretical vantage point, and quite apart from 
the unspecified practical benefits of library science and 
information science in service of mankind, Nitecki also holds 
that library science and information science are subspecies of a 
whole, termed "metalibrarianship" (cf 5.14). Metalibrarianship 
is defined as a theoretical discipline which studies the 
, relationships between the "generic book", knowledge and readers 
/users (1983: 406). Its broad practical applications are to 
acquire, organize and preserve knowledge resources; to provide 
unrestricted access to these resources and to assist users in the 
proper use of bibliographic tools (ibid.; cf also 5.21- Meijer's 
complex of functions of library and information science). 
331 
Rejecting a "two-cultur-es" metaphor- in which libr-ar-y science 
and information science ar-e diametr-ically opposed to each other-, 
Bekker- pr-oposes r-ather- that the two together-, while not being 
identical, for-m a unity pr-imar-ily committed to the lar-ger- role of 
the communication of infor-mation (cf 5.24; 1987: 20). 
This so-called whole, of which libr-ar-y science and 
infor-mation science shar-e equal or- unequal par-ts, 
for-mulated unequivocally by its pr-oponents. Also, it 
clear- whether- the differ-ent per-ceptions of this whole, 





r-econciled. For- example, Debons r-estr-icts his notion of this 
whole to "recor-ded experiences" (cf quotation above), while 
Bekker- does not make a cor-r-esponding delimitation explicitly. 
Mor-eover-, Nitecki's whole, which is labelled "metalibr-ar-ianship", 
appear-s to be nothing .mor-e than a r-e-statement of the standard 
complex of the major- functions of libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science. 
6 .1.6 No well-defined view of the r-elationship between 
infor-mation science and libr-ar-y science 
The major-ity of the contr-ibutor-s do not pr-esent 
consistently-held views of the r-elationship between infor-mation 
science and libr-ar-y science. For- Butler-, Ranganathan, De 
Vleeschauwer- and Coetzee the issue of the conjunction/disjunction 
of libr-ar-y science and infor-mation science was not as significant 
as the issue of the scientific status of libr-ar-y science. With 
r-egar-d to the other- wr-iter-s it is difficult to claim with any 
degr-ee of cer-tainty whether- the two fields ar-e consider-ed 
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co-extensive, identical, overlapping, separate or linked in any 
significant way. McGarry does make the claim that librarianship 
and information science are "overlapping but not co-e~tensive 
studies" (1981: 150). However, the nature of this relationship 
is not delineated by McGarry. Benge does not commit himself to a 
specific position on the issue, but observes, as a consequence of 
the characteristic reductionist features of science where the 
part is set up as the whole, that there is a danger that 
traditional librarianship will become an awkward 'sub-culture' 
within the main field of information science" (1972: 27). 
6.1.7 Conclusion 
It is very clear that the several categories of viewpoints 
of the relationships between library science and information 
science, as they are set forth in the contributions in Chapter 5, 
reflect divergent, and often directly confiicting, opinions. An 
attempt at establishing an epistemological position for library 
and information science requires a coherent, consistently 
maintained, consensual view of the discipline, 
uniformly held and understood. By and large, 
ie, one that is 
the contributions 
summarized in that chapter reveal a serious shortcoming in this 
regard, since some writers prefer the term library science (or 
librarianship), others prefer information science and still 
others prefer library and information science, while many are 
unsure whether and how the two are related to each other. 
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6.2 The issue of dive~gent conceptions of knowledge/~eco~ded 
knowledge 
A well-defined view of knowledge is of pivotal impo~tance in 
any discussion of epistemology (cf 2.1 & 2.5). The attempts at 
defining knowledge in the context of lib~a~y and info~mation 
science, as set fo~th in 4.3, manifest a patent lack of 
consensus, and is pe~haps a consequence of inadequate theo~etical 
development, and mo~e specifically, the absence of an app~op~iate 
epistemological position. Mo~eove~, a well-a~ticulated view of 
human knowledge is not self-evident in the cont~ibutions in 
chapte~ five. Rathe~, a multiplicity of widely dive~gent 
pe~ceptions complicates the attempt at establishing an 
app~op~iate epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation 
science. It would appea~ that this issue is ~elated to the 
p~evious one. Fo~ example, the view that lib~a~y science 
concent~ates on the speculative and info~mation science on the 
exact pole of Snow's "two-cultu~es" conception of the division of 
gene~al cultu~e, leads to na~~ow conceptions of knowledge. In 
this way, eg' the humanities a~e aligned with the speculative 
pole, the~eby sepa~ating them f~om the natu~al sciences, 
technology and those social sciences that apply natu~al 
scientific methods of ~esea~ch. 
On the othe~ hand, if info~mation science is pe~ceived in 
its ~elationship with lib~a~y science in such a manne~ that 
they jointly constitute a unity committed to the communication of 
all human knowledge as it is manifested in ~eco~ded fo~m, then 
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the perception of the essential wholeness of knowledge is 
preserved in so far as it reflects the principles of timelessness 
and universality (Kesting, 1969; 1973; Bekker, 1987). 
There is no consistently-held or uniform perception of 
knowledge in the contributions. (The notion of knowledge is 
analyzed more systematically in 4.3). The several references to 
human knowledge in Chapter 5 range from tentative and speculative 
considerations to more systematic, rigorously-analyzed views. In 
order to ascertain the general perceptions of knowledge 
encountered in Chapter 5 a broad typology may assist to reveal 
certain distinctive features as they are held by individual 
contributors. The categories of this typology are not mutually 
exclusive but serve only to express the emphases of certain 
features as they are stated by individual contributors. For this 
reason, the typology is not about knowledge as such, but 
presents, rather, a helpful schema of the several views of human 
knowledge as they are expressed in Chapter 5 (See Figure 7a). 
6.2.1 Knowledge as an interrelated, dynamic unity/whole 
In this view, knowledge is conceived in a comprehensive, 
holistic way so that it forms an essential dynamic unity, and 
serves as the proper domain for library and information science, 
which concentrates on the communication of all human knowledge 
·to· a 11 potential users. In this view, knowledge is not 
necessarily perceived as being restricted to recorded knowledge. 
Instead, the existence of both oral and literate traditions, ie, 
recorded and unrecorded knowledge, are assumed in this perception 
of knowledge. 
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FIGURE 7a: CONCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 335a 
KNOWLEDGE AS DIFFERENTIATED INTO DISTINCT 
TYPES (cf 6.2.2} 
MACHLUP, F. - 5.4 
ROYCE, J.R. - 5.13 
WRIGHT, H.C. - 5.19 
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Butler's notion of scholarship, which implies the "total 
intellectual content of a culture" confirms the emphasis on the 
whole realm of human knowledge. The chief function of 
librarianship is " 
whole community", 
to communicate the whole scholarship to the 
according to Butler (1951: 246). Ranganathan 
maintains the view that human knowledge is a unity which should 
be made readily accessible to all (cf 5.2). Continuing in the 
same vein, De Vleeschauwer postulates, as a central object of 
-librarianship, the communication of all human thought in writing, 
or, "the transmission of ideas through the instrumentality of 
He characterizes his approach as an books" (1960: 44; c f 5. 3) . 
"objectivistic" one in which the library aims at being a complete 
record of intellectual life which reflects " ... a high degree of 
intellectual many-sided and wide interests" (1960: 216). 
Shera's support of a unified, holistic view of knowledge is 
stated expl~citly in the declaration, II knowledge is 
unitary .•. the world of knowledge is a unity ... " (1970: 100; cf 
5.5). Moreover, his initially proposed discipline of social 
epistemology emphasized the "whole man, the whole society and all 
their ways of thinking, knowing ... " (1968: 24). In this way, 
knowledge is conceived in its widest possible sense but is at the 
same time a dynamic whole. Referring to an "artificial division 
in human knowledge", Foskett confirms his view of the unity of 
human knowledge when he claims that on the highest levels of 
thought there is no fundamental antagonism between science and 
the humanities (1964: 235; cf 5.12). He refers to the structure 
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of knowledge as a seamless web and to the dange~ of its 
f~agmentation into "a jumble of sepa~ate bits of data" (1986: 
316). 
Ha~mon's idea of a "sup~asystem", which is patte~ned afte~ 
Wells' notion of a wo~ld encyclopaedia o~ wo~ld b~ain, manifests 
a conce~n fo~ the need fo~ a synthesis o~ unity of all human 
knowledge (1973: 80 ; c f 5 • 22 ) . He demonst~ates the eme~gence of 
such a "sup~asystem" in mode~n info~mation and ~efe~ence netwo~k 
systems. 
Bekke~·s b~oad conception of knowledge ~ejects the duality 
of ha~d sciences at the one pole and lite~atu~e at the othe~ pole 
of Snow's "two-cultu~es" metapho~, and p~oposes in its place a 
continuum of natu~al sciences, social sciences and the humanities 
so that knowledge is seen as a whole (1987: 15; cf 5.24). This 
totality of human knowledge becomes the focus of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science so that all possible viewpoirits a~e ~evealed 
to the lib~a~y use~ in a sea~ch fo~ t~uth (1976: 6-7). 
Kesting's view that knowledge is o~ganically indivisible 
also ~epudiates a pola~ity of the "exact" sciences at one end, 
and the "soft" o~ "speculative" sciences at the othe~ end, of 
Snow's "two-cultu~es" metapho~ (cf 5.28.10). He p~oposes, 
instead, that these two poles should be pe~ceived as de~iving 
thei~ vital solida~ity f~om the continuum of ou~ total human 
cultu~e" (1973: 103). 
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These writers are clearly motivated, in their views of human 
knowledge, by the notions of unity, wholeness and that of 
I 
interrelatedness as critical features. 
Nonetheless, significantly different conceptions of human 
knowledge emerge in the writings of a number of exponents, and 
may be conveniently grouped together below. 
6.2.2 Knowledge as differentiated into distinct types 
In this category, human knowledge is perceived as 
differentiated into distinct types of knowledge according to 
various qualitative/epistemological criteria. These narrower 
conceptions of knowledge are related to the formal philosophical 
notion of truth as opposed to the broader conceptions of the 
first category where truth in its narrow, logical conception is 
not a critical feature. In contrast to the perception set forth 
in the first category where knowledge is viewed by and large as a 
dynamic unity (cf 6.2.1), this view of knowledge emphasizes more 
narrowly-defined, separate modes of thought. This view is not 
sustained adequately, ie, the proponents do not demonstrate how 
they interact or may be interrelated in any meaningful way. 
While these writers stress the different types of knowledge, 
ie, distinctiveness and separateness rather than essential unity, 
it is not possible to assert that the proposal of the former view 
implies a rejection of the latter view. It is only possible to 
infer, without fear of prejudice, that they prefer to view human 
knowledge as consisting of fairly discrete and distinctive types 
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rather than as a dynamic and interrelated whole. The types are 
merely presented as alternatives and no attempt is made to' 
arrange them in any order of priority. 
Machlup classifies knowledge into five distinct types, viz, 
practical, intellectual, ephemeral, spiritual and unwanted. 
According to Machlup, these five types of knowledge emanate from 
different ways of knowing (1980: 27; cf 5.4). Royce's 
psycho-philosophical epistemology recognizes three kinds of 
knowledge which emanate from three epistemologies, viz,. 
empiricism, rationalism and metaphorism (1973: 331; cf 5.13). 
Each Qf these types of knowledge is valid because they subscribe 
to specifiable truth criteria. Royce advocates the use of all 
three paths to knowledge in order to avoid "encapsulation", or, 
being "locked in" to a single, rigidified approach to reality. 
Wright's dualistic epistemology recognizes only two types of 
I 
knowledge, ie, experiential knowledge and intellectual knowledge 
(1977: 17; cf 5.19). Each of these two types is validated by a 
specific notion of truth, viz, experiential (artistic) truth 
which requires something to be true to a perceiver's experience, 
and intellectual (scientific) truth which relates to the 
objective realities of perceived entities (ibid.). Wright is 
unequivocal about _the suitability of intellectual knowledge (and 
hence a rationalist epistemological position) to his own 
perception of the nature of librarianship (cf 5.19). 
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6.2.3 Knowledge as exosomatic and publicly accessible 
The writers in this category stress the totality of human 
knowledge as it is expressed in the entire corpus of recorded 
In this collective sense the total sum of human writings. 
knowledge, as it is expressed in recorded form, provides the raw 
material for systematic investigation by researchers in .library 
and information science. Knowledge is perceived as objective, or 
more accurately, as objectified, and is publicly, as distinct 
from personally, privately and subjectively accessible. 
The writers grouped together here, while not conceiving of 
knowledge solely ih this way, do emphasize these features more 
strongly than other features. Other perceptions that these 
writers may have of knowledge are therefore not enlarged upon. 
The most prominent feature that unites the members of this 
category is their views of knowledge as recorded in more or less 
permanent form as distinct from the holistic views of knowledge 
as espoused in 6.2.1, and the conceptions of unrecorded 
knowledge delineated in 6.2.4. 
The conception of knowledge proposed by the members of this 
category may be loosely described as "Popperian", in the sense 
that it bears strong similarities with Popper's view of world 
three of his three-world view of knowledge, or knowledge without 
a knower (1959: 73; cf 5.10). This view maintains the 
proposition 
knowledge, 
that the content of libraries may be construed as 
ie, knowledge which does not require the recognition 
of a relation between the knower and the known. This knowledge 
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is viewed as "objective" and "public" (in the sense that Ziman 
uses it) and refers to exosomatically recorded writings (Popper, 
1973: 122) 0 
Coetzee's references to a sineidetic reality may be viewed 
as an indication of the recognition of this conception of 
knowledge (cf 5.7). For example, he holds that the sineidetic 
function of the library enables an individual to extract from the 
literature those ideas and opinions that lead to his personal 
development. Furthermore, Coetzee's notion of the record of 
learning (in its objective mode) confirms a view of knowledge as 
it is found "on the shelves of libraries" (1962: 56) 0 
Brookes' fundamental equation of information science relates 
the notions of information and knowledge in 
knowledge may be viewed as structured 




conceives of knowledge structures as "subjective" and "objective" 
(1981: 4; cf 5.10). It is his conception of objective knowledge 
structures that provides productive opportunities for systematic 
investigation through observation and analysis. It is 
particularly the literatures of the natural sciences that Brookes 
considers suitable for quantitative studies, such as, for 
example, bibliometric research (Shaw, 1990: 3). 
Debons et al claim that knowledge " ... can also refer to the 
organized record of human experience, given physical 
representation (books, reports)" (1988: 8; cf 5.11). The 
reference to human experience is perhaps broad, but the view that 
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this experience is confined to its representation in recorded 
form confirms an objective (objectified) status in contrast to a 
purely private and personal mental condition. 
Swanson's "Popper-ian" approach is evidenced by the view that 
knowledge may be likened to a "structure or an edifice" whose 
objectivity derives from II its public character and its 
accessibility to criticism and to logical argument" (1980: 114; 
cf 5.16). This structure or edifice may be continually reshaped 
and librarians should facilitate this by developing and 
effectively applying suitable bibliographic tools. Many of 
Swanson's recent essays deal with what he refers to as 
"undiscovered public knowledge" and which investigates 
little-known links between the literatures of relevant subjects 
(1986: 103-118). 
Kochen distinguishes between personal knowledge and 
objective bodies of knowledge, and he explicates the latter as 
the proper focus for information science with specific emphasis 
on the literature of scientific research (1988: 251; cf 5.18). 
Meijer applies the principle of the universal dimension to 
recorded. knowledge, proclaiming that "Documents in a library 
collectively represent all human thought in written form ... II 
(1982: 13) . These documents contain both positive and negative 
elements, ie, they " ... contain a mixed collection of commendable 
(as well as harmful) thoughts" (1982: 19) • In contrast to 
Shera's "total knowledge situation" (1972: 118), Meijer contends 
that librarianship is concerned with "that part of human thought" 
342 
that is r-ecor-ded since "Something that has not been r-ecor-ded 
cannot be collected, pr-eser-ved, opened up, r-etr-ieved, and made 
available to user-s ... " (1982: 20). Meijer-'s view·of knowledge 
may be epitomized in the phr-ase, "coded thoughts r-ecor-ded in 
documents" (1982: 21; cf 5.21). 
Kemp's notion of social knowledge, as distinct fr-om per-sonal 
knowledge, may be constr-ued in two differ-ent ways: 
" as documents containing knowledge which, at the 
time, is believed to be cr-edible .•. it cor-r-esponds to 
Ziman's public knowledge as being cur-r-ent consensus. 
Alter-natively, it may be seen as including any document 
which for-ms par-t of the 'entir-e cultur-al her-itage': 
which is to say it cor-r-esponds to Popper-'s Wor-ld Thr-ee" 
(1976: 170; cf also 5.28.2). 
Accor-ding to the fir-st view social knowledge is selective and 
accor-ding to the second view it is compr-ehensive and libr-ar-ies 
holding one or- the other- of these view will adopt differ-ent 
selection policies (ibid.). 
In a similar- manner-, Wilson inter-pr-ets knowledge in this 
social or public sense, so that it is II .... the view of the wor-ld 
that is the best at a given time, judged by our- own best 
pr-ocedur-es for- cr-iticism and evaluation of the published r-ecor-d" 
(1977: 5· ' cf 5.17). And it is the published r-ecor-d that 
encompasses knowledge in this case. 
Schr-ader-'s view of knowledge should be seen in the context 
of his notion of symbolic cultur-e, which is descr-ibed as " 
the r-epr-esentational dimension of human cultur-e expr-essed as 
ideas and values in object for-m" (1983: 356; cf 5. 27) . 
Knowledge is a component of this symbolic cultur-e and ·is 
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char-acter-ized as tr-uth-seeking and per-manently conjectur-al, and 
distinguished fr-om opinion in the Platonic sense (1983: 377). 
While this view of knowledge confines itself to intellectual 
knowledge as distinct fr-om sensory and other- modes of 
as par-t of symbolic cultur-e it is necessar-ily 
documents and accessible to the libr-ar-y user-. 
knowledge, 
r-ecor-ded in 
Those who maintain conceptions of knowledge as r-ecor-ded 
knowledge do not emphasize its relationships with unr-ecor-ded 
knowledge. The usual appr-oach is mer-ely to acknowledge that 
knowledge does not only appear- in r-ecor-ded for-m, but then to 
ar-gue that libr-ar-y and infor-mation science is concer-ned pr-imar-ily 
with the for-ms of r-ecorded knowledge. 
Nonetheless, ther-e is a need to r-ecognize the links that 
r-elate recor-ded knowledge and unr-ecorded knowledge. 
6.2.4 Conceptions of unr-ecor-ded knowledge 
While ther-e are a number- of refer-ences to "per-5onal 
knowledge" in Chapter- 5, for- example 5.7-Coetzee, 5.10- Br-ookes, 
5.18-Kochen, and Kemp in this chapter- (see pr-evious quotation), 
only De Solla Pr-ice (cf 5.28.11.1), Coomar-aswamy (cf 5.28.11.2.1) 
and Benge (cf 5.28.11.2.2) pr-ovide cogent ar-guments for- the 
validity of conceptions of unr-ecor-ded knowledge in the context of 
a total knowledge-tr-ansmission cultur-e. 
De Solla Pr-ice highlights the phenomenon of infor-mal 
communication between individual r-esear-chers within "invisible 
colleges". The epistemological validity of the knowledge 
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exchanged in this way is unquestioned. Its justification as true 
knowledge appears to be linked to the authority of the 
participants in the "invisible colleges", but this cannot be 
stated unequivocally. Nevertheless, what remains certain is that 
there is an exchange of personal knowledge, ie, unrecorded 
knowledge, between individual researchers. The communication, 
albeit in an manner, of unrecorded knowledge, 
presupposes an 
informal 
organic link with recorded knowledge because 
researchers derive their ideas from existing literature of the 
subject and intend to publish their own findings which are 
eventually incorporated into the literature of that subject. 
The caution against placing an undue emphasis on the 
distinction 
is echoed 
between unrecorded knowledge and recorded knowledge 
in the writings of Coomaraswamy and Benge (cf 
5.28.11.2). These two writers contend that oral traditions need 
not be associated with cultural backwardness, but that such 
traditions require, and in fact apply, different standards for 
evaluating the quality and truth-value of personal knowledge. 
Moreover., the interconnections between, and co-existence of, 
unrecorded knowledge and recorded knowledge are emphasized in 
their writings. Coomaraswamy records the transition from oral to 
literate traditions of prophetic literature and the so-called 
world's "best books" (1979: 35) • Benge makes the proposition 
that literate and oral traditions may co-exist as a fertile 
combination that influences communication in traditional 
societies (cf 5.28.11.2.2). 
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The co-existence of lite~ate and o~al t~aditions also 
signifies the co~existence of mo~e than one mode of knowing, ie, 
mo~e than one epistemology, within such societies. In o~al o~ 
non-lite~ate t~aditions, o~ even in the case of child~en who 
cannot ~ead, no distinction i~ made between the fo~m and meaning 
of a message since the speake~ is p~esent to convey di~ectly what 
is said (fo~m) and what is meant by what is said (meaning). When 
meaning is lost a listene~ would ask, "what do you mean?" instead 
of "what does it (the message) mean?" The Canadian psychologist, 
Olson, proclaims that lite~acy ent~enched this distinction by 
p~ese~ving the wo~ds but not the meaning, ie, sepa~ating text 
f~om inte~p~etation (1986: 305). He states: 
"In an o~a 1 society the~e we~e, of cou~se, 'texts' , 
fixed bodies of ~itual and poet~y, along with 
intentions and inte~p~etations. All language 
necessa~ily involves all of those. But lite~acy 
p~ovides the means fo~ splitting those things apa~t, 
fixing pa~t of its meaning as the text and pe~mitting 
I 
inte~p~etations to be seen fo~ the fi~st time as 
inte~p~etations" (1986: 306-7). 
In an o~al o~ p~elite~ate society the~e is little o~ no 
distinction between a text and its inte~p~etation. "The 
p~elite~ate attitude is that the inte~p~etations a~~ived at by 
the listene~ we~e actually intended by the speake~" (Olson, 1986: 
306). We obse~ve then that while w~iting solved the p~oblem of 
"memo~y" fo~ o~al t~aditions, it c~eated a p~oblem of "meaning" 
o~ "inte~p~etation" of a text. Acco~ding to Olson., this leads to 
alte~ed conceptions of mind and ~eality (1988: 28). 
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The point made he~e is that the~e appea~s to be significant 
epistemological diffe~ences in o~al and lite~ate t~aditions, 0~ 
between un~eco~ded knowledge and ~eco~ded knowledge but that 
these may be accommodated within a b~oad, 
human knowledge. 
encompassing notion of 
In cont~ast to the view that emphasizes knowledge as 
~eco~ded knowledge (cf 6.2.3), the emphasis of knowledge as 
un~eco~ded knowledge highlights the p~esumed a~bit~a~iness of 
distinguishing between the two, and the consequent need to view 
them as complementing each othe~. The majo~ity of lib~a~ians 
a~gue that the~e is an ineluctable p~ofessional need to dema~cate 
the bounda~ies of lib~a~y and info~mation science, and in this 
inte~ alia, to exclude un~eco~ded knowledge f~om its ~espect, 
scope. Howeve~, such a delimitation shifts the emphasis away 
f~om the communication o~ t~ansfe~ of knowledge to a conce~n with 
the na~~owe~ focus on the physical aspects of the fo~ms of 
~eco~ded knowledge (cf She~a-5.5; Meije~-5.21). 
6.2.5 Miscellaneous conceptions of knowledge 
Besides the mo~e well-defined pe~ceptions of knowledge as 
noted above, the~e a~e a numbe~ of w~ite~s whose view of 
knowledge may be conveniently a~~anged in a catego~y of 
miscellaneous conceptions (See Figu~e 7b). 
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6.2.5.1 Knowledge in its relationship with information 
Saracevic, Farradane and Mikhailov primarily seek to relate 
the notions of knowledge and information in a systematic, 
consistent manner (cf 4.3.5.1). 
subscribes to a hierarchical view of this Saracevic 
relationship, postulating, more specifically, a superordinate 
perception in which information is a broader concept embracing 
knowledge as a smaller component. Information is dynamic while 
knowledge is static, according to Saracevic (1975: 347; cf 
5. 20) . By this he means that information is associated with the 
more active communication-related manifestations of knowledge. 
Farradane's perception of knowledge may also be classified 
under the hierarchical rubric, but more specifically the 
coordinate mode, in which knowledge and information are not 
identical but rather on the same level and in different forms. 
In this way, Farradane views knowledge as II 
store of thoughts in the mind (and only 
information as the physical 
store of thoughts (cf 5.9). 




in the mind)" and 
this structured 
declaring 
information is a certain form of knowledge that exists when 
that 
this 
knowledge is alienated from its carrier and is materialized in 
the form of a document (1983: 14; cf 5.8 & 4.3.5.1.2). 
Knowledge is, in his view, a subjective version of the 
materialized document, although he claims that not every piece of 
knowledge can be materialized. 
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6.2.5.2 Knowledge as pe~sonal/subjective const~uctions 
st~essing the active, individual ~ole of the subjective 
knowe~ in the const~uction of knowledge, the~e a~e a numbe~ of 
cont~ibuto~s who const~ue knowledge as pe~sonal views of the 
wo~ld. Knowledge, in this conception, is inte~p~eted as a 
subjective c~eation of the individual's consciousness in its 
~elation with the envi~onment. This position is distinguished 
f~om the ~iew of knowledge as un~eco~ded (cf 6.2.4) since he~e 
the emphasis falls on the manne~ in which knowledge is 
c~eated/const~ucted ~athe~ than on the mode in which it manifests 
itself. 
This view is pa~ticula~ly typical in the cognitive viewpoint 
in which " states of knowledge, beliefs and so on of human 
beings ... mediate that which they ~eceive/pe~ceive ... " (Belkin, 
1990: 12) • In this way knowledge ~esults f~om pe~ception 
mediated by const~ucts that people hold of themselves and thei~ 
wo~lds, which a~e not only individually, but also socially 
const~ucted (Schutz, 1970). 
Nitecki a~gues that knowledge is a " system of ~elation5 
as they a~e pe~ceived by an individual" (1985: 389; cf 5.14).-
He maintains the view that the 
knowledge as neatly-packaged ideas in 
static system wi)l not do, but 
t~aditional pe~ception of 
books classified within a 
that knowledge is a dynamic 
p~ocess (as distinct f~om a commodity) 




Knowledge is" ... 
a continuous expansion of known ~elations about eve~ything a~ound 
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and within us" (1979: 32) . It is viewed as a nonphysical entity 
whose essence is the relationship between various aspects of 
reality and whose substance is a linguistic structure (ibid.). 
De Mey and Belkin stress the importance, ·as maintained in 
the cognitive viewpoint, of the active knowing subject in 
creating knowledge (cf 5.25 for De Mey's views; Belkin, 1984: 
111) . McGarry contends that knowledge does not exist in an 
abstract sense as "something out there", but that it has to 
evolve in response to human needs, ie, those of a given knower. 
"It is a creation of the human mind ... " (1975: 65; cf 5.23). 
Other contributors that emphasize the private, personal role 
of the knower in the knowing process include Von Foerster, 
Williams and Pearce, 
listed in 5.28. 
Mukhopadhyay and Taranto all of whom are 
6.2.5.3 Knowledge as a dialectical process 
Arguing against a" ... commitment to positivism as the only 
legitimate path to knowledge" with regard to research in library 
and information science, Harris declares that a dialectical 
approach would recognize the " change, conflict and tension as 
the foundations of reality rather than stability and consensus" 
(1986a: 525; c f 5. 26) . He claims that this " .... dialectical 
emphasis on contradiction ... enables the analyst to be far more 
sensitive to social potentialities than the more conventional 
positivist approaches ... " (ibid.). 
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Ha~~is advocates, albeit within the confines of the subject 
of ~esea~ch in lib~a~y and info~mation science, a view of 
knowledge in its essential linkages with political and economic 
powe~ in society (1986b: 225). The kind of knowledge that ought 
to be gene~ated th~ough ~esea~ch in lib~a~y and info~mation 
science should not me~ely be of an administ~ative, technical 
cha~acte~, as in the application of positivist methods, but 
should also be of the kind that ~eveals the unde~lying fo~ces 
that, in Ha~~is' view, seek to ~ep~oduce, in the U.S.A., the 
"dominant effective cultu~e". 
Ha~~is ·· dialectical app~oach to knowledge seeks to ~eveal 
its hidden ideological cha~acte~. This view of knowledge is 
cent~al to his theo~y of lib~a~y se~vice in 
will, he claims, assist in unde~standing " 
asymmet~ically dist~ibuted political and 
the U.S.A. which 
the extent to which 
economic powe~ 
dete~mines the natu~e dnd extent of the knowledge fo~ms we 
acqui~e, p~ese~ve, and disseminate ... " (1986b: 245). 
Be~gen's view of knowledge emphasizes both dialectical and 
"const~uctivist" featu~es, viz, "knowledge ... is const~ucted, 
not discove~ed, although the~e is a dialectical inte~play, a 
dialogue, between theo~y and fact"· ( 1985: 401 ). . The~e appea~s 
to be a diffe~ent inte~p~etation of "dialectical" in Be~gen's 
application. Whe~eas Ha~~is clea~ly has in mind the need to 
attend to political and economic influences on the ways in which 
knowledge manifests itself in society, Be~gen's conception of 
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knowledge as a dialectical process recognizes the interplay 
between the subjectivity of the knower and 
that which is known. 
the objectivity of 
6.2.5.4 No well-defined conception of knowledge 
It has not been possible to trace sustained arguments for a 
specific conception of knowledge in the case of a few 
contributors. They are identified in Figure 7b. 
6.2.6 Conclusion 
The di~ergent conceptions of knowledge in Chapter 5 enrich 
the debate surrounding the question of which one is suitable for 
library and information science. The view that advocates 
alternative modes of knowledge confronts the dilemmas of choice 
of the most suitable one, and of defending the choice of an 
inevitably narrow epistemological position (cf 6.2.2). 
Furthermore, the perception of knowledge as recorded knowledge 
cannot be distinguished from that of unrecorded knowledge in an 
unequivocal manner since the two categories are perceived as 
being dynamically interrelated (cf 6.2.4). The fluid nature of 
human knowledge is evident in its manifestations both as recorded 
knowledge that may be stored in iibraries/information centres and 
as ideas that may be exchanged between highly 
researchers in an "invisible college" or 
illiterate/non-literate persons (cf 6.2.4). 





while being useful 
warranted one. 
for certain purposes, is an insufficiently 
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If the emphasis in library and information science falls on 
the communication/transfer of human knowledge the distinction 
between recorded knowledge and unrecorded knowledge becomes less 
meaningful. Benge proclaims that in traditional African 
societies, II the focal point of the communication system was 
not literacy ... The oral mode of instruction persisted and 
persists long after literacy is available" (1972: 76) . He 
continues by adding that" ... books are to be memorized ... so 
I 
that the 'golden chain' which Professor Irwin claims as the 
historical role for libraries is embodied not in books but in a 
succession of teachers" (ibid.). The idea expressed in this 
observation by Benge is that the communication/transfer of human 
knowledge is the primary concern and may combine oral and 
literate modes. 
The view of knowledge that encompasses all the others and 
which does not face the dilemmas noted above is the conception of 
knowledge as a holistic, dynamic unity. This conception 
maintains the equal validity and recognition of all modes of 
knowing, recorded and unrecorded. Furthermore, it proposes that, 
at the highest levels, human knowledge is characterized by the 
features of interconnectedness and unity. This view of human 
knowledge is regarded by a number of philosophically-inclined 
library scholars as a tenable one for .library and information 
science (cf 6.2.1). However, a sound argument def~nding this 
view and its central idea of wholeness still needs to be provided 
(cf Chapter 7). 
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It is manifestly evident from the several views of knowledge 
described in this section that there is no unanimous or 
consensus-supported view of human knowledge in Chapter 5. The 
views of the contributors are more complex than the typology used 
here may suggest, but the overwhelming tendencies in points of 
view have been arranged to provide a helpful classification to 
confirm their widely divergent views. 
6.3 The issue of truth/ultimate reality 
Another area of conflicting views in the contributions of 
Chapter 5, is that of notions of truth and reality (or ultimate 
reality) . The relevance for library and information science of 
approaches to reality is affirmed in Benge's declaration that: 
"Our descriptions of the meaning of information rest on 
our concept of reality, eg, Soviets subscribe, in their 
descriptions of information, to a materialist concept 
of reality and the 'correspondence theory of 
knowledge', i~, information is simply a data system of 
the world around us. These philosophical 
foundations ... have to be mentioned ... since everything 
depends on what we consider reality to be" (1984: 
188-9; cf 4.2.1). 
Questions that require answers in the attempt to formulate ari 
epistemological position for library and information science are: 
"should knowledge be related to the notion of truth in its 
absolute sense or in its relative sense?" and, "is there a 
tenable view of reality for library and information science, and, 
if so, what should it be?" 
354 
A fuller treatment of the different conceptions of truth and 
reality is presented in Chapter 7. This section merely aims to 
highlight the general positions adopted by the writers in Chapter 
5 according to their predominant views of truth/ultimate reality. 
It is significant to note that certain distinctions may be 
maintained between reality and ultimate reality, and that there 
are different points of view whether ultimate reality may be 
achieved.· Royce, for example, claims that ultimate reality is 
unattainable (cf 5. 13) ' while Conradie affirms a connection 
between " ... the deepest being of man with the Ultimate Reality 
of the Universe" (1983: 52) • Further to this is the dilemma of 
the means of achieving this ultimate reality. Harman, for 
not example, contends that " 
through the physical senses, 
( 1989: 6) • 
ultimate reality is contacted, 
but through the deep intuition" 
It is Medawar's view that the physical senses, which are 
fundamental to modern science, do not make any pretence to 
attaining ultimate reality. Modern science is unable to answer 
"ultimate" questions and is only able to show the direction 
toward Ultima Thule, "where the truth lies" (1984: 5). 
It is not fruitful to pursue the issue of ultimate reality 
any further at this point, since the view adopted in this study 
is that there are many kinds of truth/reality as distinct from a 
single, absolute concepti~n thereof. Le Shan suggests different 
"systems of .construing reality" or "ways of inventing-discovering 
reality", all of which are valid "in order to give our total 
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being the nour-ishment it needs" (1976: 112; cf Chapter- 7). As 
in the case of notions of r-eality, so also in the case of notions 
of tr-uth ther-e is no fixed and unalter-able conception. Medawar-, 
for- example, mentions two equally valid notions of tr-uth in 
science. Accor-ding to the fir-st view: 
" tr-uth takes shape in the mind of the obser-ver-; it 
is his imaginative pr-econception of what might be true 
that pr-ovides the incentive for- finding out, so far- as 
he can, what is tr-ue. Ever-y advance in science is 
ther-efor-e the outcome of a speculative adventur-e, an 
excur-sion into the unknown. Accor-din~ to the opposite 
view, tr-uth r-esides in natur-e and is to be got at only 
thr-ough the evidence of the senses: appr-ehension leads 
by a dir-ect pathway to compr-ehension, and the 
scientist's task is essentially one of discernment" 
(author-'s emphasis) (1983: 13). 
Medawar-'s notions of tr-uth pr-ovide a useful fr-amewor-k for-
ar-r-anging the per-ceptions of tr-uth as they ar-e held by the 
contr-ibutor-s of Chapter- 5 (See Figur-e 8). 
6.3.1 The objective/exter-nal view of tr-uth/r-eality 
Accor-ding to this view, tr-uth or- r-eality is per-ceived to 
"r-eside in natur-e" (Medawar-, 1983: 13) . It exists in an 
objective sense, ie, independently of the knowing obser-ver- and is 
acquir-ed thr-ough the evidence of the senses. In this way, 
r-eality or- por-tions ther-eof ar-e discover-ed thr-ough systematic 
investigation and does not involve any subjective involvement. 
Reality is, as it wer-e, "out ther-e" as distinct fr-om "in her-e" 
(Le Shan, 1976: 55) . Tr-uth and r-eality , in this view, exists 
only in their- extr-eme positions as absolute tr-uth and as ultimate 
r-eality. These conceptions of tr-uth and r-eality ar-e not 
dependent upon human consciousness but ar-e discover-able thr-ough 
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Among the contributors' expositions in Chapter 5 it is 
Farradane's who comes closest to representing this view (cf 5.9). 
He maintains that reality exists outside of ourselves and that 
this external reality may be known through the mediation of our 
brains (1952: 78) . It is noteworthy that his concept of truth 
does not uphold such a strict "externalist" interpretation. He 
views truth as a consensus of consistent, communicable knowledge, 
ie, a consensus of experience among a totality of minds (1981: 
269). This interpretation, it should be noted, reveals a social 
aspect of the construction of truth. 
For Royce, ultimate reality is beyond the grasp of man (ie, 
it is unknowable), but is hypothetically monistic in character, 
ie, it is essentially of one kind (cf preamble to Chapter 7, and 
7. 1) . However, at the same time, the idea of three legitimate 
pathways to knowledge in Royce's model (cf 5.13) is premised upon 
separate sets of reality continua, ie, they assume three 
different approaches to reality. Each approach to reality is 
validated or invalidated by means of a different set of truth 
criteria. In this way it is possible for man to derive more than 
one conception of reality and truth. 
The view of truth/reality as objective and external is 
not held uniformly or consistently by any contributor. 
6~3.2 The subjective/intern~l view of truth/reality 
thus 
The majority of contributors, in so far as they refer to 
truth or reality, consider that it is privately and/or socially 
constructed. As Medawar puts it: "Truth takes shape in the mind 
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of the observer ... " (1983 : 13). In this perception, human 
consciousness is not only responsible for creating reality but is 
a constituent part of it. This view is central to the cognitive 
viewpo~nt in which· the constraints on knowledge are not in terms 
of 5ome "neutral" truth but in terms of the knowing system's 
"action equipment", ie, it is not abstract truth but personal 
truth, or, truth for someone (De Mey, 1980: 57) • In this way 
the individual constructs his own subjective view of truth. The 
means for justifying subjective conceptions of truth are 
different from those for justifying objective conceptions but 
are by no means "inferior". 
Ranganathan's Hindu religious outlook espouses an 
identification of universal (absolute) or ultimate reality 
the reality within, (Brahman), with individual reality, or 
(Atman) (Chappell, 1985: 382). This view suggests that each 
individual may relate to ultimate reality in a unique way, ie, 
through an Atman-Brahman relationship that recognizes the 
participation of the subjective individual in absolute, universal 
reality (cf 5.2). 
De Vleeschauwer's perspectivistic epistemology holds that a 
multiplicity of truth perspectives stand in harmonious relation 
to each other (1952: 267; cf 5.3). None of these perspectives 
is superior to the other. For De Vleeschauwer, according to his 
student, Rauche, the human mind is the critical denominator in 
all human truth and, because of man s changing experience of 
reality, truth-perspectives change in accordance with man's 
historically changing world-consciousness (1983: 31) . Truth is 
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then perceived as a dialogue that is carried on between man and 
his contingent experience of reality. This view corresponds 
closely with the eclectic philosophy of Victor Cousin (1792-1867) 
which proposes that each philosophical system is not false, but 
incomplete, and in reuniting all incomplete systems, we should 
have a complete philosophy, 
consciousness (no date). 
adequate to the totality of 
Shera's views of truth/reality are not evident in the texts 
considered in this study. However, his suggestion that 
librarianship should look to symbolic interactionism for its. 
"proper foundation" would appear to suggest that he was aware of 
the notions of truth/reality as they are construed in that school 
of thought. Symbolic interactionism "refers to the process by 
which people relate to their .own minds and the minds of others" 
(1983: 386 ; . c f 5. 5 ) . The emphasis in symbolic interactionism is 
on subjective meanings and on man as an active thinker, according 
to Wright (1986: 749). It requires " the observer's intimate 
and personal 
(ibid.: 750). 
involvement with the empirical social order .•• " 
Symbolic interactionism influences the cognitive 
viewpoint in which the active self plays a key role in the 
knowing process. From the brief references by Shera to symbolic 
interaction ism it is, however, not possible to infer that he 
agreed with all its precepts, and hence his views of 
truth/reality remain inconclusive. 
Coetzee, who may also be characterized as a 
pluralist-perspectivist, recognizes the distinctiveness of 
several realities which become known to individuals according to 
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their subjective experiences. He claims that different sciences 
subscribe to different spheres of reality (1978: 24; cf 5.7 & 
7. 6) . 
As a dualist, Brookes affirms the existence of two 
realities, ie, the physical world and the mental (cognitive) 
world. His concern with the cognitive world, however leads him 
to concentrate on "objective" knowledge structures which are 
accessible to observation and analysis rather than "subjective" 
knowledge structures which, he contends, are recalcitrant to 
fixed analytical techniques (1981: 4; cf 5.10 & 7.6). 
For Nitecki, reality is described as "shifty" and 
"kaleidoscopic" and is responsible for the developmental features 
of knowledge. His perception of reality as a subjective image of 
the world is evident in the view: 
"The reality of the so-called material world is 
existential in nature. Its perception is selective and 
subjective, responding to the external stimulation, or 
it is initiated by one's own intellectual curiosity. 
Its comprehension is always relative to the previously 
absorbed perceptions, interwoven into a system of 
personal relations known at any one time" (1985: 403). 
Nitecki maintains the view that it is personal knowledge 
that matters in librarianship, thereby confirming his conviction 
that a relational approach to knowledge and reality is a tenable 
one for librarianship: 
"It is not an issue of building separate theories for 
ideal and real worlds, since both, form and content, 
reflect each of the two worlds" (1985: 401). 
Swanson's and Kemp's references to truth are 
characteristically "Popper-ian" in that it is viewed as a 
"regulative principle" or as a "postulated reality" (as distinct 
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f~om its absolute o~ ultimate conception) and p~ovides a goal, o~ 
a sense of di~ection, fo~ the g~owth of knowledge. Fu~the~mo~e, 
the t~uth of statements is based on the extent to which they a~e 
compatible with othe~ statements that a~e believed to be t~ue (cf 
Swanson, 1980: 115; · Kemp, 1976: 166). Suppo~ting the 
"falsificationist" view of Poppe~ as a defensible view of the 
g~owth of knowledge in lib~a~ies, Be~gen adds that one pu~pose of 
the lib~a~y: 
" should be to facilitate the ~efutation of 
theo~etical p~opositions. This is a ~evolutiona~y 
shift since lib~a~ies have histo~ically se~ved as a 
sou~ce of evidence suppo~tive of the theo~etical 
p~oposi tions of thei ~ c 1 ients" (1985: 402) . 
w~ight's dualist app~oach to t~uth/~eality is applied 
consistently in his w~itings (cf 5.19 & 7.6). He postulates two 
kinds of t~uth, viz, expe~iential (a~tistic) t~uth and 
intellectual (scientific) t~uth (1977: 17; cf Medawa~'s 
quotation in 6.3). He also p~oposes that the ultimate ~ealities 
\ 
fo~ lib~a~ianship a~e eithe~ "ideas" o~ "data" and, in his view, 
it ought to be "ideas". This culminates in his espousal of a 
~ationalist epistemology in which ~ationality is the only 
acceptable c~ite~ion of t~uth (1986: 751; cf 2.5). 
Although "documented info~mation" can only supply a pa~tial 
view of ~eality acco~ding to Bekke~, the catego~ies of 
non-fiction and fictional w~itings a~e ~equi~ed to measu~e up to 
two diffe~ent catego~ies of ~eality (cf 5.24). In the case of 
non-fiction he postulates a co~~espondence with "exte~nal 
~eality" to achieve t~uth, and in the case of fiction t~uth is 
achieved th~ough a co~~espondence with the ~eality of the autho~, 
I 
o~ the imagina~y wo~ld c~eated by the autho~ (1984: 19) . 
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De Mey's cognitive viewpoint supports a multiplicity of 
world views and hence the recognition of several realities which 
recognize the active role of the subjective knower. In contrast 
to crude empiricism, where reality is "aut there", unfolding 
itself to a passive subject, the cognitive view emphasizes the 
active organizing activity of the subject. McGarry maintains the 
view that reality is based an "private experience" and that it is 
"socially constructed" (1975: 41• 
. ' c f 5. 23) . The cognitive view 
is also shared by Van Fae~ster (cf 5.28.3, Williams and Pearce 
( c f 5 . 28 . 5 ) ' Mukhopadhyay and Taranto (cf 5.28.6) and Belkin (cf 
5.28.4). Benge's emphasis an the personal element in the 
creation of knowledge underscores the recognition of the active 
knower as in the case of the cognitive view (1972: 189). 
Olaisen sets forth alternative realities far lib;ary science 
that invests it with the qualities of tolerance and pluralism. 
\ 
These realities represent a necessarily partial and incomplete 
conception of truth (cf 5.28.9; 1985: 148). 
Kesting proposes that reality in its ultimate essence is 
synonymous with wholeness, which also affirms the recognition and 
consideration of .the va 1 id i ty of a 11 "1 egi timate doctrines" ( c f 
5.28.10). This .holistic view of reality maintains its 
essentially multidimensional character, and the equal claims to 
truth by manifestly disparate modes of knowing, such as, far 
example, Nea-Marxism and Liberal humanism, are upheld through the 
professional ethos of supradactrinalism. 
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6.3.3 No well-defined view of t~uth/ultimate ~eality 
Many of the cont~ibuto~s listed in Chapte~ 5 do not make any 
~efe~ences to the significance of conceptions of t~uth/ultimate 
~eality in thei~ w~itings and the~~ a~e othe~s whose ~efe~ences 
~equi~e elabo~ation and inte~p~etation. The names of these 
w~ite~s a~e a~~anged in a ch~onological o~de~ in Figu~e 8. 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
The diffe~ent conceptions of t~uth/~eality and of the 
~ealities of lib~a~y and info~mation science ~eflect the 
dive~gent, and often speculative pe~ceptions of the cont~ibuto~s. 
As with the othe~ issues, this one is cha~acte~ized by a lack of 
unifo~mity. One is st~uck, howeve~, by the widesp~ead suppo~t 
among the cont~ibuto~s of the view that ~eality is 
multidimensional and the ~esult of individual and social 
const~uction, and that t~uth, as it may be applied to lib~a~y and 
info~mation science, is not conceived as fixed o~ absolute. 
When notions of t~uth and ~eality a~e conceived in b~oade~, 
holistic te~ms the~e is a g~eate~ tole~ance of differences and 
cont~adictions. In this conception, judgements, theories and 
theses are ~egarded as partial aspects which can be ~econciled in 
the· whole which maintains its "unity th~ough diffe~ences" 
(Walker, 1911: 7· ' cf 7 1.1 & 7.7). The philosopher, B~adley, 
~elates the notions of wholeness, t~uth and ~eality in the 
pronouncements that: 
"Reality is the unity in which all things, coming 
togethe~, a~e t~ansmuted, in which they are changed all 
alike, though not changed equally ... eve~y advance in 
the evolution of ~eality logically impli~s the 
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pr-ogr-essive 'absor-ption' (in to a body of know 1 edge, 
together- with subor-dination to a tr-uer- point of view)-
of ever-y r-eal within the whole •.. " (1893: 72); and 
" ever-y aspect 
pr-eser-ved within 
Kesting-5.28.10). 
of r-eality, ever-y appear-ance ••• 
the whole" (1893: 77; 
is 
cf 
A conception of knowledge in its holistic sense (cf 6.2.1) 
as a suitable one for- libr-ar-y and infor-mation science would 
appear- to requir-e an equally br-oad conception of tr-uth/r-eality. 
Never-theless, while Chapter- 5 does offer- br-ief r-efer-ences by 
cer-tain individuals to the mer-it of holistic conceptions, a mor-e 
sustained, cogent ar-gument for- the validity of its application to 
an epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and infor-mation science 
is still r-equir-ed (cf Chapter- 7). 
6.4 Summar-y 
The texts that ar-e examined in Chapter- 5 r-eveal both 
well-defined and speculative views of issues that ar-e significant 
for- developing an epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science. Mor-eover-, these views ar-e manifestly uneven 
in their- tr-eatment, ther-eby complicating the emer-gence of a 
clear--cut pr-esentation of how such a position should look. This 
cr-itique intends only to highlight concer-ns by sever-al theor-ists 
for- epistemological aspects as these concer-ns ar-e r-evealed in 
their- texts, as examined in Chapter- 5. Another- difficulty of the 
examined texts is that no cumulative pr-ogr-ession of ideas on the 
issues is discer-nible. In ver-y few instances may the influence 
of one wr-iter- be discer-ned in the theor-etical views of another-, 
eg, Sher-a's influence on Wr-ight, or- De Mey's influence on Belkin 
(cf 5.19 & 5.28.4). 
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The contributions reveal, to a large extent, the application 
of individual philosophical per5pectives, as they are held by the 
contributors, to the interpretation of key issues in library and 
information science. With the application of these different 
philosophical outlooks it is not surprising that very little 
uniformity of thought emerges. This lack of uniformity is, 
indeed, the most significant feature of the texts. However, 
these contributions provide a source of evidence of genuine 
concerns for epistemological aspects of library and information 
science. They also supply the general insights from which an 
appropriate epistemological position for library and information 
science may be explicated. 
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7 Conceptual ~egui~ements fo~ a gene~al f~amewo~k within which 
to establish an epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and 
info~mation science, and the c~ite~ia fo~ evaluating such a 
position 
P~eamble 
The~e .is no individual exponent in Chapte~ 5 f~om whose 
w~itings a singula~ly suitable epistemological position may be 
developed and applied to lib~ary and info~mation science. 
Moreove~, no single w~iter discussed in that chapte~ devoted 
himself single-mindedly to this task. 
none of these w~iters is able to do so, 
This does not imply that 
o~ that refe~ences to 
these matte~s a~e too spa~se and f~agmenta~y fo~ se~ious 
consideration. 
Of those that a~e eminently qualified to contribute to a 
discussion of epistemological issues in library and info~mation 
science, De Vleeschauwe~ (cf 5.3) and Coetzee (cf 5.8) do not 
~eveal in thei~ w~itings (in lib~ary and info~mation science) any 
consistent application of thei~ systematically a~ticulated 
epistemological positions (as established in thei~ respective 
docto~al theses) to lib~a~y and info~mation wo~k. To some extent 
it is nonetheless possible to t~ace ·in thei~ w~itings on libra~y 
and info~mation science the influence of thei~ 
epistemological views. 
"pe~spectivistic" 
She~a·s conviction that "lib~a~ianship" is t~uly based on 
epistemological foundations is not given adequate logical suppo~t 
in his w~itings, no~ is the content of his notion of "social 
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epistemology" ,delineated in an unambivalent way (cf 5. 5) • 
Brookes' support of Popper's epistemological approach for 
information science should be viewed in the light of his 
self-limiting perception that library ,science and information 
science are separate disciplines (cf 5.10 & 6.1.4). Wilson (cf 
5.17) and Bekker (cf 5. 24) ' both of whom are 
philosophically-trained librarians, offer useful, yet still 
tentative, contributions towards the establishment of a suitable 
epistemological position for library and information science. 
Wright (cf 5.19) suggests an epistemology that is supported by a 
perhaps too narrow view of the nature of "librarianship": for 
example, he holds that librarianship is antithetical to natural 
science. He does propose, however, that a rationalist 
epistemological position is the only one that is suited to the 
I ultimate realities of "librarianship" which he perceives to be 
• "ideas" rather than "data" • 
Harris' investigation into epistemological aspects of 
library and information science appears at best to constitute a 
sustained argument against the dangers of an uncritical 
acceptance of positivist epistemological approaches to research. 
He contends that research methods that are supported by these 
epistemological approaches are suited primarily to investigating 
technical aspects of library and information science. According 
to him, however, there is a critical need to inve~tigate also the 
non-technical aspects of library and information science, ie, 
political and economic forces that influence the knowledge forms 
that manifest themselves in society and which are distributed by 
libraries. He proposes for the consideration of researchers in 
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library and information science the application of a Hegelian 
Marxist epistemological approach to investigate these issues {cf 
5.26). While Bergen's respon~e to Harris endorses the validity 
of Heg~lian Marxist, positivist or, for that matter, any other 
credible epistemology, his views are not explicated in sufficient 
detail for the purpose of serious consideration. It is therefore 
unclear how he would defend such a position against the charge of 
relativism, ie, the view that any possible approach to knowledge 
and reality is valid. 
The acknowledgement of the limitations and shortcomings that 
emerge in the contributions of the "more qualified" individuals 
in Chapter 5 {as they are described above), and the widely 
divergent conceptions on key issues that are relevant for 
developing an epistemological position {as they are presented in 
Chapter 6) , does not necessarily give cause for despair. 
Instead, a more constructive approach is suggested by the seeming 
impasse: it appears possible indeed to develop the scattered, 
fragmentary and speculative insights delineated in that chapter 
into a logically tenable epistemological position for library and 
information science. 
The uncohesive nature . of the viewpoints· on 
epistemology-related matters that emerge from the examined texts 
of the writers listed in Chapter 5 confirm the need to find a 
general framework that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to 
address the key issues considered to be relevant to the 
establishment of an epistemological position for library and 




(a) a position ~ega~ding 






(b) a tenable view of the conception of knowledge of prima~y 
~elevance to lib~a~y and info~mation science; and 
(c) a tenable view of t~uth as ultimate ~eality and its 
implications fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science. 
The most essential featu~e of this gene~al f~amewo~k would 
to be its capacity to accommodate the b~oadest notions of 
human knowledge. The need fo~ this is evident f~om the ag~eement 
in seve~al cont~ibutions that lib~a~ies and info~mation cent~es, 
in a co~po~ate sense, seek to collect the enti~e sum of human 
knowledge as it is exp~essed in ~eco~ded fo~m (inte~ alia, 
Butle~'s notion of "scholar:-ship"; Meije~'s notion of "coded 
thoughts", Sch~ade~'s notion of "symbolic cultu~e" and Kesting's 
view of knowledge as o~ganic wholeness- cf 6.2.1). In addition 
to this notion of the "unive~sality" of human knowledge, the 
quality of "dive~gence" is also conside~ed to be a c~itical 
featu~e, and can only be accommodated within a f~amewo~k with the 
b~oadest possible scope. This quality of "dive~gence" of human 
knowledge is demohst~ated in the w~itings of individual 
cont~ibuto~s in the following ways: 
(a) it includes, in p~inciple, the 
positive and negative elements 
Sch~ade~-5.27); 
possibility of both 
(cf Meije~-5.21; 
(b) it encompasses distinctive pe~spectives and app~oaches 
to knowledge and t~uth/ultimate ~eality such as ~ationalism, 
empi~icism, metapho~ism, existentialism and Ma~xism (cf 
inte~ alia: De Vleeschauwe~-5.3; Coetzee-5.7; Royce-5.13; 
W~ight-5.19; Ha~~is-5.26; Be~gen and Olaisen-5.28.9); and 
(c) it ~ecognizes the o~ganic links between o~al (un~eco~ded 
knowledge) and lite~ate t~aditions (~eco~ded knowledge) (cf 
De Solla P~ice, Cooma~~swamy and Benge-5.28.11 & 6.2.4) 
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Only a general framework that encompasses the widest 
explanatory principle appears to be suited to the critical 
feature mentioned above. Moreover, that principle should 
self-evidently be one that is'supported in formal academic debate 
as one that by virtue of a rich historical background has proved 
to be worthy of serious consideration~ 
consistent critical examination. 
and that stands up to 
It is postulated that the principle suggesting itself as the 
most suitable to meet the requirements stated above is that of 
the notion of holism. However, this explanatory principle and 
th~ theoretical perspective which embodies it ne~ds to be 
evaluated in relation to rival theoretical perspectives before it 
can be proposed as one worthy of application in the field of 
library and information science. 
Two apparently opposing theoretical perspectives that are 
implicit in the several contributions in Chapter 5 subscribe to 
conflicting philosophical outlooks. These outlooks embody the 
central notions of wholeness on the one hand and of fragmentation 
on the other. On a more fundamental level, wholeness and 
fragmentation constitute the basic attitudes or orientations 
towards the vexing issue of.the nature of reality which manifests 
itself in systematic philosophy as the problem of the One and the 
Many, or as monism and pluralism (and, 
dualism as a special case of pluralism). 
as a matter of course, 
Monism maintains the 
fundamental oneness or unity of reality while pluralism 
postulates that" ... there are many kinds of thing, or that there 
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are many things" (Hall, 1967: 364). Dualism, as a special case 
of pluralism, holds that there are essentially" ... two things 
or two types of thing" (ibid.). Philosophical holism, as a 
serious philosophical orientation that also stresses the 
essential unity underpinning reality, is closely allied to monism 
(Digby, 1985). Its major features will be described a little 
later (cf 7.7). The important point that is stressed here is 
that wholeness and fragmentation as explanatory principles have 
rich intellectual traditions that support them, and provide 
valuable insight into their essential character. 
7.1 Wholeness and fragmentation in Wester~ thought 
In early cosmological theories in Western philosophy the 
debate surrounding the issue as to whether reality is One or Many 
had already been prominent in the thought of the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers (c. 600-400 BC). The monistic view that maintains 
the oneness or unity of reality is encountered in a developed 
form in the Pre-Socratic philosophy of Parmenides (c. 513 BC) , 
whose ideas were to serve as a point of departure for the diverse 
conceptions of the nature of reality held by subsequent 
philosophers. This view insists on" ... the unity of things in 
time (their freedom from change) or in space (their 
indivisibility) or in quality (their undifferentiatedness)" 
(Hall, 1967: 363-4). According to Parmenides, this view of the 
universe maintains that change is impossible, and that the 
changes we perceive in the world are mere illusions of the 
senses. His view denied the existence of empty space and is also 
called the "block view" of the universe, since its conception of 
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r-eality is that "It r-emains one a timeless, changeless, 
motionless, homogeneous mass, which he compar-ed to a spher-e" 
(Guthr-ie, 1967: 443). 
Other- Pr-e-Socr-atic philosopher-s of the Eleatic school who 
suppor-ted and expanded the view of the fundamental unity of 
r-eality wer-e Zeno (c. 490 BC), Eubulides (active in 400 BC) and 
Melissus (active in 440 BC) (Digby, 1985: 191) . It should be 
noted that philosopher-s fr-om the Ionic, or- Milesian, and the 
Pythagor-ean schools also offer-ed views of the development of 
var-iety fr-om a single substance (unity) but, none developed the 
notion o·f the essential unity of r-eality as fully as Par-men ides. 
Although the Par-menidean view is nor-mally contr-asted with 
that of Her-aclitus (c. 540-475 BC) who taught that all changes in 
the wor-ld ar-ise fr-om the dynamic and cyclic inter-play of 
opposites, ther-e ar-e distinct commonalities. Her-aclitus also 
acclaimed the unity of r-eality, a unity sustained by a tension of 
opposites (Guthr-i~, 1967: 443-4). He called this unity the 
Logos, II an intelligent gover-ning pr-incipl~ mater-ially 
embodied as fir-e ••. " (ibid.). 
We obser-ve then, at a mor-e fundamental level, that both the 
Par-menidean and Her-aclitean views endor-se the monistic, and, 
consequently, holistic conceptions of r-eality which uphold the 
notions of wholeness (and nonduality) (Loy, 1988: 2). 
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The ea~ly G~eek t~adition at that time was, howeve~, a ~ich 
one abounding in competing views of ~eality. F~agmentation, 
which is cha~acte~istic of the plu~alistic view and which holds 
that ~eality is mo~e impo~tantly Many than One, also o~iginates 
with P~e-Soc~atic thought. The fi~st of the plu~alistic systems 
was that of Empedocles (c. 490-430 BC) who p~oposed that ~eality 
is composed of fou~ elements (o~ that the~e a~e fou~ ~ealities) -
fi~e, ai~, ea~th and water- which continually mingle and 
sepa~ate unde~ the influence of love and st~ife (Guth~ie, 1967: 
444). The ~efe~ence to love and st~ife in the conception of 
~eality ~eveals the blend of ~ational and mystical elements in 
Empedocles' thought. Following Empedocles, the atomistic 
theo~ies of Leucippus (5th centu~y BC) and Democ~itus (bo~n c. 
460 BC) develop fu~the~ the plu~alist viewpoint of ~eality. The 
atomistic theo~y p~oposes that "Reality consists of innume~able 
mic~oscopic and indivisible (a-tomos = uncuttable) bodies in 
motion in infinite space" (ibid.: 445). This view is a di~ect 
~esponse to the Eleatic challenge that denies the existence of 
empty space, and acco~ding to Cap~a was late~ sustained by 
Weste~n science: 
The 
"The ancient G~eek atomists d~ew a clea~ line between 
spi~it and matte~, pictu~ing matte~ as being made of 
seve~al 'basic building blocks'. These we~e pu~ely 
passive and int~insically dead pa~ticles moving in the 
void. The cause of thei~ motion was not explained, but 
was often associated with exte~nal fo~ces which we~e 
assumed to be of spi~itual o~igin and fundamentally 
diffe~ent f~om matte~. In subsequent centu~ies this 
image became an essential element of Weste~n thought, 
of dualism between mind and matte~, between body and 
SOU 1 II ( 1 981 : 20 ) o 
dualism ~efe~~ed to above ~eceived its clea~est 
a~ticulation in the w~itings of Rene Desca~tes (1596-1650) in 
seventeenth-centu~y Weste~n thought, but it may be t~aced 
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plausibly to its ea~ly o~igins in the ideas of Pythago~as (c. 
582-501 BC) and Anaxago~as (c. 500-428 BC) • The Pythago~eans 
taught that all things .a~e composed of cont~a~ies such as One and 
Many, limited and unlimited, odd and even, ~ight and left, 
st~aight line and the cu~ve, and so on. They also distinguished 
the soul f~om the body, as is evident f~om the dictum att~ibuted 
to them as well as the O~phics, viz, "The body is a tomb" 
(Pet~ement, l973-4: 40). The dualism of Anaxago~as p~oclaimed 
that "Mind" was a causative agent that animates matte~ (Guth~ie, 
1967: 445) In his ~esponse to Pa~menides' view that the~e is no 
coming into being of new. substances, Anaxago~as also p~oposed 
that the~e is a po~tion .of,eve~ything in eve~ything else, which 
has been inte~p~eted by some schola~s of ea~ly G~eek thought to 
cha~acte~ize monistic app~oaches to ~eality (Ogilvy, 1977: 209). 
The ~ecognition that inte~p~etation is c~itical in deciding 
which philosophe~s suppo~ted eithe~ the monistic view o~ the 
plu~alistic view of ~eality cannot be denied. Fo~ example, it is 
claimed that the dualistic view was developed to its highest fo~m 
in ea~ly G~eek thought in Plato's (c. 427-348 BC) theo~y of 
fo~ms. In this theo~y the wo~ld of the senses is juxtaposed with 
the wo~ld of pu~e ~eason. Plato submitted that it was the wo~ld 
of pu~e ~eason that was ~eal and that the wo~ld of the senses 
was me~e illusion. He also associated the wo~ld of pu~e ~eason 
with knowledge and the wo~ld of the senses with opinion (Ryle, 
1967: 330). Anothe~ view of Plato, howeve~, is that his 
cosmology, as set fo~th in Timaeus, is sympathetic to a monistic 
view of ~eality (Loy, 1988: 2; Laszlo, 1973: 123). Mo~eove~, 
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it is claimed by Vaught that the confrontation between Euthyphro 
and Socrates in Plato's Euthyphro is transformed by Plato from 
the II religious quest for wholeness into the reflective 
attempt to answer the question, 'What does it mean to be whole?'" 
(1982: 12). What is certain from these conflicting 
interpretations is that pluralism and monism, and their abiding 
polarity, were lively themes for debate in early Greek thought, 
including Platonic philosophy. 
The observations from Pre-Socratic thoug~t reveal the source 
of two competing, or rather, complementary views of reality. 
Monism maintains the view of the unity and interconnectedness 
jand hence the wholeness) of reality while pluralism (and its 
variant, dualism) claim that reality is many and essentially 
disconnected (and hence fragmented). 
The treatment of monism and pluralism in the thought of 
philosophers in the West may be summed up in the words of 
Petrement: "The history of Western philosophy appears to be an 
alternation of dualism and monism" (1973-4: 41). Moreover, the 
possibility that these distinct approaches to reality do coexist, 
and have coexisted, in any given historical period of Western 
civilization cannot be excluded. For example, some writers 
submit that Aristotle (384-322 BC) is considered to have been 
more monistic in his outlook than Plato, while it is possible at 
the same time to trace aspects of Platonic dualism in his 
thought, particularly in his theory of the prime mover (unmoved 
mover) as an incorporeal and separate substance (Kerferd, 1967: 
161). Monism may also be found to be manifested as features of 
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thought in the schools of Stoicism and philosophical 
Epicureanism, both of which originated in the fourth century BC. 
The first school espoused a spiritualistic monism according to 
which the whole world is mind, while the second endorsed a 
materialistic monism which reduces everything to its atomic 
essence (Petrement, 1973-4: 40). 
Neoplatonism, a philosophical and religious system which 
combined the Platonic ideas with oriental (Middle rather than Far 
East) mysticism and which was founded by Plotinus (AD 205-270), 
emphasized the notion of unity and wholeness. Plotinus seeks in 
the Enneads to explain in mystical language the central idea of 
the One in the Many, ie, unity-in-plurality. He states that the 
Many rises from the One which itself remains unaltered. In this 
way "the whole is in every part" (Plotinus, Fourth Ennead ix.5). 
Plotinus associates the "whole" with the One which gives rise to 
the Many and yet remains undiminished itself. We find in the 
ideas of Plotinus a variation of the One-and-Many theme which 
proclaims a more basic reconciliation of monism and pluralism, 
and is echoed in the holistic view of reality (cf 7.1.1). 
In the seventeenth century a revival of the atomistic 
theories of Leucippus and Lucretius (c. 99-55 BC) contributed to 
the firm establishment later of the Cartesian tradition with its 
distinctive emphasis on dualism, which was destined to uphold a 
mechanistic world view as a valid one for natural science in the 
centuries to come (cf 7.4). As already pointed out in Chapter 
2.5, the dualism of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) separated mind 
(res coqitans) from body (res ex ten sa) . However, in his 
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affi~mation of monism, the ~ationalist Ba~uch de Spinoza 
(1632-1677) conve~ted extension and thought as two substances 
into two me~e att~ibutes of one substance, viz, God (Williams, 
1967: 72). The w~itings of the monadologist Gottf~ied Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716) pa~adoxically ~eflect featu~es of both monism 
and plu~alism. Hall, fo~ example, points out that, II a 
substantival plu~alist, Leibniz ••• maintains that the plu~ality 
of substances ••• do fo~m a systematic unity 'ideally' o~ when 
looked at f~om the viewpoint of an omniscient being" (1967: 
364). 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) c~iticized dualism insofa~ as it 
signified that thinking substance and extended substance a~e 
things in themselves, but he admitted it insofa~ as it could 
signify that subject and object a~e quite distinct phenomena. 
Kant's own dualist app~oach may be obse~ved in his distinction of 
two wo~lds, ie, one of phenomena and anothe~ of things in 
themselves (Pet~ement, 1973-4: 41). 
Philosophe~s afte~ Kant attempted to ~emove these p~ofound 
divisions of dualistic thought. G.W. Fichte (18th centu~y) made 
the f~ee subject the basis of eve~ything, while Geo~g Wilhelm 
F~ied~ich Hegel (1770-1831) b~ought " ... the-whole of ~eality in 
a single chain by making cont~adiction, fi~st posited and then 
t~anscended, the law of all thought and of all natu~e" (ibid.). 
The alte~nation of monism and plu~alism, and hence also of 
wholeness and f~agmentation continued, and, in the twentieth 
centu~y, p~agmatism developed the plu~alistic theme in its 
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tolel"'"ance of II the many ways in which expel"'"ience is 
appl"'"ehended, systemat~zed, and anticipated'' (Thayel"'", 1967: 435). 
This l"'"efel"'"ence to expel"'"ience establishes the empil"'"icist ol"'"igins 
of the pl"'"agmatist movement in the United States of Amel"'"ica. As 
one of its most influential exponents, William James (1842-1910) 
opposed monism, maintaining that the substance of J"'"eality may 
neve I"'" "get totally collected" and that " ••. in natul"'"e and _i,n 
histol"'"y the continuous flux of change and chance tl"'"ansfol"'"ms ev'el"'"y 
being" ( Ka l len , 1986: 489). He al"'"gued that thel"'"e al"'"e diffel"'"ent 
fol"'"ms of consciousness (in addition to oul"'" nol"'"mal waking 
consciousness) that l"'"equil"'"e equal l"'"egal"'"d in oul"'" intel"'"action with 
the totality of l"'"eality (James, 1902: 54) • 
James' ideas (among othel"'"s) on the "continuous flux of 
change" influenced Whitehead's (1861-1947) philosophy of Ol"'"ganism 
and its pl"'"ocess view of l"'"eality. This philosophy of ol"'"ganism 
expl"'"esses the cosmological views of Whitehead, viz, that" ... the 
univel"'"se consists entil"'"ely of becomings, 
of appi"'"Opl"'"iating and integl"'"ating 
each of them a pl"'"ocess 
the infinity of items 
('l"'"eality') pl"'"ovided by the antecedent univel"'"se and by God 
abiding soul"'"ce of novel possibilities)" (Lowe, 1986: 
(the 
636). 
Whitehead's pl"'"ocess view of J"'"eality intl"'"oduces an element of 
pel"'"sonal cl"'"eativity so that the individual pal"'"ticipates in the 
unfolding of new aspects of J"'"eality. He states: "My unity 
which is Descal"'"tes' 'I am -is my pl"'"ocess of shaping ••• the 
activities of the envil"'"onment into a new cJ"'"eation ..• and is a 
continuation of the antecedent world" (1938: 228). This 
pel"'"spective affil"'"ms a pl"'"ocess OJ"'" "movement" el.ement of l"'"eality, 




highlights a similarity between the views of James and Whitehead 
(Lowe, 1962: 342), viz, that a dynamic ("process") quality is to 
be attributed to their conception of reality. 
Up to this point we have noted the intellectual antecedents 
of the critical notions of wholeness and fragmentation as they 
manifested themselves in many of the cosmological theories 
proposed in Western thought (as doctrines of monism, pluralism 
and dual ism). Wholeness is implied in monism which proclaims an 
essential unity and oneness of reality while fragmentation is 
implied in pluralism which maintains that there is more than one 
reality. 
In the case of wholeness, these implications are as far one 
may go because although actual references to the word "whole" may 
~e identified in Plato (Theaetetus, 2048)' Aristotle (Politics, 
I. 2. 1253a 20) , in Plotinus (see the reference in the Enneads 
mentioned above), and in the works of later philosophers in the 
West, there appears to be few coherent statements of a holistic 
conception of reality, and hence no cohesive defence of wholeness 
as a serious explanatory principle. 
7.1.1 The holism of Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870-1950) 
The term "holism",- which derives from the Greek halos (the 
whole) was coined by Smuts. This is confirmed in the second 
edition of the Oxford English dictionary where holism is defined 
as: 
"A term coined by Gen. J.C. Smuts (1870-1950) to 
designate the tendency in nature to produce wholes (ie, 
bodies or organisms) from the ordered grouping of unit 
structures" ( 1989: 307). 
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Smuts' conception of holism was the fi~st attempt at a 
systematic t~eatment of a holistic view of ~eality in mode~n 
Weste~n thought. His ideas a~e p~esented in its most cohe~ent 
fo~m in his Holism and evolution ( 1926) . Smuts' thoughts, 
howeve~, should be seen as a development of that st~eam of the 
Weste~n intellectual t~adition that emphasized the value of 
wholeness. Fa~ example, Smuts d~aws on the philosophies of 
Plato, A~istotle, Kant, Hegel, Be~gson, Whitehead, B~oad, Mo~gan 
and Alexande~ in his w~iting~. He was likewise familia~ with the 
scientific ideas of the physicists Einstein (1879-1955) and Bah~ 
(1855-1962), was pa~ticula~ly influenced by the thoughts of the 
post-Da~winian biologists Weismann and Lewes, and acknowledged 





ideas we~e al~eady contained in his ea~lie~ 
Walt Whitman: a study in the evolution of 
pe~sonality, and An inqui~y into the Whole (ibid.). Although 
Smuts neve~ made any claim to being eithe~ a p~ofessional 
scientist o~ a p~ofessional philosophe~, he was acutely awa~e of 
the close ~elation between the two disciplines, and claimed that 
scientific advances had given g~eat impetus to philosophy (1932: 
1 ) . Mo~eove~, although he d~ew upon the philosophical and 
scientific w~itings of his p~edecesso~s, the holistic views which 
eme~ged f~om his conclusions we~e, acco~ding to B~ush, II not 
an esote~ic abst~action but a philosophy of life to be ~elied 
upon eve~yday in the pe~sonal and political decisions he was 
constantly p~essed into making" (1984: 290). Meanwhile, the 
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te~m holism has become fi~mly established in the vocabula~y of 
the natu~al sciences, the social sciences, the health sciences 
and ~eligion (cf fo~ example 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 7.3 & 7.4). 
Smuts' conception of holism should be viewed in the light of 
its opposition to mechanism and mechanistic explanations that 
cha~acte~ized seventeenth-, eighteenth- and nineteenth-centu~y 
science (cf 7.3). The mechanistic view of natu~e is closely 
~elated to a ~igo~ous dete~minism, the philosophical basis of 
which is the dualism of Desca~tes. "As a consequence of this 
division", acco~ding to Cap~a, "it was believed that the wo~ld 
could be desc~ibed objectively, ie, without eve~ mentioning the 
human obse~ve~, and such an objective desc~iption became the 
ideal of all science" (1981: 58). Smuts decla~es: 
"The mechanical model 
symbol, but the ve~y 
best~ode the unive~se. 
( 1929: 3) . 
o~ mechanism became, not the 
soul of ~eality. The machine 
All this is changed today" 
A~guing fo~ a "f~esh synthesis of knowledge", Smuts p~oposes 
holism as a tendency in the unive~se to c~eate g~eate~ and 
g~eate~ wholes (1926: 341). These wholes a~e empi~ically 
obse~vable, such as atoms, .cells and pe~sonality and a~e unit 
st~uctu~es " ... whose o~de~ed g~oupings p~oduce natu~al wholes" 
(1926: 86) . Holism applies a f~esh inte~p~etation of the 
evolutiona~y p~ocess as a cosmic p~inciple which is both eme~gent 
(following Alexande~ and Mo~gan) and c~eative (following 
Be~gson) • In this view, evolution cannot be seen to be 
mechanistic o~ tied to a dualism of the mind and the body. B~ush 
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explains that "Smuts deplor-ed divisions not only theor-etically 
but pr-actically. The vision he held was one of wholeness, 
cr-eativity and continuity thr-oughout the univer-se" (1984: 296). 
Thr-ough holism Smuts seeks to explain the essential 
wholeness of ~ea.lity ~nd the univer-se as a. fundamental pr-inciple. 
The onwar-d movement of developing for-ms and phases in the or-ganic 
and the inor-ganic wor-lds ar-e moments in the unfolding -of gr-eater-
wholes in accor-dance with the dictates of this pr-inciple. He 
pr-oclaims that holism is: 
" the ultimate synthetic, or-der-ing, or-ganizing, 
r-egulative activity in the univer-se which accounts for-
all the str-uctur-al gr-oupings and syntheses in it, fr-om 
the atom and the physico-chemical str-uctur-es thr-ough 
the cell and or-ganisms, thr-ough Mind in Animals to 
Per-sonality in Man. The all-per-vading and 
ever--incr-easing char-acter- of synthetic unity and 
wholeness in these str-uctur-es leads to the concept of 
Holism as the fundamental activity under-lying and 
coor-dinating all other-s, and to the view of the 
univer-se as a. Holistic Univer-se" (1926: 317). 
Smuts submits that this view offer-s a sur-er- foundation to 
science than mechanistic ideas (1929: 13) . Holism then, 
accor-ding to Smuts, is a f0nda.menta.l featur-e of the univer-se and 
expr-esses itself in its tr-end to ever- higher- for-ms (ibid.). 
The notion of holism as ar-ticulated by Smuts is not beyond 
cr-iticism. In his own lifetime, Wolstenholme, a. close fr-iend, 
was Smuts' shar-pest cr-itic (Br-ush, 1984: 289). Later-, 
Radhakr-ishnan, the eminent scholar- and statesman, offer-ed a 
cr-itique of Smuts' holism (1980). In spite of these cr-iticisms, 
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those aspects of Smuts' holistic concept which explains the 
p~ocess of c~eative synthesis and the tendency towa~ds g~eate~ 
wholes have ~emained sound (Hope, 1988: 176). 
The emphasis of holism on wholeness p~ovides an oppo~tunity 
to ~econcile the unity of monism on the one hand and the 
dive~sity of plu~alism on the othe~. 
of the sepa~ate wholes such as cells, 
Fa~ example, the appea~ance 
o~gans and so on ~esult 
f~om the dynamic p~inciple of holism that synthesizes pa~ts into 
wholes. This synthesis causes the function of the pa~ts to be 
alte~ed in such a way tha~ they function towa~ds the whole. The 
whole and the pa~ts ~ecip~ocally influence and determine each 
othe~ so that pa~ts appea~ to me~ge thei~ individual cha~acte~s 
to some extent. In this way the whole is contained in the pa~ts 
and the pa~ts a~e in the whole. This mutuality of pa~ts and 
wholes makes each a function of the othe~ (Smuts, 1932: 11). 
Yet, the whole is g~eate~ than the sum of its pa~ts in that a new 
whole displays featu~es that a~e incompatible with those of its 
constituent pa~ts. This idea is cent~al to systems philosophy 
and o~ganismic biology (cf 7.3.2). 
The holistic conception, which ~eceived its clea~est 
fo~mulation in the w~itings of Smuts, is today applied with 
g~owing inte~est in seve~al a~eas of intellectu~l and mo~al life 
(cf 7.3 & 7.4). 
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7.2 Wholeness and f~agmentation in ea~ly Easte~n thought 
In cont~ast to the West, sta~kly dichotomous conceptions of 
~eality a~e well-nigh absent in O~iental thought. Acco~ding to 
Cap~a, the idea of unity p~edominated in the ea~ly Easte~n view 
of ~eality. It is wo~th quoting Cap~a at length he~e: 
"Although the va~ious schools of Easte~n mysticism 
diffe~ in many details, they all emphasize the basic 
unity of the unive~se which is the cent~al featu~e of 
thei~ teachings. The highest aim fo~ thei~ followe~s -
whethe~ they a~e Hindus, Buddhists o~ Taoists-- is to 
become awa~e of the unity and mutual inte~~elation of 
all things, to t~anscend the notion of an isolated 
individual self and to identify themselves with the 
ultimate ~eality. The eme~gence of this awa~eness 
known as 'enlightenment' - is not only an intellectual 
act but is an expe~ience which involves the whole 
pe~son and is ~eligious in its ultimate natu~e. Fo~ 
this ~eason, most Easte~n philosophies a~e essentially 
~eligious philosophies. 
In the Easte~n view, then, the division of natu~e into 
sepa~ate objects is not fundamental and any such 
objects have a fluid and eve~-changing cha~acte~. The 
Easte~n wo~ld view is the~efo~e int~insically dynamic 
and contains time and change as essential featu~es. 
The cosmos is seen as one insepa~able ~eality fo~ 
eve~ in motion, alive, o~ganic; spi~itual and mate~ial 
at the same time" (1981: 23). 
Notions of f~agmentation (and plu~alism) appea~ to be almost 
non-existent in Easte~n thought. Cap~a's ~eview of Buddhism 
(including the Indian and Ch'an Chinese o~ Zen - Japanese 
va~ ieties) , Hinduism, Confucianism and Taoism culminates in his 
obse~vation that the one essential cha~acte~istic that they sha~e 
is " the awa~eness of the unity and mutual inte~~elation of 
all things and events, the expe~ience of all phenomena in the 
wo~ld as manifestations of a basic oneness" (1981: 133). 
This does not imply that the~e we~e absolutely no dualistic 
o~ plu~alistic views (which denied the unity of ~eality) in the 
East. In India the~e we~e dualistic philosophies such as, fo~ 
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example, Atman versus Brahman. The very ancient and important 
Samkhya tea~hes that both matter (or nature) and the Spirit have 
existed throughout eternity (P~trement, 1973-4: 41) . It may 
even be possible to argue that the Yin and the Yang of ancient 
Chinese thought represents a dualism, but Needham proffers 
convincing arguments against this proposition. Needham submits 
that Chinese "correlative coordinative thinking" assumed, rather, 
an organismic view of the universe which emphasized its essential 
unity: "The Yin and the Yang ... move parallel to each other ... 
The implication was that the universe itself is a vast 
organism ..• with all the parts of it cooperating in a mutual 
service ... " (1956: 288). 
In the Hellenized Near East of the first centuries AD a 
dualistic attitude characterized certain Gnostic religious 
teachings. The two main types of dualism were known as the 
Manichaean and the Valentinian, both of which proposed a II 
rift between God and the world, world and man, spirit and flesh" 
(Jona~, 1967: 341). It should be noted that other proto-Gno~tic 
sects, for example the Essenes, were characterized as being 
pluralistic and even as syncretistic, and hence monistic in their 
religious traditions (The Nag Hammadi ... , 1977: 7' 9) . 
It is clear, in spite of the occurrence of dualistic 
approaches, that the dominant view of the nature of the universe 
and reality in early Eastern religions was one which was 
consonant with the conception of wholeness, 
interconnectedness of all things. 
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unity and the 
7. 3 Whole·ness and fragmentation in the natural sciences 
The holistic movement, which emphasizes wholeness, has 
manifested itself today primarily as a development within science 
(McKinney, 1988: 299). ·Major conceptual revolutions in such 
fields as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology and 
neurophysiology have led to what Briggs and Peat call the 
"emerging science of wholeness" (1984). They submit that the 
articulation, and success in application, of newer theories in 
these "hard" sciences has made it possible to think about 
wholeness as "more than just a mystical affirmation" (1984: 
294). Holism is now regarded as a serious mode of approach in 
the theory of the natural sciences, although a note of caution 
has been sounded that it may itself be displaced by other 
approaches: 
"Perhaps other theories will replace those ... which 
express wholeness ... ·Perhaps the fragmentary view will 
continue to dominate science. But the theories of 
wholeness are, at last, new expressions of an ancient 
insight and of a more ancient longing, one which will 
come now into dramatic conflict with the equally 
ancient longing to possess and control through 
knowledge and ownership the various separate things of 
this world ... " (Briggs, 1984: 294). 
The essential view of the universe that emerges from these 
holistic theories is that of·one "without edges" and which is 
continually unfolding (cf Smuts' view of holism in 7.1.1). 
The need is expressed today for a re-orientation or 
restructuring of science so that its wider Germanic sense as 
Wissenschaft, which embraces a systematic study of all phenomena 
whether of nature or of the mind, is emphasized. Such a 
restructuring would enable the accommodation of " all, rather 
than just part, of human experience" (Harman, 1989: 18) . This 
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call fo~ a change in Weste~n science emanates f~om the gene~al 
dissatisfaction with the majo~ assumptions of seventeenth-, 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centu~y science, viz: 
"The objectivist assumption, that the~e is an objective 
unive~se, mo~e o~ less sepa~ate f~om and independent of 
the obse~ve~, which can be explo~ed by the exte~nal 
p~obes of scientific inqui~y, and which can be 
app~oximated, p~og~essively mo~e p~ecisely, by 
analytical models; 
The positivist assumption, that what is scientifically 
·~eal' must take as its basic data only that which is 
physically obse~vable; and 
The ~eductionist assumption, that scientific 
explanation consists in explaining complex phenomena in 
te~ms of mo~e elemental events (eg, gas tempe~atu~e in 
te~ms of the motion of the molecules; human behavio~ in 
te~ms of stimulus and ~esponse)'' (autho~·s emphasis; 
Ha~man, 1989: 9). 
Using physics and biology as examples, we obse~ve the ~esponse to 
the difficulties that these assumptions p~esent. 
7.3.1 Contempo~a~y physics 
The sweeping changes in app~oaches in physics should be 
viewed against the backg~ound of the p~oblems ~elated to the 
mechanistic app~oaches that a~e based on the Ca~tesian division 
o~ dualism of mind and body, and which we~e developed and applied 
wi~h g~eat success in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu~ies (cf 
7.1 & 7.1.1) The success of . the application of Newtonian 
mechanics was halted with the discove~y in the second half of the 
nineteenth centu~y of the identity of elect~omagnetism and light 
which could not be desc~ibed app~op~iately by the mechanistic 
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mode 1 (Capra, 1981: 60-1) . This event signalled the beginning 
of the decline of the universal application of Newtonian physics 
and a fresh interpretation of physical phenomena. 
This fresh interpretation was set forth by Minkowski who 
proposed in 1908 that space anq time (fundamental concepts in 
both science and philosophy) were indeed not independent 
entities: hence the notion of these two separate concepts was 
replaced with that of one, viz, space-time. Following upon this 
discovery in science, Einstein demonstrated that motion was not 
derived from space and time, as classical mechanics taught, but 
that, instead,_ space and time were both dependent on motion 
(Capra, 1981: 65) . In this way space and time were no longer 
seen as fixed quantities each subsisting in isolation; both, in 
unison, became relative to the velocity or motion of the 
observer. In fact, Einstein proclaimed that all forms of matter 
were in motion relative to one another (1956: 229). In 
addition, the traditional concepts of matter required radical 
revision so that the solid, weighty corporality of things had to 
give way to the idea of energy as the basic stuff of reality 
(ibid.). 
Together with the relativity theory of Einstein, the 
conception of the behaviour of subatomic particles in quantum 
theory led to radical changes in prevailing understandings of 
physical reality. Quantum theory has demonstrated the inadequacy 
of classical mechanics at the subatomic level, viz, the joint 
consideration of the velocity and the position of ultimate 
particles leads to a paradoxical situation where the more 
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accurately the one can be determined, the less accurately can 
the other. This means that it is impossible to measure 
accur~tely both the position and the momentum of any particle 
simultaneously (Heisenberg, 1958: 
known as Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty. 
(1901-1976) 
The role of the observer, 
50) . This principle became 
Law of Indeterminacy, or 
ie, the presence of human 
consciousness, became crucial in establishing the fundamental 
nature of subatomic units of matter, or ultimate particles. 
Conradie states this succinctly: "When we try to detect an 
electron, it responds like a particle, but when we are not 
looking at it, it behaves like a wave" (1986: 1). This dual 
aspect of matter introduces the realization of the influence in 
observation of the observer, or of human consciousness, ie, there 
is an essential relation between the object being observed and 
the observer. Bohr's notion of complementarity acknowledged the 
close and necessary relation of what he called the interaction 
between the measuring apparatus and the object to be observed, 
and revealed the inadequacy of the Cartesian dualism between 
observer and observed, or between mind and body. Conradie's 
observation aptly summarizes these radical changes in physics: 
"Physicists began to realize that the universe could not be 
divided into an observing subject and an observed object. The 
two were one" (ibid.: 2) • 
whose consciousness played 
observation itself. 
The observer became a participator 
an integral role in the process of 
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The conclusions drawn from comparisons of these findings in 
physics with Eastern mystical thought affirm a shared conception 
of the unity or oneness of reality and th~ unity of opposites 
(Zukav, 1980; Capra, 1981; cf 7.2). Capra, for example, 
identifies the "new physics" world view with the Taoist vision of 
reality, according to which the Tao represents a process of 
continual flow and change (1981: 111). Moreover, his 
investigations led him to conclude that there is a need to see 
the world not in a mechanistic-reductionist way but as a dynamic, 
ecological whole so that the One is in the Many and Many dwells 
within the One (cf 7.1). 
A systematic discussion on the treatment of wholeness in 
contemporary physics is found in the work of Bohm. However, an 
attempt to apply a holistic interpretation to recent discoveries 
in physics had already been undertaken by Smuts in 1932. After 
reviewing the discoveries of space-time by Minkowski and the 
relativity theory by Einstein, he declares: 
"When once we realize that space and time are not 
separates or absolutes, but abstractions from a whole, 
func.tions of something deeper, coordinates or relations 
of things springing from a more fundamental physical 
reality, we begin to sense a very different world from 
that which superficialiy appears to our senses'' (1932: 
3) • 
For Smuts such developments as, for example, the merging of space 
and time into a greater whole of space-time, merely confirm the 
holistic character of the universe which seeks to overcome the 
separation of mind and matter in order to achieve a greater 
synthesis (1932: 2, 12). 
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In a-simila~ inte~p~etation of the findings of contempo~a~y 
physics, Bohm asse~ts that the" ... inte~connectedness of the 
whole unive~se is the fundamental ~eality, and that ~elatively 
independently behaving pa~ts a~e me~ely pa~ticula~ and contingent 
fo~ms within this whole" (1975: 22) • 
Bohm distinguishes fu~the~mo~e between the implicate and "the 
explicate o~de~s of the unive~se. The implicate o~de~ is the 
p~ima~y ~ealm of wholeness, ~ega~ded by Bohm as a flowing 
movement out of which we abst~act the diffe~ent "pa~ts" of the 
explicate o~de~. This implicate o~de~ is like a holog~apric 
plate in which each pa~t contains encoded info~mation about the 
enti~e whole. It is the implicate o~de~ which p~ovides the 
g~ound o~ code fo~ the manifestation of multiplicity in the 
explicate o~de~ of eve~yday expe~ience. While science has 
~ega~ded the explicate o~de~ as the only ~eality, it is ~eally 
the wholeness of the unive~se that is p~ima~y and which allows 
fo~ all the inte~action of ~elatively stable pa~ts in the 
explicate ~ealm of pe~ceptual expe~ience (1981). 
Bohm contends fu~the~ that ou~ theo~ies a~e me~ely in~ights 
into ~eality which a~e neithe~ absolutely t~ue no~ absolutely 
false but, ~athe~, clea~ in ce~tain domains and unclea~ when 
extended beyond these domains. Fo~ example, the Newtonian fo~m 
of insight wo~ked well fo~ seve~al centu~ies on the mac~oscopic 
level, o~ with la~ge bodies, until the difficulties p~esented by 
newe~ discove~ies a~ose, when newe~ fo~ms of insight we~e 
~equi~ed to ~esolve these difficulties. In this way new fo~ms of 
insight develop to cla~ify ce~tain domains that cannot be 
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cla~ified by ea~lie~ ones (1981: 3) • He concludes that" ..• 
the~e can be no conclusive expe~imental p~oof of the t~uth o~ 
falsity of a gene~al hypothesis which aims to cove~ the whole of 
~eality" o~ that the~e will be a final fo~m of insight 
co~~esponding to absolute t~uth. Rathe~, one may expect the 
development of new fo~ms of insight which will assimilate ce~tain 
key featu~es of the olde~ fo~ms to allow ways of looking at the 
wo~ld as a whole (ibid.). 
We witness then in contempo~a~y physics _the eme~gence of a 
wo~ld view with a mo~e holistic cha~acte~ that is capable of 
offe~ing explanations fo~ p~oblems that we~e seemingly 
int~actable to mechanistic models. While the holistic view has 
not disp·laced the mechanistic one, it is ~ega~ded as one that 
me~its se~ious conside~ation by physicists today. 
7.3.2 Biology 
The use of physics as a model fo~ othe~ sciences has fo~ 
long been a customa~y intellectual p~actice. Cap~a explains how 
\ 
his a~guments fo~ the ~eplacement of the Ca~tesian pa~adigm with 
a new one in physics (cf 7.3.1) was itself an example of 
"Ca~tesian thinking", ie, that he still saw physics as the model 
fo~ othe~ sciences and hence physical phenomena as the "p~imal 
~eality and basis fo~ eve~ything else" (1988: 72). This is why, 
subsequently, his The tu~ning point ~ep~esents physics only as a 
special case of a much mo~e gene~al f~amewo~k ~athe~ than as a 
model fo~ othe~ sciences, He explains this as a change f~om 
"physics thinking" to "systems thinking" (cf 7.4) which p~ovided 
a mo~e gene~al framewo~k within which to develop his obse~vations 
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(ibid). (Bernstein argue& that the Cartesian either/or dualism 
still infects intellectual debates in which alternatives are 
proposed and selected. He claims that a better insight is gained 
if the whole framework of this type of thinking is called in 
question. His suggestion to move towards a post-Cartesian 
framework is echoed in the holistic principle in which dualisms 
are reconciled in an attempt at achieving a higher synthesis 
(1983: 23 ; c f 7 . 1 . 1 ) ) . 
For this reason, we may note also changes in the field of 
biology where a dissatisfaction with the mechanistic model led to 
the gradual emergence of holistic approaches. It should be noted 
that although there are holistic approaches in biology, there are 
also scientists who emphasize the usual mechanistic 
interpretqtions, which is applied successfully in many areas of 
biology. The point made here is simply that ,there is also a 
greater awareness of the limitations of mechanistic models and of 
the availability of holistic explanations as valid alternatives. 
We may turn again ~o the observations of Smuts for an 
insight into the limitations of the mechanistic model in biology 
with special regard to the evolutionary process. In its adoption 
of the mechanistic model from physics the assumption was made in 
biology that living beings are governed by the same laws as 
inanimate matter. However, life is more than its detailed 
reactions and living things " follow a routine and display a 
behaviour different from those of non-living things" (1929: 4). 
Smuts concludes that mechanists in biology are wrong in their 
view of life largely because they are wrong in their view of 
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matter (ibid; cf 7.3.1). In contrast to this mechanistic view he 
postulates the holistic view which supplies a creative fe~ture to 
the evolutionary process in which parts in a whole display 
entirely different characteristics from that of the whole itself. 
These ideas did not originate with Smuts. Similar views had 
already been advocated by Bergson (1859-1941) in 1911 in his 
work, Creative evolution, and by Morgan in 1912 in his book 
entitled, Instinct and experience. Nevertheless, it was Smuts 
who emphasized the more fundamental notion of the "whole" in 
creative evolution as a cosmological principle according to which 
"Life is nothing but the emergent behaviour of certain advanced 
types of wholes" (1929: 8· ' cf 7.1.1). Bergson's rejection of a 
mechanistic interpretation of certain aspects of Darwin's 
(1809-1882) theory of evolution, specifically the explanation 
offered concerning the natural selection of variations that are 
passed on to subsequent generations and that ensures the maximum 
value for survival, led to the resurgence of the doctrine of 
vitalism (Goudge, 1967a: 294). This doctrine postulated the 
existence within living things of a unifying factor or vital 
spirit, referred to as the entelechy (cf 3.3.1) a term taken from 
Aristotle. Bergson called this force the vital impetus (elan 
vital) which gave evolution a distinctive creative character, but 
the cause of the creation lay within the organisms rather than 
outside them, as Darwin's theory of natural selection had 
postulated (Phillips, 1976: 25) . 
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Anothe~ fo~m of ~eaction against the mechanist model in 
biology was o~ganicism. The biological o~ganicists, most 
notably, J.S. Haldane (1860-1936), diffe~ f~om the vitalists (as 
rep~esented in 
(and the latte~· 
the thought of Be~gson) in that the forme~ denies 
holds) "that the cha~acteristic featu~es of 
o~ganic activity •.. a~e caused by the p~esence in the o~ganism of 
a nonphysical but substantial entity" {Goudge, 1967b: 550). Of 
g~eate~ impo~tance than its qua~~el with vitalism, o~ganicismic 
views a~e mo~e consistent with those of Smuts' holistic outlook. 
Pa~ticipating in a discussion befo~e the B~itish Association fo~ 
the Advancement of Science which included Smuts, Haldane 
p~oclaimed that if we " dis~ega~d the holism o~ coordination 
of life we can give no mo~e than a disjointed and incoh~~ent 
physical and chemical account of life" (1929: 34) . By this, 
Haldane means that the o~ganism's ~elations with the envi~onment 
is mo~e ~eadily susceptible of holistic conceptions" ..• of life 
as a unity which maintains o~ asse~ts itself" (1929: 32) . 
Mo~e ~ecently, Briggs and Peat have identified seve~al 
theo~ists in biology whose fundamental ideas co~~espond st~ongly 
with the cent~al t~net~ of the notion of holism (1984: 163-255). 
Thus the p~oposition that the~e a~e views in the field of 
biology that emphasize wholeness is a plausible one. These 
pe~ceptioris exist alongside those that ~mphasize mechanical, and 
hence mo~e f~agmented, views. The mechanical outlook, acco~ding 
to some of its exponents, ~emains as valid as,eve~ fo~ the 
th~ee-dimensional ~ealm in which it was developed to ope~ate 
400 
(Hogben, 1929: 26) • Howeve~, holistic views a~e today also 
~ega~ded as valid fa~ the explanation of ce~tain biological 
p~oblems that have p~oved to be ~ecalcit~ant to t~aditional 
mechanical solutions, and have hence been accepted as being 
equally valid, especially in fou~-dimensional app~ehensions of 
~eality. 
7.4 Wholeness and f~agmentation in the social sciences and the 
humanities 
The acknowledgement of a c~isis in the natu~al sciences has 
been echoed in the social sciences. Mit~off and Kilmann h'ave 
p~oposed that: 
"The main ~eason why the social sciences have given a 
f~agmenta~y and incomplete account of the natu~e of man 
is that the social sciences have themselves been 
conceived of and p~acticed in a la~gely f~agmenta~y and 
incomp 1 ete manne~" ( 1978: 3) . 
It is impo~tant to point out that fa~ a long time the social 
sciences we~e ~ega~ded as genuine, albeit immatu~e, natu~al 
sciences that diffe~ed in deg~ee, and not in kind, f~om the ~est 
of the natu~al sciences. Acco~ding to this view, p~og~ess in the 
social sciences ~equi~e the adoption of those methods, p~ocedu~es 
and c~ite~ia fa~ testing hypotheses and theo~ies that p~oved 
successful in the natu~al sciences (Be~nstein, 1983: 27) . As a 
consequence, the mechanistic methods of the natu~al sciences we~e 
applied in seve~al of the social sciences (cf fa~ example 
Education-3.4 & Communication-3.5). 
Of cou~se, the~e has been a dea~th of significant attempts 
to app~oach the p~oblems in the social sciences within the 
f~amewo~k of holistic assumptions. Phillips submits that the~e 
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is an enormous body of literature on holism but that a student of 
the social sciences is unlikely to encounter it in any ordered 
way (1976: 1 ) . He states that debates on methodological 
individualism versus methodological holism, the place of 
psychological explanations in sociology, and structuralism versus 
functionalism are all indicative of the presence of holistic 
theses in conflict with others (ibid.). Hence, the observation 
may be made that instead of an absence of holistic ideas in the 
social sciences there appears to have been the lack of a 
widespread awareness that the above-mentioned debates are 
instances of the influence of holism. 
As distinct from its conceptions as broader, cosmological 
principles (as encountered in philosophy and the natural 
sciences; cf 7 . 1-7 . 3) , the notions of wholeness versus 
fragmentation reveal themselves as methodological debates in the 
social sciences, more specifically in ways of explaining the 
relations between individual and society. According to James, 
competing social theories embody incompatible conceptions of the 
relations between these two, and culminate in relations of parts 
to wholes, and leading to the contrasting positions of 
methodological holism on the one hand and methodological 
individualism on the other (1984: 1 ) . 
methodological holism and methodological 
The positions of 
individualism have a 
long and complex history (Phillips, 1976: 37). Method~logical 
individualism holds that every "complex situation, institution, 
or event is the result of a particular configuration of 
individuals, their dispositions, situations, 






position is analogous to mechanism in that the whole is explained 
exclusively in ter-ms of the par-ts and hence espouses a 
r-eductionist appr-oach in the explanation of social phenomena. 
Methodological holism on the other- hand denies that complex 
situations or- social wholes can be r-educed to individuals. James 
explains that methodological individualism has been mor-e 
pr-ominent in the social sciences and that this has for-ced 
methodological holism to assume a defensive position, but she 
concludes that holism is a fr-uitful appr-oach to social 
explan<;ltion and r-ivals the position of methodological 
individualism (1984: 9). 
A quest for- the most appr-opr-iate way of studying any or-ganic 
whole was also a pr-oblem that pr-eoccupied the biologist Von 
the limitations of Ber-talanffy · ( 1901- ) . He acknowledged 
mechanism in this r-egar-d and sought to establish a new standpoint 
which - at var-iance with mechanism - takes account of or-ganic 
wholeness (1962: 46). 
holistic view would 
He became convinced, however-, that such a 
thr-ow light not only on biological systems 
but on all systems. His. Gener-al Systems theor-y is a 
logico-mathematical field which seeks to for-mulate and der-ive 
those pr-inciples which hold for- systems in gener-al, system being 
defined as a complex of elements standing in inter-action (1960: 
199). This theor-y aimed at becoming a gener-al science of 
"wholeness" as distinct fr-om mer-ely vague, hazy and 
semi-metaphysical speculations, holding that ther-e ar-e gener-al 
pr-inciples which hold for- all systems r-egar-dless of the natur-e of 
the component elements and the r-elations or- for-ces between them 
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(ibid.). The gene~al failu~e of the successful application of 
this theo~y in the social sciences may be asc~ibed to its heavy 
~eliance on mathematical concepts which a~e of limited 
application in the social sciences, and to the gene~al 
acknowledgement of the limitations of this theo~y as a 
scientifically sustainable one. Be~talanffy himself identifies 
the sho~tcomings of this theo~y: 
"The decisive question is that of the explanato~y and 
p~edictive value of the 'new theo~ies' attacking the 
host of p~oblems a~ound wholeness ... The~e is no 
question that new ho~izons have been opened up, but the 
~elations to empi~ical facts often remain tenuous" 
( 1968b: 21). 
Its failu~e to serve as a useful method of explanation in the 
social sciences is also an instance of the limitations of 
applying natu~al scientific (in this instance mathematical) 
p~ocedu~es to social phenomena gene~ally. In the field of 
lib~a~y and info~mation science, Ha~mon has attempted to apply 
notions of Gene~al Systems theo~y to enhance an unde~standing of 
the concept of knowledge (cf 5.22). 
The ~ole of human consciousness in the study of social 
events and phenomen~ is an impo~tant element that cannot be 
igno~ed. Moreove~, the discove~ies in mode~n physics confi~m 
even in that field of study the inc~easing ~ecognition of the 
integ~al role of the consciousness of the subjective obse~ve~ and 
the need to take this into account in the p~ocess of obse~vation 
(cf 7.3.1). The dualism of subject and object is disappea~ing 
and the old wo~d "obse~ve~", acco~ding to Con~adie, is being 
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replaced with that of "participator" (1986: 2) • The notion of 
participation is thus linked to that.of wholeness. Skolimowski 
confirms this link: 
The idea 
"Wholeness means that all parts belong together, and 
that means that they partake in each other. Thus from 
the central idea that all is connected, that each is 
part of the whole, comes the idea that each participate 
in the whole. Thus participation is an implicit aspect 
of wholeness (author's emphasis; 1985: 25). 
of participation also connotes the idea of 
interrelatedness, since to participate requires an involvement or 
relation. In the field of psychology, the Gestalt psychologists 
seek to explain how one system (eg, the physical realm) relates 
to another (eg, what it is that is perceived) and express the 
wholeness of, or relation of, individual and environment. The 
Gestalt psychologists are the forerunners of the application of 
holistic ideas in psychology (Phillips, 1976: 120). 
However, the work of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) also 
manifests a consistent attempt to apply notions of wholeness and 
unity. His "collective unconscious" emphasizes an essential 
relationship between the individual and the rest of mankind. 
According to Jung, this domain of consciousness contains 
elements, usually present in dreams, that cannot be derived from 
the dreamer's personal experience. Jung calls these elements 
"archetypes" or "primordial images", which stem from " the 
biological, prehistoric, and unconscious development of the mind 
in archaic man, whose psyche was still close to that of the 
anima 1 " ( 1964: 57) . 
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Jung's schema is pa~ticula~ly valuable as a comp~ehensive 
model of human cognition because it seeks to encompass the widest 
inclusion of psychological types. Th~ough an application of the 
dimensions of int~ove~sion and ext~ave~sion to the fou~ ca~dinal 
functions ~efe~~ed to above, Jung p~oposes eight basic 
psychological types fo~ conside~ation in the study of individual 
psxcholDgy. He emphasizes, howeve~, that these eight types a~e 
by no means the only ones that exist (1933: 621). Fu~the~mo~e, 
each view that cha~acte~izes a psychological type is, acco~ding 
to Jung, as t~ue as anothe~ although it may be difficult fo~ any 
individual subsc~ibing to a given view to ag~ee with this claim 
(ibid.: 623; cf Royce-5.13 & Figu~e 13 fo~ Kesting's adaptation 
of Jung's schema). Although the~e is such a st~iking 
diffe~entiation of individual psychological types, at the 
foundation of human consciousness, acco~ding to Jung, the~e is a 
fundamental unifo~mity (ibid.: 624). 
If the p~yche may be a sou~ce of the wholeness of human 
consciousness in the o~ientation to the fullness of expe~ience, 
then, as Vaught contends, it may equally be a sou~ce of 
f~agmentation. He a~gues that a mo~e fundamental sou~ce of 
f~agmentation than that of cultu~al affiliation is one which lies 
at the foundation of human expe~ience and ~eveals itself as a 
pe~manent st~uctu~al featu~e of the human psyche (1984: 156). 
Within the context of Vaught's pe~ceived spi~itual dimension of 
man this featu~e may be desc~ibed as the need fo~ the psyche to 
o~ient itself beyond its ~each (as the intentionality of 
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consciousness, ie, its or-ientation towar-ds objects of 
consciousness), but also to r-etur-n to the place wher-e it star-ted. 
He explains this as follows: 
"In the final analysis, human fr-agmentation is not 
mer-ely a cultur-al phenomenon, but is a function of the 
much mor-e fundamental conflict that can ar-ise between 
the two dir-ectional or-ientations of the human soul. We 
long for- what lies beyond, but also for- a sustaining 
gr-ound. We ar-e or-iented towar-d a lar-ger- wor-ld, but we 
cannot escape the wish to r-etur-n to our- or-igins ... It 
is finally the conflict between these two tendencies 
that lies at the foundation of our- fr-agmented 
condition" (1984: 157). 
Vaught's obser-vations confir-m the emer-gence of a patter-n of 
alter-nation of holistic (wholeness) and plur-alistic 
(fr-agmentation) explanations that stem fr-om the fundamental 
conflict of the One and the Many. This patter-n in the social 
sciences manifests itself, inter- alia, in philosophy (cf 7.1) and 
r-eligion (cf 7.2). 
In shar-p contr-ast to holistic appr-oaches in the social 
sciences ther-e ar-e those which emphasize fr-agmentedness. An 
example of such a par-adigm is found in the field of aesthetic and 
liter-ar-y cr-iticism. Despite its or-igin in the humanities, it 
str-ongly influences the br-oader- contempor-ar-y intellectual scene. 
It is r-efer-r-ed to as "postmoder-nism" and is char-acter-ized by the 
pr-edominance of the following ter-ms: plur-alism, fr-agmentation, 
heter-ogeneity, deconstr-uction, ambiguity and uncer-tainty 
(McKinney, 1988: 299). 
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Postmoder-nism is a development fr-om moder-nism and takes its 
essential char-acter- fr-om a r-eaction to the moder-nist movement in 
liter-atur-e. McKinney submits that the debate between the two 
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movements may be viewed at a more basic level as a manifestation 
of the conflicting conceptions of reality as One (the monistic 
position) or Many (the pluralistic stance). He traces the 
postmodernist versus modernist debate in literature to the 
organicist view that emphasizes classical values and that 
perceives unity as a multiplicity of parts on the one hand and 
the Enlightenment drive to demystify such values on the other 
(1988: 306). Altieri distinguishes postmodernism from modernism 
in the following way: 
"Modernist poetics can be seen as stressing the 
presence or absence of a single privileged system of 
explanation giving meaning and purpose to particulars, 
whereas self-conscious postmodern writers have become 
increasingly conscious of multiple systems each having 
equal explanatory power in appropriate circumstances" 
(1984: 113). 
It is apparent from the quotation above that the postmodernist 
approach in literature emanates from a pluralistic outlook. As 
an example of the postmodernist emphasis on pluralism, Derrida's 
deconstruction approach to literary criticism seeks to undermine 
the existing hierarchical oppositions within whatever text is 
being considered (Culler, 1982: 86). For example, the dominant 
tendency in Western thought opposes certain concepts to each 
other with the first one having priority over the latter (eg, 
essence over appearance, presence over absence, identity over 
difference, being over becoming and so on) . However, the 
deconstructionist considers neither polar term to be more 
essential than the other. In addition, a simple affirmation of 
their equality is not enough to disrupt a given hierarchy 
(Culler, 1982: 166). Rather, the criti~ must show how the very 
affirmation of a hierarchy leads to its reversal. The marginal, 
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for- example, is demonstr-ated to be of mor-e impor-tance than what 
was thought to be essential, thus r-esulting in the ver-y biur-r-ing 
of such distinctions altogether- (ibid.). 
However-, the distinctions should not be abolished, nor- the 
fir-st abandoned in favour- of the second. Nor- is the aim to 
cr-eate some dialectical synthesis of opposites into something 
new. On the contr-ar-y, the deconstr-uctionist aims at following a 
"double pr-ocedur-e" wher-eby he or- she r-elies on one concept in 
or-der- to cr-iticize the other- ~nd then r-ever-ses the dir-ection of 
the cr-iticism as soon as the for-mer- has been achieved. This 
involves an oscillation between two poles of opposition and " 
destr-oys the pr-etensions of any systematic 
having the final wor-d" (Culler-, 1982: 150). 
inter-pr-etation 
In this way, 
at 
the 
pr-omotion of one inter-pr-etation leads to its own destr-uction and 
to the subsequent pr-omotion of its opposite. Culler- pr-oposes 
that this is why the deconstr-uctionist cannot do " without the 
pr-inciple of non-contr-adiction as well as why he or- she cannot 
avoid violating it as well" (1982: 150). 
McKinney contends that the debate between the moder-nist and 
the postmoder-nist is based on the mor-e pr-imor-dial dichotomy of 
the One and the Many, ie, that this debate is mer-ely an instance 
of the long-standing holism ver-sus plur-alism theme (1988: 308). 
He explains that while moder-nism opts for- the "centr-ipetal 
for-ces of unity, sameness, tr-uth, systematic har-mony, commitment 
and being", postmoder-nism chooses the "centr-ifugal r-ealm of 
differ-ence, multiplicity, contr-adiction, ambiguity, uncer-tainty, 
r-elativity and becoming" (ibid.). He con·c ludes that their-
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conflicting app~oaches emanate f~om thei~ dive~gent wo~ld views, 
ie, unity on the one hand and multiplicity on the othe~ - without 
~ecognizing the ultimate cohe~ence between the two poles of the 
One and the Many (ibid.). 
The existence of holistic and plu~alistic pa~adigms in the 
social sciences and the humanities confi~m the patte~n of 
competing wo~ld views that has dominated intellectual life since 
the time of 
unde~pinning 
the ea~ly G~eeks (cf 7.1). If one analyses the 
theo~etical bases of seve~al techniques 0~ 
st~ategies that a~e applied in diffe~ent fields of study, the 
connections may be made, even if they a~e indi~ect, with the 
These wa~ld views tend to basic tenets of a specific wo~ld view. 
suppo~t eithe~ p~edominantly monistic, and hence holistic, 
conceptions of ~eality exp~essing wholeness, o~ p~edominantly 
~eality affi~ming plu~alistic, 
f~agmentation. 
o~ dualistic conceptions of 
The existence of these appa~ently opposing views a~e evident 
also, and as a c~ucial conce~n fo~ the pu~pose of this study, in 
conceptions of human knowledge emanating f~om majo~ pa~adigms of 
thought that have eme~ged in the 
sciences. and the humanities. 
natu~al sciences, the social 
The pe~ception that lib~a~y and 




cla~ification ~ega~ding its app~oach to 
the essential featu~es that typify its 
human knowledge. The acknowledgement of 
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differ-entiation in viewpoint r-egar-d~ng conceptions of human 
knowledge complicates the task for- libr-ar-ians and infor-mation 
' 
scientists and r-equir-es fur-ther- examination. 
7.5 Wholeness and fr-aqmentat~on in conceptions of human knowledge 
Definitions of knowledge r-eflect diver-gent conceptual 
appr-oaches and r-eveal a wide var-iety of inconsistent, even 
conflicting meanings (cf definitions of knowledge, 4. 2) . In an 
attempt to systematize this diver-gence ther-e has been a helpful 
division of the conceptions of human knowledge into br-oad 
conceptions as applied in the social sciences and nar-r-ower 
conceptions as found in systematic philosophy (cf 4.2.4). In 
addition to these conceptions, sever-al theor-ists in the field of 
libr-ar-y and infor-mation science have expr-essed the need to define 
this ter-m for- its effective application in sever-al ar-eas of the 
pr-ofession, and many have pr-oposed their- own conceptions in this 
r-egar-d (cf 4.2.1). In this study the views of the exponents 
that ar-e listed in Chapter- 5 have been pr-esented in the for-m of a 
typology (cf 6.2.5). These views ar-e also discussed again in the 
context of holistic conceptions of r-ecor-ded knowledge in libr-ar-y 
and infor-mation science (cf 7.6). This section, however-, aims at 
a br-oad over-view of a few attempts (other- than those in Chapter-
5) to per-ceive knowledge as whole or- holistic on the one hand, 
and attempts to emphasize its fr-agmentedness on the other-. 
The fr-agmentation of human knowledge, accor-ding to 
Skolimowski, may be tr-aced to the separ-ation of knowledge fr-om 
values. In a per-iodizing schema, he descr-ibes four- positions 
that developed histor-ically in the r-elation between knowleqge and 
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values. First, there is the position held by Plato and which 
predominated during classical antiquity. In this position values 
and knowledge were fused together and the possession of superior 
knowledge led to the leading of a superior life. Second, the 
position that prevailed during the Middle Ages was one that fused 
knowledge with values but which, at the same time, subordinated 
knowledge to the values established by the Roman Catholic Church 
(values, in other words, were superior to knowledge). Third, the 
post-Renaissance position separated knowledge from values without 
giving supremacy (or censure) to either. Finally, classical 
empiricism, whLch is associated with positivism and logical 
empiricism, separated knowledge from values and attached supreme, 
importance to knowledge of physical things and ruled that values 
are not proper knowledge - knowledge, in other words, being held 
superior to values (1981: 1-4). 
Skolimowski's concern extends to intellectual and moral 
realms. He contends that the separation of knowledge from 
mankind's actions and judgement divided man into halves and that 
this has led to fragmentation in intellectual and moral life 
(1981: 12) • He blames this division on the Cartesian, 
mechanistic conception of the world which, he argues, needs to be 
replaced with a much broader and richer one that is founded on 
holistic notions (1981: 28) • In his regard for the equal 
importance of all facets of life and human experience and his 
attempt to reconcile knowledge with values once again, he 
advances what he describes as an 
explains: 
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"epistemology of life". He 
I 
"The epistemology of life signifies mapping out the 
territories of our implicit faculties and resources of 
knowledge, including the subconscious, intuitive, and 
extrasensory, which participate in our acts of 
.perception and comprehension, which guide us through 
the labyrinth of ~ctual living, of which we are 
aware ... "(1981: 112). 
This may be explained as a kind of holistic knowing which 
involves participation of the consciousness of the knower in the 
process of the acquisition of knowledge. The role of human 
consciousness in current scientific thinking has already been 
established as a critical factor that cannot be ignored (cf 7.2). 
The essential unity of mind and matter in epistemological 
issues is a conclusion that Smuts inferred from his own 
observations of the holistic principle at work in the universe 
(cf 7.1.1). As distinct from the mechanistic view that separated 
mind from matter, Smuts contends that the holistic view implies 
that "Mind in knowledge has co·mmerce with matter" ( 1932: 9) . 
Comparing knowledge to a prism, Smuts submits that while 
experience, as a necessary procedure Of the mind, is refracted or 
divided so that it appears to be separate, the truth is that the 
full spectrum of knowledge is much larger than the sum of 
separate things that the mind focuses on. In this way, the 
separate things that the mind attends to are, in essence, parts 
of a larger whole that reflects the holistic nature of reality, 
as Smuts perceives it to be (1932: 10) • 
This holistic kind of knowing also emphasizes the 
multidimensional character of human knowledge and its tolerance 
for different modes of knowing or forms of cognition. 
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The biological basis for this claim receiv~s support from 
clinical evidence in split-brain research. Traditional thinking 
about the functioning of the brain is that the left hemisphere 
controls the right side of the body and the right hemisphere the 
left side, and that each hemisphere controls distinctive 
characteristics that could manifest themselves as different 
cognitive styles if the left and right hemispheres were' to 
operate independently. Recent research in split-brain surgery 
has yielded evidence to suggest that higher mental functions 
utilize what is common to both hemispheres (Ornstein, 1975) . 
According to the view that emerges from this research, the whole 
brain is involved and transcends the overall individual capacity 
of each hemisphere. In this way, the holistic view that the 
parts tend to merge their individual functions with the complete 
functioning of the whole, is reinforced. In his application of 
these findings to educational possibilities, Hope urges educators 
to aim at developing the whole brain rather than one part 
thereof. For him this means the recognition of the "holistic 
mode of knowing", which " ... integrates all forms of cognition 
from the innate impulse of instinct, to the rational faculty of 
the intellect, to the apprehensive powers of intuitive 
perception" ( 1988: 193). This mode of knowing appears to allow 
the expression of different ways of perceiving reality but to 
recognize, at the same time, that all are contained within a 
greater whole that develops to a higher synthesis of the 
individual parts. 
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The notion of development mentioned above is another 
characteristic feature of the holistic conception of knowledge as 
perceived by its proponents. 
growth rather than a final state, 
This notion expresses a dynamic 
ie, knowledge grows in such a 
way as to become a greater whole that is not a complete or final 
state of knowledge, 
further development. 
but that contains the potential for even 
Bohm's interpretation of the "holomovement" 
of the growth of knowledge implies the assimilation of certain 
aspects of older theories by new ones without the claim of 
absolute truth or finality by the new theories (1981: 
7.3.1). 
Knowledge assumes a fluid and dynamic character 
63; cf 
that 
develops into larger wholes without the assertion that the whole 
is the ultimate state of knowledge (Watson, 1979: 240). When 
Vaught states that: II the quest for wholeness as a cognitive 
activity transcends the fragmentation which a mere capitulation 
to the complexity of experience would entail, but it does this 
without transforming the quest for wholeness into a quest for 
complete comprehension", he may be seen to be making a similar 
c 1 aim ( 1984:, 160). The point made by these authors is that the 
growth of knowledge is holistic in that parts are integrated into 
newer and greater wholes, but these wholes contain within 
themselves the potential of evolving to even greater ones. 
Merrell. takes into consideration the ideas of part and whole 
in his articulation of an epistemology of written texts and comes 
to a similar conclusion. His views regarding the growth of 
knowledge through the production of texts rest upon a hypothesis 
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of what he calls "the potential infinity of texts and mental 
worlds". He continues by suggesting that" ... this hypothesis 
allows us to maintain the idea that any particular system and any 
particular theory constitutes only an approximation, only a 
relative truth, along with the optimistic vision of there 
perpetually existing the possibility of discovering-inventing 
newer and more broadly-based portions of t r u t h a=-=d=----=i:..:.n..:..f.:_::i:..:.n"-'1.=-· -=t:.::u::..:m.:..:.." 
(1984: 148). 
We may safely infer from the observations by different 
proponents of the holistic outlook that holistic conceptions of 
knowledge are characterized by the qualities of wholeness, unity, 
multidimensionality, dynamic creativity and infinite 
potentiality. 
knowledge as 
The pluralist on 
being essentially 
the other hand conceives of 
fragmented and its growth as a 




its mechani"stic outlook appears to emphasize the 
human consciousness from nature. However, 
in several areas of intellectual life note the 
shortcomings of this approach and suggest the increasing evidence 
for the acceptance of the scientific credibility of notions of 
wholeness and holism. The argument for the recognition of the 
holistic explanatory principle as an intellectual rival to the 
reductionistic explanatory principle is enriched by its 
association with long and distinguished intellectual traditions 
in the West and the East (cf 7.1 & 7.2). Holism appears to be 
more than just a mystical affirmation or a religious quest, 
although these aspects are themselves integral to a true 
understanding of the conception of wholeness, ie, holism 
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recognizes all forms of cognition as being valid within their own 
epistemological 
Royce-5. 13) . 
crite~ia for establishing truth (cf Jung-7.4 & 
The suitability of the holistic principle as a basis for a 
general framework for developing an epistemological position for 
library and information science may be tested partially by an 
overview of the success or failure of attempts to apply the ideas 
of wholeness (holism) and fragmentation (pluralism and dualism) 
in several ~reas of this field of study. 
7.6 Wholeness and fragmentation in library and information 
science 
Although there are no readily available records of 
systematic and explicit discussions of the application of the 
notions of wholeness and fragmentation in the field of library 
and information science, several references may be found that 
provide speculative and tentative opinions regarding their values 
and limitations. Moreover, if techniques and strategies that are 
applied in several areas of library and information science are 
carefully analyzed, certain definite connections with holistic or 
pluralistic world views may be ascertained. Furthermore, close 
analysis of the ideas of several theorists and their approaches 
in this field of study suggest that their predominant ideas may 
be loosely associated with the central notions of either 
wholeness or fragmentation. 
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The exponents in Chapter 5 serve as an example of this 
diversity of conceptions. A simple typology of these approaches 
may highlight the major divisions that characterize the general 
world views of these theorists. Admittedly, these divisions are 
based on inferences drawn from their writings, and may for that 
reason not be entirely accurate or necessarily comprehensive in 
coverage. The purpose of this typology is simply to support the 
view that, although wholeness and fragmentation may not be 
explicit in the views of major thinkers in library and 
information science, the more fundamental notions underlying 
their theories appear to influence the geheral outlook of those 
theories (See Figure 9). Figure 9 suggests a fairly even 
distribution of views and hence of the ambivalence regarding an 
explicitly stated, unanimous acceptance or rejection of either 
wholeness or fragmentation. The views of theorists who have 
treated the notions of wholeness and fragmentation either 
directly or indirectly in their writings are summarized 
below. 
briefly 
Butler appears to find holistic ideas useful in his more 
pivotal conceptions that the library should be viewed within the 
context of a larger whole, viz, a broader cultural context (cf 
5. 1) • Moreover, his interpretation of "scholarship" as the total 
intellectual content of a culture serves to reinforce this idea. 
Ranganathan's Hinduistic religious views affirm the notions of 
unity and interrelationship of all things, and it is little 
wonder that he sought, in his approach to librarianship, to unify 
library practices as a whole (cf 5.2). The notions of unity and 
synthesis are characteristic features of Shera's views of 
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THEORISTS WHO ARGUE 
FOR INCLUSIVENESS 
EXPLICITLY 
RANGANATHAN, S.R. - 5.2 
SHERA, J.H. - 5.5 
BEKKER, J. - 5.24 
KESTING, J.G. - 5.28.10 
THEORISTS WHO APPEAR 
TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO 
INCLUSIVENESS 
BUTLER, p. - 5.1 
DEBONS, A. - 5.11 
FOSKETT, D. J. - 5.12 
NITECKI, :J.Z. - 5.14 
KOCHEN, M~ - 5.18 
MEIJER, J.G. - 5.21 
HARMON, G. - 5.22 
MCGARRY, K.J. - 5.23 
HARRIS, M. H .. - 5.26 
KEMP, A. - 5.28.2 
BENGE,· R.C. - 5.28.11.2.2 
NO WELL-DEFINED VIEW 
STaBER, P. & 
K, SCHMIDT. - 5.28.1 
VON FOERSTER, H.- 5.28.3 
WILLIAMS, P. & 
J. PEARCE - 5.28.5 
MU~HOPADHYAY, A.- 5.28.6 
TARANTO; R.E. - 5.28.6 
DE SOLLA PRICE, 
D.J. - 5. 28. 11. 1 
COOMARASWAMY, A.K. 
- 5. 28. 11 . 2. 1 
THEORISTS WHO ARGUE 
FOR DISJUNCTION, BUT 
NOT EXPLICITLY 
DE VLEESCHAUWER, H.J. 
5.3 
MACHLUP, F. - 5.4 
FAIRTHORNE, R.A. - 5.6 
COETZEE, P.C. - 5.7 
MIKHAILOV, A. I. - 5.8 
ROYCE, J. R. - 5.13 
ZAAIMAN, R.B. - 5.15 
SWANSON, B.R. - 5.16 
WILSON, P. - 5.17 
SARACEVIC, T. - 5.20 
DE MEV, M. - 5.25 
SCHRADER, A.M. - 5.27 
BELKIN, N.J. - 5.28.4 
BERGEN, D. - 5.28.8 
OU\ISEN, J.L. - 5.28.9 
THEORISTS WHO ARGUE 
FOR DISJUNCTION 
EXPLICITLY 
FARRADANE, J. - 5.9 
BROOKES, B.C. - 5.1(} 
WRIGHT, H.C. - 5.19• 
FIGURE 9: TYPOLOGY OF VIEWS OF SELECTED THEORISTS IN 
(WHOLENESS) AND DISJUNCTION (FRAGMENTATION). 
UBR.,'\aY Jl.NO !NFORMATION SCIENCE REGARDING INCLUSIVENESS ------
419a 
libr-ar-ianship. He ur-ges that "fr-agmentation" and 
"centr-ifugation" in human knowledge should be counter-ed with a 
"power-ful cohesive for-ce". His conviction of the value of 
holistic appr-oaches extended to his effor-ts to r-econcile 
libr-ar-ianship with infor-mation science, but he later- conceded 
that ther-e was no necessar-y connection (cf 5. 5) . Debons' 
"infor-matology" may be per-ceived as an integr-ative appr-oach in 
infor-mation science, and hence holistic in its outlook. He 
envisaged, along with Otten, that this metascience would ser-ve as 
common basis upon which to study all infor-mation-or-iented and 
specialized sciences and technologies' (cf 5.11). 
Foskett contends that the unity of knowledge is evidenced in 
the fundamental affinities that exist between the sciences and 
the humanities·. He war-ns of the danger-s of the potential ethical 
consequences of the fr-agmentation of knowledge (cf 5. 12) . 
Nitecki also r-eflects a holistic appr-oach in ·his expr-ession of 
the need for- a unified theor-y for- libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science. This emer-ges clear-ly in his notion of 
"metalibr-ar-ianship" which seeks to examine the inter-r-elationships 
that may be found between the gener-ic book, knowledge and r-eader-s 
(cf 5.14). 
Kochen's inter-est in the fr-agmentation and synthesis of 
knowledge was inspir-ed by the conception of a "wor-ld 
encyclopaedia" as pr-oposed by H.G. Wells. He pr-oceeded to 
develop his own ver-sion of a wor-ld encyclopaedia, and his 
pr-oposed new discipline called "episterna-dynamics" aimed at an 





especially concerned with holistic aspects of knowledge, such as 
syntheses, reviews and links between fragments of knowledge ( c f 
5. 18) . Universalit~ and divergence as critical features of 
knowledge also characterize librarianship, according to Meijer 
(cf 5.21). These ideas correspond closely with that of unity and 
diversity (as it is subsumed within unity), and hence with a 
holistic outlook. Also inspired by Wells' "world encyclopaedia" 
idea, Harmon proposes a suprasystem of knowledge that would unify 
the arts and the sciences in order to provide a "more complete 
interpretation of reality" (cf 5.22). l"'oreover, his application 
of the tenets of General Systems theory to library and 
information science would appear to confirm his fundamental 
holistic approach. 
In Bekker' s- theoretical ideas the central notion of 
"continua", as distinct from dichotomized dualities (eg, the hard 
sciences and literature, library science and information science, 
non-fiction and fiction, external reality and "internal" 
reality), reveal the need to see things as a whole rather than as 
separate individual parts (cf 5.24). Moreover, Bekker calls for 
the elimination of "destructive dualities" from library and 
information science. Whether it is possible to characterize 
Harris as a holist, or even a monist, is complicated by the 
observation that while he is articulate about his rejection of a 
"pluralist ontology" and a "positivist epistemology", very little 
is said about what should replace these faulty frameworks for 
thinking about library and information science, except his 
insistence on the need to transcend the .dialectic of positivism 
and subjectivism (cf 5.26). Finally, Kesting's plea for a 
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science committed to dealing with all the phenomena of an 
undivided universe, and his view that knowledge is indivisible, 
stem from a commitment to the notion of wholeness and to holism 
as the position that best describes his philosophical outlook (cf 
5. 28. 10) . 
Both De Vleeschauwer and Coetzee subscribe to a 
perspectivistic epistemological position which recognizes a 
multiplicity of truth perspectives (cf 5.3 & 5.8). Perspectivism 
affirms a pluralistic world view as distinct from a monistic one 
(cf 8.2 for a discussion of the compatibility of perspectivism 
and hal ism) . The pluralistic approach of Royce recognizes three 
basic ways of knowing, each with its own truth criterion or 
epistemology (cf 5.13). 
multiplicity of world views, 
The pluralist affirmation of a 
each with equal claim to validity, 
is also an essential component of the cogn.itivist approach. De 
Mey (cf 5.25) and Belkin (cf 5.28.4) refer, in this regard, to 
the several ways in which the world can be known. In similar 
fashion, 
knowing" 
Schrader suggests different epistemologies or "ways of 
that may be applied in research in library and 
information science (cf 5.27). Bergen may also be regarded as 
being essentially pluralistic in his approach. He calls for an 
"anarchic hospitality" to all world views as a better approach 
than the assignment of status" to only one (cf 
5. 28.8) . In a similar way, Olaisen argues that "paradigmatic 
tolerance" espouses the perception that paradigms provide partial 
and incomplete truths, but that each paradigm may be considered 
as being a valid way of obtaining knowledge (cf 5.28.9). 
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' Besides the pluralists, there are also a few theorists who 
maintain a strict bifurcation of reality as two distinctively 
different types. These dualists appear to be compelled to accept 
the superiority of one type at the expense of the other. For 
example, Brookes' dualism of the physical world and the cognitive 
world emphasizes the latter, although he draws several analogies 
from the physical world in his descriptions of the key features 
of the cognitive world (cf 5.10). His quarrel with and 
consequent dismissal of holism as a profitable conceptual 
framework for library and information science is that it raises 
the level of an argument to a higher level in its resolution of 
difficulties and is hence rendered incapable of verification. 
Natural science, on the other hand (which he contrasts in this 
instance with holism), resolves the difficulty by analysis on a 
more specific level. The application of holistic explanations in 
the natural sciences repudiates a simplistic dichotomy between 
natural science and holism (cf 7.3 & 7.4). 
Another dualistically-inclined thinker, Farradane, also 
questions the validity of holism (cf 5.9). His essentially 
mechanist outlook (as manifested by his strict adherence to the 
traditional "scientific method") leads him to discount the 
validity of philosophical, non-experimental and intuitive 
I 
approaches to knowledge. 
Wright, whose dualism emerges from his consistent 
distin.ction of the physical and metaphysical aspects of 
librarianship, also faces the difficulty of having to make a 
selection between the two (cf 5.19). The ultimate realities for 
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librarianship, according to him, are either data or ideas, and 
the choice of one or the other leads to the adoption of either a 
rationalist or an empiricist epistemological position. His own 
preference is that of rationalism since, he proposes, 
librarianship deals with the "intellectual realities of 
and not with the "sensibles of experience". 
thought" 
No firm views reflecting holistic, pluralistic or dualistic 
approaches in library and information science may be inferred 
from the other theorists listed in Chapter 5. 
The recognition .of the concept of wholeness as a valuable 
one for theory of library and information science is not new. In 
1949, Broadfield introduced his A philosophy of librarianship 
with the observation that philosophical thinking requires a 
holistic attitude. He notes the dominant trend in philosophy to 
rid itself from the need to see things as a whole, while science, 
on the other hand, finds the need to re-examine its metaphysical 
underpinnings (and its holistic aspects, cf 7.3). Broadfield 
puts the point succinctly: "It is the totality of all that is 
the case" (1949: 1 ) . Whether Broadfield implies by this 
statement that wholeness is a dubious category for modern 
systematic philosophers or that it is a valuable one for 
What remains unequivocal theorists o~ librarianshi~ is unclear. 
is the relevance of wholeness as a theme worthy of debate in the 
philosophy of librarianship. 
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Perhaps the impetus for this debate arose from the ideas and 
work of Paul Otlet (1868-1944) and Henri La Fontaine (1854-1943). 
These men were clearly motivated by holistic ideas in their 
efforts to preserve the total sum of recorded human knowledge. 
In 1895 they founded the Institut Internationale de 
Bibliographie, and " ... addressed themselves to the task of 
organizing the world's knowledge in the form of a classified 
central card catalog of the literature, illustrations, and 
institutions of all countries, ages and languages" (Arntz, 1974: 
377). Although this catalogue, Repertoire biblioqraphique 
the initial idea to place the universel, has been discontinued, 
world's knowledge in a systematized form at the disposal of the 
individual library user is still the governing principle of the 
International Federation for Documentation, albeit with the 
significant addition ''strictly selected and only to the necessary 
extent" as opposed to unlimited collection (ibid.). 
Following the pioneering work of Otlet and La Fontaine, it 
is not surprising that the idea of wholeness in the field of 
library and information science has been predominantly applied to 
conceptions of recorded human knowledge. The perceptions of 
certain exponents in Chapter 5 who stress the holistic features 
of the entire corpus of recorded human knowledge and knowledge in 
genera 1, confirm the recognition of the valuable application of 
the notion of wholeness to conceptions of knowledge (cf 6.2.1). 
This idea of the wholeness of recorded human knowledge is 
transferred to library and information science itself as 
manifestly the only profession that concerns itself in the 
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collective, co~po~ate sense with the enti~e co~pus of ~eco~ded 
knowledge. Unive~sal lib~a~ies, such as those that we~e found at 
Nineveh and Hattushash and the Royal lib~a~y of Alexand~ia, the 
Mouseion, and the la~ge national and unive~sity lib~a~ies today, 
aim at accessibility to the widest ~ange of mate~ials that 
~ep~esent the totality of human knowledge in ~eco~ded fo~m. The 
holistic cha~acte~ of lib~a~y and info~mation science in its 
effo~t to effect this, gives it a distinctively inte~disciplina~y 
outlook. Kesting explains that an ideal conceptual model fo~ 
lib~a~y and info~mation science that would manifest this 
pe~ception of its essential cha~acte~ would inco~po~ate all 
aspects of the collection-development and use-p~omotion 
functions, such as the following: 
"All the fields of recorded human 






All the media of ~eco~ded human knowledge, f~om stone 
inscription, clay tablet, papy~us and pa~chment ~oll 
and codex to the p~inted book, the se~ial, the 
~ep~og~aphic p~int, audio-visual mate~ial and the 
latest fo~ms of ~eco~d p~oduced by the technologies of 
elect~onics and lase~ which a~e p~ese~vable and thei~ 
message ~et~ievable; 
All the languages of ~eco~ded info~mation and othe~ 
symbols of inte~pe~sonal communication, such as music, 
mathematics and othe~ consistently st~uctu~ed coded 
messages; 
All the individuals and groups in eve~y age and gende~ 
catego~y who have a desi~e and ability to communicate 
with ~eco~ds o~ thei~ ~ecitals by othe~s, a p~ocess 
dependent on ~esou~ce-sha~ing as a sub-function of 
collection-development; 
All the modes of knowing unde~lying o~ dominating the 
natu~e of ~eco~ded knowledge: a modification of the 
Jungian schema of the functions of human consciousness 
(viz thinking, sensing, feeling and intuiting) yields 
an epistemological model which highlights the ca~dinal 
~oles of the philosophe~ as ~ationalist, the natu~al 
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scientist as empiricist, the artist as aestheticist, 
and the religious mystic as noumenalist, respectively, 
both as 'authors' and 'users' of human records; 
All ideologies, beliefs and value systems reflected 
implicitly and explicitly in recorded human thought: 
it seems almost impossible for either 'author' or 
'user' not to presume some form of ideology in 
knowledge transmission, and even the apparent absence 
of a philosophy may be seen as a philosophy which is 
important in the dynamics of the knowledge cycle; 
All the methodologies of scholarship in general, and in 
the specialised disciplines to which each is suited; 
and 
The full range of the 'genres' reflecting the 
entertainment-recreational and toe educational-research 
expressions and communication needs in recorded human 
knowledge" ( 1990: vii-viii). 
This broad concern emanates from the more fundamental conviction 
that human knowledge is an organic whole and essentially 
indivisible (Kesting, 1973: 101-112; cf 5.28.10). In supp'?rt of 
this perception, the following statements from library and 
information science theorists may be seen to strengthen the 
holistic view of the nature of librarianship and recorded human 
knowledge: 
(a) The aim of the librarian is 11 side by side with 
the philosopher, to provide a gestalt for all of the 
specialisms; to point to the inevitable unity of 
knowledge, the wholeness of the universe" (author's 
emphasis; Shores, 1975: 222); 
(b) " the tradition of the written word is whole and 
single and entire and cannot be dismembered" (Macleish, 
1940: 790); 
(c) "Libraries are the sum total of the recorded ideas 
of all men ... a microcosm, the fullest image of the 
universe that exists ... the common basis of unity" 
(Richardson, 1927: 293); and 
(d) The domain of librarianship is " 
knowledge, the whole of culture" (Kaplan, 
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the whole of 
1964: 304). 
In an attempt to apply the idea of wholeness to lib~a~y and 
info~mation science in a mo~e systematic and consistent way, 
Beagle app~op~iates the ideas of the physicist, Bohm, and 
explains the g~owth of ~eco~ded knowledge as a holistic p~ocess 
(1988: 30) • Acco~ding to Beagle, it is often noted that lib~a~y 
and info~mation science o~iginally developed in the context of 
the mechanistic wo~ld vie~ (1988: 27). Howeve~, he contends that 
the changes in the conceptual outlook in seve~al disciplines has 
led to the g~adual acceptance of the concept of unity and 
inte~connectedness as basic p~inciples fa~ ~esea~che~s (cf also 
7.3 & 7.4). This holistic pe~spective has been noted by 
~esea~che~s in lib~a~y and info~mation science, and holds that it 
is impossible fa~ the ~esea~che~ to fully comp~ehend any single 
entity without conside~ing its context o~ envi~onment taken as a 
whole in o~de~ to bette~ comp~ehend the natu~e of the subject 
being studied (G~ove~ & Glazie~, 1986: 241) • 
Beagle a~gues that the g~owth of knowledge defies a cent~al 
tenet of the mechanistic wo~ld view, viz, the disinteg~ation 
p~ocess that the second law of the~modynamics postulates. In 
di~ect cont~ast to this law knowledge and lib~a~ies ~eflect a 
movement towa~ds g~eate~ synthesis and integ~ation (cf also 7.1.1 
& 7.3.2). He ave~s: II lib~a~ies a~e not .some negent~opic 
abe~~ation f~om a fundamental law of cosmic disinteg~ation, but 
~athe~ a~e an exp~ession of an integ~ative law of unde~lying 
o~de~" (1988: 44) . 
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The holistic and integrative features of knowledge have not 
gone unnoted by classificationists, and is evidenced in the more 
recent developments to construct more effective general 
bibliographic classification schemes, eg, the attempts by the 
Classification Research Group to apply the theory of integrative 
levels to the arrangement of main classes, and the work on the 
Broad System of Ordering conducted under the auspices of UNISIST. 
Notions of the possible value of 
implicit in these projects. 
the idea of wholeness are 
Holistic approaches have also been applied in other areas of 
library and information science. For example, it is claimed that 
a holistic approach to library organization could counteract the 
unfortunate bifurcation in the profession that hinders the 
delivery of superior services (Murray-Lachapelle, 1983: 349). 
The prevailing dichotomous model of organization along functional 
lines which separate public services from technical services (eg, 
reference and cataloguing departments respectively) lead to the 
appearance that they are different disciplines rather than 
subsections of the same discipline (ibid.). According to 
Murray-Lapachelle, the recent manifestations in library and 
free-lance information science of information brokers, 
librarians, information managers, librarians without walls, and 
so on, II do not respect this age-old duality" (ibid.). 
Although pluralism is associated in a neutral manner with 
fragmentation and the mechanistic world view inspired by 
Cartesianism, Harris gives pluralism a socio-political meaning in 
his view that the pluralist perspective dominates research in 
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library and information science in the United States of America 
(1986; cf 5. 26). Harris submits that the pluralist perspective 
dominated research in the social sciences since the 1930's, and 
that it is based on the supposition that the prevailing social 
and political consensus is one that has been democratically 
derived through mutual adjustment to conflict between power 
groups (1986: 214). It is assumed further that this achieved 
consensus is a "good thing" and that the social sciences merely 
express and reflect this consensus in their research. In its 
application to libraries, the pluralistic perspective holds that 
libraries II came to be seen as simple mirrors, 
reflections of society's 'racial memory'" (1986: 215). 
neutral 
Since 
libraries merely reflect the "pluralist and democratic 
consensus", its research should focus on themes of II 
performance, productivity, and usefulness, that is, research that 
has come to be called 'administrative'" (ibid.). To this end, 
Harris reasons, researchers develop~d a positivist epistemology 
to resolve the technical problems that the pluralist perspective 
identifies. Non-technical problems such as the political and 
economic influences on the ways that knowledge is distributed in 
society are ignored because they are not susceptible of treatment 
by positivist methods. At best, the positivist epistemology, in 
Harris' view, can only provide a limited view of the social 
context of librarianship, and what is needed is to give up the 
single-minded adherence to a pluralist perspective (also referred 
to by Harris as a pluralist ontology), and to search for an 
epistemology capable of understanding what libraries do and why 
(1986: 222). 
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Harris' analysis suggests the need to develop an 
epistemology that is sufficiently broad to .offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of the rich diversity of the complex 
of professional functions in 1 i brary· and information science. 
Such an epistemology should provide not only a wider range of 
research techniques and strategies to investigate technical and 
"non-technical" problems in the field, but should also supply a 
deeper appreciation of the diversified content of libraries and 
information agencies as manifestations of several different "ways 
of knowing". 
It would appear that such an epistemology could be 
constructed within a general framework that is sustained by 
' 
holistic notions which emphasize wholeness and interrelatedness 
as distinct from one supported by essentially pluralist notions 
which endorse fragmentation. The mechanistic world view reveals 
limitations that have been recognized generally in several 
academic disciplines (cf 7.3 & 7.4). Its pluralistic outlook 
does recognize the validity of several "ways of knowing", but 
does not go far enough for library and information science, ie, 
in uniting these several ways as parts of a greater whole that 
characterizes the growth of knowledge ( cf 7.5 & above). 
Moreover, although.the mechanist (positivist) approaches may be 
applied with success in certain areas of library and information 
science, its narrow outlook cannot accommodate. holistic 
approaches, whereas the holistic world view conversely may 
accommodate other approaches. Its integrative character allows 
it to incorporate newer methods and to develop higher syntheses 
which establishes internal relations between all its parts. 
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This does not mean that holism does not leave itself exposed 
to criticism. For example, the view that holism is antithetical 
to reductionism neglects to observe the necessity for holism to 
accommodate reductionism and mechanism as a necessary requirement 
of the holistic principle. McKinney argues that the question 
arises as to whether the whole, consisting of several 
complementary world views, has its own opposing polarity with 
which it must be integrated to be true to the spirit of holism 
(1988: 309). The significant point to be observed, however, is 
that holism suggests itself as the principle that appears to do 
justice to the established features of universality and diversity 
(and specialization) of the continually developing body of 
recorded human knowledge. As a world view that is currently 
emerging in several fields of study it may offer deeper and more 
coherent insights into the nature of knowledge and libraries. 
The principle of holism provides a suitable framework within 
which to develop an epistemological position for library and 
information science. Such a framework contains the qualities 
that facilitate the development of the speculative and tentative 
observations by theorists (cf Chapters 5 & 6) into a more 
coherent position that may be applied in theoretical aspects of 
library and information science. These qualities may, at this 
point, be articulated in a more or less systematic definition of 
holism as it is applied in this study. 
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7.7 Holism defined 
It may se~ve the pu~poses of this study to summa~ize b~iefly 
he~e the most salient featu~es of holism as it has been discussed 
in this chapte~. 
The wo~d holism is de~ived f~om the G~eek wo~d halos which 
means whole. Holism is a unive~sal p~inciple which involves the 
c~eation of g~eate~ and g~eate~ wholes as a dynamic evolutiona~y 
p~ocess. The whole is g~eate~ than the sum of the pa~ts, whose 
function me~ges with the ove~all function of the whole. Holism 
' emphasizes wholeness ~athe~ than f~agmentation, but accommodates 
wo~ld views (as pa~ts of a whole) that suppo~t f~agmented 
app~oaches as a natu~al consequence of its inclusive o~ientation. 
As a mode of inqui~y, holism conside~s all fields of human 
knowledge as being essentially inte~~elated and inte~connected. 
Each field of human thought is ~ega~ded as a valid discipline 
that investigates a mo~e specific ~ealm of ~eality with its own 
st~ategies and techniques. The commitment of holism to the 
inte~~elationship of all fields of study foste~s the c~eation of 
newe~ syntheses which p~ovide a mo~e comp~ehensive unde~standing 
of the phenomenal and sup~aphenomenal wo~ld. Holism is eminently 
suited to the inte~disciplina~y natu~e of lib~a~y and info~mation 
science and may se~ve as an integ~ative fo~ce that counte~acts 
the f~agmentation that could accompany an unc~itical acceptance 
and application of techniques and st~ategies based on mechanistic 
models. 
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7.8 C~ite~ia fo~ the evaluation of an epistemological position 
fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science 
To ensu~e that the body of thought ~ega~ding epistemological 
aspects of lib~a~y and info~mation science (that has eme~ged f~om 
an analysis of the views of seve~al theo~ists of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science, cf Chapte~s 5 & 6) co~~esponds as closely as 
pos,sible with 
epistemological 
the cha~acte~istic featu~es of a tenable 
position, a set of c~ite~ia may be postulated. 
These c~ite~ia may p~ove helpful in testing the adequacy of the 
epistemological position ~ega~ding its satisfacto~y p~ovision fo~ 
the essential featu~es that such a position should manifest. 
Fu~the~mo~e, the set of c~ite~ia may cont~ibute to the 
fo~mulation of a cohe~ent and clea~ly a~ticulated position, 
the~eby enhancing its theo~etical value. 
7.8.1 An epistemological position fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation 
science should p~oceed f~om the p~oposition that lib~a~y 
science (o~ lib~a~ianship) and info~mation science 
constitute a single discipline, o~. at the ve~y least, sha~e 
the same disciplina~y basis 
Chapte~ 5 ~eveals the seve~al diffe~ent pe~ceptions as held 
by a wide ~ange of p~ominent theo~ists in the field of lib~a~y 
and info~mation science of the ~elationship between lib~a~y 
science and info~mation science. 
p~esented in the fo~m of a typology in 
five clea~ly conceived ~elationships 





diffe~ent f~om each othe~. One may only speculate as to whethe~ 
this dive~gence of pe~ceptions may actually be att~ibuted to the 
absence of a clea~ly defined epistemological position. 
434 
Ir-r-espectively, however-, the ar-gument in favour- of the 
application of holism to librar-y and infor-mation science suggests 
that an inclusive appr-oach holds out the possibility for- mor-e 
enr-iching insights than one that str-esses the differ-ences that 
may appar-ently exist between the two disciplines (cf 7.6). 
7.8.2 An epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science should be based fir-mly upon notions of wholeness and 
unity as distinct fr-om fr-agmentation and disunity. 
This wholeness, as embodied in the pr-inciple of holism (cf 
7.1 & 7.7) should account for- the development of the cr-eative 
synthesis of the manifest diver-sity that exists in the libr-ar-y 
and infor-mation science pr-ofession as demonstr-ated in Kesting's 
pr-oposed compr-ehensive conceptual model (eg the r-ange of 
bibliogr-aphic activities; the complex of libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science functions; the diver-sified content of r-ecor-ded human 
knowledge; the var-iety of r-esear-ch str-ategies and techniques, and 
so on; cf Kesting's quotation-7.6), viz, as par-ts of a gr-eater-
unity and wholeness. Holism pr-esen~s a defensible alter-native to 
the mechanistic view and has been applied with a r-easonable 
measur-e of success in the natur-al sciences, the social sciences 
and the humanities (cf 7.3, & 7. 4) . Its application in libr-ar-y 
and infor-mation science has been tentative and cautious, but its 
essential message is implied, in some cases, 




even in the ear-ly 
(cf Otlet and La 
The specific application of holism to conceptions of 
recorded human knowledge recognizes the validity of all forms of 
human cognition and the fundamental interrelatedness of all 
fields of human knowledge. Conceptions of human knowledge as an 
interrelated and dynamic unity are represented in the theoretical 
writings of a number of exponents in Chapter 5. These views are 
categorized, along with other conceptions of human knowledge, in 
Chapter 6 (cf 6.2.1). At a more specific epistemological level, 
holism recognizes the interaction of the reader and the content 
of a· document (ie, recorded knowledge) and transcends a dualistic 
approach that denies the constitutive role that subjective 
interpretation 
knowledge. 
(human consciousness) plays in the acquisition of 
7.8.3 An epistemological position for library and information 
science should subscribe to the notions of relative truth, 
relative certainty and ultimate reality as variable, 
alterable entities. 
The idea of absolute truth is one that no longer features as 
a crucial element in the natural sciences and the social sciences 
(cf 7.3 & 7.4). Evidence from investigations in several academic 
disciplines suggests that the emergence of newer theories implies 
the assimilation of certain features of older ones that are 
replaced, and its subsequent application, with greater success, 
in other contexts. Hence, claims its most eloquent exponent, any 
particular theory will constitute an approximate, conditional, 
and relative truth (Bohm, 1984: 165). 
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The overwhelming majority of theorists whose texts regarding 
epistemology-related issues are analyzed in this study concur 
with the proposition that truth or reality is privately and/or 
socially constructed (cf 6.3.2). This consensus conflicts with 
the predominantly mechanistic view that truth or reality "resides 
in nature" and that it exists in an objective sense and 
independent of the knowing observer (cf 6.3.1). 
These three criteria for an epistemological position in 
library and information science are adequate in their 
accommodation of the perceived key features that are considered 
to be relevant to the establishment of 
position of library and 




(cf preamble to 
This chapter has identified the manifest interrelationships 
that library and information science, in all its major 
professional functions and subfunctions, displays with the notion 
of wholeness. Although these interrelationships are also evident 
in the analysis of other knowledge-transmitting professions such 
as education (cf 3.4) and communication (cf 3.5), it appears that 
the unique nature of library and information science's 
multidimensional involvement in, for example, the "Alls" of 
Kesting's quotation above distinguishes it from those 
professional disciplines. 
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This perception of the exclusive professional features of 
universality and multidimensional interconnectedness has led 
several theorists to emphasize its singularly exceptional 
synthetic, interdisciplinary, metascientific (in the broadened 
sense of an inclusive study of human inference that encompasses 
scientific inference) and hence holistic characteristics (cf, for 
example, Kaplan, 1964; Shera, 1966: 176-7; Wright, 1985; 
Kesting, 1990: i-ix). 
Holism as a philosophical outlook which embodies these 
qualities provides a congenial conceptual framework within which 
to establish an epistemological position which matches the 
perceived nature of library and information science. 
The criteria postulated above reflect the view endorsed in 
this study that wholeness, and holism as an embodiment of its 
essential qualities, may offer deeper and richer insights into 
the nature of the relationships between recorded knowledge, 
readers and librarians and information officers. This view is 
echoed in the apt statement by Butler-Adam, although he excludes 
the librarian as a key component: "World, writer, text and 
reader are all separate and individual creators/creations. Yet 
all are linked, too" ( 1983: 7) • It is this latter emphasis on 
the links of unity that are extrapolated in order to construct a 
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an ove~view of the 
be relevant to a discussion of epistemological issues in library 
and information science. This variation of opinion has been 
explicated in considerable detail in Chapter 6. 
The multiplicity of approaches identified in the writings of 
the exponents who were selected for closer investigation in this 
study may be accommodated within the proposed holistic framework 
as interpenetrating parts of a larger whole whose essential 
character differs significantly from that of any individual part. 
This implies that each approach is a valid perspective in its~lf, 
viz as an attempt to identify the perceived central dynamics of 
library and information science and their interaction in 
knowledge-transmitting functions, as well as the roles of 
librarians and information scientists as intermediaries in this 
process. When these approaches are viewed as perspectives within 
a larger whole that dynamically interact with each other in an 
ongoing process of development into a more inclusive whole, we 
observe the mutual interrelations between the principles of 
holism ~nd pluralism as themselves being parts of a process 
may be described·here as "holistic perspectivism". 
that 
Holistic perspectivism is the view that the several 
approaches to the acquisition and validation of human knowledge 
is located within the broadest possible context as parts within a 
whole. As a purportedly valid perception of reality, each 
perspective is, 
truth/reality, 
in essence, a partial view of ultimate 
and its dialectical conflict with contrary 
perspectives ensures the continuous evolution and growth of human 
knowledge. 
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Holistic pe~spectivism is not pe~ceived to be the me~e 
' 
juxtaposition of two appa~ently cont~adicto~y views about the 
natu~e of ~eality, viz wholeness and f~agmentation (cf Chapte~ 7 
fo~ a fulle~ discussion of these concepts). Rathe~, it is the 
exp~ession of the continuous gene~ation of newe~ pe~spectives 
that emanate f~om ea~lie~ ones. As it has been stated in the 
definition of holism (cf 7.7), each t~aditionally dema~cated 
field of human thought is itself ~ega~ded as a valid discipline 
that investigates a given, mo~e specific, ~ealm of ~eality with 
its own st~ategies and techniques. As a p~oposed 
epistemological position, holistfc pe~spectivism is viewed as 
being committed to the inte~~elationship of all fields of study 
and foste~s the constant c~eation of newe~ syntheses which may 
p~ovide potentially mo~e comp~ehensive unde~standings of the 
supposedly "exte~nal" wo~ld and the inne~ (inte~nal) self. These 
syntheses manifest themselves as pe~spectives held by individuals 
whethe~ in thei~ use of ~eco~ded human knowledge o~ within 
specific disciplines as pa~adigms of thought. These pe~spectives 
embody pe~sonal o~ collective insights gleaned f~om the content 
of ~eco~ded human knowledge, and a~e applied in an attempt to 
extend an unde~standing of ~eality. 
8.1 Pe~spectivism 
Acco~ding to the Dictiona~y of philosophy and ~eligion, 
pe~spectivism is a te~m used to facilitate the p~esumption that 
II eve~y point of view is in some sense t~ue and offe~s a 
valuable and unique pe~spective of the unive~se" (1980: 425). 
The epistemological w~itings of F~ied~ich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
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I 
(1844-1900) provide a rich context for 
perspectivism as an epistemological position. 
understanding 
One commentator 
construes Nietzsche's application of the term as follows: 
"perspectivism means that the world is always understood within 
the perspective of some point of view; all knowledge is thus an 
interpretation of reality in accordance with the set of 
assumptions that makes one perspective different from another" 
(Small, 1983: 99). This perspectival approach of Nietzsche 
emphasizes the anthropomorphic character of all human knowing 





1979: xlviii; cf also De 
on the anthropological context of 
knowing-5.3, and his interpretation of perspectivism below). 
Since Nietzsche was himself partially influenced in his 
philosophical development by traditions of Eastern mysticism and 
Oriental philosophy, it is not surprising to note 





It manifests itself on the one hand as an apparent 
Indian thought that expresses the catholicity of 
styles or modes of thinking, worship, art, etc, which all strive 
to attain one truth. On the other hand it maintains the 
proposition that each individual has his/her own perspective on 
it (Kaplan, 1962: 228). This doctrine is known as syadvada, ie, 
the "maybe so", "up to a point" or "in a manner of speaking" 
doctrine (ibid.: 230). It proclaims that, however carefully 
elaborated a philosophy may be, it remains only a human point of 
view since it is inseparable from a particular viewpoint and, 




reality (ibid.). Furthermore, no proposition is completely true 
but only up to a point or in a manner of speaking (cf for example 
Victor Cousin's philosophy of eclecticism-6.3.2). Kaplan 
elaborates this outlook by arguin~ that no man can assume an 
absolutistic perspective since" ... we approach truth, not by 
choosing among alternative beliefs and philosophies, but by 
broadening our perspectives so as to find a place for the several 
alternatives" (1962: 231). According to Saral, this approach to 
truth is applied in Hindu philosophy of communication (1983: 
53) . This implies that truth is relative and dependent upon the 
perspective from which a given object/event is observed or 
experienced. The same object/event may be perceived and/or 
experienced differently by different individuals and by the same 
individual at different times (ibid.). 
This process of the broadening of perspectives as a means of 
encompassing contradictory standpoints underscores an important 
link between holism and perspectivism. 
8.2 Holism and perspectivism 
The notion of perspectivism appears to be entirely consonant 
with that of holism as it is construed in this study. 
Brockriede, for example, perceives perspectivism as an attempt to 
overcome the dichotomies that II abound in the history of 
scholarship .. ~" (1985: 151) . He continues by asserting that 
"Per spec ti vi sm ... recognizes that everything is related to 
everything" (ibid.: 153) . By this, Brockriede implies that, 
rather than choosing one view to the total exclusion of others (a 




emphasis. This means that a specific view is emphasized without 
discarding the others as irrelevant. This principle operates in 
a manner similar to the metaphor of "figure and ground" as 
applied by gestalt psychologists (cf 7.4). While a given 
perspective is featured as the figure in the foreground, other 
perspectives make up the background. This principle of emphasis 
in perspectivism echoes the notion of tolerance as advocated in 
holistic approaches, ie, the espousal of one perspective does not 
imply the automatic rejection of all others. Rather, at the 
broadest levels of human thought, all perspectives are mutually 
complementary and interrelated. Perspectivism hence allows also 
for " ... a kind of coexistence of opposites" (Brockriede, 1985: 
153; cf also Kesting's notion of supradoctrihalism or 
transdogmatism-5.28.10). 
Similar thoughts are expressed in the writings of the two 
theorists in library and information science whose 
epistemological 
perspectivistic, 
positions may be described as being specifically 
viz De Vleeschauwer-5.3 and Coetzee-5.7). De 
Vleeschauwer maintains the view that our knowledge of the truth 
in our search for is perspectival and that we are confronted 
knowledge with more than one kind of knowledge, viz moral 
knowledge, aesthetic knowledge and so on. These types of 
knowledge are methodologically ~onstituted in terms of man's 
changing experience of reality which results in the generation of 
several truth-perspectives. This insight, in De Vleeschauwer's 
view, encourages open-mindedness and tolerance for all 
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ideological trends. Hence the link between holism and 
perspectivism appears to have been established indirectly in De 
Vleeschauwer's writings. 
Coetzee's perspectivist epistemological position, as 
developed in his formal philosophical works, is not elaborated in 
any significant_ way in his writings oM library and information 
science. However, his concern with the historically-induced 
problem of cultural disinheritance seems to identify the need to 
preserve the "whole" of culture. In order to achieve this 
preservation of the whole, according to Coetzee, libraries should 
collaborate with other social institutions (eg, schools and 
universities) and groups (eg, authors, 
to this end (1975: 12) • Furthermore, 
publishers and teachers) 
Coetzee's ackowledgement 
of the value of both inductive and deductive approaches to 
scholarly investigation may be interpreted as being supportive of 
the underlying holistic assumption of tolerance for several 
research methodologies. 
However, these inferences from Coetzee's writings remain 
speculative rather than substantive in the light of his emphasis 
upon other central concepts in library and information science. 
8.3 Holistic perspectivism 
The similarities as noted above between holism and 
perspectivism do not imply that there is therefore no need to use 
both appellations in a single comprehensive description of the 
proposed epistemological position. Each term emphasizes an 
important dimension or component of the position as a whole. The 
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holistic component accounts fo~ the qualities of inte~~elatedness 
of all fields of human thought, the inte~connectedness of 
conceptions of ~eco~ded knowledge and un~eco~ded knowledge as 
pa~ts of a dynamically evolving whole, and the unity of the 
knowe~ and the object of knowledge in the p~ocess of the 
acquisition of knowledge. In Figu~e 9 the theo~ists listed 
within the ~ange of 0 to +5 a~e p~oponents, in va~iable deg~ees 
of commitment, of the notion of inclusiveness and hence with 
equal fo~ce of holism. 
The pe~spectivistic component seeks to explain the existence 
of the development of individual and collective viewpoints that 
~esult f~om the inqui~ies involving the use and application of 
the content of ~eco~ded knowledge. In the case of an individual 
use~, the inqui~y may ~esult in the b~oadening and deepening of 
pe~spectives and the stimulation of new knowledge. In the case 
of a g~oup (egan academic community), systematic ~esea~c.h may 
lead to the fu~the~ ~efinement of existing pa~adigms of thought 
o~ may lead to the questioning of p~evailing assumptions with a 
view to ~evising o~ ~efo~mulating such pa~adigms of thought (cf 
fo~ example the so-called Kuhnian "pa~adigm shifts"). Systematic 
expositions of pe~spectivism as an epistemological position a~e 
found in the fo~mal philosophical w~itings of De Vleeschauwe~ (cf 
5.3) and Coetzee (cf 5.7). Othe~ exponents in Chapte~ 7 who 
discuss simila~ views in conside~able detail include Royce (cf 
5.13), Sch~ade~ (cf 5.26), 
5. 28.9). 
Be~gen (cf 5.28.8) and Olaisen 
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(cf 
The merging of holism with perspectivism offers an 
epistemological position that not only reveals continuities with 
traditional epistemological thought but also accommodates the 
departure from absolute notions of truth and certainty towards a 
greater tolerance for the perception of a never-ending 
development of human knowledge and the qualitatively infinite 
dimensions of reality. Rather than implying that wholeness 
( ho 1 ism.) and fragmentedness (pluralism) and their attendant 
methodological approaches are antithetical visions of reality, 
they are construed to be complementary perspectives within a more 
._ 
inclusive whole. Even if the former view ~s maintained it would 
be incontestable that holism is capable of accommodating 
pluralism rather than the other way round. 
Holistic perspectivism advocates an allegiance to the notion 
of a "non-hierarchical, dynamic interplay of opposites" 
(McKinney, 1988: 309) and a constant emergence of higher 
syntheses of human knowledge that emphasizes its organic 
interrelatedness, regardless of disciplinary boundaries or modes 
of expression (eg oral, script or electronic media). 
Holistic perspectivism as it is construed in this study 
bears certain epistemological similarities with, as well as 
contrasts to, the systems approach or systems theory. The 
1 
similarities include a commitment by both to the unity of the 
knower and the known in the epistemological process and an 
emphasis upon the active role of the subjective knower's 
derivation of individual perspectives in the knowledge process 
(Kriek, 1976: 34) • However, the difference lies in their 
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conceptions of human knowledge. For systems theory, the 
conception of knowledge is confined to scientific knowledge in 
the original logical positivist attempt to reduce all the 
sciences to a single empirical basis (thereby claiming to unify 
them) (Kriek, 1987: 222, 232). Holistic perspectivism, on the 
other hand, is broader in its inclusivist conception of human 
knowledge. A further implication of this distinction is that 
whereas systems theory rejects reductionist methods of the 
validation of knowledge, holistic perspectivism incorporates both 
reductionist and anti-reductionist methods (or mechanist and 
anti-mechanist approaches) as parts of a larger whole or as 
extreme poles along a continuum that encompasses a range of 
approaches to the validation of human knowledge (cf 8.4.2.2 for 
the application of this view to research in library and 
information science). 
As an epistemological position for library and information 
science, holistic perspectivism meets all the criteria as set out 
in Chapter 7, viz: 
(a) an epistemological position 
science should proceed from 
science (or librarianship) 
constitute a single discipline, 
the same disciplinary basis; 
for library and information 
the proposition that library 
and information science 
or, at the very least, share 
(b) an epistemological position for library and information 
science should be based firmly upon notions of wholeness and 
unity as distinct from fragmentation and disunity; and 
(c) an epistemological position for library and information 
science should subscribe to the notions of relative truth, 
relative certainty and ultimate reality as variable, 
alterable entities. 
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With r-espect to the fir-st cr-iter-ion, libr-ar-y science and 
infor-mation science ar-e per-ceived as constituting a single 
discipline as distinct fr-om being two separ-ate fields of study 
(cf also 4.3.3). This ar-gument is defended by sever-al theor-ists, 
albeit for- differ-ent r-easons (cf Figur-e 6). 
Holistic per-spectivism also subscr-ibes to notions of unity 
and wholeness as r-equir-ed in the second cr-iter-ion. This theme 
has been explor-ed at gr-eat length as a cr-itical one in this 
thesis. In Chapter- 3 the holistic epistemological position 
featur-ed as a pr-ominent .one in the fields of medicine (cf 3. 3) ' 
education (cf 3.4) and communication theor-y (including mass 
communication) (cf 3.5). Fur-ther-mor-e, the theor-ists in libr-ar-y 
and infor-mation science whose wr-itings r-eflect under-lying 
assumptions of wholeness ar-e discussed in Chapter- 7 (cf Figur-e 
9) • 
The notions of absolute tr-uth and ultimate r-eality as fixed, 
unalter-able entities ar-e not suppor-ted by holistic per-spectivism. 
For- example, the emer-gence of holism in sever-al br-oad ar-eas of 
human knowledge (cf the natur-al sciences-7.3 & the social 
sciences and the humanities-7.4) acknowledges the fallacy of an 
objectivistic notion of tr-uth, and the doctr-ine of per-spectivism 
also emphasizes the view of a multiplicity of tr-uth-claims r-ather-
than absolute tr-uth. 
thir-d cr-iter-ion. 
Hence, holistic per-spectivism satisfies the 
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Many of the essential char-acter-istics of holistic 
per-spectivism may be obser-ved in its application to cer-tain ar-eas 
of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science. 
8.4 The application of holistic per-spectivism in an explanation 
of the inter-mediar-y r-ole of libr-ar-ians in the tr-ansmission 
of knowledge, and as a philos~phical basis for- the selection 
of r-esear-ch methodoloqie~ in libr-ar-y and infor-mation science 
As a pr-oposed epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation science, holistic per-spectivism is viewed as a 
suitable fr-amewor-k for- explaining the philosophical assumptions 
under-lying the dynamics of the inter-mediar-y r-ole of the libr-ar-ian 
in the br-oadening and deepening of the individual user-'s 
knowledge per-spectives thr-ough the r-eading pr-ocess (consider-ed as 
a means of 
Fur-ther-mor-e, 
knowledge tr-ansmission) 
it may clar-ify the 
( c f 8.4.1 & 8.4 .2). 
implications of holistic 
per-spectivism as an under-lying philosophical basis for- the 
selection and application of r-esear-ch methodologies consider-ed to 
be appr-opr-iate 
(cf 8.'4.2.2). 
in the field of libr-a~y and infor-mation science 
Finally, holistic per-spectivism offer-s an 
oppor-tunity to establish tenable views of the epistemological 
concepts of human knowledge and tr-uth/ultimate r-eality within the 
context of this pr-ofession.· These applications ar-e discussed 
below under- the headings "the individual user-" (cf 8.4.1), "the 
libr-ar-ian" (cf 8.4.2), "conceptions of r-ecor-ded human knowledge" 
(cf 8.4.3) and "appr-oaches to tr-uth/ultimate r-eality" (cf 8.4.4).' 
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Admittedly, exhaustive t~eatment of these applications is 
not possible within the scope of this thesis, nor- is it the 
intended pu~pose of this study to pu~sue these issues as a 
cent~al featur-e. However-, the b~oader- char-acte~istics of these 
applications a~e highlighted as a means of typifying holistic 
pe~spectivism as an epistemological 
info~mation science. 
8.4.1 The individual user-
position in 
The inter-active pr-ocesses between the sou~ce and 
libr-a~y and 
the user-
whe~eby r-ecor-ded knowledge in its enti~ety is abso~bed and 
assimilated, is constr-ued in a gener-ic conception of the r-eading 
p~ocess as the most typical mode of inter-action in the context of 
libr-ar-y and info~mation science. The ter-m "r-eading"is hence used 
as an umb~ella te~m to connote the wide~ pe~spectives of 
inte~action or- engagement between the user- (active/passive) as 
seeker- (of t~uth, enjoyment, enlightenment and education). and the 
gene~ic text - the fab~ic of o~ganized ~eco~ded human knowledge. 
In this view, the activity of ~eading as an example of 
communicative inter-action has been cast within an epistemological 
f~amewor-k by ce~tain w~ite~s in lib~a~y and info~mation science . 
Although r-eading has many pur-poses and effects, the kind of 
~eading that is emphasized her-e is that kind that inc~eases one's 
knowledge of oneself and of the exter-nal envi~onment. In this 
view, ~eading may lead to the potential unde~standing of the self 
and the physical wo~ld as it is mediated thr-ough the symbols of 
human language. Neill has claimed, fo~ example, that: 
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"Reading can contribute in a special way to the 
broadening of our human experiences, our self-knowledge 
and our horizons; for everything that is mediated 
through reading and understanding is mediated along 
with ourselves. Each adds a unique personal meaning to 
the dictionary definition of words, and to the author's 
definition as well. Reading is not merely for 
"information retrieval." Readers make themselves as 
they make meaning in partnership with the author" 
( 1985: 59) . 
Neill's claim highlights the development of personal perspectives 
through the reading process, and he adds an acknowledgement of 
the holistic interconnections that exist between the individual 
as knower and society as the object of knowledge in his 
declaration that when librarians quote Emily Dickinson's lines: 
"There is no frigate like a book to take us lands away" (1961: 
267)' it is a "positive action in social epistemology a 
statement about the human mind and the individual's role in 
society and in history" (Neill, 1985: 59; cf 5.5 for Shera's 
conception of social epistemology). For Neill, the individual 
user should be allowed to gain access to all facets of human 
knowledge in libraries as a means of counteracting the 
reductionist methods of empirical or positivist science proposed 
implicitly as the only way to valid knowledge (ibid.: 60). The 
wholeness of human life, according to him, can only be preserved 
when libraries become sources of knowledge " that leads to an 
understanding of all life ... - the kind of understanding that 
gives the necessary distance, depth and meaning to make 
judgements for the whole person, not merely plugging a temporary 
information gap" (ibid.: 61) . 
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Neill's perceptions of the reading process clearly imply 
what is understood by holistic perspectivism in 'that an 
individual reader is able to widen his perspectives of himself as 
a person and of the physical world through the interaction of 
subjective meaning and the symbols to which such meaning is 
attached. 
In a similar way, Nitecki has recently stressed the value of 
reading as an effective and efficient way of understanding 
oneself and the world. 
( 
He argues that reading as a part of the 
cognitive ("thinking") process contributes to a definition of 
reality as a subjective image of the world (1986: 230). Nitecki 
focuses on reading for knowledge or "creative reading" as 
distinct from reading for entertainment and reading for 
information. He applies a cognitivist approach to reading so 
that one's interpretation of the content of what is read is in 
accordance with a view or theory of what the world is like which 
underlies all one s perceptions and understanding of the world 
(1986: 231; cf De Mey-5.25 for a fuller treatment of the 
cognitivist approach). Nitecki maintains further that the 
knowledge acquired through this kind of reading is not its 
traditional perception as II neatly-packaged ideas in books 
classified within a static system ... K~owledge is a process, not 
a commodity, a dynamic process of relating previously known 
experiences with new ones. It is a constantly changing network 
of relations" (1986: 232). This view of Nitecki is entirely 




development of knowledge pe~spectives f~om p~evious ones and 
emphasizes the asc~iption of pe~sonal, subjective meaning to the 
content of what is ~ead. 
Th~ self-~efe~ential dimension of the ~eading p~ocess and 
the epistemological dynamics su~~ounding this featu~e have been 
I 
examined in ~ecent app~oaches to ~eading in the field of 
lite~a~y theo~y. Fo~ example, the transactional view of the 
~eading p~ocess as expounded by Rosenblatt (1978) highlights the 
~eade~ as a dynamic ~e-c~eato~ of the text ~athe~ than a me~e 
passive ~eceptacle of messages. Reade~s a~e not detached 
obse~ve~s, acco~ding to this view, but a~e constitutive of 
communication between autho~s and themselves (ibid.). In an 
elabo~ation of the epistemological implications of this app~oach, 
Me~~ell claims that the act of ~eading involves feedback channels 
which allows' an inte~change o~ exchange p~ocess that influences 
the shaping of meaning fo~ the individual ~eade~ (1984: 145; cf 
7. 4) . Me~~ell's p~oposition that the knowledge gained in this 
way is o~iented towa~ds obtaining inc~easingly la~ge~ insights 
into t~uth as distinct f~om the ideal of attaining a state of 
absolute t~uth in a static sense, is one that typifies the 
holistic f~amewo~k within which he postulates these views (cf 
8.4.4 fo~ a fulle~ t~eatment of app~oaches to the concept of 
t~uth). 
The individual use~ of the content of ~eco~ded knowledge is 
also a potential cont~ibuto~ to that content, as one link in what 
may be ~efe~~ed to as "the knowledge cycle" 0~ "the knowledge 
system". This knowledge cycle which encompasses the p~ocesses of 
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·knowledge p~oduction, o~ganization and sto~age, dist~ibution and 
use (Holzne~ & Ma~x, 1979: 13) inte~~elates the use~ and the 
lib~a~y with othe~ b~oade~ social a~~angements and patte~ns as 
components of a la~ge~ f~amewo~k within which an explanation fa~ 
the constarit g~owth of knowledge and the va~iety of pe~ceptions 
of its validity may be sought. 
Holistic pe~spectivism, as an epistemological position in 
lib~a~y and info~mation science, p~ovides a suitable context fa~ 
examining·and pe~haps explaining the acquisition of knowledge by 
the individual use~ and highlights the ~ole of the ~eading 
p~ocess as a valid activity fa~ developing pe~spectives of 
~eality. The application of holistic pe~spectivism may be 
depicted g~aphically as follows (Figu~e 10/component 8 of the 
comp~ehensive model in Figu~e 15): 
USt.R 
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The user as the knowing subject is dynamically linked with 
the content of recorded knowledge as the object of knowledge as 
may be observed by the circular rotation indicated by the arrows. 
This figure reflects the perception of the nature of the reading 
process described above as an example of user/recorded knowledge 
interaction. 
The role of both fiction and non-fiction categories of 
literature in this process is examined in 8.4.3, below. 
8.4.2 The librarian 
The epistemological status of the librarian may be observed 
within the contexts of the roles played in the transmission of 
knowledge on the one hand and in the acquisition of new knowledge 
related to improving professional services on the other, ie as a 
researcher. 
8.4.2.1 As an intermediary in the knowledge-transmission process 
The professional world view of the librarian embodies " a 
combination of ideas, values, prejudices, moral and aesthetic 
principles, and fundamental philosophical assumptions", according 
to Winter (1988: 133). The latter regards such a world view as 
an occupational or professional "ideology". He explains his 
interpretation of "ideology" as follows: 
"While this notion is obviously rooted in a much more 
general concept of ideology, we are looking here at its 
occupational form. When we study occupational or 
professional ideology, we are looking at the 
fundamental outlook that shapes everything else: the 
sense of what is important, what counts as a serious 
problem, what modes of thought dominate discussion, 
what methods of solving problems are approved, and in 
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gener-al how the wor-k should be car-r-ied out" (ibid.: 
134; cf 3.2 for- an inter-pr-etation of "ideology" in an 
educational context). 
Winter-'s per-ception of an occupational or- pr-ofessional ideology 
is per-haps best encapsulated in his own questions: "What does it 
mean to 'think like a libr-ar-ian'? To look at the wor-ld fr-om the 
viewpoint of the libr-ar-ian?" (ibid.: 133). The answer-s to these 
per-tinent questions would contr-ibute to an under-standing of the 
r-ole of the libr-ar-ian in the knowledge-tr-ansmission pr-ocess. 
A pr-ofessional position of neutr-ality is advocated by 
sever-al of the theor-ists whose wr-itings wer-e examined in Chapter-
five (cf for- example De Vleeschauwer--5.3; Wilson-5.17; 
Bekker--5.24; Ber-gen-5.28.8; Olaisen-5.28.9; Kesting-5.28.10). 
This conception of neutr-ality is not per-ceived as a timid 
avoidance of involvement in the many intellectual, mor-a 1 , 
spir-itual, aesthetic, political and other- kinds of debate, but a 
positive, and ultimately even an "ideological" stand in its own 
r-ight based on the commitment of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science 
to the "Alls" r-efer-r-ed to at the end of Chapter- 7. This 
standpoint r-ests upon a mor-e secur-e epistemological position, viz 
holistic per-spectivism, that advocates a par-ticular- pr-ofessional 
attitude emanating fr-om the mode of thought and action which 
typifies libr-ar-ians as individuals and as a pr-ofessional gr-oup. 
This pr-ofessional pr-eoccupation with the whole (ie the 
sever-al "Alls" as highlighted in the quotation fr-om Kesting-7.6) 
implies that libr-ar-ians ar-e not ar-biter-s of either- absolute tr-uth 
or- par-ticular- claims to kinds of tr-uth in the tr-ansmission of 
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knowledge functions that they pe~fo~m. The basic p~ofessiona~ 
commitment is ~athe~ to" ... the flow of all kinds of info~mation 
without ~ega~d to its t~uth o~ falsehood" (Swan, 1986: 46). 
In the systematic collection, making optimally available 
(heu~istics) and p~omotion of use of all kinds of mate~ials- that 
unde~sco~e the unive~sality (and unde~lying dive~gent qualities) 
of ~eco~ded knowledge, the lib~a~ian is not only expected to 
guide o~ to facilitate access but to secu~e the f~eedom and 
spontaneity of access fo~ any o~ all use~s who wish to use 
lib~a~y collections. Swan submits that the lib~a~ian's t~uth is 
one dispensed th~ough the mediation of " ... f~eedom, f~eedom of 
access" (ibid.), a~guing that the knowledge of t~uth and the 
knowledge of unt~uth, like the knowledge of good and evil, a~e 
indissolubly joined and that ou~ cause, p~ofessionally and 
politically, is with both ends of the scale (ibid.: 52; cf 8.4.4 
fo~ a fulle~ discussion of app~oaches to t~uth). The implication 
of , this position in ~espect of systematic collection, fo~ 
to example, is that even the p~esumed "e~~o~s" of mankind ought 
be p~ese~ved in lib~a~y collections fo~ thei~ potential 
cont~ibution to the b~oade~ lea~ning p~ocess. Fu~the~mo~e, 
comp~ehensive, systematic collection acknowledges the possibility 
that what was dead, unknown o~ useless to one gene~ation may 
sudd'enly become impo~tant fo~ the next (K~istelle~, 1983: 113 cf 
also Meije~-5.21). 
In the inte~media~y ~ole that lib~a~ians play in knowledge 
t~ansmission, holistic pe~spectivism implies that they should 
apply methods of collection development and use p~6motion that 
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emphasize inclusiveness, and that they ought to advocate those 
values that advance intellectual freedom both in selection and 
the provision of access to library collections in a corporate 
sense. This implies that the execution of 
functions that involve an ethical dimension, 
those professional 
such as collection 
development for example, require as a basis the postulation of 
given principles. Bekker claims unequivocally that the 
guidelines of occupational conduct for librarians proposed as the 
culmination of an extensive investigation in his doctoral thesis 
had been drawn up in accordance with all the principles 
established in that study (1976: 316). It is suggested here 
that holistic perspectivism may provide a firm principle as a 
foundation for supporting 
librarians. 
a code of 
The intermediary role of the 
professional ethics for 
librarian in the knowledge 
transfer process may be illustrated as follows (Figure 




Although the full value of this figure is diminished if 
·viewed in isolation, the significant features are the indications 
of the qualities of supradoctrinalism or transdogmatism, as well 
as the identification of its interrelatedness with other 
components of the epistemological position. These connections 
---are ----evident- --Via. -the---outgoing __ ar:-J-:-.ows __ Jcf __ Eigure_l5 _:f_oc.tbe 
relative context of this component in the proposed 
epistemological position). 
8.4~2.2 As a re~earcher 
Research in library and information science, according to 
Schrader, of necessity serves to investigate problems of fairly 
different kinds and require different methods of inquiry which in 
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their turn are supported by different epistemologies or "ways of 
knowing" (cf 5.27). Schrader himself regards these divergent 
epistemologies as being equally valid as underpinnings to the 
given research design concerned, urging though that each, when 
applied in a specific area of research in library and information 
science, should be appropriate in context (cf also Bergen's view 
of "anarchic hospitality"-5.28.8 and Olaisen's notion of 
"paradigmatic tolerance"-5.28.9). Moreover, a knowledge of the 
variety of research methodologies may enhance the quality of 
library and information service to users who could employ several 
widely different research techniques in their own searches for 
- knowledge and truth. 
• 
Such pleas for the tolerance of several research approaches 
have not always been heeded, according to Harris (cf 5.26). 
Instead, he claims, many library and information science 
I researchers either implicitly or explicitly espouse methods that - are undergirded by a positivist (logical positivist/logical 
empiricist) epistemology which has been widely applied in the 
natural sciences (cf 7.3-7.4 for a more detailed treatment of 
this epistemology in the natural sciences and the social 
sciences) .. Harris argues that while positivist epistemology is 
uniquely suited to the problems of certain aspects of library and 
information science such as the technical, logistical and 
manager ia 1, it ignores other valuable questions surrounding its 
cultural, political and economic dimensions (1986: 221-2). 
Although Bergen has questioned the validity of Harris' view that 
a positivist epistemology is only suited to technical and 
administrative aspects of library and information science, the 
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influence of the positivist app~oach upon ~esea~ch in this field 
has been well documented (cf fo~ example She~a, 1972; W~ight, 
1978; Busha, 1980; House~, 1982; Odi, 1982; Lynch, 1984). 
A_cco~ding to Be~gen, Ha~~is' own attempt to t~anscend the 
pe~ceived limitations of the positivist epistemological position 
is unfo~tunately equally pa~ochial in its p~oposal of a "Hegelian 
Ma~xist" epistemological position to ~esea~ch in lib~a~y and 
info~mation science ~esea~ch (1987: 74-75). Be~gen advocates 
the application of many epistemologies to (and hence acknowledges 
the suitability of seve~al ~esea~ch methods fo~) studies in 
lib~a~y and info~mation science, because each one sensitizes us 
to diffe~ent aspects of the full p~ofessional ~ole unde~ 
sc~utiny. Fu~the~mo~e, such tole~ance fo~ the adoption of a 
dive~sity of seve~al ~esea~ch methods is manifestly consistent 
with the inclusive and inte~disciplina~y natu~e of this 
p~ofession. 
Holistic pe~spectivism in pa~ticula':" is eminently 
app~op~iate as an epistemological position fo~ guiding the 
conduct of ~esea~ch in lib~a~y and info~mation science because 
its emphasis upon the whole implies an accommodation of the 
~anges of both quantitative and qualitative ~esea~ch methods as 
distinct f~om eithe~/o~ points of depa~tu~e. (House~·s 
insistence, fo~ example, that the choices fo~ ~esea~ch in lib~a~y 
and info~mation science a~e confined to me~e ones of " ... science 
o~ nonscience" amply illust~ates the latte~ conce~n (1982: 
I 
102) ) . Holistic pe~spectivism acknowledges the 
inte~~~lationships of lib~a~y and info~mation science with 
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several fields of study and its role as a mediating profession 
that derives knowledge from a range of disciplinary bases, and 
hence recognizes the value and validity of applying research 
methods from those fields of study to library and information 
science problems. 
Qualitative and quantitative research methods have 
equivalent epistemological status (Mouton, 1985) and may be 
applied hence in appropriate areas of the multi-disciplinary base 
of library and information science. As an epistemological 
foundation for research in library and information science, 
holistic perspectivism suggests an interconnectedness of 
seemingly divergent methods a notion which has become 
increasingly more widely accepted in modern scholarship. Writing 
in the context of library and information science research, 
Grover and Glazier note this trend: 
"The concept of unity or interconnectedness ... is one 
of the basic principles that typify the philosophical 
position of many thinkers today. In this holistic 
perspective, it is impossible to fully comprehend any 
single entity without considering its context or 
environment, taken as a whole, that provides the 
researcher ... the opportunity to better comprehend the 
nature of the subject being studied" (emphasis added; 
1985: 241). 
This observation by Grover and Glazier encapsulates in essence 
the principle of the wholeness-context which should be implicit 
in the diverse approaches to research by several theorists in 
library and information science already referred to above. As 
such the statement is entirely consonant with the position of 
holistic perspectivism. 
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As a researcher, the librarian is hence able to select from 
a wide array of research methods according to its appropriateness 
to the problem at hand. Such an approach is based on the 
philosophical _____ -ii~sumptions of unity, - : -wholeness and 
interconnectedness as qualiti~s of holistic perspectivism that 
acknowledges several "ways of knowing" as parts within a greater 
whole. The two major categories of research method, viz 
qualitative and quantitative, are illustrated below as parts of a 
continuum in which the librarian as researcher may select that 
method that is the ~ost appropriate in context (Figure 
12/component C of the comprehensive model in Figure 15). 
OR ULTIMATE REALITY AS 
BEJN~ H-oLISTIc., 
RESEARCH METHDOS AND APPRoACHES To1Rl1TH 
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This figu~e inco~po~ates the app~oaches to t~uth o~ ultimate 
~eality as discussed in 8.4.4. 
8.4.3 Reco~ded and un~eco~ded knowledge 
Holistic 
unde~standing 
pe~spectivism offe~s a fe~tile f~amewo~k fo~ 
and explaining the epistemological status of 
~eco~ded and un~eco~ded knowledge and of thei~ ongoing 
inte~dependence and inte~action within the context of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science as a knowledge-t~ansmitting p~ofession. 
8.4.3.1 Reco~ded knowledge 
The claim that ~eco~ded knowledge conveys insight and 
unde~standing of ~eality, eg of the exte~nal physical wo~ld and 
the inte~nal subjective self, may be made fo~ both the fiction 
and non-fiction catego~ies of lite~atu~e. 
8.4.3.1.1 Fiction 
The view that fiction conveys knowledge of ~eality has been 
p~opounded fo~cefully in lite~a~y theo~y (cf fo~ example Hi~sch, 
1976; Schick, 1982; Scholes, 1982; Laina~que, 1983; Kunde~a, 
1990). Howeve~, the conceptions of ~eality and t~uth that a~e 
applied to fiction ~equi~e substantial elabo~ation in o~de~ to 
explicate and outline its epistemological status (cf 5.28.11.2 
fo~ the association of fiction with myth and allego~y). 
The cognitive function of fiction has been c~itically 
analyzed in studies of the novel as a lite~a~y fo~m. Scholes, 
fo~ example, a~gues that: 
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"When a writer calls his book Dubliners, and situates 
the fictional names of his characters among the real 
names of his city, he is asking us to use the 'fiction 
not as some pure artifact but as information about the 
way real people behave in a real place ... the real 
context is always present; the fictional one does not 
efface it but brings some aspects of it into a 
particular focus for our scrutiny. All fairy tales 
tell us something about reality" (1982: 33). 
The thrust of this proposition is that fiction as works of the 
imagination can enlarge significantly our experience of real life 
through the depiction of fantastic characters and places in 
unison with ordinary life-like situations. 
In respect of the nature of the conception of reality, 
Bekker ( cf 5.24) has argued that the reality of the work of 
fiction (as "literature of the imagination") is not the empirical 
reality of sense experience (ie external reality) but rather the 
reality of the author's imaginitive inner world (although this 
may itself be subjected in the final instance to a comparison 
with empirical reality). 
Whether such a comparison is necessary as a means of 
determining the degree of correspondence and continuity with 
external reality has been disputed, especially by Marxist 
literary theorists. Lukacs contends, for example, that every 
significant work of fiction creates its own "world" (1978: 35) 
and that this unique "world" is a reflection both on reality as 
well as of reality which is different from and complementary to, 
rather than inferior to, other epistemological categories such as 
philosophy or science (Blake, 1989: 34). It is suggested, 
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accor-dingly, that the novel makes the attempt to r-eveal other-
dimensions of r-eality r-ather- than to confine itself to a 
depiction of its empir-ical conceptions only. 
Mor-eover-, the notion of tr-uth when applied to fiction 
appear-s to r-equir-e a wider- inter-pr-etation than its nar-r-ower-
positivist meaning as a cor-r-espondence with physical r-eality. 
Although ther-e have been fir-m pr-oposals that the status of tr-uth 
in fiction is logically equivalent to that applied mor-e usually 
in the natur-al sciences (cf for- example Bear-dsley, 1966; Olsen, 
1978, & Schick, 1982) ' such a need for- compar-ison with the 
natur-al sciences has not been a str-ong featur-e in the wr-itings of 
I 
liter-ar-y theor-ists gener-ally. Gr-ay, for- example, claims that 
tr-uth in liter-atur-e should not be per-ceived in its ontological 
monistic conception as absolute tr-uth nor- in its ontological 
' 
I plur-alistic conception as extr-eme r-elativism (1975: 532). He 
contends that knowledge gained thr-ough liter-atur-e is not tr-ue in 
the sense of being beyond fur-ther- r-evision but tr-ue in the sense 
of fidelity to an objectively established fr-ame of r-efer-ence 
(ibid.; cf Mer-r-ell's view of the epistemology of wr-itten texts 
for- a similar- inter-pr-etation of tr-uth-7.5 & 8.4.1). 
Fiction encour-ages the br-oadening of tr-aditional ways of 
under-standing and insight, and may lead to the acquisition of 
valid per-spectives beyond the r-ange of those that may be gr-ouped 
with empir-ical modes. Fur-ther-mor-e, it highlights the expr-ession 
of the inter-r-elatedness of individuality with the r-est of 
r-eality. Kunder-a char-acter-izes this holistic quality of fiction 
in the statement: "In the age of the excessive division of 
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labor-, of r-unaway specialization, the novel is one of the last 
outposts wher-e man can still maintain connections with life in 
its entir-ety (emphasis added; 1990: 67) • 
8.4.3.1.2 Non-fiction 
Accor-ding to Bekker-, the tr-uth-quality, or- epistemological 
status, of non-fiction is deter-mined by compar-ing their- claims 
with the r-eality of sense exper-ience, ie empir-ical r-eality (1984: 
17) . 
However-, whether- all the major- tr-aditional non-fictional 
divisions of human knowledge, viz the natur-al sciences, the 
social sciences and the humanities should maintain this appr-oach 
to tr-uth and r-eality has not been established unequivocally. The 






ter-ms of a single per-spective, had itself been 
the natur-al sciences when its most admir-ed 
physics, acknowledged the limitations of mechanistic 
methods (cf 7.4 for- an exposition of this issue). The emer-gence 
of a mor-e holistic outlook in contempor-ar-y physics led to the 
gr-eater- awar-eness of other- dimensions of r-eality and of differ-ent 
conceptions of the inter-r-elationships between (and status of) the 
natur-al sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. 
Bekker- himself ar-gues in a later- ar-ticle for- the per-ception 
of human knowledge as a whole, ie as a continuum of natur-al 
sciences, social sciences and the humanities (1987: 15) - a view 
entir-ely consonant with that of holistic per-spectivism. 
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Holistic perspectivism as a proposed epistemological 
position for library and information science may provide a 
suitable framework for the explanation of these developments and 
hence for an understanding of the epistemological status of 
factual recorded knowledge, ie non-fiction. In this view, there 
are several truth-perspectives that are considered to be parts of 
a larger whole so that the epistemological status of non-fiction 
need not be exclusively based upon its correspondence with 
empirical reality as the sole criterion of a test of validity (cf 
8.4.4 for a fuller treatment of approaches to truth). 
8.4.3.2 Unrecorded knowledge 
In Chapters 5.28.11 and 6.2.4 the equal validity and 
recognition of all modes of knowing, recorded and unrecorded, in 
the context of library and information science were discussed and 
characterized as typical features within a holistic conception of 
human knowledge for this professional discipline. The organic 
coexistence and mutual interdependence of oral and literate 
traditions, and hence of unrecorded and recorded knowledge, are 
evident at the levels of the research scholar in the form of 
"invisible colleges" and at the level of the ordinary person in 
preliterate societies (cf f6r example De Solla Price-5.28.11.1; 
Coomaraswamy-5.28.11.2.1; Benge-5.28.11.2.2). 
Although sound arguments have been proposed in support of 
the claim that libraries are concerned exclusively with recorded 
knowledge 
know 1 edge) , 
(thereby denying its concern with unrecorded 
the·equally cogent arguments for the perception of 
the interrelatedness and unity of human knowledge require that 
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lib~a~ians should acknowledge both thei~ inte~connectedness and 
complementa~ity, and hence a dual acceptance of both catego~ies. 
The notion of complementa~ity implies that although the~e a~e 
distinctively dive~gent epistemological styles that typify o~al 
and lite~ate t~aditions, 
inevitable consequence. 
a supe~io~ity diffe~ential is not an 
Finnegan has a~gued convincingly, fo~ 
example, that it is unjustifiable to assume that since the o~al 
t~adition, whethe~ in p~elite~ate society o~ in p~edominantly 
literate cultu~es, has its own set of p~oblems ~ega~ding t~uth 
and ~eality it is the~efo~e fundamentally diffe~ent in its modes 
of thought than those manifest in ~eco~ded cultu~e (1973: 144). 
Lib~a~ians as inte~media~ies in the knowledge t~ansmission 
p~ocess ought to be awa~e of the inte~~elations between ~eco~ded 
and un~eco~ded knowledge as well as thei~ dynamics of inte~action 
in the g~owth of human knowledge both in a collective sense and 
as the development of valid pe~spectives as they a~e held by 
individuals. The ~easons fo~ this a~e: (a) the knowledge cycle 
encompasses, fo~ example, both the "invisible college" and the 
content of ~eco~ded knowledge as essential components ('cf 8.4.1 
fo~ the individual use~ as anothe~ component of this cycle), and 
(b) an awa~eness of the b~oade~ contexts of the dynamics of 
knowledge will imp~ove the quality of se~vice to use~s. Holistic 
pe~spectivism implies 
knowledqe-t~ansmitting 
that lib~a~y and info~mation science as a 
p~ofession is committed 
communication of all human knowledge ~ega~dless of mode, 




The unity of all modes of thought as ref+ected collectively 
in both fiction and non-fiction is depicted in Figure 13. This 
graphic model is a further adaptation of Kesting's conception of 
the structure of human knowledge (cf Figure 5) which, in its 
turn, reflects the influence of Jung's schema of the four 
cardinal functions of consciousness (cf 7.4) and Royce's model of 
the basic paths to knowledge (cf Figures 1 & 3). In the 
comprehensive model in Figure 15 (Component D) ' the 
interconnectedness of these modes of thought is manifested 
through the use of the circle as a continuum that encompasses all 
the individual modes of thought as parts of a whole. The Kesting 
model has simply been rearranged in a more symmetrical manner to: 
(a) indicate the prominence in society of the rational and 
empirical modes of knowing (cf Chapter 2), and (b) to highlight 
the interrelatedness of, 
major modes of 
perspectivism. 
knowing 
and the need to integrate, 
as a requirement of 
all the 
holistic 
8.4.4 Approaches to truth or ultimate reality in library and 
information science 
In Chapter 6.3 the notions of truth and ultimate reality as 
inferred from the writings of theorists 
information science appear to lack consensus. 
in library and 
Figure 8 reflects 
this divergence of opinion. Irrespective of such differentiation 
in viewpoint, the notions of truth and ultimate reality are 
central to an epistemological position and need to be articulated 
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By themselves, the traditional theories of truth, ie, the 
correspondence theory and the coherence theory, are incomplete 
and inadequate in the context of library and informat~on science. 
The correspondence theory of truth locates truth in the relation 
between ideas and the material world apart from them (Sayers, 
1985: 178). This quality of truth is construed in logical 
positivism as the correspondence between a statement and an 
empirical fact (Snyman, 1987: 245). The limitations of logical 
positivism and the inadequacy of this theory of truth have been 
acknowledged widely (cf 7.4 & 7.5). The coherence theory of 
truth locates truth not in the relationship between ideas and 
objects independent of them, but rather in the logical relations 
of ideas as a whole which guarantees their truth. The validity 
of mathematical statements, for example, is determined by the 
coherence theory of truth because their rational consistency with 
a specific system of mathematics is sufficient to establish it. 
According to Sayers this theory is inadequate because it makes 
truth a purely internal property of ideas with no reference to 
external reality (1985: 178). 
A more useful approach appears to be the perception of the 
correspondence and coherence theories of truth as moments within 
a larger whole that may als~ encompass other theories. In this 
way, truth and ultimate reality are viewed as being associated 
with the notions of unity and wholeness rather than with any 
individual theory. Instead of absolute truth, a range or spectrum 
(multiversum) of truth perspectives is accommodated in holistic 
perspectivism. These truth-perspectives are continually changing 
in an ongoing, dynamic quest that stimulates philosophical 
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accor-ding to Rauche (1985: 263). This pr-oposition ar-gument, 
excludes the possibility of absolut~ knowledge, total knowledge 
or- absolute tr-uth, 
inter-r-elation of 
and affir-ms, as Br-adley has ar-gued, the 
the notions of unity and wholeness with tr-uth 
and r-eality, 
of r-evealing 
which in its tur-n holds out the distinct potential 
lar-ger- por-tions of the tr-uth as aspects within the 
whole (1893: 72, 77; cf Br-adley's quotation-6.3.4). 
On a pr-actical, per-sonal level holistic per-spectivism 
implies that tr-uth is always "tr-uth for- someone", ie a valid 
per-spective held by some or- other- individual per-son. Holzner- ~nd 
Mar-x have pr-oposed a. view that is consistent with this appr-oach. 
They suggest the application of so-called "tr-uth tests" or-
"r-eality tests" which ar-e ways of validating descr-iptions and ar-e 
always situated within given fr-ames of r-efer-ence, or- embedded 
within specific contexts. Holzner- and Mar-x distinguish 
empir-ical, pr-agmatic, author-itative, r-a tiona 1, consensual , 
magical and mystical tr-uth or- r-eality tests (1979: 106). Any 
additional dimensions of r-eality manifestations with their- own 
ac know 1 e·dged, scholar-ly sanctioned methodologies and tr-uth 
cr-iter-ia that may be included in this list ar-e to be viewed in 
consequence as par-ts of the lar-ger- whole, ie, as ways of 
descr-ibing the sever-al aspects of ultimate r-eality conceived as a 
multidimensional, dynamic unity. 
In the context of libr-ar-y and infor-mation science, this 
appr-oach to tr-uth and ultimate r-eality may be applied to sever-al 
ar-eas. For- example, as inter-mediar-ies in the knowledge-
tr-ansmission pr-ocess, libr-ar-ians cor-por-ately pr-omote the 
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systematic collection of all ~eco~ded knowledge in the belief 
that t~uth fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science is necessa~ily 
holistic and ~equi~es inclusivist ~athe~ than exclusivist 
app~oaches to collection-development and use-p~omotion (cf 8.4.3 
above). Fu~the~mo~e, at the level of the individual use~, t~uth 
is the ~esult of the validation of a pe~spective within a given 
f~ame of ~efe~ence (cf 8.4.1 above). As a ~esea~che~, the 
lib~a~ian may apply quantitative o~ qualitative methodologies as 
they a~e ~equi~ed, with the confidence that each methodology - as 
long as it is inte~nally consistent is suppo~ted by an 
epistemology o~ "way of knowing" that is ~ega~ded as a valid (and 
hence pe~spectivistically t~ue) pe~spective within an objectively 
established f~ame of ~efe~ence. Mo~eove~, an unde~standing of 
the ~ange of available ~esea~ch methodologies 
apply will 
lib~a~ian. 
imp~ove the quality of 
The accommodation of seve~al 
se~vice 
conceptions 
that use~s may 
~ende~ed by the 
to ~eality, 
including the ove~lapping of such conceptions, has been discussed 
by Nitecki in the context of lib~a~y and info~mation science. He 
distinguishes between empi~ical and fictional concepts of ~eality 
which may, in thei~ tu~n, be inte~p~eted ~espectively in 
objective o~ subjective t~~ms (1979: 30) . He submits that the 
" juxtaposition between the empi~ical and fictional concepts 
of ~eality with thei~ objective and subjective inte~p~etations 
may emphasize eithe~ the simila~ities o~ diffe~ences between the 
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These app~oaches to ~eality a~e consistent with Nitecki's 
open-ended epistemology fo~ lib~a~y and info~mation science in 
which knowledge is constantly g~owing th~ough the abso~ption of 
new ~elationships with ~eality (cf 5.14 fo~ mo~e detail on 
Nitecki's ideas). 
This conception of t~uth o~ ultimate ~eality is a key 
featu~e of holistic pe~spectivism as an epistemological position 
fa~ lib~a~y and info~mation science and is ~echoed in the 
following quotation: 
"In t~ying to unde~stand the myste~y of life, man has 
followed many diffe~ent app~oaches. Among them, the~e 
a~e the ways of the scientist and mystic, but the~e a~e 
many mo~e: the ways of poets, child~en, clowns, 
shamans, to name but a few. These ways have ~esulted 
in diffe~ent desc~iptions of the wo~ld, both ve~bal and 
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non-verbal, which emphasize different aspects. All are 
valid and useful in the context in which they arose. 
All of them, however, are only descriptions, or 
representations, of reality and are therefore limited. 
None can give a complete picture of the world" (Capra, 
1981: 321). 
The different approaches referred to in the quotation above lead 
to different descriptions or representations of reality and 
correspond with the conception of perspectives as it is 
understood in holistic perspectivism. Furthe~more, no single 
perspective can provide a complete picture of ultimate reality or 
absolute truth, but each one remains a valid viewpoint as a 
partial perception of, and an opportunity to discover, larger 
portions of truth or ultimate reality, ie as an evolving, dynamic 
whole. 
The holistic conception of truth is graphically illustrated 
in conjunction with the conception of the librarian as a 
researcher in Figure 12/component C of the comprehensive model in 
Figure 15. 
In this figure it is evident that no single theory of truth, 
and hence also no given research method, takes precedence over 
another, and that each is part of the larger encompassing whole. 
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8.5 Gr-aphic r-epr-esentation of a model of holistic per-spectivism 
as an epistemological position for- libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
science 
When the major- components, as noted above, ar-e br-ought 
together- in an attempt to pr-ovide a compr-ehensive over-view of 
holistic 
science, 
per-spectivism in the context of libr-ar-y and infor-mation 
the following gr-aphically illustr-ated theor-etical model 
emer-ges (See Figur-e 15). 
8.5.1 Explanation of the model 
The theor-etical model in Figur-e 15 is a composite of: (a) 
per-sonally conceived, and (b) consensually sanctioned models that 
pr-ovide a unique synthesis which attempts to depict the 
epistemological position of holistic per-spectivism in libr-ar-y and 
infor-mation 
or-iginal. 
science. The final synthesis (Figur-e 15) 
The essential holistic qualities of constant motion 




component cir-cle on its own axis and the inter-r-elatedness of each 
with the other-s. The symbol of a r-otating cir-cle conveys the 
notions of wholeness and dynamism as significant featur-es of 
holistic per-spectivism. The four- components of the compr-ehensive 
model, in tur-n, collectively constitute a spher-ical fr-amewor-k, 
suggesting an inter-connectedness and continuous movement of the 
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The shape of this framework and its quaternity of components 
are influenced by the symbol of the circle and the mandala as a 
basic form representing the /idea of wholeness (cf Jung's 
application-7.4). In this way, the entire model is perceived as 
an open-ended spiral which espouses the hypothesis of infinite 
potentiality in the growth of human knowledge as an integral and 
critical epistemological feature (cf 8.4.3). This growth may be 
explained as the result of a dialectical interaction between 
postulated opposites or conflicting tensions that may appear 
within each component. The perspectives that emanate from this 
interaction reveal a human or anthropological dimension in the 
process of the acquisition and validation of human knowledge both 
by individual users and librarians themselves (cf 8.4.1 & 8.4.2). 
The component identifying the librarian as an intermediary 
in the knowledge transfer process (A) is located between the 
components that characterize recorded knowledge (D) and the 
individual user (B) • Component D identifies most of the major 
epistemological styles that are reflected in the entire compass 
of recorded human knowledge, ie both fiction and non-fiction. In 
his/her intermediary role, the individual librarian endeavours to 
represent, through systematic collection-development, as many of 
these modes of thought as may be possible. In a corporate sense, 
and through programmes of cooperation and networks, all the major 
modes of thought as perspectives of truth should be reflected in 
the collective holdings of libraries, in accordance with the 
holistic perspectivist principle. Each individual user who 
avails himself/herself of the services of a library would be in 
a position to acquire knowledge perspectives in the process of 
484 
individual cognitive development. These perspectives may be 
tested for their validity in a number of ways (cf 8.4.4), as 
suggested in the dynamics of Component C. The acquisition of 
knowledge emerges from a dynamic interaction between the user 
knowledge (Component 8) and the content of recorded human 
(Component D) within an objectively established framework, ie 
valid knowledge is produced as a result of the application of a 
set of criteria that is considered to be relevant to that 
context. 
As a researcher, the librarian should also be aware of the 
several distinctive sets of epistemological assumptions that 
underpin the design of given research methods. Component C 
highlights the need for this awareness. A wider range of 
selection of potentially useful research methods are made 
available to the librarian (viz quantitative and qualitative 
methods) as a necessary feature of holistic perspectivism. 
Each component is interconnected with the other. In this 
way, for example, individual users (Component 8) may also apply 
one of a range of research methods and subscribe to different 
notions of truth, which the librarian needs to acknowledge in 
order to render optimal service. The librarian himself or 
herself 
between 
(Component A), although essentially an intermediary 
recorded knowledge and the individual user, is also 
linked with the research method and truth continua (Component C). 
The individual user (Component 8) is linked with recorded 
knowledge (Component D) in a more direct manner not only without 
possible mediation by the librarian, but also as a potential 
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contr-ibutor- to its gr-owth (cf the knowledge cycle-8.4.1). 
the link between the libr-ar-ian (Component A) and Finally, 
r-ecor-ded knowledge (Component D) implies also that he or- she is 
both a user- of and potential pr-oducer- to the gr-owth of 
human knowledge. 
r-ecor-ded 
Holistic per-spectivism maintains the view that the validity 
of knowledge is fir-mly based upon the pr-oposition that the 
inter-r-elation of the knower- (as the subject of knowledge) and the 
object of knowledge accounts for- the gener-ation of per-spectives 
that can be justified, and hence author-itatively maintained, 
within specified domains of application as par-ts of a lar-ger-
whole. It is pr-opounded in this thesis that such a view, viz 
that knowledge per-spectives may be appr-opr-iate in some contexts 
and inappr-opr-iate in other-s, is suitable for- pr-ofessional 
libr-ar-ians both as inter-mediar-ies in the knowledge-tr-ansfer- and 
as r-esear-cher-s. 
As a pr-oposed epistemological position, holistic 
per-spectivism may offer- a theor-etical foundation or- context for-
under-standing and explaining many of the pr-actical aspects of 
libr-ar-y and infor-mation wor-k, ther-eby contr-ibuting to a 
r-esolution of the pr-oblem of discontinuities in the 
theor-y-pr-actice r-elationship in libr-a~y and infor-mation science. 
An awar-eness of the influence of given philosophical assumptions 
upon modes of pr-ofessional pr-actice is acknowledged in many 
pr-ofession~l disciplines (cf 3.3, 3.4 & 3.5). The pr-oposal of 
this epistemological position aims at integr-ating theor-y and 
pr-actice in this pr-ofession as a necessar-y impr-ovement to the 
486 
well-documented long-standing predominance of its practical 
orient~tion coupled with a striking indifference to theory 
for example, a confirmation of this in several of 
( c f' 
the 
contributions in Chapter 5, beginning with the concerns expressed 
by Butler in 1933). 
This model advocates neither an · "anything goes" nor an 
"everything goes" approach to truth in the context of library and 
information science. It supplies the basis for a comprehensive 
structure that accommodates several approaches to truth that 
derive their criteria for validation from objectively established 
frames of reference (cf 8.4.4); and the suitability of such a 
basis is inferred inductively from a thorough analysis of the 
writings of library and information science theorists as well as 
the considered perception of the essentially holistic character 
of this profession (cf Chapters 6 & 7 for fuller discussions of 
these claims). 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to synthesize the 
inductively-inferred conclusions of theorists in library and 
information science as a basis on which to construct a model for 
a suitable epistemological position for this profession. This 
epistemological position is described as holistic perspectivism 
and appears to satisfy the postulated criteria. Holistic 
perspectivism is applied to certain areas of library and 
information science in order to explicate the philosophical 
assumptions that underpin the activities and professional outlook 
of librarians in these areas. 
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The theo~etical model is g~aphically illust~ated as a 
composite of othe~ pe~sonal and consensually sanctioned models, 
and its essential featu~es a~e cha~acte~ized as pa~ticula~ly 
suited to the pe~ceived holistic natu~e of lib~a~y and 
info~mation science. 
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9 Conclusions and recommendations 
This study has provided sufficient evidence in response to 
the informal assumptions that are articulated as the major points 
of departure in Chapter 1. 
(a) First, it has been demonstrated that a significant 
feature of professional development is the identification 
of the major epistemological positions that guide and 
influence modes of professional practice, 
selection of suitable research techniques. 
as well as the 
The professions 
examined in this investigation have included medicine (cf 
3. 3) ' education (cf 3.4), 
(including mass communication) 
and communication 
(cf 3. 5) ' with 
theory 
brief 
references to the professions of social work and law (cf 
3. 1) ; 
(b) Second, no cohesive statement on epistemological 
positions in library and information science have been 
traced in the literature. The references to 
epistemology-related issues in library and information 
science reflect little consensus. This differentiation in 
viewpoint has been highlighted in the form of typologies 
analyzed in Chapters 6 & 7 (cf also Figures 6-9); 
(c) Third, despite the characteristic feature of divergent 
perceptions in the examined theoretical writings, certain 
criteria for establishing and evaluating an appropriate 
epistemological position for library and information science 
were generated from presumed continuities and commonalities 
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/ 
in the seminal ideas of these exponents. The intellectual 
these ideas was tradition, viz holism, that underlies 
identified and traced from its early philosophical origins 
to its more recent disciplinary applications. In this way a 
general framework was established as a context within which 
to articulate the criteria for an appropriate 
epistemological position for library and information science 
(cf 7.8.1-7.8.3); 
(d) Fourth, the analysis of the views of the library and 
information science theorists suggested an 
epistemological position called 
has 
holistic perspectivism. 
This epistemological position satisfies the postulated 
criteria and was inductively supported by the majority of 
exponents (cf Figure 9 & Chapter 8.3); and 
(e) Fifth, the application of this epistemological position 
in given areas of library and information work has 
contributed to an enhanced understanding of, for example, 
the user's range of possibilities in the acquisition of 
the critical role of the librarian as knowledge; 
intermediary in the knowledge-transfer process; the 
librarian's intellectual outlook as a professional, a 
researcher, and an awareness of the range of research 
methods adopted by users; and, conceptions of knowledge and 
truth or ultimate reality in the context of library and 
information science (cf 8.4.1-8.4.4). 
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Kaplan contends that "An adequate theory of knowledge must 
be comprehensive enough to do justice to the whole range of 
cognitive experience art and religion, in myth and 
mysticism, as well as 
in 
in science" (1962: 150-1). Holistic 
perspectivism proposes such a theory of knowledge for library and 
information science. 
This epistemological position accounts both for the 
development of knowledge perspectives by individuals as users 
(and hence also accounts to some degree for the growth of human 
knowledge in genera 1) as well as the development of knowledge 
perspectives by librarians as researchers (and hence also 
accounts to some degree for the growth of library and information 
science as a discipline). It is an explicit statement of the 
philosophical assumptions that underlie the mode of knowing that 
typifies the professional librarian and characterizes the content 
of the librarian's world view. As a mode of thought, holistic 
perspectivism influences the professional life of the librarian 
in all its facets. The specific implications and applications of 
this theory of knowledge may be explored in other major empirical 
investigations that will test the appropriateness of this 
epistemological position. 
This theoretical analysis of the views of several 
philosophically-inclined thinkers in library and information 
science and those concerned about the process of 
knowledge-transmission suggest the suitability of an open-ended 
theory of knowledge that affirms the continuous growth of human 
knowledge in its recorded dimension as well as the dynamic 
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• 
interdependence of this dimension with unrecorded knowledge as a 
key element in such growth. The perceived holistic character of 
the discipline of library and information science requires that 
it maintain a view of truth or ultimate reality that is consonant 
with that character. Such a view has been described as holistic 
perspectivism in this thesis. It advocates an open-ended theory 
of knowledge in which each stage in the development of knowledge 
is justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its 
origin, ie it is true and correct relative to a particular stage 
of development, but is always open to further improvement. 
Bradley asserts his contention in this regard: 
II the foundation in truth is provisional merely. In 
order to begin my construction I take the foundation as 
absolute so much certainly is true. But that my 
construction continues to rest on the beginnings of my 
knowledge is a conclusion which does not follow. It 
does not follow that, if these are allowed to be 
fallible, the whole building collapses ... A foundation 
used at the beginning does not in short mean something 
fundamental at the end, and there is no single 'fact' 
which in the end can be called fundamental absolutely" 
(1914: 210). 
The above-mentioned feature of provisionality and capacity for 
eternal growth in the apprehension of truth by man - as outlined 
in Bradley is a significant one in holistic perspectivism and 
its implications may be applied in several areas of library and 
information science (see 8.4.1-8.4.4). 
Holistic perspectivism as a proposed epistemological 
position needs to be examin~d and tested empirically in order to 
discover the suitability thereof in explaining aspects of library 
and information work and of justifying the selection of given 
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research methodologies for investigating problems in this field 
of study. It is recommended that such empirical testing should 
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